Opinion

Court: District Court, C.D. California
Filed: Jan 27, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 40.7%

affirming 11 dismissal of claims

How later courts described this case

affirming 11 dismissal of claims
affirming dismissal of equal 19 20 protection claim when crux of complaint was defendants’ failure to treat plaintiffs 21 differently from others similarly situated
“United States has no 19 20 continuing interest in the property” acquired through federal land patents
affirming dismissal of federal claim under public trust doctrine, which 6 applies only to states

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11 JEREMY ANDREW HULES and NO. CV 25-10591-FMO (AGR)

12 STEPHANIE LYNN HULES,

13 Plaintiffs, ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

THE COURT SHOULD NOT

v. RECOMMEND DISMISSAL OF

15 COMPLAINT WITHOUT LEAVE TO

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., AMEND

Defendants.

18 I.

19 PROCEDURAL HISTORY

21 Plaintiffs Jeremy Andrew Hules and Stephanie Lynn Hules filed a complaint

on November 4, 2025 and paid the filing fee. (Dkt. No. 1.) The complaint names

two categories of defendants: (1) the County of Ventura, County Clerk-Recorder-

25 Registrar Michelle Ascencion in her official and individual capacity, and Sr.

26 Deputy Sheriff Sean Eskridge in his official and individual capacity (hereinafter

“County Defendants”); and (2) the State of California, Governor Gavin Newsom in

1 his official and individual capacity, and Secretary of State Shirley Weber in her

official and individual capacity (hereinafter “State Defendants”).

For the reasons set forth below, the Court orders Plaintiffs to show cause,

5 in writing, on or before February 27, 2026, why it should not recommend

6 dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend.

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

10 “[C]ourts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject

11 matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.”

Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). “If a court

determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must

15 dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

16 A district court may dismiss a complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on

its own motion if it gives Plaintiffs notice of its intention to dismiss the complaint

and an opportunity to file a written memorandum in opposition. Seismic Reservoir

20 2020, Inc. v. Paulsson, 785 F.3d 330, 335 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Belanus v.

21 Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1029 (9th Cir. 2015) (“frivolous action clogs the system and

drains resources regardless of whether the plaintiff pays the filing fee or proceeds

in forma pauperis”).

25 “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to

26 ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

1 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility

standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a

5 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citations omitted).

6 The “tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained

in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the

elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not

10 suffice.” Id. at 678; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

11 The court reviews the complaint, materials that are the subject of judicial

notice, and materials “submitted as part of the complaint.” See Lee v. City of Los

Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688 (9th Cir. 2001); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard

15 Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990).

16 A pro se complaint is liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,

94 (2007) (per curiam). Plaintiffs proceeding pro se should be given a statement

of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to cure them unless it is clear

20 the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d

21 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, “district courts are only required to

grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not

required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v.

25 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

1 III.

ALLEGATIONS OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiffs attempted to record a document entitled “The united states of

5 America, And In The Republic state of California” “NOTICE OF, CERTIFICATE

6 OF ACCEPTANCE OF DECLARATION OF LAND PATENT.” (Exh. A to Compl.)

The Clerk-Recorder-Registrar of the County of Ventura issued a

Notification of Unrecordable Document pursuant to Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 27203-

10 27204. (Exh. B to Compl.) The Notification states that the Notice of Certificate of

11 Acceptance of Declaration of Land Patent presented on December 1, 2023 is

“unrecordable, [t]here are no provisions to record this type of document.” (Id.;

Compl. at 4 ¶ A, at 6 ¶ F.) The Notification states that there is a “right to judicial

15 review of the recorder’s refusal to record the document in any court of competent

16 jurisdiction.” (Exh. B to Compl.); Cal. Gov’t Code § 27203(a)(2).

Plaintiffs allege that their use of a public recording service has thereby

been impaired by California and the County of Ventura. (Compl. at 4 ¶¶ A-C.)

