Dorrell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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KAMARLEY DORRELL, et anno.,

Plaintiffs, REPORT AND

-against- RECOMMENDATION

23-CV-8471 (GRB)(SIL)

NASSAU COUNTY et al.,

Defendants.

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STEVEN I. LOCKE, United States Magistrate Judge:

Presently before the Court in this civil rights action arising under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (“Section 1983”), on referral from the Honorable Gary R. Brown for Report and

Recommendation, are: (1) Plaintiffs Kamarley Dorrell’s (“Dorrell”) and Nagie Nadal’s

(“Nadal”) (together “Plaintiffs”) motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Fed. R. Civ. P”); (2) Defendant All County

Towing & Autobody Inc.’s (“ACT”) cross-motion for summary judgment; and (3)

Plaintiffs’ two motions to suppress exhibits J, K, and L submitted in support of ACT’s

motion. See Docket Entry (“DE”s) [71], [74], [75]-[78]. ACT seeks to dismiss the

claims as to it concerning alleged violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth

Amendment rights. See generally ACT’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (“ACT Mot.”) DE [71]. Defendant Nassau County (the

“County”) and the Nassau County Police Department (“NCPD”), (together with ACT,

“Defendants”) did not file an opposition to Plaintiffs’ motion or move for summary

judgment. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court respectfully recommends that

Plaintiffs’ motions be denied in their entirety and that ACT’s motion be granted, and

that ACT be dismissed from the case.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs’ pleadings and motion papers are extremely difficult to follow.

Accordingly, the Court reviewed pleadings outside of the motion papers to discern the

facts, including the Complaint, see DE [1], and Plaintiffs’ premotion submissions, see

(“Pl. 56.1”), DE [56], and preliminary statement in their motion for summary

judgment, see (“Pl. Mot.”), DE [74], ACT’s cross-motion for summary judgment, see

ACT Mot., DE [71], and the admissible facts cited and relied upon therein.1 Unless

otherwise noted, these facts are not in dispute.

1. The Parties

Dorrell and Nadal consider each other as spouses. See Dorrell’s Deposition

Transcript, (“Dorrell’s Tr.”), DE [71-11], 70. The County is a local municipal entity

which operates its own police department. See, e.g., Nunez v. Vill. of Rockville Ctr.,

18-CV-4249(DRH)(SIL), 2022 WL 523753, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2022) (accepting

undisputed fact that Nassau County is municipality with its own police department).

ACT is a corporation with its principal place of business in Freeport, New York, and

has a contract with Nassau County to provide towing services and storage facilities

for the NCPD. See ACT’s 56.1 Statement, (“ACT 56.1”), DE [71-13] ¶ 2.

1 Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se and used a form to file their Complaint without paragraph numbers

and their statement of facts is “Attachment 2,” titled “Explanatory Statement.” Accordingly, citations

to the Complaint are to the page numbers Plaintiffs used for Attachment 2.

2. The Incident at Issue

This case turns on the impoundment of a moped co-owned by Plaintiffs. See

Compl. at 1; Memorandum of Law in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary

Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (“ACT Mem. Law”), DE [71-14] at 1. On

August 28, 2023, between 9:00 pm and 10:00 pm NCPD Officers Christopher Costello

(“Costello”) and James Cocozzo (“Cocozzo,” together the “Officers”) trailed behind

Dorrell in their patrol vehicle for approximately five minutes as he drove the moped

on Nassau Expressway and Burnside Avenue in Inwood, Nassau County. See Pl. Mot.

at 1; ACT 56.1 ¶3. The Officers stopped Dorrell because he was not wearing a helmet,

lacked safety equipment for his eyes, traveled below the designated speed limit, and

there was no visible license plate on the moped. See Deposition Transcript of Officer

Cocozzo, Ex. F., (“Cocozzo’s Tr.”) DE [74-1], 78-79. Upon initiating the stop, Costello

asked Dorrell if he had a license, as well as registration, and insurance for the moped.

Id. at 22. Dorrell responded that he did not. Id. The Officers then confiscated the

key to the moped, after which Dorrell provided his passport card. Id. at 22-23. Then,

the Officers input Dorrell’s information into the New York Statewide Police

Information Network, commonly referred to as NYSPIN, and determined that his

license was suspended. Id. at 68-69. During the stop, Costello looked inside of

Dorrell’s bookbag for safety purposes because Plaintiff Dorrell had reached into it.

