Sweeting

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

DERRICK SWEETING, : Case No. 1:25-cv-863

:

Plaintiff, :

: District Judge Douglas R. Cole

vs. : Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

:

CYNTHIA DAVIS, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

:

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff, a prisoner at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility (“SOCF”), has filed a pro se

civil rights complaint in this Court against Defendants Warden Cynthia Davis, Inspector A.

Hockett, Unit Manager Brabson, Sgt. Terry (property room), Major Bell (Theft Lost Report), Sgt.

Chinn (K-7 property pack up), Roger Steel (cashier’s office), and Inspector Kevin Parker, all with

SOCF. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID# 11). By separate Order Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed

in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 8).

This matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine

whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant

who is immune from such relief. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 804, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B); § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for

Declaration (ECF No. 5) and his Motion Requesting Status Updates (ECF No. 6). The

Undersigned addresses each in turn.

I. SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT

A. Screening Standard

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to “lower

judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing

so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed

by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,

malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).

To address this concern, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action upon the

Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the

action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See

also § 1915A(b).

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Hill v.

Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

standards to a review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). A complaint must contain

a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In other words, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual demands on the authors of

complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd. P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir.

2013) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662

(2009)).

Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does

require more than “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks

omitted). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, “a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility of an inference

depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing

explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted).

A plaintiff’s allegations are “accepted as true.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570). But a court need not accept factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional.”

Hill, 630 F.3d at 471 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327-28). Further, pro se complaints are held

“to less stringent standards” than a formal pleading drafted by a lawyer. Martin v. Overton, 391

F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996)). A

pro se plaintiff’s pleadings are “to be liberally construed.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94

(2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). This “lenient treatment has limits,”

however, because “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frengler

v. G.M., 482 F. App’x 975, 977 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th

Cir. 1989)) (additional citations omitted).

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations

Plaintiff first alleges that Defendants Davis, Hockett, Brabson, Terry, Bell, Chinn, and

Parker failed to replace his television despite non-defendant Chief Inspector Morrow affirming

Plaintiff’s grievance to replace the television. (Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, PageID# 12). Plaintiff

alleges that these Defendants were responsible for replacing his television and were negligent in

failing to do so. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that he was not on “TV restriction” and that there is no

policy against television use for prisoners on tablet restrictions. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges that he submitted an informal grievance to Defendant Brabson, who

determined that Plaintiff had signed his property sheet and denied the grievance. (Id. at PageID#

10). Plaintiff alleges that he was then sent to the “hole” for submitting a false ticket. (Id.). Plaintiff

alleges that he appealed the denial, which resulted in Defendant Parker affirming Brabson’s

decision for the same reasoning. (Id.).

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendant Steel stole Plaintiff’s $3,200 government stimulus

check from the IRS, resulting in fraud. (Id. at PageID# 12). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Davis

was aware of the issue but failed to fix it and that she enforces broken policies. (Id.).

Plaintiff alleges in sum that Defendants deprived him of his television; that when he tried

to get his television replaced, Defendant Brabson posted false sanctions against him as retaliation

for submitting a grievance; that Defendant Steel stole government money from him; and that

Defendant Davis failed to correct these issues. (Id. at PageID# 10-13).

Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id. at PageID# 13).

C. Discussion

The Undersigned understands Plaintiff to be raising the following claims:

1. Retaliation claim against Defendant Brabson for allegedly sending Plaintiff to “the

hole” as retaliation for filing a grievance about his missing television;

2. Negligent deprivation of property claims against Defendants Davis, Hockett, Brabson,

Terry, Bell, Chinn, and Parker for allegedly failing to return Plaintiff’s television,

despite Chief Inspector Morrow’s decision otherwise;

3. Failure to investigate claims against Defendants Parker and Davis;

4. Supervisor liability claims against Defendant Davis for allegedly being aware of and

then failing to correct the other Defendants’ actions; and

5. Unrelated fraud claims against Defendant Steel for allegedly stealing Plaintiff’s

government stimulus check and against Defendant Davis for being aware of the fraud

but failing to correct it.

At this stage of the proceedings and without the benefit of further briefing by the parties,

the Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against Defendant Brabson may

PROCEED in an abundance of caution. Under liberal construction, Plaintiff has pleaded

sufficient facts to warrant further development of his retaliation claim against Brabson. See

Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). Although Plaintiff does not allege exact

dates for these incidents, his exhibits show that he started the grievance process to get back his

television in July 2025. (Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, PageID# 14-21).1 The Court advises Plaintiff

that this is only a preliminary determination. The Court has not made a determination as to the

merits of the claims or potential defenses thereto, nor are Defendants precluded from filing a

motion to dismiss, motion for more definite statement, or other appropriate motion under the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s unrelated fraud claim against Defendant Steel and the connected

supervisor liability claim against Defendant Davis should be SEVERED. Plaintiff’s remaining

claims, including any official capacity claims for monetary damages, should be DISMISSED for

the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as explained below.

