Opinion

Rahmatov

Court
District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Mar 26, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.8%

holding that conditions at Pike County Correctional Facility were indistinguishable from criminal punishment

How later courts described this case

  • holding that conditions at Pike County Correctional Facility were indistinguishable from criminal punishment
  • “This means he will stay in prison as long as it takes the Board to issue its decision.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMSHED RAHIMKULOVICH

RAHMATOV :

Petitioner, 3:26-cv-553

: (JUDGE MARIANI)

V.

FILED

CRAIG LOWE, in his Official Capacity: SCRANTON

as Warden of the Pike County MAR 26 2028

Correctional Facility et a/., :

pen___UP? □

Respondents. DEPUTY CLERK

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. BACKGROUND

On March 5, 2026, Petitioner Jamshed Rahimkulovich Rahmatov (“Petitioner’), a

citizen of Uzbekistan residing in the United States since January 2021, filed a petition for

writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). On February 8, 2022,

Petitioner was arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and charged with Hobbs Act

extortion and money laundering. (Doc. 7 at 2). In November 2022, Petitioner pled guilty in

the Southern District of New York and was sentenced to 66 months in prison. (/d.).

Petitioner was released from BOP custody on or about October 16, 2025, after

completing his criminal sentence. (Doc. 1 at 2). That same day, Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“ICE”) transferred Petitioner to the Pike County Correctional Facility within the

Middle District of Pennsylvania where he remains detained. Two days prior to Petitioner's

release from BOP custody, an Immigration Judge (“lJ”) ordered Petitioner's removal and

that decision is pending before the BIA.

The Petition names as Respondents Craig Lowe, Warden of the Pike County

Correctional Facility; Todd Lyons, Acting Director, ICE; Kristi Noem, Secretary of the United

States Department of Homeland Security; Pamela Bondi, United States Attorney General;

David O'Neill, Acting Field Office Director, ICE ERO Philadelphia Field Office; and the

Department of Homeland Security. (Doc. 1 Jf] 5-10). Respondents are currently detaining

Petitioner pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

Petitioner challenges his prolonged immigration detention and contends his

detention violates the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. (Id. at 2). Specifically, he

alleges that he has “been in continuous federal custody for more than four years” first under

the BOP and then ICE “without any bond hearing or individualized determination of probable

cause or dangerousness.” (/d.). Petitioner “does not dispute his criminal conviction or

removability.” (/d.). Rather, Petitioner “seeks bond—not release—and an opportunity to

pursue his pending asylum appeal with his family in the community.” (/d.). Respondents

oppose the Petition, claiming that his detention is not prolonged and comports with due

process. (Doc. 7). In his reply, Petitioner states for the first time that “[tlhe appropriate

remedy is release with conditions of supervision, or, at a minimum, a bond hearing

conducted by this Court and subject to this Court's direct oversight.” (Doc. 8 at 2).

Il. | STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a federal district court may grant a habeas petition

where a petitioner's immigration detention is “in violation of the Constitution or laws or

treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It is well established that a federal

habeas corpus petitioner generally has the burden of proving facts entitling him to a

discharge from custody. Goins v. Brierley, 464 F.2d 947, 949 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations

omitted).

lll. ANALYSIS

The question before the Court is whether Petitioner's prolonged immigration

detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) violates his due process rights under the Fifth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. “8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) requires the

Government to detain immigrants with certain criminal convictions pending removal without

bond hearings.” Michelin v. Warden Moshannon Valley Corr. Ctr, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL

263483, at * 11 (3d Cir. Feb. 2, 2026). In Jennings, the Supreme Court held that “§ 1226(c)

does not on its face limit the length of the detention it authorizes.” Jennings v. Rodriguez,

583 U.S. 218, 303, 138 S.Ct. 830 (2018). But as applied constitutional challenges to

prolonged immigration detention, like those advanced here, are recognized by the United

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. German Santos v. Warden Pike Cnty. Corr.

Facility, 965 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2020).

To determine whether prolonged detention is unreasonable, a “highly-specific-fact

inquiry,” this Court must consider “a nonexhaustive list of four factors to consider in

assessing whether an alien's detention has grown unreasonable.”! German Santos, 965

F.3d at 210-11. “The most important factor is the duration of detention.” /d. at 211. The

Court must also consider: (1) whether the detention is likely to continue; (2) reasons for the

delay, such as a detainee’s request for continuances; and (3) “whether the alien’s conditions

of confinement are meaningfully different from criminal punishment.”2 /d. If a noncitizen’s

“civil detention under § 1226(c) looks penal, that tilts the scales toward finding the detention

unreasonable.” /d (citations omitted). “And as the length of detention grows, so does the

weight that we give this factor.” Id.

Duration of Detention

Petitioner has been detained by Respondents since October 16, 2025. (Doc. 1 at 2).