20 Plaintiffs apparently submitted to the County of Ventura documents entitled

21 “Removal of Patented Land from Tax Rolls.” (Exh. C to Compl.) Plaintiffs

purported to “give notice of removal of patented land from the tax rolls of the

County of Ventura.” (Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs also submitted a document entitled “La

25 Paz County Recording District Court of Record of the Land Jurisdiction” “Notice of

26 Dispute, Demand and Affidavit of Status” and other attachments. (Exh. D to

Compl.) These documents state, among other things, that Plaintiffs’ “land is

1 private property and has legal and lawful protections from encumbrance (ie

taxation) under settled superior law pertaining to land patents.” (Id. at 2.)

Plaintiffs allege that the County of Ventura Treasurer-Assessor has refused

5 to respond to Exhs. C-D despite a “lawful responsibility to respond to such

6 claims.” (Compl. at 5 ¶ E.)

Plaintiffs “stopped paying property taxes beginning with the 2024-2025

billing cycle.” (Compl. at 6 ¶ I.) The County of Ventura Treasurer-Tax Collector

10 issued a “Defaulted Secured Property Tax Bill” indicating that Plaintiffs’ property

11 taxes are in defaulted status for 2024-2025.1 (Exh. F to Compl.) For residential

property that is tax defaulted, the Defaulted Secured Property Tax Bill notifies of

the “Tax Collector’s power to sell 5 years after the first year of delinquency.” (Id.)

15 Plaintiffs contend that Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 3691 conflicts with the Fourth

16 Amendment to the United States Constitution, which protects the right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against

unreasonable searches and seizures. (Compl. at 6-7 ¶ I.)

20 Plaintiffs allege that Senior Deputy Sheriff Eskridge refused to investigate

21 or intervene “with a felony act in the process of being committed.” (Id. at 6 ¶ G.)

Plaintiffs allege that California, Governor Newsom, and Secretary of State

Weber engaged in a “pattern of behavior under the RICO Act.” (Id. at 7 ¶ J.)

26 1 The complaint also alleges that their property taxes include local public

school district bond assessments. (Compl. at 5 ¶ D.) Plaintiffs allege that these

27 assessments are without rational basis because their local school system uses

indoctrination instead of teaching critical thinking and problem-solving skills.

1 The complaint demands a jury trial and seeks relief in the form of a court

order: (1) appointing a trustee to assume control of California; (2) declaring that

Plaintiffs’ property is not subject to the jurisdiction of any “commercial forum or

5 for-profit corporation” or their statutes without Plaintiff’s express written consent;

6 (3) requiring County of Ventura to record Exh. A to the complaint and any other

papers presented by Plaintiffs even “where no provision exists”; (4) prohibiting the

County of Ventura from assessing property taxes and local educational bonds; (5)

10 declaring Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 3691 unlawful and requiring the County of

11 Ventura to cease any actions that would force a sale of Plaintiffs’ property

described in Exh. A to the complaint due to a tax lien; and (5) awarding damages

of $11,450,000 to each plaintiff pursuant to 3571 and RICO. (Id. at 11 ¶¶ A-G.)

15 IV.

16 DISCUSSION

The complaint appears barred by law, and it does not appear that the

deficiencies could be cured by amendment.

20 A. Tax Injunction Act

21 Under the Tax Injunction Act (“TIA”), “[t]he district courts shall not enjoin,

suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law

where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such

25 State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341. The purpose of the TIA is “to prevent federal court

26 intrusion into state tax collection, an area which deserves the utmost comity to

state law and procedure.” Jerron West, Inc. v. California State Bd. of

1 Equalization, 129 F.3d 1334, 1338 (9th Cir. 1997); see Lowe v. Wahoe Cnty., 627

F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The Supreme Court repeatedly has

characterized the Act as a broad jurisdictional barrier, which limits drastically

5 federal court jurisdiction to interfere with so important a local concern as the

6 collection of taxes.” (citations and quotations omitted)).