1 Plaintiff attaches copies of exhibits to his Complaint. These exhibits are considered a part of the Complaint

“for all purposes.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). See Fishman v. Williams, No. 14-cv-4823, 2016 WL 11484591,

at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2016) (“When screening a pro se plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915A, the Court may consider facts drawn from the complaint and supporting exhibits attached

thereto.”); Johnson v. Buffalo Pub. Schs.: Adult Educ. Div., No. 19-cv-1484, 2021 WL 9455714, at *3

(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2021) (“The Court deems the attachments and exhibits attached to [the plaintiff’s]

Complaint part of the pleading and considers them, to the extent they are relevant, in its screening

decision.”). However, the Court declines to comb through the exhibits to raise new claims or make legal

arguments for Plaintiff. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 672 (10th Cir. 1998)

(“Furthermore, although this court has discretion to more broadly review the record on appeal, we, like the

district courts, have a limited and neutral role in the adversarial process, and are wary of becoming

advocates who comb the record of previously available evidence and make a party's case for it.”).

1. Official Capacity Claims for Monetary Damages

To the extent that Plaintiff seeks money damages from Defendant Brabson in his official

capacity, the Eleventh Amendment bars recovery of monetary relief against state employees in

their official capacities. Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 270-71 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Kentucky

v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985)). States are immune from damage suits absent an express

waiver, and the State of Ohio has not made such a waiver. Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th

Cir. 1999) (citations omitted); Cook v. Trostel, No. 2:23-cv-2314, 2024 WL 4451535, at *3 (S.D.

Ohio July 12, 2024) (citations omitted). Although Plaintiff does not indicate in which capacity he

is suing Brabson, Plaintiff does seek monetary relief. (Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, PageID# 13).

Brabson is immune from suit in his official capacity to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary

damages. As a result, any request for monetary relief against Brabson in his official capacity

should be DISMISSED for the failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

2. Retaliation Claims Against Other Defendants

To the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise retaliation claims against all named

Defendants, not just Defendant Brabson, such allegations fail to state a plausible claim for relief.

Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that Defendants retaliated against him (see Complaint, ECF No.

1-1, PageID# 12-13), without any further factual enhancement, are insufficient to meet the basic

pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678;

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. While Plaintiff may proceed with his retaliation claim against

Brabson, any retaliation claims against the other named Defendants should be DISMISSED.

3. Negligent Deprivation of Property Claims

To the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise claims against Defendants because they

deprived him of his personal property without due process of law, Plaintiff fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted. Prisoners do not have a fundamental right to personal property.

Taylor v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:23-cv-2956, 2025 WL 2451151, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 26, 2025)

(citing Johnson v. Miron, No. 2:11-cv-6, 2011 WL 489778, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 7, 2011);

Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1353 (6th Cir. 1990)). The United States Supreme Court has

held that a plaintiff “deprived of property through a random and unauthorized act” of a

governmental employee does not state a due process claim “merely by alleging the deprivation of

property.” Darling v. Lake Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. 1:12-cv-194, 2012 WL 1902602, at *17

(N.D. Ohio May 25, 2012) (citing River City Cap., L.P. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Clermont Cnty.,

Ohio, 491 F.3d 301, 306 (6th Cir. 2007); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 542-43 (1981)). To state

a cognizable deprivation of property claim, a plaintiff must plead “that state remedies for

redressing the wrong are inadequate.” Freeman v. Spoljaric, 667 F. Supp. 3d 636, 650 (S.D. Ohio

Mar. 31, 2023) (quoting Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065-66 (6th Cir. 1983)). Deprivation

of property claims should be dismissed where a plaintiff has failed to allege “any facts which

indicate that the state post-deprivation remedies are inadequate or unavailable to redress the

wrong.” Thompson v. Esham, No. 1:15-cv-553, 2016 WL 692542, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2016)

(citing Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995)); Brooks v. Dutton, 751 F.2d 197,

199 (6th Cir. 1985). And as other courts in this District have found, Ohio state law provides an

adequate remedy for the deprivation of personal property. E.g., Black v. ODRC, No. 1:23-cv-404,

2023 WL 5671817, at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2025

WL 332676 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 29, 2025), (quoting Mason v. Wal-Mart Corp., No. 2:14-cv-446, 2015

WL 1197916, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2015)); Carr v. Vill. Of Greenhills, No. 1:14-cv-994,

2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15253, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2015) (citing Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d

700, 704 (6th Cir. 1989)).

