Ezell

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

BOBBY EZELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 24-cv-2300-RJD

)

JAMES A. SAROKA, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:1

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the

Issue of Exhaustion (Doc. 63).2 For the reasons explained below, the motion is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

Background

Plaintiff Bobby Ezell is an inmate with the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

who is currently housed at Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”). Prior to

Pinckneyville, Plaintiff was housed at Stateville Correctional Center (“Stateville”). Id. Plaintiff

filed an Amended Complaint alleging his constitutional rights were violated during transport from

Pinckneyville to Stateville Correctional Center. (Doc. 11 at 1). Following threshold review of the

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on the following claims:

1 This case has been assigned to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings through the parties’ consent

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Doc. 55).

2 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to update the docket sheet to reflect Defendant Nicholas Schulte’s full

and correct name as follows: Nicholas Schutte (See Docs. 45 & 56).

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Claim 1: Eighth Amendment excessive force/failure to intervene or deliberate

indifference claim against Defendants James A. Saroka, Bryce W. Hicks,

Hunter Farmer, Bruce Sisney, Nicholas Schutte, and Zachary Westfall for

their use of restraints for transport on April 10, 2024;

Claim 2: First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Saroka for his

conduct on April 10, 2024.

(Doc. 11).3

Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that on April 10, 2024, he was awaiting transport to

Stateville. (Doc. 11 at 2). Upon request, Plaintiff gave Defendants Hicks and “John Doe” his

medical waist chain permit. (Id.). Defendant Hicks showed the permit to Saroka, who stated that

he would not honor the permit and that Plaintiff would have to be handcuffed or face segregation.

(Id.). Defendants Saroka, Hicks, Farmer, Sisney, Schutte, and Westfall then applied handcuffs

“very tightly smashing plaintiff[’s] wrists with the handcuffs all the way around both wrists all the

way through the wrist wraps, tongues, breaking the skin to the bone.” (Id.). Plaintiff indicated he

was going to file a grievance about the incident, to which Saroka responded that he was going to

make Plaintiff suffer for filing a lawsuit against his friend (Sgt. Neibel—a non-party to this

lawsuit). Saroka then began bending and contorting Plaintiff’s wrists to break them. (Id.).

Plaintiff further alleged that “all the defendants” refused to loosen the handcuffs or to

provide him with medical attention. (Doc. 11, p. 2). Plaintiff characterized Saroka’s actions as

excessive force and claimed that he suffered bruising and pain in his wrists, arms, neck, and spine,

and that surgery for his injuries was pending. (Id. at 3).

Plaintiff faulted Defendant Hicks for failing to intervene because he allegedly held

3 Defendants Farmer, Sisney, Schutte, and Westfall were substituted for Defendants John Does 1-4. (Doc.

38).

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Plaintiff’s arms together for Saroka to apply the handcuffs. He further claimed that all Defendants

were deliberately indifferent to his health and safety because they applied a single set of handcuffs

secured in front of his body for transport. (Doc. 11, p. 3). He claimed they refused to acknowledge

the implications of their actions by refusing him medical attention, and that Saroka and Hicks

compounded this problem at the transfer point en route to Stateville.

At the threshold review, Judge Dugan noted that Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants

as to Claim 1 are complex because they “lie right at the intersection of excessive force or cruel and

unusual punishment and deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.” (Doc. 11, p. 6). Judge

Dugan concluded that Plaintiff could proceed against the Defendants on the following theories: (a)

that their actions constituted excessive force, (b) that their actions amounted to deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s documented wrist problems, or (c) that Defendants exhibited deliberate

indifference to any injuries he sustained as a result of the April 10, 2024, handcuffing incident.

(Doc. 11, p. 8).

As to Claim 2 against Defendant Saroka for retaliation, Plaintiff alleged that Saroka refused

to honor Plaintiff’s medical permit on April 10, 2024, citing a desire to cause him physical pain

based on a lawsuit he previously filed against Saroka’s friend. Plaintiff alleged that the prior events

occurred from 2018 to 2021. Judge Dugan noted that despite the temporal gap between the prior

incidents and the alleged retaliation on April 10, 2024, Plaintiff had sufficiently asserted a claim

for retaliation due to Saroka’s explicit verbalization of a desire to retaliate against Plaintiff for

those past incidents.

Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his

administrative remedies before initiating this action. (Doc. 63). Plaintiff opposed the motion. (Doc.

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67). The Court originally set this matter for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Pavey v. Conley,

544 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2008). However, after more careful review of the record, the Court found

that a hearing was not necessary.

Analysis

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate “that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also Ruffin-

Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving

party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the

adverse party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists

when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at

248). In considering a summary judgment motion, the district court views the facts in the light

most favorable to and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Apex

Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). While

courts generally may not resolve factual disputes on a motion for summary judgment, when the

motion pertains to a prisoner’s exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Seventh Circuit has

instructed courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing and resolve contested issues of fact regarding

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a prisoner’s efforts to exhaust. Pavey, 544 F.3d at 742.4 A hearing, however, is not necessary when

material facts are not in dispute. See Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F. Supp. 2d 905, 912 (S.D. Ill. 2009) (no

hearing required where there are “no disputed facts regarding exhaustion, only legal questions”).

Exhaustion Requirement

Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), prisoners are required to exhaust available administrative

remedies before filing lawsuits in federal court. “[A] prisoner who does not properly take each

step within the administrative process has failed to exhaust state remedies.” Pozo v. McCaughtry,

286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies

have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the claim on

the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez v.

Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999). “[A]ll dismissals under § 1997e(a)

should be without prejudice.” Ford v. Johnson, 362 F.3d 395, 401 (7th Cir. 2004).

An inmate in the custody of the IDOC must first submit a written grievance within 60 days

after the discovery of the incident, occurrence, or problem to his or her institutional counselor

unless certain discrete issues are being grieved. 20 Ill. Admin. Code § 504.810(a). “The grievance

shall contain factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint, including what

happened, when, where, and the name of each person who is the subject of or who is otherwise

involved in the complaint.” Id. § 504.810(c). An inmate who does not know the names of

individuals involved in the complaint must include as much descriptive information about the

individual as possible. Id.

4 This case does not implicate Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 145 S. Ct. 1793, 222 L. Ed. 2d 108 (2025)

because Plaintiff has not argued that his attempts to exhaust his administrative remedies were hindered by

Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct as alleged in the Amended Complaint.

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If the complaint is not resolved through a counselor, the grievance is considered by a

Grievance Officer who must render a written recommendation to the CAO — usually the Warden

— within two months of receipt, “when reasonably feasible under the circumstances.” Id.

§504.830(e). The CAO then advises the inmate of a decision on the grievance. Id. An inmate may

appeal the decision of the CAO in writing within 30 days to the ARB for a final decision. Id.

§_504.850(a); see also Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 806–07 (7th Cir. 2006). “The appeal must

be received by the [ARB] within 30 days after the date of the decision.” Id. The ARB will submit

a written report of its findings and recommendations to the Director, who shall review the same

and make a final determination within six months of receipt of the appeal. 20 Ill. Admin. Code §

504.850(d) and (e).

Further, the Seventh Circuit has explained that to satisfy its purpose and comply with the

PLRA requirements, the grievance must contain sufficient information to allow prison officials

“time and opportunity to address complaints internally before allowing the initiation of a federal

case.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988, 152 L. Ed. 2d 12 (2002). A

grievance that does not raise the same claim as the lawsuit and does not provide sufficient

information from which to infer that the defendants are the targets does not comply with the PLRA

requirements. Brown v. Briggs, No. 22-1963, 2023 WL 3674669, at *2 (7th Cir. May 26, 2023).

Such a disconnect between a grievance and the complaint deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction

to hear the claims. Bowers v. Dart, 1 F.4th 513, 518 (7th Cir. 2021); see also Shipp v. Lobenstein,

No. 23-1923, 2023 WL 8868501, at *2 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2023) (“To exhaust remedies, a prisoner

must follow the prison’s administrative rules, . . . including the level of detail required by them[.]”).

However, failing to name the defendants in a grievance is “a mere technical defect” where the

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inmate sufficiently describes the alleged wrongdoing to allow prison officials a fair opportunity to

respond. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 722 (7th Cir. 2011).

Discussion

Defendants’ motion contains a Statement of Material Facts that details Plaintiff’s relevant

grievance history. (Doc. 63, pp. 4-6). Based on the record, the parties do not dispute that Plaintiff

filed only two relevant grievances. (Doc. 63, ¶¶ 9-10; Doc. 67, ¶¶ 9-10). Both are dated April 10,

2024, and were directly sent to the ARB on April 16, 2024, and June 7, 2024, respectively.