Plaintiffs’ complaint expressly seeks a court order to prevent the County of

Ventura from levying and assessing property tax against Plaintiffs’ property, and

10 from collecting in the future unpaid property taxes that Plaintiffs concede they do

11 not pay. “If the owner of non-exempt real property in California fails to pay

property taxes, a ‘default is declared’ and the property becomes ‘[t]ax-defaulted

property.’” Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Westside Delivery, LLC, 888

15 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The “tax collector has the

16 power to sell tax-defaulted property that has not been redeemed after the

property has been in default for . . . five years for residential real estate.” Tracht

Gut, LLC v. L.A. Cnty. Treasurer & Tax Collector, 836 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th Cir.

20 2016) (citing Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 3691(a)(1)(A)). The complaint also seeks

21 millions of dollars in damages under “U.S. Code § 3571.” It is unknown to which

chapter of the U.S. Code the complaint refers, but the TIA precludes an action for

damages that challenges state or municipal taxation “so long as a ‘plain, speedy

25 and efficient’ remedy is available in state court.” Patel v. City of San Bernardino,

26 310 F.3d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002); see Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass’n v.

McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981) (“taxpayers are barred by the principle of

1 comity from asserting [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax

systems in federal courts” and must “seek protection of their federal rights by

state remedies”).

5 The TIA bars these claims and relief in Plaintiffs’ complaint so long as

6 Plaintiffs have an adequate remedy in state court. “The state court remedy need

only meet ‘certain minimal procedural criteria.’ Specifically, the party challenging

the state tax must have access to ‘a full hearing and judicial determination’ of all

10 federal constitutional objections to the tax.” Lowe, 627 F.3d 1155 (quoting

11 Rosewell v. La Salle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 512 (1981)). The state court

remedy need not be “the best remedy available or even equal to or better than the

remedy which might be available in the federal courts.” Id. at 1155-56.

15 The California Constitution provides that a taxpayer may seek a refund of a

16 disputed tax amount after the tax has been paid. Cal. Const., art. XIII, § 32 (“No

legal or equitable process shall issue in any proceeding in any court against this

State or any officer thereof to prevent or enjoin the collection of any tax. After

20 payment of a tax claimed to be illegal, an action may be maintained to recover the

21 tax paid, with interest, in such manner as may be provided by the Legislature.”);

Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 4807 (“No injunction or writ of mandate or other legal or

equitable process shall issue in any suit, action, or proceeding in any court

25 against any county, municipality, or district, or any officer thereof, to prevent or

26 enjoin the collection of property taxes sought to be collected.”).

1 The Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have held that California’s refund

procedures provide an adequately “plain, speedy and efficient remedy” for

purposes of the TIA. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminum Ltd., 493 U.S.

5 331, 338 (1990) (“To the extent they are available, California’s refund procedures

6 constitute a plain, speedy, and efficient remedy.”); Jerron, 129 F.3d at 1339-40

(same); Capitol Indus. EMI, Inc. v. Bennett, 681 F.2d 1107, 1118 (9th Cir. 1982)

(California “has a ‘plain, speedy, and efficient remedy’ within the meaning of

10 Section 1341”); see Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 505 (“remedy which requires property

11 owners contesting their property taxes to pay under protest and if successful

obtain a refund . . . is ‘a plain, speedy and efficient remedy”) (citation omitted)).

Plaintiffs do not allege that they are unable to pay the assessed property taxes.

15 Even if they did so allege, a “demonstrated inability to pay a tax does not remove

16 the jurisdictional bar of the Tax Injunction Act.” Air Polynesia v. Freitas, 742 F.2d

546, 548 (9th Cir. 1984). California courts have concurrent jurisdiction over

actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 523

20 (1975).