See Deposition Transcript of Officer Costello, Ex. F., (“Costello’s Tr.”), DE [74-1], 38.

Dorrell was threatened with arrest and Officer Cocozzo issued him ten tickets which

Plaintiffs assert are fraudulent.2 Pl. Mot. at 1.

Ultimately, the Officers impounded Plaintiffs’ moped due to its unregistered,

uninsured, and uninspected status as well as Dorell’s suspended license. See

Cocozzo’s Tr. at 70. The moped’s status also resulted in the Officers’ uncertainty as

to whether Dorrell was the proper owner. Id. at 70-71. ACT was directed by the

Officers to tow and hold the moped, which it did. See ACT 56.1 ¶ 6; Impound

Worksheet, DE [71-7]. As a result of his interactions with the Officers, Dorrell felt

that he had been “racially profiled due to the fact that [he] was laughed at, spoken to

aggressively, [and] searched without prior consent.” Compl. at 7.

B. Procedural Background

By way of Complaint dated November 14, 2023, Plaintiffs commenced this

litigation in which they assert four primary causes of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983 (“Section 1983”): (i) unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth

Amendment; (ii) deprivation of property by unreasonable seizure without due process

in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (iii) deprivation of property by unreasonable

seizure without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (iv) a

2 Dorrell received tickets for the following infractions: (i) driving below the minimum posted speed

limit in violation of New York State Vehicle and Traffic Law (“NYS VTL”) § 1181B; (ii) unlicensed

operator in violation of in violation of NYS VTL § 5091; (iii) unapproved/no face shield in violation of

NYS VTL § 3817; (iv) unapproved/no protective helmet in violation of NYS VTL § 3816; (v) uninspected

motor vehicle in violation of NYS VTL § 306B; (vi) aggravated unlicensed operation in violation of NYS

VTL § 5111A; (vii) uninsured ATV in violation of NYS VTL § 22653; (viii) operating out of class in

violation of NYS VTL § 5092; (ix) unregistered motorcycle in violation of NYS VTL § 4101; and (x)

unregistered limited use vehicle in violation of NYS VTL § 22611. See ACT 56.1 ¶ 4; Traffic Tickets,

Ex. C, DE [71-4].

violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. See generally Compl.? On December 20,

2023, the County and NCPD filed an amended motion to dismiss for failure to state

a claim which was marked withdrawn by the district judge and construed as a

premotion conference request. See DE [4],[5]; December 21, 2023, Order. ACT

answered the Complaint on February 5, 2024. See DE [14]. The NCPD and the

County answered on March 1, 2024. See DE [24]. After the exchange of discovery,

the parties initiated summary judgment motion practice on October 9, 2024, see DEs

[56]-[60], [62] and were directed by the Court to file fully briefed motions by May 12,

2025, which Plaintiffs and ACT did. See DEs [71]-[73], [74]; February 25, 2025,

Order.

Il LEGAL STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, a “court shall grant summary judgment if the

movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding a motion

for summary judgment, the Court “is not to weigh the evidence but is instead required

to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary

judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew

3 Plaintiffs’ claims are unclear. In addition to invoking their civil rights they allege violations of a

variety of other statutes, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 35; 5 U.S.C. § 552; 26 U.S.C. § 7206; and NYS VTL § 511-b.

See Compl. at 2-6. The Court interprets these alleged statutory violations as supporting Plaintiffs’

civil rights claims rather than as separate causes of action. See Pl. 56.1 § 20 “[The County] has been

proven to commit 4b, and 13 Amendment violations against both plaintiffs.”).

4 Although the NCPD and the County did not file an opposition or cross motion to Plaintiffs’ motion

for summary judgment, they filed a letter motion for summary judgment requesting a premotion

conference which this Court denied. See DE [59]; February 25, 2025, Order.

credibility assessments.” Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113, 122 (2d

Cir. 2004); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505,

2510 (1986) (holding that a motion for summary judgment should be denied if “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving

party”). In determining whether summary judgment is warranted, “the court’s

responsibility is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess whether there are

any factual issues to be tried, while resolving ambiguities and drawing reasonable

inferences against the moving party.” Knight v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 804 F.2d 9, 11 (2d

Cir. 1986); see Maxton v. Underwriter Labs., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 534, 542 (E.D.N.Y.

