Covington

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

HOT SPRINGS DIVISION

GARY WAYNE COVINGTON, PLAINTIFF

vs. Civil No. 6:25-cv-06094

FRANK BISIGNANO, DEFENDANT

Commissioner, Social Security Administration

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Gary Wayne Covington (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to § 205(g) of Title XVI

of the Social Security Act (“The Act”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final

decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his

application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Act.

The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge to conduct any and all

proceedings in this case, including conducting the trial, ordering the entry of a final judgment, and

conducting all post-judgment proceedings. (ECF No. 6.) Pursuant to this authority, the Court

issues this memorandum opinion and orders the entry of a final judgment in this matter.

1. Background

Plaintiff filed his disability application on March 22, 2023. (Tr. 14.)1 In this application,

0F

Plaintiff alleged being disabled due to schizophrenia, PTSD, and bipolar disorder. (Tr. 272.)

1 The docket numbers for this case are referenced by the designation “ECF No. ___.” The transcript

pages for this case are referenced by the designation “Tr.” and refer to the document filed at ECF

No. 8. These references are to the page number of the transcript itself not the ECF page number.

Plaintiff alleged an onset date of January 1, 2015. (Tr. 14.) Plaintiff’s application was denied

initially on July 27, 2023, and again upon reconsideration on February 16, 2024. Id.

Plaintiff requested an administrative hearing on his denied application, and this request was

granted. (Tr. 14.) An Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) conducted the hearing on September

23, 2024. (Tr. 33-63.) At this hearing, Plaintiff was present and represented by Randolph Mark

Baltz. (Tr. 14.) Plaintiff and Vocational Expert (“VE”), Elizabeth Clem, both testified at the

hearing. Id.

On October 16, 2024, the ALJ entered an unfavorable decision. (Tr. 14-24.) In this

decision, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March

22, 2023. (Tr. 16, Finding 1.) The ALJ also determined Plaintiff has the severe impairments of

bradycardia, hypertension, obesity, depressive disorder, schizophrenia, bipolar type, anxiety

disorder, and posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). (Tr. 16, Finding 2.) Despite being severe,

the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets

or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments. (Tr. 17, Finding 3.)

The ALJ also determined Plaintiff has the Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) to

perform medium work with the exception of

he can maintain concentration, persistence and pace for simple tasks; can

understand, carry out and remember simple work instructions and procedures; can

adapt to changes in the work setting are simple, predictable and can be easily

explained; and he can occasionally interact with co-workers, supervisors and the

public.

(Tr. 19, Finding 4.) The ALJ then determined Plaintiff has no Past Relevant Work (“PRW”). (Tr.

23, Finding 5.) Finally, the ALJ determined that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work

experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, such

as laundry worker with 70,000 jobs in the national economy and commercial cleaner with 45,000

jobs in the national economy. (Tr. 23, Finding 9.) Based upon these findings, the ALJ determined

Plaintiff has not been disabled under the Act from March 22, 2023, through the date of the decision.

(Tr. 24, Finding 10.)

On September 5, 2025, Plaintiff filed the present appeal. (ECF No. 2.) Both parties filed

appeal briefs. (ECF Nos. 10, 12.) This case is now ready for decision.

2. Applicable Law

In reviewing this case, the Court is required to determine whether the Commissioner’s

findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);

Ramirez v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 576, 583 (8th Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence is less than a

preponderance of the evidence, but it is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to

support the Commissioner’s decision. See Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1147 (8th Cir. 2001).

If substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion, the Court cannot reverse simply

because substantial evidence also supports a different outcome. Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963,

968 (8th Cir. 2010); Haley v. Massanari, 258 F.3d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 2001). Therefore, “if after

reviewing the record, the court finds it is possible to draw two inconsistent positions from the

evidence and one of those positions represents the ALJ’s findings, the court must affirm the ALJ’s

decision.” Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790-91 (8th Cir. 2005); Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065,

1068 (8th Cir. 2000).

It is well-established that a claimant for Social Security disability benefits has the burden

of proving his or her disability by establishing a physical or mental disability that lasted at least

one year and prevents him or her from engaging in any substantial gainful activity. See 42 U.S.C.

§§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A), Cox v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 1203, 1206 (8th Cir. 1998). The Act

defines a “physical or mental impairment” as “an impairment that results from anatomical,

physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable

clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), 1382(3)(c). A plaintiff

must show his or her disability, not simply his or her impairment, has lasted for at least twelve

consecutive months. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).

To determine whether the adult claimant suffers from a disability, the Commissioner uses

the familiar five-step sequential evaluation. He determines: (1) whether the claimant is presently

engaged in a “substantial gainful activity”; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that

significantly limits the claimant’s physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities;

(3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling

impairment listed in the regulations (if so, the claimant is disabled without regard to age, education,

and work experience); (4) whether the claimant has the RFC to perform his or her past relevant

work; and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner

to prove there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform. See Cox, 160

F.3d at 1206; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(f). The fact finder only considers the plaintiff’s age,

education, and work experience in light of their RFC if the final stage of this analysis is reached.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

3. Discussion

In his appeal brief, Plaintiff raised the following arguments for reversal: (1) the ALJ failed

to properly formulate the RFC based on substantial evidence and (2) the ALJ failed to properly

evaluate Plaintiff’s subjective allegations. (ECF No. 10.) In response, Defendant argues

substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings and the ALJ properly evaluated Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints. (ECF No. 12.)

A. RFC Determination

In this matter, the ALJ determined Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform medium work.

(Tr. 19-23.) Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred in this RFC determination. (ECF No. 10, pgs. 3-18.)

However, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.