21 Accordingly, the Court does not have jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims

challenging the levy, assessment, and collection of property taxes under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the United States Constitution.2 Marvin F. Poer &

25 2 A party has no cause of action directly under the United States

Constitution and must bring such claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Azul-Pacifico,

26 Inc. v. Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992); see Gonzaga Univ. v.

Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002) (“§ 1983 merely provides a mechanism for

27 enforcing individual rights secured elsewhere, i.e., rights independently secured

by the Constitution”).

1 Co. v. Counties of Alameda, 725 F.2d 1234, 1235 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming

dismissal of claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and damages). This

defect cannot be cured by amendment. Silver v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 2024 U.S.

5 Dist. LEXIS 243205, *20 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2024) (dismissing claims barred by

6 TIA without leave to amend).

Plaintiffs’ citations to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 do not save these claims.

Sections 241 and 242 are criminal statutes that “do not give rise to civil liability.”

10 Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1048 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming

11 dismissal of claims); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). This

defect cannot be cured by amendment. See Romine v. Big O Tires Corp. Hdqtrs.,

685 Fed. Appx. 516, 517 (9th Cir. 2017) (affirming dismissal of claims under 18

15 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 without leave to amend because amendment would be futile).

16 B. Failure to Respond

Plaintiffs appear to allege a claim based on the County’s failure to respond

to documents entitled “Removal of Patented Land from Tax Rolls” (Exh. C to

20 Compl.) and “La Paz County Recording District Court of Record of the Land

21 Jurisdiction” “Notice of Dispute, Demand and Affidavit of Status” and other

attachments (Exh. D to Compl.) Plaintiffs allege that the County of Ventura

Treasurer-Assessor has refused to respond to Exhs. C-D despite a “lawful

25 responsibility to respond to such claims.” (Compl. at 5 ¶ E.)

26 The complaint fails to allege any federal basis for a legal duty to respond to

Exhs. C-D. As discussed above, the California Constitution and laws provide

1 procedures through which a taxpayer may seek a refund of a disputed tax amount

after the tax has been paid. The complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs have

availed themselves of such procedures. Although Plaintiffs may communicate

5 with the government outside established legal procedures, “the First Amendment

6 does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to

respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargain with it.”

Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1979); see

10 also Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 285 (1984)

11 (same); L.F. v. Lake Washington Sch. Dist. #414, 947 F.3d 621, 626 (9th Cir.

2020) (“First Amendment does not compel the government to respond to speech

directed toward it”).

15 The complaint alleges that the failure to respond to Plaintiffs’ submission of

16 Exhs. C-D violates due process and equal protection. The complaint fails to state

a claim for relief under either theory of liability.

A procedural due process claim has two elements: (1) a protectible liberty

20 or property interest; and (2) denial of adequate procedural protections. Thornton

21 v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 1158, 1164 (9th Cir. 2005). The complaint does

not allege facts to support the second element. As discussed above, California

law provides a procedure by which a taxpayer who claims a tax is illegal or

25 otherwise disputes the tax bill must pay the tax first and then pursue a refund,

26 including by a lawsuit. The complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs complied with

this procedure or were denied the opportunity to do so. Rather, the complaint

1 alleges the opposite – Plaintiffs “stopped paying property taxes beginning with the

2024-2025 billing cycle.” (Compl. at 6 ¶ I.)

Plaintiffs’ equal protection claim fares no better. The Equal Protection

5 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “is essentially a direction that all persons

6 similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living

Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim, the complaint

must allege facts indicating that Defendants acted with an intent or purpose to

10 discriminate against them based on their membership in a protected class. Lee v.

11 City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001). Alternatively, under a

“class of one” theory, a complaint may allege that Plaintiffs “ha[ve] been

intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no

15 rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Village of Willowbrook v. Olech,

16 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). The complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs are a

member of a protected class or that they were treated differently from similarly

situated persons. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 687 (affirming dismissal of equal

20 protection claim when crux of complaint was defendants’ failure to treat plaintiffs

21 differently from others similarly situated).