Plaintiff here alleges that Defendants failed to return his television, negligently depriving

him of his property, but he does not allege that Ohio’s post-deprivation remedies are insufficient

to remedy this situation. (See Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, PageID# 10-13). Because Plaintiff fails

to meet the required pleading standards, his deprivation of property claims should be

DISMISSED.

4. Failure to Investigate Claims Against Defendants Parker and Davis

To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Parker and Davis failed to investigate

his grievances or that he challenges the outcome of the prison grievance process, such allegations

fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A prisoner has an “undisputed First

Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials on his own behalf.” Maben, 887 F.3d

at 564 (quoting Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000)). But “there is no inherent

constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure.” Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x

427, 430 (6th Cir. 2003) (collecting cases). A prison official whose only role “involve[s] the denial

of administrative grievances or the failure to act” to remedy the alleged unconstitutional behavior

is not liable under § 1983. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted)

(“[L]iability under § 1983 must be based on active unconstitutional behavior and cannot be based

upon ‘a mere failure to act.’”). Allegations that a prison official failed to investigate a prisoner’s

grievance or that the prison grievance process failed to produce the right outcome therefore fail to

state a plausible claim for relief.

Plaintiff alleges that when he filed a grievance to Defendant Parker, Parker “did nothing

but go with the staff’s decision.” (Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, PageID# 10). Parker failing to act or

doing “nothing” about Plaintiff’s grievance is insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See

Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300. Similarly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Davis was aware of the issues

but failed to correct anything (id. at PageID# 12), which is likewise insufficient to show more than

a mere failure to act. Plaintiff does not allege that he was prevented from filing grievances and

instead appears to challenge the result of the prison grievance process or with Davis and Parker

failing to act. Accordingly, any failure to investigate claims against Parker and Davis fail to state

a plausible claim for relief and should be DISMISSED.

5. Supervisor Liability Claims Against Defendant Davis

Plaintiff fails to state a plausible claim for relief against Defendant Davis in her role as a

supervisor because he fails to allege any facts to indicate that Davis engaged in active

unconstitutional conduct. The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in § 1983 claims to

impute liability on supervisory personnel. Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984);

Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 764 (E.D. Mich. June 19, 2009) (citation omitted).

Instead, defendants sued in their personal capacities under § 1983 are “liable only for their own

unconstitutional behavior.” Hollis v. Erdos, 480 F. Supp. 3d 823, 833 (S.D. Ohio May 12, 2020)

(citing Murphy v. Grenier, 406 F. App’x 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011)). A plaintiff must allege that

the supervising official “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the

unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” Graves v. Malone, 810 F. App’x 414, 420

(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 241 (6th Cir. 2016)).

Plaintiff fails to make any such allegations against Defendant Davis. Although Plaintiff

alleges that Davis was “aware” of the issues, he fails to allege any facts that Davis engaged in

active unconstitutional conduct. See Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 903 (6th Cir. 2003)

(citations omitted) (“[S]imple awareness of employees’ misconduct does not lead to supervisor

liability.”). And as noted above, the mere failure to act is insufficient to state a constitutional claim

under § 1983. Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300. Davis cannot be held liable for the actions of a subordinate,

and any supervisor liability claims against her should be DISMISSED.

6. State Law Claims

To the extent that Plaintiff intended to raise state-law negligence claims or state-law

infliction of emotional distress claims (whether negligent or intentional), Plaintiff fails to state a

plausible claim for relief. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were negligent in failing to return his

television (Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, PageID# 12) and alleges that he suffered emotional stress

from the incidents (id. at PageID# 13), without further factual enhancement of the essential

elements of these state-law claims. These conclusory allegations are mere threadbare assertions

that are insufficient to meet the basic pleading standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

8(a). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state-

law claims should be DISMISSED without prejudice.

7. Misjoined Fraud Claims

Plaintiff also raises an unrelated fraud claim against Defendant Steel for allegedly taking

Plaintiff’s government stimulus check, and he alleges that Defendant Davis was aware of the fraud

but failed to correct it. This claim is misjoined in this lawsuit and should be dismissed.

