Garcia

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

LUCIA GARCIA, )

)

) Case No. 23-cv-11493

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Sharon Johnson Coleman

v. )

)

JASON CLIFT, MASON SARTI, )

Individually, and the CITY OF OTTAWA )

and the CITY OF STREATOR, )

a Municipal Corporation )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Lucia Garcia (“Garcia”), brings this action against Defendants, Jason Clift (“Officer

Clift”) and Mason Sarti (Officer Sarti”)(together, “Officer Defendants”), the City of Ottawa, and the

City of Streator (together, “City Defendants”) (altogether, “Defendants”) stemming from her arrest

and 17-day detention after an informant allegedly bought drugs from Garcia on July 12, 13, 14, and

18, 2022, at 607 North Monroe Street in Streator, Illinois. Garcia’s Second Amended Complaint

(“Complaint”) brings claims against the Officer Defendants: false arrest (Count I), illegal detention

(Count II), federal malicious prosecution claims (Count III), Illinois malicious prosecution claims

(Count IV), and brings indemnification claims, (Count V), against the City Defendants. Presently

before the Court are Officer Clift’s and the City of Streator’s Motion for Summary Judgment [113]

and Officer Sarti’s and the City of Ottawa’s Motion for Summary Judgement [158]. For the following

reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motions in full.

I. Background

A. Factual Allegations

The following material facts are not in dispute, unless otherwise noted, and are relevant to

resolving both Motions.

i. Tri-Dent Investigation

The Tri-County Drug Enforcement Narcotics Team (“Tri-Dent”) is a multi-jurisdictional

narcotics task force composed of various police departments. In 2022, while working for Tri-Dent

on behalf of the City of Streator, Officer Clift participated in a drug investigation of James Forbes

(“Forbes”), the father of Garcia’s two children. Officer Clift, with the help of an informant, Anthony

Gibson (“Gibson”), facilitated several controlled drug buys from Forbes’ residence located at 607

North Monroe Street, Streator, Illinois. During the drug buys, Tri-Dent placed a camera with audio

and video capabilities on Gibson. Out of all the controlled drug buys, four of them, occurring on July

12th, 13th, 14th, and 18th , involved the same Latina who provided Gibson with cocaine.

According to Defendants, Officer Clift offered the case to Officer Sarti, who became the lead

investigator. Officer Clift did not prepare any reports or paperwork, did not pay the informant, never

appeared at any court proceedings, and never discussed the investigation with the LaSalle County

Assistant State’s Attorney Jason Goode (“ASA Goode”). Garcia, however, denies that Officer Clift

was not further involved in the investigation and prosecution. Defendants admit however, as part of

their investigation into Forbes, Officer Clift informed Officer Sarti that Forbes shared children with

Garcia.

Officer Sarti testified that after learning Garcia’s identity, he compared her Facebook photos

to the woman depicted in the video and independently identified her as the Latina in question. He

then showed the pictures to Officer Clift who verified that the woman from the Facebook photos was

Garcia. Finally, Officer Sarti showed Garcia’s photos to Gibson, who identified her as the woman

from whom he purchased cocaine. While Officer Sarti and Officer Clift testified that Gibson

positively identified Garcia as the woman involved in the drug buys, Gibson testified that he did not

recall Officer Sarti or Officer Clift showing him a Facebook photo.

ii. Forbes’ Arrests

On July 20, 2022, Officer Sarti and other officers executed a search warrant at 607 North

Monroe Street, where they recovered narcotics and a firearm. Forbes was arrested on July 22, 2022,

and taken into custody at the LaSalle County Jail. ASA Goode, who previously handled a felony

possession case involving Forbes and was aware that law enforcement believed Forbes was

distributing heroin and crack cocaine, approved the charges against Forbes. During that earlier

prosecution, a victim brought a locker of weapons to law enforcement and stated that the remaining

arsenal was with Garcia. ASA Goode believed that Garcia used her real estate background to help

Forbes buy properties on tax sales to turn them into drug “dens.”