The complaint’s attempt to bring this claim under federal criminal statutes is

unavailing. As discussed above, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are criminal statutes

25 that “do not give rise to civil liability.” Allen, 464 F.3d at 1048; Aldabe, 616 F.2d at

26 1092. The Ninth Circuit has not recognized a private right of action under 18

U.S.C. § 1341. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 533 n.1 (9th

1 Cir. 1987); see Holscher v. Hess, 837 Fed. Appx. 560, 560 (9th Cir. 2021)

(affirming dismissal of claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1341). The criminal statute, 18

U.S.C. § 1001, expressly applies only to the “executive, legislative, or judicial

5 branch of the Government of the United States” and not state government.

6 Moreover, section 1001 does not contain a private right of action and cannot be

the basis of federal jurisdiction. Stockstill v. Fresno Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 2020

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46261, *32 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2020); see also Andrews v.

10 Heaton, 483 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007) (18 U.S.C. § 1001 “do[es] not

11 provide for a private right of action and [is] thus not enforceable through a civil

action”).

The complaint cites the Supremacy Clause, which makes the federal

15 constitution and laws “the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any Thing in the

16 Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const.,

art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause “invalidates state laws that ‘interfere with, or

are contrary to, federal law.” Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs.,

20 Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985) (citation omitted). However, the complaint does

21 not identify any state law that interferes with or is contrary to any federal law. Nor

is it apparent how the Supremacy Clause would create a legal duty to respond to

Exhs. C-D.

25 Finally, the complaint’s reliance on the public trust doctrine fares no better.

26 “The public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law.” PPL Mont., LLC v.

Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 603 (2012); Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,

1 285 (1997) (Illinois Central R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), “was

‘necessarily a statement of Illinois law’”) (citation omitted)); Alaska Constitutional

Legal Def. Conservation Fund, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 198 Fed. Appx. 601, 603 (9th

5 Cir. 2006) (affirming dismissal of federal claim under public trust doctrine, which

6 applies only to states). Thus, the public trust doctrine does not provide a basis for

federal jurisdiction.3

C. Notification of Unrecordable Document

10 A county recorder is required to “accept for recordation any instrument,

11 paper, or notice that is authorized or required by statute, or court order to be

recorded.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 27201(a)(1)(A). A county recorder is liable for

recording “any instrument, paper, or notice, willfully or negligently, untruly, or in

15 any manner other than that prescribed by this chapter.” Cal. Gov’t Code §

16 27203(b); Seeley v. Seymour, 190 Cal. App. 3d 844, 863 (1987).

Plaintiffs complain that the Clerk-Recorder-Registrar of the County of

Ventura issued a Notification of Unrecordable Document pursuant to Cal. Gov’t

20 Code §§ 27203-27204 in response to their attempt to record a document entitled

21 Notice of Certificate of Acceptance of Declaration of Land Patent. To be clear,

the complaint does not allege that a Notice of Certificate of Acceptance of

Declaration of Land Patent is authorized or required by statute to be recorded.

25 3 Even under California law, the “public trust doctrine generally concerns

the preservation of certain natural public resources.” Lucas v. Santa Maria Pub.

26 Airport Dist., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1025 (1995); e.g., In re Bay-Delta, 43 Cal. 4th

1143, 1154 (2008) (noting state has affirmative duty to take public trust into

27 account in allocating water resources). It is difficult to discern how California’s

public trust doctrine could apply to Plaintiffs’ complaint.

1 Instead, the complaint cites Cal. Civ. Code § 22.2, which provides: “The common

law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with the

Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the

5 rule of decision in all the courts of this State.” As threshold matter, Plaintiffs do

6 not allege that the common law of England requires recordation of a Notice of

Certificate of Acceptance of Declaration of Land Patent. Even assuming Plaintiffs

could overcome that hurdle, the express terms of Cal. Civ. Code § 22.2 limit

10 application of the common law of England when it is “inconsistent with” the laws

11 of California, namely, Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 27201(a)(1)(A) and 27203(b).