2014) (“An issue of fact is considered ‘genuine’ when a reasonable finder of fact could

render a verdict in favor of the non-moving party”); Artis v. Valls, No. 10-CV-

427(GTS)(TWD), 2012 WL 4380921, at *6 n.10 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2012) (“It is well

established that issues of credibility are almost never to be resolved by a court on a

motion for summary judgment.”).

III. DISCUSSION5

A. Summary Judgment Motions

The Court first addresses the parties’ motions for summary judgment,

Plaintiffs’ as to the County and NCPD on the one hand, and ACT’s as to Plaintiffs on

5 It appears from the docket that ACT did not serve Plaintiffs with the Notice to Pro Se Litigant Who

Opposes a Summary Judgment pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.2. The purpose of the notice is to

ensure that a pro se party understands the burdens when opposing a motion for summary judgment,

including submitting evidence. See, e.g., White v. Roosevelt Union Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. 15-CV-

1035(JS)(JMW), 2023 WL 4420117, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. July 10, 2023); see also Vital v. Interfaith Med.

Ctr., 168 F.3d 615, 620-21 (2d Cir. 1999) (setting forth the standard). This failure is grounds for

denying a motion unless the Court can discern from the record that the pro se litigant understood his

obligations on summary judgment. White, 2023 WL 4420117, at *1. Here, it is clear from the record

the other. Because the legal standards are the same as to each motion, the motions

are treated together.

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although Section 1983 itself does not create substantive rights, it

does provide “a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established

elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993). To prevail on a claim

arising under Section 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1) the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and its laws; (2) by a

person acting under the color of state law.” Hawkins v. Nassau Cnty. Corr. Facility,

781 F. Supp. 2d 107, 111 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see Dubin v. Cnty.

of Nassau, 277 F. Supp. 3d 366, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) (quoting Cornejo v. Bell, 592

F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010)).

Relevant to ACT’s motion, Section 1983 pleadings must allege that the

Plaintiffs were injured by a state actor or a private party acting under color of state

law. See Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002). For liability

the Plaintiffs understood their summary judgment obligations. In fact, they filed their own motion for

summary judgment with exhibits attached, along with a statement of uncontested facts pursuant to

Local Civil Rule 56.1. Accordingly, the Court recommends that ACT’s motion for summary judgment

be addressed on the merits.

to attach to a private party depends on whether that party exercises “power possessed

by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with

the authority of state law.” Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 755-56 (2d Cir. 2000).

1. Fourth Amendment Claim

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

Gem Fin. Serv., Inc. v. City of New York, 298 F. Supp. 3d 464, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)

(citing U.S. Const. amend. IV); see Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 68, 113 S. Ct.

538, 547 (1992) (observing that the Fourth Amendment protects against any

government interference with personal property, even if a police officer has merely

found that property in public). “A seizure occurs when the Government interferes in

some meaningful way with the individual’s possession of property.” United States v.

Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted); see United States v.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984) (“A ‘seizure’ of property

occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory

interests in that property.”). As a result, warrantless seizures of personal property

are unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and are therefore

invalid, unless an exception to the warrant requirement applies. United States v.

Cosme, 796 F.3d 226, 235 (2d Cir. 2015). Exceptions to the warrant requirement

include, inter alia: (i) whether the property is contraband, evidence of a crime, or

otherwise subject to forfeiture; or (ii) other exigent circumstances, such as a danger

to society. See Harrell v. City of New York, 138 F. Supp. 3d 479, 490-91 (S.D.N-Y.

2015).

There is also an exception to the warrant requirement for “what the Supreme

Court has called community caretaking functions.” VW Credit Leasing LTD. v.

Runway Towing Corp., 757 F. Supp. 3d 271, 284-85 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (quoting Barnes

v. City of New York, No. 13-CV-7283 (GBD)(JLC), 2015 WL 4076007, at *7 (S.D.N-Y.

July 2, 2015)). This exception provides that, even without a warrant, police officers

may “seize and remove from the streets automobiles in the interests of public safety

and as part of their community caretaking functions—an authority that is beyond

reasonable challenge.” United States v. Lyle, 919 F.3d 716, 728 (2d Cir. 2019).

“(U]nder this community caretaking exception .. . , police officers may exercise their

discretion in deciding whether to impound a vehicle,” and “whether a decision to

impound is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is based on all the facts and

circumstances of a given case.” Jd. at 731 (internal quotation omitted); see South

Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3907 (1976) (observing that

the Supreme Court has long recognized that police may impound vehicles “[i]n the

interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called ‘community

caretaking functions”) (quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S. Ct.

2523, 2528 (1973)); Vasquez v. Yadali, No. 16-CV-895(NSR), 2020 WL 1082786, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2020) (“[I]t is reasonable for police officers to impound [a] vehicle

under [] community care functions where, among other things, the vehicle would

otherwise . . . threaten public safety.”).

Moreover, even where the government validly seizes property, it has an

“ultimate obligation to return it” if the property is not contraband. City of W. Covina

v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240, 119 8. Ct. 678, 681 (1999); Gomez-Arboleda v. United

States, No. 93 Civ. 4757(JFK), 1993 WL 512838, at *2 (S.D.N-Y. Dec. 9, 1993) (“[I]t is

the general practice of the Government to return seized property, other than

contraband ...”). Asa result, “[iJfthe government... cannot establish probable cause

for the initial seizure or offer post-seizure evidence to justify continued impoundment,

retention of the seized property runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment.” Krimstock v.

Kelly, 306 F.3d 40, 50 (2d Cir. 2002); Santander Consumer USA, Inc. v. Cnty. of

Suffolk, No. 20-CV-2656(JS)(AKT), 2021 WL 4480574, at *11 (E.D.N-Y. Sep. 30,

2021).

Examples of lawful impoundment of a vehicle include: (1) where a driver is

operating a vehicle with a suspended license to avoid leaving the vehicle unattended

for an unknown amount of time, King v. Creed, No. 14-CV-165(LEK)(TWD), 2017 WL

6389708, at *3 (N.D.N-Y. Dec. 18, 2017); see United States v. Colon, No. 10 Cr.

498(RPP), 2011 WL 569874, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 8, 2011), and (2) where an

automobile “violate[s] parking ordinances and . . . thereby jeopardize[s] both the

public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.” Bowser v. City of New

York, No. 23-CV-6183(DG)(VMS8), 2025 WL 1707174, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2025).

Where, as here, “the driver’s violation of a vehicle regulation prevents the

driver from lawfully operating the vehicle,” and “it is necessary to remove the vehicle

from a[ ] public location,” “impoundment may be proper under the community

10

caretaking doctrine.” VW Credit Leasing LTD., 757 F. Supp. 3d at 285 (quoting

Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 865 (9th Cir. 2005)); United States v.

Fabian, No. 16-CR-131(DLD, 2019 WL 3578226, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2019)

(“[W]hether or not [the vehicle] was parked legally is irrelevant as the community

caretaking function still applies. As noted above, the Jeep did not have proper plates

.... It was appropriate to impound [the vehicles] following Defendant’s arrest and

not leave them on the street for an indefinite period, as a reasonable exercise of law

enforcement’s ‘community caretaking’ responsibilities.”). Similarly, “a car that is

legally parked in a public place, such as a street or parking lot, but that will be

inaccessible to its owner for an extended period — as a result of an arrest, for example

— may also be impounded in order to safeguard the vehicle if such a step is reasonable

under the circumstances.” United States v. Barrios, No. 07 Cr. 658 (DLC), 2007 WL

3256945, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2007).

Applying these standards, Plaintiffs are not entitled to summary judgment. It

appears from the evidence that Dorrell was not operating the vehicle with a valid

license, rendering the moped subject to impoundment under the community

caretaker exception. See VW Credit Leasing LTD., 757 F. Supp. 3d at 285 (“Where,

as here, the driver’s violation of a vehicle regulation prevents the driver from lawfully

operating the vehicle, and it is necessary to remove the vehicle from a public location,

impoundment may be proper under the community caretaking doctrine.”) (internal

quotation and citation omitted). To this end, impounding a vehicle that is not

authorized to operate is undoubtedly a reasonable measure to ensure the public’s

11

safety. Vasquez, 2020 WL 1082786, at *7; see Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368, 96 S. Ct.

at 3907. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment with respect to the

seizure of the moped should be denied.

Plaintiffs further contend that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated

because the Officers conducted an unconstitutional search of Dorrell’s bag. See

Compl. at 1. The issue turns on the reasonableness of the search. This issue involves

a quintessential question of fact that makes summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor

on this claim as to the County inappropriate. See Allen v. Schiff, 908 F. Supp. 2d 451,

461 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff'd, 586 Fed. Appx. 759 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Although the

reasonableness of a search is a matter of law, the character and manner of the search

is a matter of fact.”); Bulgari v. Bulgari, No. 22 Civ. 5072, 2024 WL 4345580, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024)(“Even where the facts are undisputed, the issue of whether

conduct is reasonable is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury.”). Accordingly, the

Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment as to their Fourth

Amendment cause of action be denied.

ACT’s motion for summary judgment as to this claim, however, should be

granted. The seizure leading to impoundment was conducted by the County and

NCPD. The Officers, not ACT, seized Plaintiffs’ moped after determining that Dorrell

had a suspended license, and the vehicle was uninsured, unregistered, and

uninspected. See Cocozzo Tr. at 70. Further, Costello looked into the bookbag

because he needed to check for officer safety and weapons as a result of Dorrell

placing his hand in the bag. See Costello Tr. at 38.

12

ACT’s role in this regard, conducting the physical towing and storage did

nothing to contribute to the issuance of the underlying tickets which led to the

impoundment and search. Its conduct was ministerial and therefore liability on this

cause of action is unwarranted as a matter of law. Accordingly, the Court respectfully

recommends that Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on their Fourth

Amendment claims be denied and that ACT’s motion on this cause of action be

granted.

2. Due Process Claims

Plaintiffs also claim that their due process rights were violated under the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments. Because the Fourteenth Amendment due process

clause is the one properly invoked against a municipality, the Court devotes its

analysis accordingly.6 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires

that individuals “receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the

Government deprives them of property.” United States v. James Daniel Good Real

Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48, 114 S. Ct. 492, 498 (1993); Connecticut. v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1,

12, 111 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (1991) (“[E]ven the temporary or partial impairments to

property rights that attachments, liens, and similar encumbrances entail are

6 To the extent the Plaintiffs’ papers could be read to invoke the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause,

providing that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation,” Comty.

Hous. Improvement Program v. City of New York, 59 F.4th 540, 550 (2d Cir. 2022), the claim would

fail as a matter of law because there appears to be no allegation or evidence in the record that the

moped was taken for public use. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Maha, 834 F. App’x 619, 621 (2d Cir. 2020)

(holding that the plaintiff could not establish a claim where his pistol permit was suspended and his

guns were confiscated because he failed to adduce evidence that the firearms were taking for public

use); Brown v. Town of Amherst, 23-CV-993(EAW), 2024 WL 4308310, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,

2024) (dismissing claim where property was not taken for “public use”).

sufficient to merit due process protection.”). In evaluating whether a deprivation

violates the Fourteenth Amendment, courts “identify the property interest involved”

and “whether the plaintiff received constitutionally adequate process in the course of

the deprivation.” O’Connor v. Pierson, 426 F.3d 187, 196 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Harhay

v. Town of Ellington Bd. of Educ., 323 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 2003)). The denial of

possession to an owner is a deprivation of property. See Alexandre v. Cortes, 140 F.3d

406, 410-11 (2d Cir. 1998). To this end, even “a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of

property is nonetheless a ‘deprivation’ in the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

HVT, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., No. 15-CV-5867(MKB)(VMS), 2018 WL

3134414, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2018) (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 85,

92 S. Ct. 1983, 1997 (1972)).

Ordinarily, “‘the Constitution requires . . . a hearing before the State deprives

a person of liberty or property.’” Ferreira v. Town of E. Hampton, 56 F. Supp. 3d 211,

225 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting New Windsor Volunteer Ambulance Corps., Inc. v.

Meyers, 442 F.3d 101, 115 (2d Cir. 2006)). “In certain circumstances, [however,] the

lack of such pre-deprivation process will not offend the constitutional guarantee of

due process, provided there is sufficient post-deprivation process.” Catanzaro v.