Because of this, in September of 2022, after Forbes’ arrest, ASA Goode requested reports

regarding Garcia from Officer Sarti. Officer Sarti submitted the requested reports to the ASA in

November 2022. Officer Sarti testified that he believed these reports would be utilized for further

investigation of Forbes, not for subsequent charges against anyone else; he also stated that, while did

not think it was necessary to arrest all the individuals involved with this drug operation, it was up to

the State’s Attorney’s Office to decide who they were going to charge.

iii. Garcia’s Arrest

After reviewing Officer Sarti’s reports, conducting his own independent investigation, and

based on his prior knowledge of Garcia, ASA Goode believed he had probable cause to seek a warrant

for and charge Garcia for the controlled drug buys from July 12, 2022, to July 18, 2022, and filed such

charges in October of 2022. Garcia additionally sought an arrest warrant from a LaSalle County Judge,

who issued one on October 25, 2022. ASA Good testified that he did not use any information

provided by Gibsson to obtain the arrest warrant, that his decision to bring charges was not influenced

by Officers Clift or Sarti, and that he made an independent determination that there was probable

cause to arrest Garcia.

On October 31, 2022, Garcia was arrested by the Bloomington Police Department following

a traffic stop and was subsequently held on the LaSalle County warrant. After her arrest, on November

7, 2022, ASA Goode proceeded to a grand jury. Officer Sarti testified before the grand jury which

returned a true bill indicting Garcia on four counts of Unlawful Delivery of a Controlled Substance.

iv. Limited Prosecution

At a November meeting at LaSalle County Jail that included Garcia, her criminal defense

attorney, Officer Sarti, and Officer Sarti’s supervisor, Commander Hoster, the parties reviewed still

photographs of the woman captured on video by Gibson and compared them to photos of Garcia.

At that meeting, Commander Hoster told Officer Sarti that he was not “100% convinced” that Garcia

was the Latina who sold drugs to Gibson. Officer Sarti, still believing Garcia was the woman in the

video, then reached out to another officer involved in the Forbes investigation, Michael Ray Taylor

(“Officer Taylor”), for additional identification assistance.

On November 14, 2022, Officer Taylor met ASA Goode and his two secretaries at the LaSalle

County State’s Attorney’s Office, where ASA Goode presented to Officer Taylor a photo array of

approximately six pictures of the Latina woman captured on Gibson’s body camera to verify if it was

Garcia. Officer Taylor then responded that he believed the person in the pictures was actually Emilee

A. Costillo (“Costillo”), a “known drug dealer” and associate of Forbes. In that meeting, Officer

Taylor sent a video recording depicting Costillo to ASA Goode along with her birthdate and driver’s

license number. Soon after that meeting on November 17, 2022, Plaintiff was released from Lassalle

County Jail.

On June 23, 2023, ASA Goode decided to discontinue his prosecution against Garcia. While

ASA Goode testified that he still believed he had probable cause to prosecute Garcia, he ultimately

dismissed the charges because the confidential informant, Gibson, broke off contact with law

enforcement and had an active warrant. Without this witness, ASA Goode dismissed the charges.

v. Subsequent Communications with Gibson

On September 20, 2024, Garcia’s counsel in the present case informed Defendants that he

located Gibson at a Texas prison and that he intended to depose him. On September 26, 2024,

Plaintiff’s counsel notified Defendants that Gibson was no longer at that facility and produced an

affidavit from Gibson, which Plaintiff intended to use as substantive evidence. In the affidavit

obtained by Garcia’s counsel, Gibson stated that he did not know Garcia and that neither Officer Clift

nor Officer Sarti showed him any photo after a buy to confirm whether the woman depicted was the

Garcia. Gibson later conceded, however, that it was possible he had been shown photos to identify

the person from whom he purchased the drugs, contradicting the affidavit obtained by Garcia’s

Counsel.

A. Remaining Disputed Facts

Defendants raise objections to certain statements of fact proffered by on the basis that they

are based on conjecture, not supported by the record, or inadmissible hearsay. “To be considered

on summary judgment, evidence must be admissible at trial…” Cairel v. Alderden, 821 F.3d 823, 830

(7th Cir. 2016). The Court therefore addresses the admissibility of these contested facts and

determines how those facts can be considered for purposes of resolving Defendants’ Motions.

i. Statement that Officer Clift “Coached” Officer Sarti

Defendants take issue with Garcia’s statement that “Defendant Clift ‘coached’ and coerced

Defendant Sarti to write reports indicating that Plaintiff Lucia Garcia was the one who Anthony

Gibson bought drugs from on July 12, 13, 14, and 18th of 2022.” Specifically, Defendants object to

this proffered fact because Garcia fails to cite any admissible evidence that supports this conclusion.