In any event, the Court addresses this claim separately from the claims

covered by the TIA because recordation would not affect the County’s ability to

15 levy, assess, and collect property taxes on the property described in Exh. A to the

16 complaint. See Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 468 (1896) (noting property

received through federal land patent is subject to state and local regulation);

Landi v. Phelps, 740 F.2d 710, 713-14 (9th Cir. 1984) (“United States has no

20 continuing interest in the property” acquired through federal land patents); Langan

21 v. Langan, 2023 U.S Dist. LEXIS 28519, *3 (D. Az. Feb. 21, 2023) (“Counties

have the authority to initiate foreclosure proceedings on patented land when a

landowner fails to pay their property taxes.”); see also Wisconsin v. Glick, 782

25 F.2d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1986) (self-drafted land patents “are frivolous gestures”);

26 Flores v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40137, *4-*5 (E.D. Wis.

Mar. 22, 2013) (noting proponents of land patents believe they can prevent

1 foreclosure for delinquent property taxes; courts considering these types of claims

“have uniformly rejected them, with most courts deeming the claims frivolous”).

The complaint fails to state a federal claim for relief based on the Clerk-

5 Recorder-Registrar’s issuance of the Notification of Unrecordable Document. As

6 discussed above, the complaint’s attempt to bring this claim under federal criminal

statutes is unavailing. Again, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 are criminal statutes that

“do not give rise to civil liability.” Allen, 464 F.3d at 1048; Aldabe, 616 F.2d at

10 1092. The Ninth Circuit has not recognized a private right of action under 18

11 U.S.C. § 1341. Wilcox, 815 F.2d at 533 n.1; see Holscher, 837 Fed. Appx. at

560. The criminal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001, expressly applies only to the federal

government and does not contain a private right of action. Stockstill, 2020 U.S.

15 Dist. LEXIS 46261, at *32; see also Andrews, 483 F.3d at 1076 (18 U.S.C. § 1001

16 “do[es] not provide for a private right of action and [is] thus not enforceable

through a civil action”).

The complaint’s citation to the Supremacy Clause is unavailing because

20 Plaintiffs have not identified any federal law that allegedly preempts Cal. Gov’t

21 Code § 27201(a)(1)(A) and § 27203(b). Hillsborough, 471 U.S. at 712. To the

extent the complaint alleges that the failure to record the Notice of Certificate of

Acceptance of Declaration of Land Patent violates the oath of office to support the

25 United States Constitution, any such claim is frivolous. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl.3.

26 The public trust doctrine does not provide a basis for federal jurisdiction because

1 the doctrine is “a matter of state law.” PPL, 565 U.S. at 603; Idaho, 521 U.S. at

285.

D. Failure to Investigate Felony

5 The complaint alleges, in conclusory fashion, that Sr. Deputy Sheriff

6 Eskridge “refused to investigate or intervene with a felony act in the process of

being committed.” (Compl. at 6 ¶ G.) The complaint does not identify the alleged

felony or provide any other facts.

10 Plaintiffs do not have a stand-alone federal constitutional right to an

11 investigation of a felony. Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985)

(per curiam) (“We can find no instance where the courts have recognized

inadequate investigation as sufficient to state a civil rights claim unless there was

15 another recognized constitutional right involved.”); Page v. Stanley, 2013 U.S.

16 Dist. LEXIS 80698 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2013) (“Plaintiff had no constitutional right

to any investigation of his citizen’s complaint, much less a ‘thorough’ investigation

or a particular outcome.”); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619

20 (1973) (“private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or

21 nonprosecution of another”). For the reasons discussed above, the complaint

fails to state a claim for relief under any other recognized constitutional right.

Therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief against Eskridge.