Prior to Step Four of the sequential analysis in a disability determination, the ALJ is

required to determine a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). This RFC

determination must be based on medical evidence that addresses the claimant’s ability to function

in the workplace. See Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004). The ALJ should

consider “‘all the evidence in the record’ in determining the RFC, including ‘the medical records,

observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual’s own description of his

limitations.’” Stormo v. Barnhart, 377 F.3d 801, 807 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Krogmeier v.

Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019 (8th Cir. 2002)). The Plaintiff has the burden of producing documents

and evidence to support his or her claimed RFC. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A);

Cox, 160 F.3d at 1206. The mere fact a claimant has a long list of medical conditions does not

demonstrate that person is disabled; instead, the RFC determination is a function-by-function

analysis. See SSR 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 (July 2, 1996). “The RFC assessment considers only

functional limitations and restrictions that result from an individual’s medically determinable

impairment or combination of impairments, including the impact of any related symptoms.” Id.

The ALJ, however, bears the primary responsibility for making the RFC determination and

for ensuring there is “some medical evidence” regarding the claimant’s “ability to function in the

workplace” that supports the RFC determination. Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700, 703-04 (8th Cir.

2001). Furthermore, this Court is required to affirm the ALJ’s RFC determination if that

determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See McKinney v.

Apfel, 228 F.3d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 2000).

Based upon this standard and a review of Plaintiff’s records and allegations in this case,

the Court cannot find Plaintiff has demonstrated having any greater limitations than those found

by the ALJ. The ALJ provided a thorough summary of Plaintiff’s medical records and subjective

complaints in this matter. The mere fact Plaintiff suffered from several impairments does not

demonstrate he had more limitations than those found in the RFC assessment.

Although Plaintiff claims the ALJ failed to base his RFC determination on substantial

evidence and erred by not properly considering Plaintiff’s subjective allegations regarding

hallucinations and his schizophrenia diagnosis, the ALJ based his decision on substantial evidence.

This includes medical opinions from Ouachita Behavioral Health & Wellness, Maxine Ruddock,

Ph.D., Graham Reid, M.D., Jesica Tucker, LMSW, Kenneth B. Jones, Ph.D., and Denise Hudson,

APRN. (Tr. 652-773, 830-842, 878-933, 1015-1128, 65-71, 72-82, 623-625, 871-877, and 934-

936.)

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination. Plaintiff has the burden of

establishing his claimed RFC. See Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting

Eichelberger v. Barnhart, 390 F.3d 584, 590 (8th Cir. 2004)). Because Plaintiff has not met this

burden in this case and because the ALJ’s RFC determination is supported by sufficient medical

evidence, the ALJ’s RFC determination should be affirmed.

B. Subjective Allegations

Plaintiff also claims the ALJ erred in evaluating his subjective allegations of disability.

(ECF No. 10, pgs. 18-20.) In assessing the subjective allegations of a claimant, the ALJ is required

to examine and to apply the five factors from Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984) or

from 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929.2 See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th

1F

Cir. 2007). The factors to consider are as follows: (1) the claimant’s daily activities; (2) the

duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the

dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; and (5) the functional restrictions. See

Polaski, 739 at 1322.

The factors must be analyzed and considered in light of the claimant’s subjective

allegations of pain. See id. The ALJ is not required to methodically discuss each factor if the ALJ

acknowledges and examines these factors prior to discounting the claimant’s subjective

allegations. See Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 971-72 (8th Cir. 2000). If the ALJ properly applies

these five factors and gives several valid reasons for finding that the Plaintiff’s subjective

allegations are not entirely valid, the ALJ’s determination is entitled to deference. See id.; Cox v.

Barnhart, 471 F.3d 902, 907 (8th Cir. 2006). The ALJ, however, cannot discount Plaintiff’s

subjective allegations “solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them

[the subjective complaints].” Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322.

When discounting a claimant’s allegations of pain, the ALJ must make a specific

evaluation of a claimant’s subjective allegations, articulating the reasons for discrediting the

testimony, addressing any inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors. See Baker v. Apfel,

2 Social Security Regulations 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 require the

analysis of two additional factors: (1) “treatment, other than medication, you receive or have

received for relief of your pain or other symptoms” and (2) “any measures you use or have used

to relieve your pain or symptoms (e.g., lying flat on your back, standing for 15 to 20 minutes every

hour, sleeping on a board, etc.).” However, under Polaski and its progeny, the Eighth Circuit has

not yet required the analysis of these additional factors. See Shultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983

(2007). Thus, this Court will not require the analysis of these additional factors in this case.

159 F.3d 1140, 1144 (8th Cir. 1998). The inability to work without some pain or discomfort is not

a sufficient reason to find a Plaintiff disabled within the strict definition of the Act. The issue is

not the existence of pain, but whether the pain a Plaintiff experiences precludes the performance

of substantial gainful activity. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1991).

In the present action, the ALJ fully complied with Polaski in his evaluation of Plaintiff’s

subjective allegations. (Tr. 19-23.) The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s daily activities, including that

he went to church three to four times a week, used his four-wheeler and boat, and went camping

and deer hunting. (Tr. 21, 20.) The ALJ also discussed Plaintiff’s medication, specifically the use

of Prazosin, Topamax, Bupropion, Lamotrigine, Hydroxyzine, and Zyprexa. (Tr. 20.) Finally, the

ALJ opined the RFC is “supported by some of the claimant’s own subjective allegations, the

relatively benign objective findings, the conservative degree of treatment the claimant has

received, [and] the claimant’s response to the treatment.” (Tr. 22-23.)

4. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the decision of the ALJ, denying

benefits to Plaintiff, is supported by substantial evidence, and should be affirmed. A judgment

incorporating these findings will be entered pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52 and

58.

ENTERED this 26th day of May 2026.

Spencer G. Singleton

/s/

HONORABLE SPENCER G. SINGLETON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE