Cremeans

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

NICOLETTE CREMEANS, et al., :

:

Plaintiffs, : Case No. 2:19-cv-02703

:

v. : Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

:

SAMANTHA TACZAK, et al., : Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

:

Defendants. :

AMENDED OPINION & ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion to Stay Execution of the

Court’s Order and Collection on the Judgment Pending Appeal and Request to Waive Bond and

Security Requirements (“Motion”). (ECF No. 277). The Defendants seek a stay under Rule 62(b),

but request that any bond requirement be waived. (Id.). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’

Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

On October 23, 2025, Plaintiffs Nicolette Cremeans and James Cremeans filed a Notice of

Appeal. (ECF No. 271). Plaintiffs appeal this Court’s Final Judgment Order (ECF No. 221), Post-

Judgment Order (ECF No. 269), and all prior interlocutory and post-judgment orders that merge

into, or otherwise affect, the Final Judgment. (Id.). Subsequently on October 27, 2025, Defendants

Keith Washburn and the City of Chillicothe, Ohio cross-appealed. (ECF No. 274). A day later,

Defendants filed this Motion requesting an order staying enforcement of the Jury Award (ECF No.

218), the Final Judgment (ECF No. 221), and this Court’s Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for

Attorney’s Fees (ECF No. 269). (See ECF No. 277). Additionally, Defendants request any bond

associated with the stay be waived given the Final Judgment here involves a political subdivision

of the state and therefore “the City itself—a constant with taxing authority— constitutes adequate

security for the judgment pending appeal.” (Id.).

On October 30, 2025, this Court issued an Order granting Defendants’ Motion to Stay and

Request to Waive Bond. (ECF No. 280). That same day, however, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to

Clarify and Motion for Extension of Time to reply to Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 281).

Accordingly, this Court issued an Order (ECF No. 282) holding in abeyance Defendants’ Motion

to Stay and this Court’s Order Granting the Stay (ECF Nos. 277; 280). Plaintiffs have since filed

an Opposition Motion to Defendants’ Motion to Waive Supersedeas Bond (ECF No. 284), and

Defendants have submitted their reply in support of the Motion (ECF No. 287). Accordingly, this

Court now addresses those motions.

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

Under Federal Rule of Procedure 62(b), a party may obtain a stay any time after judgment

is entered by providing a bond or other security. The Rule has a “dual protective role” that balances

protecting “both parties’ interests, as it ensures that the prevailing party will recover in full if the

decision is affirmed, while protecting the other side against a risk that it will not be able to recover

any payment made in the event a decision is reversed.” See Buckhorn Inc. v. Orbis Corp., 2014

WL 4377811, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 2014); Sofco Erectors, Inc. v. Trustees of Ohio Operating

Engineers Pension Fund, 2021 WL 858728, *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2021). The Sixth Circuit,

however, has clarified that “the Rule in no way necessarily implies that filing a bond is the only

way to obtain a stay. It speaks only to stays granted as a matter of right, it does not speak to stays

granted by the court in accordance with its discretion.” Arban v. W. Pub. Corp., 345 F.3d 390, 409

(6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. Prescription Serv., Inc. v. Am. Pharm. Ass'n, 636 F.2d 755, 759 (D.C.

Cir. 1980)). Accordingly, the court may use its discretion to waive bond when presented with

“extraordinary circumstances.” Hamlin v. Charter Township of Flint, 181 F.R.D. 348, 353

(E.D.Mich.1998). Further, while “supersedeas bond is ‘almost always’ required, the Sixth Circuit

has held that waiver of the bond requirement is appropriate where the court is confident that the

judgment debtor has adequate financial resources to satisfy the judgment.” Gould Elecs. Inc. v.

Livingston Cnty. Rd. Comm., 2021 WL 1526277, *2 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 19, 2021). “[T]he court has

no discretion to deny the stay itself, but only to fix the amount of (or to waive) the bond.” Frommert

v. Conkright, 639 F.Supp.2d 305, 308 (W.D.N.Y.2009).