Defendants did not dispute that the ARB reviewed and denied the latest grievance (Grievance

#590524-1618) on its merits. They argue, however, that even though the ARB reviewed it on its

merits, Grievance #590524-1618 was substantively insufficient to exhaust Plaintiff’s claims.

Because the parties do not dispute that there are only two relevant grievances, there is no

need to discuss Plaintiff’s entire grievance history. Further, the Court’s review of the two relevant

grievances shows that the first grievance is fully incorporated into Grievance #590524-1618.

Accordingly, the Court only needs to address the substantive sufficiency of Grievance #590524-

1618.

Grievance #590524-1618

On June 7, 2024, the ARB received Grievance #590524-1618, dated April 10, 2024. (Doc.

63, ¶ 10; Doc. 67, p. 3). Plaintiff grieved that on April 10, 2024, he was waiting to be transferred

to Stateville-NRC. At that time, he “showed staff” his waist chain permit and was told to show it

to the bus driver. (Doc. 63-4, pp. 158-59). Plaintiff showed the permit to Hicks and Saroka, who

told him that medical waist chains were not allowed on transfer. (Id.). Thereafter, Hicks left to

prepare the transportation bus. At that time, Ezell again showed Saroka his permit, to which Saroka

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responded: “You are not going in medical waist chains on my bus, so I do not care if you file a

grievance later on me,” and that he would be in handcuffs or “going to segregation for failure to

cuff up and refusing transfer.” (Id.). Ezell grieved that, thereafter, he was “cuffed tightly in

retaliation,” resulting in both of his wrists being hurt, damaged, swollen, and bruised. (Id.). Ezell

stated that he explained his prior nerve damage and pain in his spine, neck, shoulder, arm, and

fingertips to Saroka again, to no avail.

In the grievance, Plaintiff requested that he be provided with all “C/O John Does’ names”

that were present in 6-A-wing on April 10, 2024, between 6:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., that all staff

involved be fired without pay, and that Ezell receive monetary compensation for his physical and

emotional injuries. He further requested an investigation and that the video footage of the incident

be preserved. The ARB reviewed Grievance #590524-1618 on the merits and denied it, finding

that the issue had been appropriately handled by the facility and the staff misconduct was not

substantiated. (Doc. 63-4, p. 157).

Claim 1

In Claim 1, Plaintiff first argues that all Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his

wrist issues by failing to honor the waist chain permit. Plaintiff clearly described the claim in

Grievance #590524-1618 regarding Defendants Saroka and Hicks, stating that he showed them the

permit, but they responded that waist chains were not allowed during transfer. Defendants argue

that Plaintiff’s “theory of deliberate indifference due to Defendant [Saroka]’s preexisting

knowledge of Plaintiff’s prior injuries was not properly exhausted” because “Plaintiff did not

allege any such facts.” However, this specific allegation is not an essential element of Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claim. Plaintiff was not required to plead his entire case in the grievance.

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Plaintiff stated in Grievance #590524-1618 that he advised Saroka of his medical waist chain

permit and his prior nerve injuries, but Saroka did not honor the permit. This is sufficient to alert

the institution of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Saroka.

Defendants also argue that the grievance is substantively insufficient as to Plaintiff’s claims

against Saroka because it does not specifically allege that he “bent and contorted Plaintiff’s wrists

in an effort to break them.” Id. The Court agrees that Grievance #590524-1618 does not contain

any factual allegations regarding Saroka’s bending and contorting of Plaintiff’s wrists after

Plaintiff had already been handcuffed, as alleged in the Amended Complaint. This is a distinct

claim of deliberate indifference or use of excessive force against Saroka, which Plaintiff failed to

exhaust before initiating this action. Accordingly, Plaintiff may not proceed with that claim.