“While [the Court] must construe all the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, [its] favor toward the nonmoving party does not extend to drawing inferences

that are supported by only speculation or conjecture.” Monroe v. Indiana Dep’t of Transportation, 871 F.3d

495, 503 (7th Cir. 2017). The specific statement Garcia cites to support this statement comes from

Officer Taylor’s deposition, where he states:

10 A. I think Agent Sarti believed that was Lucia

11 Garcia. I 100 percent do.· I think he was coached by

12 Jason Clift, and Jason Clift being from Streator has

13 dealt with Lucia Garcia a lot and I think that --

14 I -- I would have to think that Clift probably said that

15 is Lucia Garcia in those photos.

(Dkt 1-6 at *75). This statement made by Officer Taylor, who does not allege he witnessed or was

aware of any such “coaching,” is the very speculation and conjecture that the Court will not draw

inferences from. Absent any concrete evidence of such “coaching,” the Court will not consider this

fact for purposes of resolving these Motions.

ii. Statements by ASA Goode and his Secretaries

Again, relying on Officer Taylor’s testimony, Garcia seeks to proffer a fact that during Officer

Taylor’s meeting at ASA Goode’s office, ASA Goode and his secretaries stated that “they didn’t think”

the woman from the video was Garcia, that they weren’t “on board with it” being her, and that they

“all came to agreement that [the woman in the video] was not Lucia Garcia.” Defendants object to

these statements on the grounds that they are inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is an out-of-court

statement offered to prove the truth of the matter stated. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Absent any indication

that statements by ASA Goode and his unidentified secretaries fall within a hearsay exception, the

Court will not consider this statement for the truth of the matter they assert, or for any other purpose,

while resolving these Motions.

iii. Gibson’s Affidavit

Garcia seeks to admit numerous statements from Gibson’s 2024 Affidavit contradicting his

initial identification of Garcia to dispute that Officer Sarti and ASA Goode had probable cause to

arrest and prosecute her. Defendants argue that any statements from Gibson’s Affidavit constitute

inadmissible hearsay and do not satisfy any exclusion or exception under Federal Rule of Evidence

801(d). Inadmissible hearsay cannot be used to establish a dispute of fact at summary judgment. Eaton

v. J.H. Findorff & Son, Inc., 1 F.4th 508, 512 n.3 (7th Cir. 2021). Because Garcia does not provide any

exclusion or exception to establish admissibility, the Court will not consider the statements in Gibson’s

Affidavit for purposes of summary judgement. Furthermore, since Defendants’ Motions hinge on the

existence of probable cause at the time of Garcia’s arrest and prosecution, facts proffered from

Gibson’s 2024 Affidavit cannot create a dispute of material fact for determining the Officers’ and

ASA’s determination of probable cause in 2022.

With these material issues addressed, the Court now turns to its ruling on the merits of

Defendants’ Motions.

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to

any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see

Spurling v. C & M Fine Pack, Inc., 739 F.3d 1055, 1060 (7th Cir. 2014). A genuine dispute as to any

material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court “consider[s] all

of the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and . . . draw[s] all

reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Logan

v. City of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted).

III. Discussion

A plaintiff may recover damages for Fourth Amendment, false arrest and unlawful detention

claims, as well as malicious prosecution claims, when there is no probable cause. See Manuel v. City of

Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 367 (2017). The existence of probable cause is a defense to both Fourth

Amendment and malicious prosecution claims. Washington v. City of Chicago, 98 F.4th 860, 863 (7th Cir.

2024). As such, the facts that are relevant to determining whether the officers had probable cause to

arrest a plaintiff, are the same facts that are relevant to determining if probable cause existed for a

plaintiff’s detention and prosecution. See Esco v. City of Chicago, 107 F.4th 673, 677 (7th Cir. 2024).

Consequently, this case turns on whether probable cause existed to originally arrest Garcia, detain her,

and for her continued prosecution.

Officer Clift and the City of Streator argue summary judgement is proper for several reasons:

first, because there was probable cause to seize, detain, and prosecute Garcia; second, because Garcia

was indicted by a grand jury and a warrant was issued for her arrest, there is a rebuttable presumption

of probable cause that Garcia has not overcome; third, because Garcia was arrested and detained only

after an arrest warrant was issued, her claim for false arrest fails; fourth, because Defendants are

entitled to qualified immunity as to all of Garcia’s federal claims; and finally, because Garcia’s claim

for illegal detention is duplicative of her malicious prosecution claim. (Dkt. 114 at *1.) Officer Sarti

and the City of Ottawa argue summary judgement is proper because Garcia presented no credible

evidence that Officer Sarti fabricated or withheld evidence, misled prosecutors, or influenced the

independent determinations of the State’s Attorney, the judge, or the grand jury. (Dkt. 160 at *3.).