Here, Defendants assert that their statuses as a political subdivision of the state and an

indemnified employee of such makes their ability to pay the bond so obvious as to render the need

for a bond unnecessary. (ECF No. 277 at 4) (citing Gillispie v. City of Miami Twp., 2024 WL

897592, *2 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 1, 2024). Defendants also highlight that the City’s financials are a

matter of public record, and attach an affidavit of Defendant, Keith Washburn, attesting to his

community ties and his ability to pay in order to establish that the Judgments are secure without

bond. (ECF No. 287 at 3). In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that waiver of bond is not warranted, as

the Defendants failed either to provide any financial documentation supporting their ability to pay

or present extraordinary circumstances that would dispose of the bond requirement. (ECF No. 284

at 4-6; 11). Additionally, Plaintiffs contest that Defendant Washburn merely speculates that the

City will indemnify him and fails to provide adequate support of his or the City’s ability to satisfy

the Final Judgement. (Id. at 6-7).

Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ failure to address their Gillispie arguments regarding the

City’s status as a constant with taxing authority ends the bond analysis; however, this Court finds

Gillispie distinguishable from the current case. (See ECF No. 287 at 1). In Gillispie, the Township

did not set forth ability to post bond and the court instead ascertained the Township’s inability to

post bond from public record. Gillispie, 2024 WL 897592 at *5; (ECF No. 287 at 3). Additionally,

the court noted that the Township’s status as a sovereign entity with taxing authority provided

security for the judgment; however, this was not the sole reason that the court waived bond.

Gillispie, 2024 WL 897592 at *5. Rather, the Gillespie court also reasoned that enforcing a bond

against the Township would cause substantial economic harm given the judgment against it far

exceeded the Township’s annual budget. (Id.). Hence, absent similar extraordinary circumstances,

this Court does not find that Defendants’ statuses alone warrant waiver of the bond. See Hoge v.

Honda of America Mfg., Inc., 2003 WL 1338227, *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2003).

Further, considering the dual protective role of Rule 62, this Court finds that a bond will

best protect Plaintiffs interests. Hamlin, 181 F.R.D. at 351. Thus, although, this Court does not

dispute Defendants’ ability to pay the Judgment, this Court will exercise its discretion in ordering

Defendants to post bond, especially considering the length of time since final Judgment was

entered and the potential length of time it will take to resolve the pending appeals. Finally, “[c]ourts

generally require that the amount of the bond include the full amount owed under the award, post-

judgment interest, attorney's fees and costs.” Verhoff v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 2007 WL

4303743, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 2007). Post-judgment interest should include “a reasonable

estimate of the postjudgment interest that will accrue during the pendency of the appeal.” Jack

Henry & Assoc., Inc. v. BSC, Inc., 753 F.Supp.2d 665, 673 (E.D. Ky. 2010), aff'd, 487 F. App’x

246 (6th Cir. 2012). This Court estimates the appeal process will take no more than two years. As

such, this Court reasonably estimates post-judgment interest for the purpose of the supersedeas to

be $ 1,290.09 (for two years at the rate of 4.3%).1 This Court notes, however, that the post-

1 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961 this Court calculated post-judgment interest from the date of the entry of judgment

(December 6, 2024), at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by

judgment interest calculation here is a reasonable estimate that only applies for the purposes of

supersedeas bond, given that the true amount of post-judgment interest is not ascertainable at this

time.

I. CONCLUSION

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, and for good cause shown, this Court GRANTS

in part and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Stay Execution of the Court’s Order and

Collection on the Judgment Pending Appeal and Request to Waive Bond (ECF No. 277). This case

is STAYED pending the posting of bond in the full amount of the Final Judgement ($15,001.00)

plus attorney’s fees ($356,405), costs ($2,266.55), and post-judgment interest ($1,290.09). The

Defendants are hereby ORDERED to post a supersedeas bond with the Clerk of this Court in

amount of $374, 962.64. This Court’s October 30, 2025, Order (ECF No. 280) is VACATED.

IT ISSO ORDERED.

M4 L. i

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: March 11, 2026

the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding (November 29, 2024, at

4.3%). See 28 U.S.C. § 1961; Jack Henry & Assocs., 753 F.Supp.2d at 667; Barrett v. Detroit Heading, LLC, 2007

WL 2649714, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 10, 2007). Postyjudgment interest at a rate of 4.3% for two years on the damages

($15,001.00 x 0.043 x 2 years) = $1,290.09.