Weiden, 188 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, “this requirement does not

necessarily mean plaintiffs are entitled to a full administrative hearing.” City Line

Auto Mall, Inc. v. Mintz, No. 05-CV-5524(ERK)(VVP), 2006 WL 8439742, at *3

(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006) (citing Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115, 97 S. Ct. 1723, 1729

(1977)). “‘Either the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of

providing any meaningful predeprivation process, when coupled with the availability

of some meaningful means by which to assess the propriety of the State’s action at

some time after the initial taking, can satisfy the requirements of procedural due

process.’” Catanzaro, 188 F.3d at 61 (quoting Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 539,

101 S. Ct. 1908, 1915 (1981)). Accordingly, “[d]ue process does not, in all cases,

require a hearing before the state interferes with a protected interest, so long as ‘some

form of hearing is [provided] before an individual is finally deprived of [the] property

interest.’” Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147, 158 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Brody v. Vill. of

Port Chester, 434 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2005)).

In evaluating the constitutional adequacy of due process procedures, Courts

consider the framework outlined in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct.

893, 903 (1976), and balance:

(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures

used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute

procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’s interest, including the

function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the

additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.

Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 2021 WL 4480574, at *8 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S.

at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903); see Nnebe, 644 F.3d at 158 (“‘Mathews is the test for both

when a hearing is required (i.e., pre- or post-deprivation) and what kind of procedure

is due[.]’”) (quoting Brody, 434 F.3d at 135).

It does not appear that there is any dispute that the moped was impounded by

the Officers and so the first Mathews factor is satisfied. See Krimstock v. Kelly, 464

F.3d 246 253 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting the “particular importance of motor vehicles . . .

as a mode of transportation and, for some, the means to earn a livelihood”) (citation

omitted); Mercedes-Benz Fin. Servs. USA, LLC v. City of New York, 770 F. Supp. 3d

643, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (holding that the plaintiff had a property interest in a

vehicle impounded pursuant to a scofflaw policy). Questions of fact exist, however,

with respect to the second and third Mathews factors. The second Mathews factor

requires analysis of “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [a property] interest

through the procedures used.” City Line Auto Mall, Inc., 2006 WL 8439742, at *4

(quoting Krimstock, 306 F.3d at 62). The third Mathews factor “considers the

Government’s interest” in the deprivation of liberty or property. Diaz v. Genalo, No.

22-CV-3063(VSB)(BCM), 2024 WL 4124756, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 9, 2024); see

Weinstein v. Krumpter, 386 F. Supp. 3d 220, 237 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The third Mathews

factor inquires as to the government’s interest, including the function involved and

the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

requirement would entail.”) (internal quotation and alteration omitted).

Applying these standards, summary judgment is inappropriate as to whether

the County and NCPD violated Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights by

impounding the moped without a formal hearing. Plaintiffs have not submitted

evidence that the Court can rely on as a matter of law to conclude that the risk of an

erroneous deprivation, when compared with a substitute process weighs in favor of

finding a civil rights violation. Similarly, there is no evidence that any substitute

process would not create excess burdens on the County. In fact, Plaintiffs do not

suggest that a reasonable alternate process exists. Accordingly, the Court

recommends denying Plaintiffs summary judgment as to their due process claim

pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.

ACT’s motion for summary judgment however, as to this claim should also be

granted. Plaintiffs do not allege, and there are no facts that would support a claim,

that ACT had the ability to provide Plaintiffs with due process to challenge the

impoundment or the underlying tickets. See Cloister E., Inc. v. N.Y. State Liquor

Auth., 563 F. Supp. 3d 90, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (internal citations omitted)

(“Individual [d]efendants cannot be held legally accountable for the alleged process

failure if they did not have the power to provide process to the plaintiff”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Indeed, courts in other districts to address these types of

claims against towing companies have concluded that they are untenable. See Doney

v. Hammond City, 15-CV-21123, 2016 WL 5072409, at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 2016)

(rejecting due process claim against towing company); Shipley v. B.& F Towing Co.,

04-CV-1530(JJF), 2006 WL 1652787, at *3-4 (D. Del. June 13, 2006) (dismissing due

process claims against towing company); Beverly Hills v. Chicago Ins. Co., 668 F.

Supp. 1402, 1408 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (the towing company could not provide due process

relief); Mays v. Scranton City Police Dep’t, 503 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1980)

(the towing company is not in a position to provide a process for redress). Accordingly,

the Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment due process claim

against ACT fails as a matter of law and summary judgment should be granted in

favor of the towing company.

3. Thirteenth Amendment Claim

Finally, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ Thirteenth Amendment claim, which

appears to be asserted only against the County. “To sustain a claim under the

Thirteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must ‘demonstrate he has been subjected to

compulsory labor akin to African slavery which in practical operation would tend to

produce like undesirable results.’” Jones v. City Sch. Dist. of New Rochelle, 695 F.