They argue that the undisputed facts, the prosecutor’s independent determination of probable cause,

and the existence of a facially valid arrest warrant all establish that Defendants are entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. (Id.)

Garcia, by contrast, argues that Defendants’ Motions should be denied because there are

genuine issues of material facts barring summary judgment. (Dkt. 130 at *2.) Specifically, because

Defendants’ Motions ask the Court to resolve disputed facts, weigh credibility, and credit an

investigation that key witnesses, supervisors, and even the prosecutor “later concluded was wrong,”

summary judgement is not permitted. (Dkt. 179 at *3.)

The Court will address the merits of these arguments in turn.

A. Probable Cause Determination (Counts I and II)

Probable cause is a “common-sense inquiry requiring only a probability of criminal activity;”

probable cause exists “whenever an officer has enough information to warrant a prudent person to

believe criminal conduct has occurred.” Leaver v. Shortess, 844 F.3d 665, 669 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting

Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2010)). Officers making probable-cause determinations

“are entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts before them, based on their training and

experience.” Funches, 327 F.3d at 586. Additionally, a presumption of probable cause arises after a

judicial determination of probable cause. Washington, 98 F.4th at 863. To overcome this presumption,

plaintiffs must show “that the officer who sought the warrant (1) ‘knowingly or intentionally or with

a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements to the judicial officer, and (2) that the false

statements were necessary to the judicial officer’s determination that probable cause existed for the

arrest.’ ” Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010).

In their Motion, Officer Clift and the City of Streator argue Garcia’s false arrest and illegal

detention claims fail as a matter of law because she has not overcome the presumption of probable

cause established by the arrest warrant and grand jury indictment. (Dkt. 114 at *4.) Defendants

further argue that Plaintiff’s principal theory that Gibsons identification of Garcia was fictitious, is

flawed for three reasons: first, whether Gibson identified Plaintiff is irrelevant as Defendants had

probable cause to arrest Plaintiff after separately concluding it was her on the video; second, even if

the court were to analyze Gibson’s testimony in the present case, probable cause would still have been

present in November 2022, when Plaintiff was arrested; finally, even if the Court considers that

Gibson recanted his testimony, this does not negate that probable cause existed at the time of the

arrest based on the information available to the officers. (Id. at *4-5.) Finally Defendants argue that

even if the prosecutor, judge, and grand jury relied on Gibson’s alleged fictitious identification, Garcia

cannot show these facts were “necessary” to the judicial determination of probable cause as required

to overcome its validity. (Id. at *8.)

In their Motion, Officer Sarti and the City of Ottawa similarly argue that the existence of a

properly obtained arrest warrant, and the presumption of probable cause that goes with it, defeats the

false arrest and false imprisonment claims asserted here. (Dkt. 160 at *8.) Defendants first emphasize

Officer Sarti turned the report of the investigation over to the LaSalle County State’s Attorney’s

Office. (Id.) That office, without further input from Officer Sarti, determined that charges should be

against Garcia. (Id.) Next, Defendants argue, to the extent Garcia’s claims hinge on an assertion that

Officer Sarti provided false or misleading testimony in the criminal proceedings, that argument fails

as a matter of law because he enjoys absolute immunity for any such testimony. (Id. at *6.) (citing

Khorrami v. Rolince, 539 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining witnesses in criminal proceedings,

including police officers, enjoy absolute immunity from civil liability under § 1983 for their testimony,

even if it is alleged to be false.)). Finally, Defendants argue, Gibson’s recantation, obtained nearly two

years after Garcia’s arrest, cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient to overcome the

presumption of probable cause established by the judicially issued arrest warrant and the independent

prosecutorial determinations that occurred at the time of Garcia’s arrest. (Dkt. 160 at *7.)