As to the Defendants Farmer, Sisney, Shutte, and Westfall, who were originally identified

as John Does 1-4, Defendants argue that Grievance #590524-1618 was insufficient to exhaust

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference or excessive force claims because it did not state “what, if any,

Defendants’ involvement was beyond knowing that Plaintiff had a waist chain permit.” However,

Plaintiff specifically referenced in the grievance that he showed his medical permit to “staff John

Doe[s]” who directed him to show it to the bus drivers. Further, Plaintiff’s use of passive voice

(“Ezell was cuffed up” tightly “under duress” at which time his wrists again got injured) combined

with his requested relief (punishment of all John Does who participated in the grieved conduct—

with specific reference to the location and timeframe in which the misconduct occurred) suggests

that the John Does Defendants either actively participated in his handcuffing or were at least

present during Plaintiff’s handcuffing and failed to intervene. The Grievance Officer’s description

of Plaintiff’s requested relief in its response to Grievance #590524-1618 (to punish C/O John Does

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1-4, C/O Hicks, and Saroka for their failure to honor the wrist permits) supports that reading. (Doc.

63-4, p. 158). Accordingly, the Court finds that Grievance #590524-1618 contained sufficient

factual details to apprise the institution of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference, excessive force, or

failure to intervene claims against those Defendants for not honoring Plaintiff’s medical permit

and for their use of restraints on April 10, 2024.

The Court clarifies, however, that Plaintiff has not exhausted any potential claim against

Hicks for his direct involvement in the handcuffing. Unlike in the Amended Complaint, where

Plaintiff faulted Defendant Hicks for failing to intervene because he allegedly held Plaintiff’s arms

together for Saroka to apply the handcuffs, Grievance #590524-1618 contains no such reference.

Rather, Plaintiff explicitly stated therein that Hicks had already left to prepare the transportation

bus before the forceful handcuffing. There is nothing to indicate Hicks’ presence during that

incident.

Plaintiff also asserts in Claim 1 that Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to any

injuries he sustained as a result of the April 10, 2024, handcuffing (“they refused to acknowledge

the implications of their actions by refusing him medical attention, and that Saroka and Hicks

compounded this problem at the transfer point en route to Stateville”). However, unlike Plaintiff’s

Amended Complaint, Grievance #590524-1618 does not contain any similar allegations to apprise

the institution of the Defendants’ alleged failure to attend to Plaintiff’s medical needs following

the handcuffing. As Defendants correctly point out, Plaintiff did not allege in his grievance that

Defendants “were aware that the handcuffs were inappropriately smashing Plaintiff’s wrists,

causing lacerations all the way to the bone, and that they failed to remove or loosen the cuffs upon

request.” Accordingly, Plaintiff has not exhausted that part of Claim 1.

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Claim 2

As to Claim 2, Defendants argue that Plaintiff did not allege in his grievances that Saroka

had any knowledge of other lawsuits Plaintiff had filed against his “friends,” indicating that

Defendant Saroka’s actions were not retaliatory. Id. The Court agrees. Plaintiff stated in the

grievance that Ezell “was cuffed tightly in retaliation.” (Doc. 63-4, p. 161). But the grievance does

not make any reference to prior lawsuits Plaintiff had filed against Saroka’s friends. Rather,

Plaintiff’s reference to retaliation appears to be connected to his immediately prior insistence that

his medical permit be honored. There is nothing in the grievance to apprise the facility of a

connection between Saroka’s retaliatory conduct and Plaintiff’s prior lawsuits against Saroka’s

friend. Accordingly, Grievance #590524-1618 did not exhaust Plaintiff’s retaliation claim.

Conclusion

For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion

(Doc. 63) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The following claims are DISMISSED

without prejudice: Plaintiff’s claims that Defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to any

injuries he sustained as a result of the April 10, 2024, handcuffing incident (Claim 1); Plaintiff’s

claim against Defendant Hicks for failure to intervene during the forceful handcuffing (Claim 1);

Plaintiff’s use of excessive force or deliberate indifference claim for Defendant Saroka’s bending

and contorting of Plaintiff’s wrists to break them after Plaintiff had already been handcuffed

(Claim 1); and Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Saroka for his

conduct on April 10, 2024 (Claim 2). Plaintiff will proceed against Defendants Saroka and Hicks

for the use of excessive force or deliberate indifference when they denied Plaintiff’s medical waist

chain permit on April 10, 2024 (Claim 1) and for the use of excessive force or deliberate

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indifference or failure to intervene against Defendants Saroka, Farmer, Sisney, Schutte, and

Westfall for their use of restraints for transport on April 10, 2024 (Claim 1).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 12, 2026 . >

(| hOMWES 6 £L1

{ -— )

Hon. Reona J. Daly

United States Magistrate Judge

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