At the time he filed his Petition he had been detained for approximately 140 days, or 4

1 “When an alien is first detained, we can presume that detention is needed to prevent flight or danger

to the community.” German Santos, 965 F.3d at 209 (citing Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison,

783 F.3d 469, 474 (3d Cir. 2015)). “The benefit of detaining these aliens as a class outweighs their short-

term deprivation of liberty.” /d. (citing Chavez-Alvarez 783 F.3d at 474). “Eventually, though, that burden

‘outweighs a mere presumption that the alien will flee’ or pose a danger.” /d. (citing Chavez-Alvarez 783 F.3d

at 474-75). At some point, “due process requires the Government to justify continued detention at a bond

hearing.” /d.

2 The Court cannot hold a noncitizen's "good-faith challenge to his appeals or applications for relief"

against him, otherwise that would effectively punish him for pursuing his legal rights and remedies. German

Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. “Nor do we hold the agency's legal errors against the Government, unless there is

evidence of careless or bad faith.” /d.

months and 17 days. As of the date of this writing, Petitioner has been detained for

approximately 161 days, or 5 months and 9 days at the Pike County Correctional Facility.

“There is no presumption of reasonableness or unreasonableness of any duration.”

German Santos, 965 F.3d at 211. The Third Circuit has declined to impose a per se rule

that any detention longer than a specific duration is unreasonable. However, the Third

Circuit finds that, “detention becomes more and more suspect after five months.” /d. at 211.

In German Santos, the Third Circuit held that “detention became unreasonable sometime

between six months and one year” after it began. /d.

As Judge Munley recently recognized in a similar § 1226(c) case, “9.5 months is less

than the periods typically found unreasonable in this district” and that Yirenky/s duration of

detention “weighs against relief at this time.” Yirenkyi v. Hoover, 2026 WL 268230, at *4

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2026) (collecting cases). Here, Petitioner has been detained slightly over

5 months, and the Court finds that the duration of civil immigration detention weighs against

relief at this time. .

Likelihood of Detention

Petitioner has established he is likely to stay detained for some time. Petitioner's

appeal of the lJ’s removal order is currently pending before the BIA. See German Santos,

965 F.3d at 212 (“This means he will stay in prison as long as it takes the Board to issue its

decision.”). Further, if the BIA denies his appeal and affirms the order of removal, Petitioner

may appeal that decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals, as he is entitled to. 8 U.S.C. §

1252(a). No final order of removal exists. Under these circumstances, the Court finds the

second German Santos factor favors granting habeas relief. See Joseph v. Warden, 2026

WL 497532, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2026) (“The second factor, the likelihood that detention

will continue, favors granting habeas relief. Joseph is appealing his removal order to the

BIA, and expresses his intent to appeal to the Third Circuit if necessary.”).

Reasons for the Delay

The Court finds no party is responsible for any delay. Accordingly, this factor is

neutral.

Conditions of Confinement

The Court next finds that Petitioner's civil immigration detention at the Pike County

Correctional Facility “is indistinguishable from criminal punishment.” German Santos, 965

F.3d at 213 (holding that conditions at Pike County Correctional Facility were

indistinguishable from criminal punishment). If a noncitizen’s “civil detention under §

1226(c) looks penal, that tilts the scales toward finding the detention unreasonable.” /d. at

211.

Weighing the German Santos factors, the Court finds that Petitioner's civil

immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) has become unreasonable. Petitioner has

been detained over five months and has demonstrated that he is likely to be detained for an

extended period of time, as his appeal to the BIA remains pending and he is likely to appeal

any forthcoming BIA decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Moreover, because

.

Petitioner's detention looks penal, that tips the scales toward a finding that his detention has

become unreasonable. The next question is the appropriate remedy.

Remedy

Petitioners initially sought only a bond hearing, not his release from custody. (Doc. 1

at 2). The Third Circuit in German Santos found the appropriate remedy for prolonged civil

immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) was a prompt and individualized bond

hearing. In that bond hearing, “the Government must put forth clear and convincing

evidence that continued detention is necessary.” German Santos, 965 F.3d 213. Because

this Court finds Petitioner's continued detention is unreasonable, at the bond hearing

required by German Santos the Government “must show,” by clear and convincing

evidence, that Petitioner “would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if released.”

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's habeas petition will be granted in part.

Respondents shall provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an IJ within

days of the date of the accompanying Order. At that hearing, Respondents will bear

the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner's continued

detention is necessary because he presents a flight risk or danger to the community if

released. : .

3 The Court will not order Petitioner released from custody, as he requests in his Reply. Nor will it, as

Petitioner requests, conduct the bond hearing itself. The appropriate remedy for unreasonable prolonged

civil immigration detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) is an individualized bond hearing before an IJ. German

Santos, 965 F.3d at 213.

h □

obert D. Mariani

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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