Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MARK SILVA, JR., CASE NO. 3:24 CV 1547

Plaintiff,

v. JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II

DONALD J. KREAGER, JR., et al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

Defendants. ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended

Complaint Instanter. (Doc. 55). Defendants1 opposed (Docs. 56, 58), and Plaintiff replied (Doc.

60). Also pending is the parties’ Joint Motion to Stay (Doc. 65). For the reasons discussed below,

the Court grants both Motions.

BACKGROUND2

This case stems from a traffic stop on October 15, 2023, where Defendant Kreager and an

unnamed officer stopped and detained Plaintiff3 for a traffic violation. (Doc. 16, at 5). Plaintiff was

experiencing an altered mental state, which Plaintiff states was immediately apparent and that a

history of mental health issues was known by “local police.” Id. Plaintiff told the officers he needed

1. Defendant Officer Donald J. Kreager, Jr., a police officer for the Genoa Police Department, filed

the first opposition. (Doc. 56). Defendant Officers E. Sandwisch, S. Gable, and A. Webb, and

Sargeant J. Martin, police officers for the Oregon Police Department, then joined in Defendant

Kreager’s Opposition and incorporated such into their own opposition. (Doc. 58, at 1). These

opposing Defendants are collectively referred to as “Defendants” herein.

2. The facts in this section are taken from Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint.

3. Plaintiff Mark Silva, Jr. filed this case on behalf of his late father, Mark Anthony Silva, who is

also a named Plaintiff. For clarity, Mark Anthony Silva is referred to as “Plaintiff” herein.

medication, and EMTs transported him from the traffic stop location to St. Charles Hospital in

Oregon, Ohio. Id. Kreager followed him to the hospital. Id.

Upon Plaintiff’s discharge, Kreager handcuffed and escorted him to a police car in the

hospital parking lot. Id. In Plaintiff’s “altered mental state,” he “meandered away” from Kreager

in the parking lot; Kreager told him to stop and deployed his taser twice, causing Plaintiff to fall

to the ground. Id. Kreager then “yanked” Plaintiff up and toward the ambulance bay. Id. at 6.

Plaintiff stopped walking when he reached the sidewalk, and Kreager responded by “taking [him]

down onto the sidewalk with force.” Id. Kreager called for backup, continuing to restrain Plaintiff

and push on his head, neck, and chest while Plaintiff repeated: “I’m gonna die.” Id. Defendants

Sandwisch and Gable then joined in restraining Plaintiff. Id. While pushing down on Plaintiff’s

head and back, Sandwisch struck Plaintiff’s body with his knee before “yank[ing]” his cuffed

wrists over his head and kneeling on his forearm while Kreager “climbed on top of [Plaintiff] and

pushed down on his back.” Id. The First Amended Complaint continues to detail violence to

Plaintiff by Kreager, and states Defendants Webb and Martin also joined in the restraint efforts

against him. Id. at 6–8.

Plaintiff eventually went silent and stopped moving. Id. at 8. Officers continued to hold

him down and re-cuffed him before turning him over to see his lips had turned blue. Id.

Approximately two minutes after Plaintiff had gone silent, Kreager asked if he should start chest

compressions; no officer attempted chest compressions, CPR, or called 911. Id. at 9. Medical

personnel at the hospital were notified, but Plaintiff alleges they lacked appropriate urgency. Id.

Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint on September 11, 2024, alleging excessive force,

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, failure to intervene, assault and battery, and

reckless breach of duty against the Defendant Officers; medical malpractice against the medical

personnel Defendants; and negligence against the hospital Defendants. See Doc. 1. On October 18,

2024, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint, adding the true identities of the then-John Doe

Defendants. (Doc. 16).