Garcia responds to Officer Clift and the City of Streator by asserting “the most reasonable

inference to take from all of the evidence in this case is that Defendants Clift and Sarti fabricated their

basis for probable cause against Garcia based solely on the fact that the father of her children was the

target of their investigation.” (Dkt. 130 at *1-2.) Garcia asserts, when Officer Sarti viewed Gibsons’

video recording of a Latina, he made improper assumptions that Garcia was the individual in that

video solely because of her race and her prior relationship with Forbes. (Dkt. 130 at *2.) Garcia then

asserts that Officer Sarti, at Officer Clift’s direction, created false reports that ASA Goode used as the

“sole” basis to bring charges against Garcia. In addition to this issue, Garcia asserts there are multiple

factual issues that necessitate denial of summary judgement: first, Officer Sarti was never present at

the scene to personally identify Garcia; second, the video evidence creates a reasonable disagreement

on whether Officer Sarti could actually identify Garcia; and finally, Officer Taylor’s testimony calls

into question ASA Goode’s probable cause determination after Officer Taylor provided him

information of an alternative suspect. (Id. at *6-7.)

Garcia responds to Officer Sarti and the City of Ottawa by asserting that Officer Sarti made

statements in his reports “from which a reasonable jury could conclude that he knowingly

misrepresented that Anthony Gibson positively identified the Plaintiff and further omitted from the

investigative file the picture that he alleged was relied on when submitting the file to States Attorney

Jason Goode.” (Dkt. 179 at *6.) Garcia next argues that the presumption of probable cause gives

way to her showing of fact that Officer Sarti made false statements or omitted facts to a judicial officer

which were necessary to the judicial officer’s determination. (Id. at *6-7.) Finally, Garcia argues her

claims are not subject to summary judgement because they necessitate creditability determinations and

require a finder of fact to weigh any alleged inconsistencies in Gibson’s testimony, which is generally

the province of the jury. (Dkt. 179 at *12.)

As an initial matter, the Court reiterates that it will not draw inferences that are supported

solely by speculation or conjecture when resolving these Motions. See Monroe v. Indiana Dep’t of

Transportation, 871 F.3d at 503. Garcia’s assertions that Officer Clift and Officer Sarti fabricated

reports to provide to ASA Goode and that Officer Sarti misrepresented his and Gibson’s identification

of Garcia, are not supported by any admissible evidence in the record. The Court, therefore, will not

consider these speculative theories when determining the merits of Garcia’s false arrest and unlawful

detention claims against Defendants.

As to her false arrest claims, generally, a person arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant

cannot prevail on a false arrest claim, even if it is later determined that a warrant had an inadequate

factual foundation. Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 443-44 (7th Cir. 2013); see Bianchi v. McQueen,

818 F.3d 309, 322 (7th Cir. 2016) (a false arrest claim arises “from a warrantless arrest without probable

cause”). There is, however, a recognized exception for situations where officers knew that the arrest

warrant was issued without probable cause, especially when the individuals obtaining the warrant

deceived the authorizing body to obtain it. See id. The record does not show that this exception

applies. Garcia cannot maintain her claim against the Officer Defendants because it was the state’s

attorney’s office, and not Officer Clift or Sarti, who determined probable cause existed and sought

Garcia’s warrant and arrest. It was ASA Goode’s determination of probable cause that led to her

warrant and arrest. The record also does not identify any alleged misstatements that were material to

the probable cause determination. Gibsons’ 2024 recantation does not create a dispute of material

fact as to whether ASA Goode had probable cause in 2022. Even assuming Gibson did not identify

Garcia, probable cause existed based on Officer Sarti’s visual comparison of the covert camera footage

and its comparison to Garcia’s Facebook photos, ASA Goode’s independent visual confirmation of

the same, a properly obtained arrest warrant, and the grand jury’s indictment of Garcia.

While the Court is mindful that discrepancies in video evidence often make summary

judgement improper, Kailin v. Vill. of Gurnee, 77 F.4th 476, 481 (7th Cir. 2024), a determination of

whether the Officer Defendants and ASA Goode believed that Garcia was the individual depicted in

the video, based on what they knew at the time, does not create a dispute of material fact that can be

resolved by a jury’s review. Their identification of Garcia, albeit an alleged incorrect identification, is

protected by arguable probable cause. Fleming v. Livingston County, Illinois, 674 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir.