A plaintiff may not join unrelated claims and various defendants unless the claims arise

“out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and . . . any

question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Unrelated claims against defendants

belong in different suits, not only to prevent the sort of morass [a multiple claim, multiple

defendant] suit produce[s] but also to ensure that prisoners pay the required filing fees—for the

Prison Litigation Reform Act limits to 3 the number of frivolous suits or appeals that any prisoner

may file without prepayment of the required fees.”). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21,

courts have “broad discretion ‘to order a severance to avoid causing unreasonable prejudice and

expense to the defendant . . . and to avoid great inconvenience in the administration of justice.’”

Proctor, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 781 (citation omitted). For misjoined claims or defendants, “a court

has two options: it may (1) drop misjoined parties ‘on just terms’; or (2) sever any claim against a

party.” Harris v. Erdos, No. 1:21-cv-104, 2022 WL 3053496, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2022)

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; Roberts v. Doe, No. 16-2082, 2017 WL 3224655, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb.

28, 2017)). A court may exercise discretion to select the parties to drop or the claims to sever. Id.

(citations omitted); Cage v. Michigan, No. 16-cv-11679, 2018 WL 3729062, at *2 (E.D. Mich.

Aug. 6, 2018) (“the proper remedy for . . . misjoinder is to sever the claims against the unrelated

parties and dismiss those claims without prejudice” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21) (additional citation

omitted)).

Plaintiff fails to allege any facts to tie the fraud claim to the basis of this lawsuit—that the

other Defendants refused to return Plaintiff’s television and that Defendant Brabson retaliated

against him for filing grievances about the issue. (See Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, PageID# 10-13).

Plaintiff has not shown that the check fraud allegations arise from the same transaction or

occurrence as the television claims or that it relies on the same material facts to warrant joinder.

And as discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to state any other plausible claims for relief against

Defendant Davis. Plaintiff’s unrelated fraud claim against Steel for allegedly stealing Plaintiff’s

government stimulus check and Davis’s awareness of that alleged fraud involve distinct factual

allegations and therefore should be SEVERED from this action. Proctor, 661 F. Supp. 2d at 781

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21). The Undersigned RECOMMENDS that this claim be DISMISSED

without prejudice to Plaintiff re-filing a separate action including such claim if he so wishes.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2), 21; Harris, 2022 WL 3053496, at *6.

Additionally, Plaintiff fails to allege any other facts against Steel. (See generally ECF No.

1-1). Because Plaintiff fails to state a related plausible claim for relief against Defendant Steel, he

should be DISMISSED as a defendant in this action.

II. MOTION FOR DECLARATION

On December 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Declaration,” seeking a temporary

restraining order (“TRO”) against Defendants. (ECF No. 5, PageID# 49-51). Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Davis ordered her assistant, B. Trelka, to reveal identifying information about

Plaintiff’s family member on a conduct report, which could “cause threats, death if the wrong

staffs get a hold of this information.” (Id. at PageID# 49-50). Plaintiff also seeks a transfer to a

different security level and for the Court to lift his 90-day phone restriction. (Id. at PageID# 51).

In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, this Court must balance the

following factors:

1. Whether the party seeking the injunction has shown a strong likelihood of success on

the merits;

2. Whether the party seeking the injunction will suffer irreparable harm absent the

injunction;

3. Whether an injunction will cause others to suffer substantial harm; and

4. Whether the public interest would be served by a preliminary injunction.

Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted); S. Milk Sales, Inc. v.

Martin, 924 F.2d 98, 103 n.3 (6th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The four factors are not

prerequisites but must be balanced as part of a decision to grant or deny injunctive relief. Leary,

228 F.3d at 736 (citing United Food & Commercial Wkrs. Union, Loc. 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg’l

Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 1998); McPherson v. Mich. High Sch. Ath. Ass’n, 119

F.3d 453, 459 (6th Cir. 1997)). Courts must also consider whether the purpose behind preliminary

injunctions—to preserve the status quo until a trial on the merits can be held—will be served in

granting such a request. S. Glazer’s Distribs. of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d

844, 848 (6th Cir. 2017) (Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). A preliminary

injunction is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only “upon a clear showing that the

plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d at 849 (quoting Winter v.

Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008)); Leary, 228 F.3d at 739 (citation omitted)

(noting that a preliminary injunction should only be granted when the circumstances “clearly

demand it”).

A preliminary injunction is not warranted here because the purpose of a preliminary

injunction would not be served. According to Plaintiff, the present status quo in this case is that

he has suffered violations of his constitutional rights, including a retaliation claim for filing a

grievance. One remedy Plaintiff presently seeks, a transfer to “Level 3A” from his current “Level

4A,” is more than an injunction maintaining the status quo. And Plaintiff seeks an Order from this

Court requiring Defendants to affirmatively correct constitutional deficiencies yet to be proven.