Plaintiff now requests leave to file a Second Amended Complaint to add the Village of

Genoa, Ohio (the “Village”) and the City of Oregon, Ohio (the “City”) as new party Defendants,

thereby including them in the existing constitutional claims. The proposed Second Amended

Complaint further adds an eighth cause of action explicitly alleging Monell liability and includes

“allegations reflecting the newly-discovered facts” Plaintiff claims justify amendment. (Doc. 55,

at 7).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

After amending a pleading once, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing

party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The court should “freely

give leave when justice so requires.” Id. “In the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such

as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue

of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules

require, be ‘freely given.’” Parchman v. SLM Corp., 896 F.3d 728, 736 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)). An amendment is futile “if the amendment could not

withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Beydoun v. Sessions, 871 F.3d 459, 469 (6th Cir.

2017) (quoting Riverview Health Inst. LLC v. Med. Mut. of Ohio, 601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir.

2010)).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff seeks leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, which adds claims against two

new parties, the Village of Genoa and City of Oregon. (Doc. 55, at 1). Plaintiff seeks to add these

new parties as Defendants to his existing constitutional claims, allege a stand-alone Monell liability

claim against both municipalities, and include the newly discovered evidence in those claims’

factual bases. Id.; see Doc. 55-1; Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Plaintiff

contends he brought this Motion as soon as reasonably practicable upon new evidence found

during discovery. (Doc. 55, at 1).

Defendants oppose. See Docs. 56, 58. First, they argue undue delay, citing the extensive

discovery efforts already undertaken. (Doc. 56, at 4). Second, Defendants contend Plaintiff

repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies in his Complaint, citing the “notice” Plaintiff received of

these purportedly new claims through an affirmative defense in Defendant Kreager’s Answer to

the First Amended Complaint. Id. at 5–6. Third, Defendants argue allowing amendment would

result in undue prejudice. Id. at 6–8. Finally, Defendants claim amendment would be futile. Id. at

8–9; Doc. 58. The Court discusses each argument in turn and concludes Plaintiff shall be permitted

to amend.

Undue Delay

Defendants claim Plaintiff’s request for leave to file a second amended complaint was

unduly delayed. (Doc. 56, at 4–5). They note the request comes nearly a year after the First

Amended Complaint’s filing and that discovery was already “largely under way.” Id. at 4.

Defendants particularly take issue with the fact that representatives of both proposed new parties

have been deposed for “extended periods of time,” the hardships associated with re-deposing them,

and that Plaintiff cites no authority supporting re-deposition. Id. at 4–5.

In analyzing whether there has been undue delay, this Court must “weigh the cause shown

for the delay against the resulting prejudice to the opposing party.” Johnson v. Ventra Grp., Inc.,

1997 WL 468332, at *2 (6th Cir.) (citing Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 873

(6th Cir. 1973)). “Delay, standing alone, is an insufficient basis for denying leave to amend, and

this is true no matter how long the delay.” Wallace Hardware Co. v. Abrams, 223 F.3d 382, 409

(6th Cir. 2000) (citing Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 559–62 (6th Cir. 1986)); Tefft v.

Seward, 689 F.2d 637, 640 n.2 (6th Cir. 1982) (“Delay that is neither intended to harass nor causes

any ascertainable prejudice is not a permissible reason, in and of itself[,] to disallow an amendment

of a pleading.”).

Defendants argue prejudice would result from the costs, travel, missed work, stress, and

inconvenience associated with re-taking depositions and continued litigation. (Doc. 56, at 4–5).

But Plaintiff maintains any additional discovery will be “extremely limited in scope,” and has

stated no intent to re-depose the municipal representatives. (Doc. 55, at 10; Doc. 60, at 2). And at

the time the Motion was filed, discovery remained open for nearly two more months.4 See Osborn

v. Griffin, 2013 WL 12176849, at *2 (E.D. Ky.) (“[A] defendant’s claim it would have to bear the

expense of conducting a second round of discovery, including re-deposing the plaintiff, was

insufficient prejudice to deny the motion for leave to amend the complaint, which was filed while

discovery was ongoing.”) (citing Janikowski v. Bendix Corp., 823 F.2d 945, 951–52 (6th Cir.