Supp. 2d 136, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing Ford v. Nassau County Executive, 41

F.Supp.2d 392, 400-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)). The Court recognizes that Dorrell felt

racially profiled during his encounter with the County because the Officers laughed

at him and spoke to him aggressively. Compl. at 7. Nevertheless, a Thirteenth

Amendment claim is not an appropriate avenue to sustain a cause of action arising

from these pleadings because a traffic stop or arrest, even when conducted

inappropriately or unprofessionally, is not viewed in the law as amounting to the

realities of slavery endured by Black Americans. See Williams v. Savory, 87 F. Supp.

3d 437, 452-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that summary judgment for defendants is

merited on plaintiff’s Thirteenth Amendment claim where “ACS coerced her to attend

a parenting course . . . and court hearings, and forced her to undergo drug testing, a

mental health examination, and counseling sessions.”); Alexander v. Schenk, 118 F.

Supp. 2d 298, 302 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting summary judgment to Defendants on

Plaintiff’s Thirteenth Amendment claim where plaintiff, an incarcerated person, is

required to work for minimal compensation while in prison.). Accordingly, the Court

recommends denying Plaintiffs’ request for summary judgment as to their Thirteenth

Amendment cause of action.

B. Plaintiffs’ Motions to Suppress

In addition to moving for summary judgment, Plaintiffs seek to suppress ACT’s

exhibits J, K, and L submitted in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment.

See DE [75], [77]. Exhibit J is Dorrell’s deposition transcript. See DE [71-11]. Exhibit

K is Nadal’s deposition transcript. See DE [71-12]. Exhibit L is a printout from the

Department of State website which is publicly available. See DE [73-1]. The main

thrust of the motions is that Plaintiffs did not have an opportunity to review their

transcripts prior to summary judgment motion practice, and the printout was not

produced during discovery. See DE [77] at 2. The Court recommends that the

motions be denied.

Rule 30(e)(1) by its terms does not state that the deponent must be given

an opportunity to review and correct the transcript before a party

submits that transcript to the Court in support of a summary judgment

motion; it simply states that a party must be allowed 30 days to review

the transcript and sign a statement listing any changes thereto and the

reasons for making them.

Tycoons Worldwide Grp. (Thailand) Pub. Co., Ltd. v. JBL Supply Inc., 721 F. Supp.

2d 194, 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (denying Defendants’ motion to suppress a deposition

transcript where they argued that the deponent was not provided timely review of

the transcript.). Accordingly, the Court recommends denying Plaintiffs’ motions as

to Dorrell’s and Nadal’s deposition transcripts, Exhibits J and K. Further, Exhibit L

is a publicly available record and thus, it should not be excluded from the Court’s

review on summary judgment. See DE [76] at 2; Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City

of New York v. Y.F. by and through C.F., No. 23-CV-8883(VEC)(JW), 2025 WL

357730, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2025) (“[I]t is well established that discovery need

not be required of documents of public record which are equally accessible to all

parties.”) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court recommends that

Plaintiffs’ motions to suppress be denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court recommends that Plaintiffs’ motions

for summary judgment and to suppress be denied in their entirety and that ACT’s

cross-motion for summary judgment be granted in full and that ACT be dismissed

from this case. Plaintiffs and the County are directed to review Judge Brown’s

individual rules concerning the filing of pretrial orders, meet and confer about the

same, and file a proposed pretrial order by February 27, 2026. Final Pretrial

Conference: March 12, 2026, at 11:45am.

V. OBJECTIONS

A copy of this Report and Recommendation is being served on Defendant by

electronic filing on the date below. Defendant is directed to serve a copy of it on

Plaintiffs via first-class mail and promptly file proof of service by ECF. Any objections

to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within

14 days, that is by February 5, 2026. See 28 U.S.C. §636 (b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72;

Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) and 6(d). Failure to file objections within the specified period

waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Ferrer v. Woliver, No. 05-

3696, 2008 WL 4951035, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov. 20, 2008); Beverly v. Walker, 118 F.3d

900, 902 (2d Cir. 1997); Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1996).

Dated: Central Islip, New York /s/ Steven I. Locke

January 22, 2026 STEVEN I. LOCKE

United States Magistrate Judge