Such affirmative relief is generally beyond the scope and purpose of preliminary injunctive relief.

See Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d at 849. Accordingly, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS

that Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaration and his TRO request be DENIED.

III. MOTION REQUESTING STATUS UPDATES

On February 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking an update on this proceeding. (ECF

No. 6, PageID# 62-63). Plaintiff also states that he attempted to contact attorney Jan Dils to

represent him. (Id.). Plaintiff stated previously that Dils could represent him in this case,

attempting to enter an appearance on behalf of the attorney. (ECF No. 2, PageID# 38-43). On

December 11, 2025, this Court directed attorney Dils to enter an appearance within thirty days if

Dils planned to represent Plaintiff in this matter. (ECF No. 3, PageID# 45). That time has passed.

With no response nor notice of appearance from said counsel, Plaintiff must proceed pro se,

without the assistance of counsel.

To the extent that Plaintiff’s filings could be construed as a request for representation (see

generally ECF Nos. 2, 6), such request is denied. Although this Court has statutory authority

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) to appoint counsel in a civil case, appointment of counsel is not a

constitutional right. Lanier v. Bryant, 332 F.3d 999, 1006 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Lavado v.

Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605-06 (6th Cir. 1993)). A court has discretion to appoint counsel in civil

matters, but the appointment of counsel is a “privilege that is justified only by exceptional

circumstances.” Lanier, 332 F.3d at 1006 (citing Lavado, 992 F.2d at 604-06). The Court has

evaluated whether such exceptional circumstances exist in this case and determines that the

appointment of counsel is not warranted at this juncture. Plaintiff’s case is in the early stages of

development and the Undersigned declines to exercise discretion to appoint counsel at this time.

Plaintiff’s request for counsel is DENIED without prejudice.

Further, because this Order and Report and Recommendation serve as a status update,

Plaintiff’s motion requesting the same (ECF No. 6) is DENIED as MOOT.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims against Defendant Brabson may

PROCEED for further development at this juncture. Plaintiff’s remaining claims, however,

should be DISMISSED. Additionally, Plaintiff’s request for preliminary injunctive relief (ECF

No. 5) should be DENIED; and his motion for status updates (ECF No. 6) is DENIED as MOOT.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff may PROCEED with his retaliation claim against Defendant Brabson, except

to the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary relief from Brabson in his official capacity.

2. If Plaintiff wishes the United States Marshals to effectuate service, he must submit a

complete copy of the Complaint together with copies of the exhibits for Defendant

Brabson. Plaintiff must also submit an individual service form and United States

Marshals summons form (USM-285 form) for Defendant Brabson. To proceed,

Plaintiff must submit a service copy of the Complaint and attached exhibits and submit

the service and summons forms for Defendant Brabson WITHIN 30 days of the date

of this Order with a motion to issue service. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send

a blank copy of the required service and summons forms to Plaintiff at the address

listed on the docket.

3. Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendant Brabson or, if appearance has been entered by

counsel, upon Defendant Brabson’s attorney(s), a copy of every further pleading or

other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with

the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of Court a certificate stating the date a true

and correct copy of any document was mailed to Defendant Brabson or his counsel.

Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed

with the Clerk, or which fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by

the Court.

4. Plaintiff must keep this Court informed of his current address and promptly file a

Notice of New Address if he is released or transferred.

5. Plaintiff’s request for counsel is DENIED without prejudice.

6. Because this Order and Report and Recommendation serve as a status update,

Plaintiff’s motion requesting the same (ECF No. 6) is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s allegations that fail to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983 be

DISMISSED with prejudice, including any official capacity claim for monetary

damages against Defendant Brabson, deprivation of property claims against all

Defendants, failure to investigate claims against Defendants Davis and Parker, and

supervisor liability claims against Defendant Davis;

2. Plaintiff’s state-law negligence and emotional distress claims be DISMISSED without

prejudice.

3. Plaintiff’s unrelated fraud claims against Defendants Steel and Davis, be SEVERED

and DISMISSED without prejudice;

4. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief against Defendants

Davis, Hockett, Terry, Bell, Chinn, Steel, and Parker, they should all be DISMISSED

as defendants;

5. Plaintiff’s Motion for Declaration (ECF No. 5), construed as a motion for preliminary

injunction and a TRO request, should be DENIED.

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed

findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and

shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and

Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: _ March 11, 2026 _s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers_____

Elizabeth Preston Deavers

United States Magistrate Judge