1987)). Additional discovery under these circumstances does not amount to prejudice. See

Verragio, Ltd. v. Signet Jewelers Ltd., 2021 WL 4813279, at *4 (N.D. Ohio) (“[C]ourts have found

[] the defendant suffered little or no prejudice if the alleged prejudice is merely the ‘additional

4. While those deadlines have now passed, the Court extended discovery while Plaintiff’s Motion

was pending and, as discussed below, case deadlines will be further reset to accommodate

additional required discovery. See this Court’s non-document Order dated January 5, 2026.

expense and inconvenience of defending against [the] new claims’ or if ‘the dates for discovery

cut-off . . . ha[s] not yet . . . elapsed.”) (internal citations omitted). Further, Plaintiff offers sufficient

cause for the delay—he required discovery to be able to plausibly state the claims he now wishes

to add.

Thus, the Court finds there was no undue delay in the filing of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave

to File Second Amended Complaint.

Repeated Failure to Cure

Defendants next contend Plaintiff has had notice of a potential Monell claim since the filing

of Defendant Kreager’s Answer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint because it raised an

affirmative defense grounded in the reasoning of Monell. See Doc. 56, at 5 (citing Doc. 18, at 4)

(noting Defendant Kreager’s fourteenth affirmative defense states “[t]here was no policy, custom,

or practice that resulted in any constitutional violation of Plaintiff’s claims”). Defendants argue

prior notice of such a deficiency is a “critical factor[] in determining whether an amendment should

be granted.” (Doc. 56, at 6) (quoting Pittman v. Franklin, 282 F. App’x 418, 425 (6th Cir. 2008).

But Plaintiff asserts he did not have a sound factual basis to assert these claims prior to completing

the depositions on September 29, 2025, and October 7, 2025. (Doc. 55, at 4–6; Doc. 60, at 5). He

argues any earlier attempt to amend would have failed under Federal Civil Rule 8, as he first

gathered enough factual support to plead a viable Monell claim during discovery. See Doc. 60, at

5. The Court agrees.

Discovery often provides the factual development necessary to move a Monell theory into

the realm of plausibility. See King v. Blackhawk Recovery & Investigations, LLC, 2017 WL

5992367, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Mich) (noting, after dismissing a Monell claim, “[d]iscovery or other

avenues may yet reveal facts that would support Monell liability; if so, [plaintiff] may seek leave

to amend to add such a claim”) (typeface altered). Even if Defendant Kreager’s Answer arguably

signaled Monell-related issues, it did not provide Plaintiff with factual material to state a viable

municipal liability claim. And courts have left open the opportunity to amend where discovery

provides the facts necessary to state a plausible Monell claim. See Pierce v. Bailey, 2023 WL

11892358, at *1 (W.D. Mich.) (“Plaintiff may seek to amend at a later date with sufficient

allegations if discovery reveals a plausible basis for a Monell claim.”).

Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff did not repeatedly fail to cure deficiencies in the First

Amended Complaint so as to preclude his Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.

Undue Prejudice

Defendants’ argument of undue prejudice largely echoes that of undue delay. They expand

on their argument regarding the hardship they may face in expanding discovery to include the

Monell claims. (Doc. 56, at 7). But the cases relied upon are not on point; they are composed of

circumstances in which those courts initially found undue delay. See, e.g., id. at 8 (citing Johnson

v. City of Detroit, 2008 WL 4940589 (E.D. Mich.) (denying a plaintiff’s request to amend when it

was submitted over a month after all discovery deadlines ended and the court found undue delay)).

And, as discussed supra, this Court not only finds no undue delay in the filing of the present

Motion, but also the hardships Defendants cite are inflated given Plaintiff’s narrow and limited

requests.

Thus, this Court finds no undue prejudice which would require denial of Plaintiff’s Motion

for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint.

Futility

Defendants’ final argument is that amendment would be futile. (Doc. 56, at 9; Doc. 58, at

1–7). An amendment is futile if, even with the proposed changes, the complaint fails to state a

claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Greer v. Strange Honey Farm, LLC, 114 F.4th 605, 617 (6th Cir. 2024).