2012) (arguable probable cause, or mistaken probable cause, is established when “a reasonable police

officer in the same circumstances and ... possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question

could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed.”). Even if Defendants were mistaken in

their identifications based on racial assumptions, because the admissible evidence shows Defendants

at least had arguable probable cause to believe Garcia was the woman depicted on the video, Garcia

cannot overcome the presumption of probable cause created by multiple independent identifications,

a judicial arrest warrant, and a grand jury indictment. The Court therefore grants Defendants’ Motion

for Summary Judgement on Garcia’s false arrest claim.1

This finding does not, however, automatically entitle Defendants to summary judgment on

Garcia’s illegal detention claim. She can also recover damages for “ensuing pretrial detention without

probable cause,” when probable cause was obtained through fabricated evidence. Manuel, 580 U.S. at

1 The Court acknowledges had Garcia brought a Monell claim alleging an official custom or policy of

racial discrimination, the outcome of Garcia’s claims may have differed, at least as they relate to the

City Defendants. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658

(1978)(subjecting defendants to municipal liability based on a policy, practice, or custom that resulted

in a constitutional violation). The record shows that the Defendants may have mistakenly identified

Garcia as the woman in the video based on racial profiling. This alleged misidentification, coupled

with evidence of repeated misidentification of Latino suspects by Tri-Dent and the LaSalle County

State’s Attorney’s Office, could become actionable.

367. This is because fabricating evidence can harm a person charged with a crime “before and not

just during the trial, [where] it was used to help indict him,” and the indictment leads to a nontrivial

period of pretrial detention Fields v. Wharrie (“Fields II”), 740 F.3d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir.

2014) (citing Julian v. Hanna, 732 F.3d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 2013). Specifically, where an unbroken causal

chain connects the acts of evidence fabrication to an individual’s imprisonment, defendants can be

liable for a plaintiff’s detention without probable cause. See, e.g., Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 847 F.3d

433, 439–40 (7th Cir. 2017). While Garcia is not automatically foreclosed from recovering damages

for her 17-days in detention, in the present instance, where she has not shown any proof that the

Officer Defendants fabricated evidence to influence ASA Goode’s determination that he had probable

cause to prosecute and detain her, Garcia’s illegal detention claim also fails.

A. Malicious Prosecution Claims (Count III and IV)

In Counts III and IV of her Complaint, Garcia alleges that Officers Sarti and Clift maliciously

prosecuted her, in violation of the Constitution and Illinois law. To prevail on a federal malicious

prosecution claim, a plaintiff must prove that the malicious prosecution resulted in a seizure, or

detention, of the Plaintiff. See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 n. 2, (2022); see Neita v. City of Chicago,

148 F.4th 916, 939 (7th Cir. 2025) (noting a plaintiff must prove they were detained after “legal

process,” or after criminal charges were filed). To prevail on a malicious-prosecution claim under

Illinois law, plaintiffs must show that: “(1) [they were] subjected to judicial proceedings; (2) for which

there was no probable cause; (3) the defendants instituted or continued the proceedings maliciously;

(4) the proceedings were terminated in the plaintiff[s’] favor; and (5) there was an injury.” Martinez v.

City of Chicago, 900 F.3d 838, 849 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citation omitted). Importantly, because

“[t]he State’s Attorney, not the police, prosecutes a criminal action…. [t]he chain of causation

[between a wrongful arrest and post-indictment tort liability] is broken by an indictment,” absent an

allegation of misstatements or influence exerted by the police officers. See Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851

F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2017).

Officer Clift and the City of Streator argue that Garcia’s federal malicious prosecution claim

fails because it is duplicative of Garcia’s illegal detention claim. (Dkt. 114 at *12.) (citing Smith v.

Chicago, 2024 WL 3757127, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2024) (Coleman, J.)(explaining that a Fourth

Amendment claim of illegal pretrial detention, or “unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process,” is

analogous to a malicious prosecution claim)). Defendants also argue Garcia’s state malicious

prosecution claim fails because the indictment by the grand jury breaks the chain of causation. (Dkt.

114 at *14-15.) Further, they argue, it is undisputed that ASA Goode reviewed the evidence and

sought the arrest warrant for Garcia on his own, meaning Garcia cannot maintain malicious

prosecution claims against the Officer Defendants because she cannot show that they caused

(commenced or continued) her prosecution. (Id. at *13.)

Officer Sarti and the City of Ottawa also argue that Garcia’s federal malicious-prosecution

claim fails because it is duplicative of her illegal detention claim. (Dkt. 160 at *10-11.) Regarding the

state malicious prosecution claim, they argue a malicious prosecution action against a police officer is

anomalous because the charges were prosecuted by the State’s Attorney and not the police. (Id. at

*11)(citing Snodderly v. R.U.F.F. Drug Enf’t Task Force, 239 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2001)).