25 E. Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights

26 The complaint alleges that the County Sheriff’s Department, Recorder’s

Office, Assessor’s Office, and Treasurer’s Office have collectively infringed upon

1 Plaintiffs’ constitutional and federally protected rights as described above.

(Compl. at 6 ¶ H.)

The complaint cites 18 U.S.C. § 241, but as discussed above, section 241 is

5 a criminal statute that “do[es] not give rise to civil liability.” Allen, 464 F.3d at

6 1048; Aldabe, 616 F.2d at 1092.

“Conspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort under § 1983.” Lacey v.

Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). Absent an

10 underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiffs do not state a claim for conspiracy.

11 See Avalos v. Baca, 596 F.3d 583, 592 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, “a mere

allegation of conspiracy without factual specificity is insufficient.” Karim-Panahi v.

Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs must

15 allege facts showing “the existence of an agreement or meeting of the minds to

16 violate constitutional rights.” Crowe v. Cnty. of San Diego, 608 F.3d 406, 440 (9th

Cir. 2010). The complaint must allege “enough factual matter” to support a

reasonable inference of conspiracy. Bell, 550 U.S. at 556. The complaint

20 contains no facts raising a reasonable inference of an agreement or meeting of

21 the minds to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

F. State Defendants

The complaint improperly alleges unrelated claims against unrelated parties

25 (the State Defendants) in a single lawsuit. Persons may be joined as defendants

26 if “(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or

1 series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common

to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). The claims

asserted against the State Defendants do not arise out of the same transaction,

5 occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and do not involved

6 common questions of law or fact.

The complaint asserts a RICO claim against the State of California,

Governor Newsom and Secretary of State Shirley Weber. (Compl. at 7-10 ¶¶ J-

10 K.) Plaintiffs cannot maintain a RICO action against California and the individual

11 defendants in their official capacity. Abcarian v. Levine, 972 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th

Cir. 2020).

To state a civil RICO claim against Governor Newsom and Secretary of

15 State Weber in their individual capacity, a complaint must allege “‘(1) conduct (2)

16 of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity (known as

‘predicate acts’) (5) causing injury to the plaintiff’s ‘business or property.’” Id. at

1028 (citation omitted).

20 The complaint fails to allege any cognizable predicate acts. Although the

21 complaint cites 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242, violations of these statutes are not listed in

the definition of “racketeering activity” for purposes of RICO. 18 U.S.C. 1961(1).

The complaint generally alleges California’s failed fire and water management,

25 failed homeless programs, failed high speed rail projects, failed public safety that

26 permits rioting and looting, failed public education, failed border security and

immigration enforcement, and failed election logistics (e.g., failure to require proof

1 of citizenship for voting). Plaintiffs’ political differences with the current Governor

and Secretary of State, however, do not meet the definition of racketeering

activity.

5 The complaint also fails to allege a cognizable injury to Plaintiffs’ business

6 or property. “[T]o establish statutory standing pursuant to RICO, a plaintiff must

show . . . that his alleged harm qualifies as injury to his business or property.”

Shulman v. Kaplan, 58 F.4th 404, 410 (9th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks

10 omitted). The complaint must allege “(1) harm to a specific property interest

11 cognizable under state law, and (2) that the injury resulted in concrete financial

loss.” Glob. Master Int’l Grp., Inc. v. Esmond Nat., Inc., 76 F.4th 1266, 1274 (9th

Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

15 G. State Law Claims

16 In the absence of federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the

complaint does not establish federal diversity jurisdiction because the action is not

between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).

20 “A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related

21 state-law claims once it has ‘dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.’” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, the Court would recommend dismissal without prejudice of any state-

25 law claims.

l V.

2 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

For the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs show cause,

5 | in writing, on or before February 27, 2026, why the Court should not recommend

6 | dismissal of the complaint without leave to amend.

DATED: January 27, 2026

10 ALICIA G. ROSENBERG

11 United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.