Because the 12(b)(6) standard is used to analyze futility, this Court construes Plaintiff’s Motion

liberally in his favor and accepts all factual allegations and permissible inferences as true. See Ed

Schmidt Pontiac-GMC Truck, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., 538 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1034

(N.D. Ohio 2008). A claim cannot withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if it “fail[s] to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. Defendants make several arguments as to why

Plaintiff’s new claims would not survive this analysis. See Docs. 56, 58. For the reasons set forth

below, the Court finds those arguments unpersuasive.

The Second Amended Complaint includes two new parties, the Village and the City. (Doc.

55-1, at 4–5). It states the Village of Genoa was the employer of Defendant Kreager and the City

of Oregon was the employer of Defendants Sandwisch, Gable, Webb, and Martin. Id. It also asserts

these municipal entities are “responsible for the policies, practices, customs, training, and

supervision of their respective police departments,” which included the care and treatment of

Plaintiff. Id. at 12. It further adds allegations regarding the entities’ review and ratification of

Defendants’ conduct, the lack of adequate policies as to pertinent risks and tactics, and the failure

to provide proper practices, customs, training, and supervision to its officers. See id. at 12–13. It

contends these failures and deficiencies “encouraged” and were the “moving force” behind

Defendants’ acts, and names the City and Village as Defendants to four Counts: (1) Count I for

excessive force; (2) Count II for deliberate indifference; (3) Count III for failure to intervene; and

(4) a new Count VIII for Monell liability. See id. at 14–20.

Plaintiff’s claims against the Village and City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force,

deliberate indifference, and failure to intervene are based on his allegation that those entities “were

the moving force behind” the officers’ violations of Plaintiff’s rights, and thus subject to Monell

liability for them. (Doc. 55-1, at 14–16). The facts incorporated to support these three counts are

those stated relating to policy, custom, ratification of officer actions, and training. See id. Count

VIII, Plaintiff’s Monell claim, which also falls under § 1983, specifically alleges Defendants’

unconstitutional actions were made “pursuant to one or more interrelated de facto policies (written

and/or unwritten), practices, customs, supervision of officers, and tolerance and ratification in the

police departments of the” Village and City. Id. at 19–20.

In Monell and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has “required a plaintiff seeking to

impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 to identify a municipal ‘policy’ or ‘custom’ that

caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). “To

prevail on a claim against a municipality under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish both: (1) the

deprivation of a constitutional right; and (2) the [municipality]’s responsibility for that violation.”

Houpt v. City of Cleveland, 2013 WL 6330905, at *2 (N.D. Ohio). “[T]he plaintiff must also

demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind

the injury alleged.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404. “That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal

action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link

between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Id. As Defendants note, a

municipality is not subject to liability under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell,

436 U.S. at 691; see Doc. 56, at 9; Doc. 58, at 1–2. But Plaintiff does not bring his claims under

such a theory. (Doc. 60, at 8).

There are four avenues a plaintiff can use to prove a Monell claim: “(1) the municipality’s

legislative enactments or official agency policies; (2) actions taken by officials with final decision-

making authority; (3) a policy of inadequate training or supervision; or (4) a custom of tolerance

or acquiescence of federal rights violations.” Thomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429

(6th Cir. 2005). Defendants’ remaining arguments target the Second Amended Complaint’s ability

to adequately state a claim under any of those avenues, but, as discussed below, the Court finds

the proposed amendments provide enough support for § 1983 claims such that they are not futile.

Defendants contend policies under Monell cannot be established by a single instance of

alleged misconduct. (Doc. 58, at 2, 3). And while that is true when a single act serves as the sole

basis for liability under Monell, Defendants fail to provide any meaningful argument or analysis

as applied to this case. See id. The Second Amended Complaint contains allegations not just of the

single instance of misconduct in question, but also of lack of pertinent policies, lack of proper

guidance as to other policies and practices, inadequate training and supervision, and tolerance and

ratification of misconduct. See Doc. 55-1, at 12–14. As detailed below, these additional allegations

support a plausible Monell claim.

Defendants also contend Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not support a ratification theory.