Notwithstanding this anomaly, Defendants similarly argue they are still entitled to summary judgement

on the malicious prosecution claims because of the independently obtained judicial determination of

probable cause. (Id. at *11.) Without any influence from Officer Sarti, ASA Goode independently

decided to obtain a warrant for Garcia’s arrest. (Id.) Following her arrest, ASA Goode again reviewed

the matter and made the prosecutorial decision to proceed before a grand jury, which returned a true

bill indicting Garcia, a second judicial confirmation that the arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff were

supported by adequate legal grounds. (Id. at *12-13.) Defendants conclude that it is problematic

Garcia did not sue the prosecutors but instead sued the Officers who did not request charges against

Garcia and who are not liable for what the prosecutors did, or did not, do. (Id. at *13.)

Garcia, in response, argues that her federal malicious prosecution claim is not duplicative of

her illegal detention claim because, rather than addressing her injuries from her pre-indictment arrest,

it addresses her post-charge seizure pursuant to criminal proceedings. (Dkt. 179 at *15-16.) Regarding

her state claims, Garcia argues they can survive against the Officer Defendants because she alleges

“misstatements and falsehoods” they made that “completely influenced the prosecutor in this case.”

(Id. at *8.) Garcia argues, because there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Gibson identified

Garcia, and since Officer Sarti’s reports relied on that identification, “all of the written evidence that

the prosecutor relied on in this case was false and material in the prosecution of the Plaintiff.” (Id. at

*9.) Garcia concludes, because the prosecution was initiated and continued without probable cause,

because there was a seizure after the commencement of the legal process, and because the proceedings

were terminated in her favor, Plaintiff has stated a viable malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth

Amendment and Illinois law. (Id. at *15.)

Since the Court granted Summary Judgement on Garcia’s illegal detention claim, it need not

determine if her malicious prosecution claim is duplicative. Unfortunately for Garcia, however, her

malicious prosecution claim fails because she cannot show that the Officer Defendants caused,

commenced, or continued her prosecution. While Garcia argues Officer Sarti “commenced or

continued” her arrest by submitting investigative reports that allegedly contained misstatements, the

undisputed record establishes that Officer Sarti did not decide whether Plaintiff would be charged,

arrested, or prosecuted. He submitted his investigative reports to ASA Goode, who independently

reviewed the evidence, determined that probable cause existed, sought an arrest warrant from a neutral

judge, and later presented the case to a grand jury who all found probable cause, breaking the chain

of causation necessary to maintain her claim against the Officer Defendants. While Garcia seeks to

allege Officer Sarti fabricated claims in his report to ASA Goode, as stated, Garcia provides no

admissible evidence supporting this theory. The only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the

undisputed evidence is that ASA Goode maintained control over Garcia’s prosecution, without the

influence of the Officer Defendants, as evidence by his independent fact-gathering and decision to

prosecute Garcia, rendering superfluous any alleged misleading statements. See Washington, 98 F.4th

at 874.

Finally, the eventual dismissal of her criminal case does not undermine the probable cause

determinations, because the undisputed record shows, the dismissal was driven by practical evidentiary

concerns, namely, that the confidential informant had broken off contact with law enforcement and

was subject to an active warrant, not because probable cause was lacking. In fact, ASA good Goode

testified that he believed probable cause existed against Plaintiff up until the charges were dismissed.

Accordingly, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgement on Garcia’s malicious

prosecution claims. 2

The Court declines to address whether the Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity on all federal claims since it granted summary judgment on independent grounds.

Additionally, because the Court granted summary judgement to Defendants on claims I-IV, Garcia’s

derivative liability claims against the City of Streator and City of Ottawa based on those claims, also

fail.

IV. Conclusion

2 The Court acknowledges had Plaintiff brought her claims against ASA Goode, who made the

prosecutorial decisions and who it appears failed to investigate or prosecute an alternative suspect, her

claims may have been viable. Her decision to bring claims against the Officer Defendants, however,

without any admissible proof that they fabricated evidence to influence ASA Goode, dooms her

claims.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgement

in full [113, 158}.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 3/31/2026 (U JELLO

Entered:

SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN

United States District Judge

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