The opinion
J-A26020-25
2026 PA Super 102
TYRONE DIXON : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
HERITAGE VALLEY SEWICKLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 307 WDA 2025
Appeal from the Order Entered September 23, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
No(s): GD-20-009605
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and KING, J.
DISSENTING OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED: May 28, 2026
I believe we are constrained to quash this appeal. Therefore, I
respectfully dissent from the learned Majority’s determination in this matter.
As the Majority ably notes, on June 21, 2024, Heritage Valley Sewickley
(“Appellant”) filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, where it claimed
that the action filed by Tyrone Dixon (“Plaintiff”) was barred by the two-year
statute of limitations. Appellant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings,
6/21/24, at 1-5. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion by order entered
on September 23, 2024. See Trial Court Order, 9/23/24, at 1.
In response, on October 17, 2024, Appellant filed an application
requesting that the trial court amend its interlocutory, September 23, 2024
order, to allow for an interlocutory appeal by permission. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 702(b). The trial court denied Appellant’s application on November 20,
2024. Trial Court Order, 11/20/24, at 1.
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On December 13, 2024, Appellant filed a petition for permission to
appeal from the interlocutory, September 23, 2024, order in this Court. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1311. While the petition was pending, a motions’ panel of this Court
sua sponte entered an order declaring that we would treat the Appellant’s
petition for permission to appeal as a notice of appeal. We thus dismissed the
petition for permission to appeal as moot. Order, 3/18/25, at 1. This Court’s
order declares:
Upon consideration of the December 13, 2024, petition for
permission to appeal filed by [Appellant], and noting no
response thereto, the petition shall be treated as a notice
of appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1316(a) (providing that
appellate court shall treat request for discretionary review of
immediately appealable order as appeal notice if party filed
timely petition); see also Pa.R.A.P. 313(a) (stating appeal
may be taken as of right from collateral order).
The Prothonotary of this Court is DIRECTED to assign this
matter a direct appeal number. The petition for
permission to appeal is DISMISSED as moot.
Id. (some emphasis added) (some emphasis omitted).
This Court’s March 18, 2025 order was apparently issued under the
belief that the trial court’s interlocutory, September 23, 2024 order satisfied
the requirements of the collateral order doctrine.1 While this appeal was
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1 Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313 defines a collateral order as
one that: “1) is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; 2)
involves a right too important to be denied review; and 3) presents a question
that, if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be
irreparably lost.” In re Bridgeport Fire Litigation, 51 A.3d 224, 230 n.8
(Pa. Super. 2012); see also Pa.R.A.P. 313(b). Our Supreme Court has
emphasized:
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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pending, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Chilutti v. Uber
Technologies, Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) and expressly narrowed the
breadth of the collateral order doctrine’s “irreparable loss” prong.
In Chilutti, the plaintiffs filed a complaint against Uber Technologies,
Inc., claiming that Uber acted negligently when it failed to provide the
wheelchair-bound wife with a seatbelt during transport, thus causing her
injuries. See Chilutti, 349 A.3d at 828. “In response to the Chiluttis’
complaint, Uber filed a petition to compel arbitration, arguing that, when the
Chiluttis enrolled in Uber, they agreed to arbitrate the claims that they
presented in their complaint.” Id. The trial court granted Uber’s petition to
compel arbitration and stayed the court proceedings pending the result of the
arbitration. Id. The Chiluttis then filed a notice of appeal and claimed that
the trial court’s order, granting the petition to compel arbitration, was
immediately appealable as a collateral order. See id. at 828-829.
Our Supreme Court held that the trial court’s order failed the third-prong
of the collateral order doctrine and was, therefore, unappealable. In doing so,
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the collateral order doctrine is a specialized, practical [exception
to] the general rule that only final orders are appealable as of
right. Thus, Rule 313 must be interpreted narrowly, and the
requirements for an appealable collateral order remain stringent
in order to prevent undue corrosion of the final order rule. To that
end, each prong of the collateral order doctrine must be clearly
present before an order may be considered collateral.
Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 46-47 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted).
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the Supreme Court rejected the Chiluttis’ argument that, “because they may
incur a substantial loss of money in litigating this action in arbitration, the trial
court’s order compelling arbitration meets the requirements of the third prong
of the collateral order doctrine.” See id. at 833-834. Further, the Chilutti
Court distinguished the case before it from its earlier opinion in Pridgen v.
Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422 (Pa. 2006). As the Chilutti Court
explained, Pridgen involved:
(1) complex litigation that followed a fatal aviation accident;
and (2) a federal statute, the General Aviation Revitalization
Act of 1994 (GARA), which Congress enacted to contain the
costs of aviation-related litigation. . . . [T]he defendants in
Pridgen filed motions for summary judgment, claiming that
they were immune from suit under GARA. The trial court
denied the motions. The defendants appealed to the Superior
Court, which quashed the appeals on the basis that the trial
court's orders were interlocutory and did not constitute
collateral orders. [The Pennsylvania Supreme Court] granted
allowance of appeal and held, in relevant part, that the orders
denying the defendants’ motions for summary judgment
qualified as collateral orders.
As to the third prong of the collateral order doctrine, [the
Pridgen] Court opined:
With regard to the element of irreparable loss, we
conclude that the substantial cost that the defendants will
incur in defending this complex litigation at a trial on the
merits comprises a sufficient loss to support allowing
interlocutory appellate review as of right, in light of the
clear federal policy expressed in GARA to contain such
costs in the public interest. Consistent with the plaintiffs’
arguments, we realize that future litigants may seek to
extend our determination here more broadly to other
statutes of repose. Nevertheless, balancing the potential
vindication of the interest in freedom from tort claims
created by Congress through GARA against the state
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interest in curtailing piecemeal appellate review, we find
that the former prevails relative to the review of
controlling legal issues in the present cases.
Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433.
Chilutti, 349 A.3d at 834 (footnotes and corrections omitted), quoting
Pridgen, 905 A.2d at 433.
The Chilutti Court held that “Pridgen simply is inapplicable to this
matter” because: “[u]nlike Pridgen, [the Chiluttis’ case] does not involve
costly complex litigation or a federal statute that expresses a legislative policy
to contain litigation costs in specific cases. In addition, this matter does not
have anything to do with a claim of immunity from suit.” Chilutti, 349 A.3d
at 834. Moreover, the Chilutti Court quoted, with approval, a concurring
opinion from Justice Wecht, where Justice Wecht declared:
[The Pennsylvania Supreme] Court has focused on the cost
of litigation [in assessing the third prong of the collateral
order doctrine] on at least one occasion, but that ruling was
premised upon federal law supporting a clear policy of cost
containment in aviation litigation. . . . If expenditure of
resources when such expenditure could be avoided through
an interlocutory appeal sufficed for [Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure] 313 purposes, then every interlocutory
order presumably would satisfy the irreparable loss prong of
the collateral order rule. The exception would devour the
rule.
Id. (corrections in original), quoting J.C.D. v. A.L.R., 303 A.3d 425, 442-443
(Pa. 2023) (Wecht, J. concurring).
Here, the trial court’s interlocutory, September 23, 2024 order denied
Appellant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings; and, in that motion,
Appellant claimed that the Plaintiff’s medical malpractice action was barred by
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the statute of limitations. With respect to the collateral order doctrine,
Appellant’s statute of limitations claim can always be raised at later points
during the litigation (including on appeal from an adverse judgment) and,
thus, does not “present[] a question that, if review is postponed until final
judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” See In re
Bridgeport Fire Litigation, 51 A.3d 224 at n.8. Further, any claim that the
third-prong of the collateral order doctrine is satisfied because Appellant “may
incur a substantial loss of money in litigating” this relatively simple medical
malpractice action fails under Chilutti. See Chilutti, 349 A.3d at 834.
Therefore, the trial court’s September 23, 2024 order is not appealable under
the collateral order doctrine.
In its effort to reach the merits of this appeal, the Majority attempts to
sua sponte revive Appellant’s petition for permission to appeal. See Majority
Memorandum at *10 n.7. Unfortunately, however, that petition is no longer
before this Court, as we expressly dismissed the petition in our March 18,
2025 order. See Order, 3/18/25, at 1. And, with no petition pending before
this Court, we simply have no jurisdiction over this appeal. See
Commonwealth v. Yingling, 911 A.2d 572, 575 (Pa. Super. 2006) (holding:
“when a party seeks discretionary review of an interlocutory order, and the
trial court properly certifies such an order for immediate appeal, if no petition
for permission to appeal is filed with the appellate court, the appeal will be
quashed, as we are without jurisdiction to exercise our discretion in this
regard”) (quotation marks, citations, and corrections omitted).
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Further, even though the Majority’s actions attempt to strike an
equitable result in light of this Court’s mistaken, sua sponte, March 18, 2025
order, the issue at hand concerns our subject matter jurisdiction. See
McCutcheon v. Phila. Elec. Co., 788 A.2d 345, 349-350 (Pa. 2002) (“[i]n
this Commonwealth, there are few legal principles as well settled as that an
appeal lies only from a final order, unless otherwise permitted by rule or by
statute”). As our Supreme Court has held, “the parties may not stipulate
appellate jurisdiction in disregard of statutory procedures. Nor may
jurisdiction be conferred through the approval of such agreements by the
court.” Commonwealth v. Yorktowne Paper Mills, Inc., 214 A.2d 203,
205 (Pa. 1965) (citations omitted). Moreover, “it is well settled that a
judgment or decree rendered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the subject
matter . . . is null and void.” Strasburg Scooters, LLC v. Strasburg Rail
Rd., Inc., 210 A.3d 1064, 1067 (Pa. Super. 2019). Thus, and respectfully,
while the Majority attempts to do the right thing in this case, its action in the
absence of subject matter jurisdiction leaves both parties worse off, as “[t]he
want of jurisdiction over the subject-matter may be questioned at any time.
It may be questioned . . . for the first time in an appellate court, and it is fatal
at any stage of the proceedings, even when collaterally involved.” In re
Patterson’s Estate, 19 A.2d 165, 166 (Pa. 1941) (quotation marks and
citations omitted).
I believe we must quash this appeal. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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