The Second Amended Complaint asserts both police departments ratified unconstitutional conduct

through their investigation and response to this incident, and their failure to discipline Defendants

is evidence of tolerance for such tactics and actions. See Doc. 55-1, at 13. But Defendants assert

“[r]atification must precede the illegal act and resulting injury.” (Doc. 58, at 3). And they are

correct that such circumstances cannot be the sole basis forming Monell liability. The Sixth Circuit

has held “[a] plaintiff can establish municipal liability by showing that the municipality ratifies the

unconstitutional acts of its employees by failing to meaningfully investigate and punish allegations

of unconstitutional conduct.” Wright v. City of Euclid, 962 F.3d 852, 882 (6th Cir. 2020). But “a

local government’s failure to investigate the plaintiff’s claim cannot alone be the basis of Monell

liability—a faulty post hoc investigation can never be the cause of an injury that already occurred.”

Palma v. Johns, 2022 WL 4080629, at *4 (N.D. Ohio) (citing Smith v. City of Troy, 874 F.3d 938,

947 (6th Cir. 2017)). “To establish Monell liability for ratification based on a failure to investigate,

a plaintiff needs to show ‘“not only an inadequate investigation in this instance,” but also “a clear

and persistent pattern of violations” in earlier instances.’” Hart v. Michigan, 138 F.4th 409, 425

(6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Pineda v. Hamilton Cnty., F.3d 483, 494–95 (6th Cir. 2020)). Plaintiff

cites only a single incident (his own) in attempting to establish Monell liability under this

ratification theory. See Doc. 55-1, at 12. This is insufficient.

But while Plaintiff has not plead enough for Monell liability under a ratification theory, he

is still permitted to use the alleged failure to discipline Defendants’ and the ratification of their

conduct as evidence in support of a defective policy theory. See Otero v. Wood, 316 F. Supp. 2d

612, 627–28 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (“[E]vidence that a municipality inadequately investigated an

alleged constitutional violation can be seen as evidence of a policy that would condone the conduct

at issue.”).

Defendants argue “case law does not call for the non-existence of a pertinent policy” to

form a basis for Monell liability. (Doc. 56, at 9). But municipal liability may arise from the absence

of a necessary policy where such omission plausibly caused constitutional injury. See Blackmore

v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (reversing a district court’s grant of

summary judgment where “the record presents an issue of fact regarding the total lack of any

County policies, practices, and adequate training for this type of constitutional claim, and

regarding whether the harm complained of resulted from the County policies, or lack thereof.”).

And Plaintiff alleges both police departments lacked policies governing prone restraint, on-ground

restraint, and positional asphyxia. See Doc. 55, at 12. Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Officers

received no policy guidance addressing how to use those tactics or the risks and limitations

associated therewith. Id.

Plaintiff further alleges each police department’s “Use of Force” policies failed to instruct

officers on the “improper or unlawful use of prone and/or on-ground restraint and tactics that

present risk of positional asphyxia, despite officers’ recurrent use of prone restraint and on-ground

restraint, and through such restraints, positional asphyxia, and related uses of force present an

obvious potential for injuring subjects and violating their rights.” (Doc. 55-1, at 12–13). At this

stage, those allegations plausibly support an inference that a known use-of-force tactic carried

obvious constitutional risk without written safeguards or operational limits. See Andrews v.

Camden Cnty., 95 F. Supp. 2d 217, 229 (D.N.J. 2000) (“It is well established that in § 1983 suits,

a municipality may be held liable for not having in place a policy that is necessary to safeguard

the rights of its citizens, or for failure to act where inaction amounts to deliberate indifference to

the rights of the persons affects.”).

Defendants further argue Plaintiff cannot establish Monell liability from a single instance

of unconstitutional conduct on a failure-to-train theory. See Doc. 58, at 3, 5. But there is no rigid

requirement for multiple prior incidents before a Monell claim may proceed under such theory.

Instead, Plaintiff correctly states the relevant inquiry centers on notice and deliberate indifference.

(Doc. 60, at 10). “Monell claims made under a ‘failure to train’ theory do not necessarily require

Plaintiffs to allege more than one instance of misconduct.” Rolen v. City of Cleveland, 2013 WL

12145960, at *4 (N.D. Ohio) (citing Harvey v. Campbell Cnty., 453 F. App’x 557, 562–63 (6th

Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff may “show deliberate indifference through evidence of a single violation of

federal rights, accompanied by a showing that the [municipality] had failed to train its employees

to handle recurring situations presenting an obvious potential for such a violation.” Harvey, 453

F. App’x at 562–63. Plaintiff maintains both Police Departments failed to supervise officers in

their use of prone restraint and related tactics, and failed to address practices, customs, or unwritten

policies involving misuse of those techniques. (Doc. 55-1, at 13).

A single incident may only support a failure to train theory “‘in a narrow range of

circumstances’ where a federal rights violation ‘may be a highly predictable consequence of a

failure to equip [employees] with specific tools to handle recurring situations.’” Winkler v.

Madison Cnty., 893 F.3d 877, 903 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Shadrick v. Hopkins Cnty., 805 F.3d

724, 739 (6th Cir. 2015)). As the Sixth Circuit explained:

[T]he Supreme Court has left open the possibility that a plaintiff might prove

deliberate indifference using only the single incident of unconstitutional conduct

against the plaintiff. If the need for a certain type of training is sufficiently

“obvious,” the Court reasoned, the failure to provide the obviously needed training

“could properly be characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to constitutional

rights.”

Gambrel v. Knox Cnty., 25 F.4th 391, 408 (6th Cir. 2022) (internal citation omitted) (quoting

Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)).

Here, Plaintiff contends that where a municipality places officers in situations involving

prone restraint, positional asphyxia, and other use of force decisions without meaningful guidance,

one serious constitutional violation may itself expose an obvious training failure. (Doc. 60, at 10).

And the constitutional risk associated with prone restraint has long been recognized. The Sixth

Circuit has concluded:

[It is] clearly established that putting substantial or significant pressure on a

suspect’s back while that suspect is in a face-down prone position after being

subdued and/or incapacitated constitutes excessive force. . . . Creating asphyxiating

conditions by putting substantial or significant pressure, such as body weight, on

the back of an incapacitated and bound suspect constitutes objectively unreasonable

excessive force.

Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 903 (6th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff asserts both Police Departments failed to provide officers meaningful guidance on

prone restraint, on-ground restraint, and positional asphyxia despite placing officers in situations

where such use of force decisions predictably arise. See Doc. 55, at 6. Plaintiff alleges both Police

Departments provided no meaningful policy or training on prone restraint despite the recognized

constitutional danger associated with such force, and failed to supervise officer use of those

techniques. See Doc. 55-1, at 13; Doc. 55, at 6. Because officers routinely confront physical

restraint situations, and because prone restraint presents a known risk of serious constitutional

harm, Plaintiff plausibly alleges an obvious need for training. At this stage, those factual

allegations support a plausible Monell claim under a failure to train theory even where Plaintiff

identifies only one instance of allegedly excessive force. The Court therefore finds futility is not a

basis to deny leave to amend.

In sum, this Court finds no sufficient reason to bar amendment and grants Plaintiff’s

requested leave to file his Second Amended Complaint instanter.

Joint Motion to Stay (Doc. 65)

Following full briefing on the above Motion to Amend, Plaintiff filed a Notice of

Suggestion of Death stating that Plaintiff Mark Silva is deceased. (Doc. 64). A later filing states

the family is in the process of opening an estate and having an administrator appointed. See Doc.

65, at 1. The parties thus jointly move the Court to stay the case until such time as the estate’s

administrator is appointed and can be substituted as Plaintiff in this action. (Doc. 65). The parties

further request that, at that time, they be permitted to propose new case management deadlines.

The Court grants the parties’ Joint Motion. All current case management deadlines are

vacated and this case is stayed until June 30, 2026 at which point the Court will conduct a telephone

status conference.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint (Doc.

55) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the parties’ Joint Motion to Stay (Doc. 65), be and the same

hereby is, GRANTED and this case is STAYED until June 30, 2026; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that a Telephone Status Conference is set for June 30, 2026, at

2:00 p.m.

s/ James R. Knepp II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated: April 17, 2026