State of Tennessee v. Jeremy Brian Poe

05/27/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

May 5, 2026 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JEREMY BRIAN POE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Madison County

No. 24-485 Kyle C. Atkins, Judge

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No. W2025-01143-CCA-R3-CD

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A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Jeremy Brian Poe, of one count of theft

of property greater than $10,000, but less than $60,000. On appeal, the defendant contends

the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, and the trial court erred in

sentencing the defendant as a Range III offender. Upon our review of the record, the

parties’ briefs, oral argument, and the applicable law, we affirm the defendant’s conviction.

However, following our review of the defendant’s sentence, we conclude the trial court

erred in its application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-107(b) and in finding

the defendant to be a Range III, persistent offender. Accordingly, the defendant’s Range

III sentence requires reversal, and we remand this matter for resentencing.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in

Part and Reversed in Part

J. ROSS DYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which TOM GREENHOLTZ, J., joined.

JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., J., not participating.

Brennan M. Wingerter and Mitchell A. Raines, Tennessee District Public Defenders

Conference – Appellate Division, Franklin, Tennessee, (on appeal) and Caroline

Ballentine, Jackson, Tennessee, (at trial) for the appellant, Jeremy Brian Poe.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; William C. Lundy, Assistant Attorney

General; Jody Pickens, District Attorney General; and Katie Ferguson, Assistant District

Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

Facts and Procedural History

The defendant was indicted for theft of property valued over $10,000, but less than

$60,000, by a Madison County grand jury in July 2024. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103.

On April 25, 2025, the State presented the following proof at trial:

Andrew Taylor testified that on February 20, 2024, he drove to the Trinity Food

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Market on North Parkway in Jackson, Tennessee. Upon arrival, he parked his 2022 Jeep

Wrangler near the front door. Mr. Taylor went into the store, leaving the vehicle unlocked

and running. After approximately two minutes, Mr. Taylor exited the store, noticed his

Jeep was no longer where he had parked it, and then observed his Jeep “headed down

Parkway.”

Remembering he had left his cell phone in his Jeep, Mr. Taylor borrowed another

customer’s cell phone to call his nephew. According to Mr. Taylor, he and his nephew

shared cell phone location data, and therefore, his nephew was able to track the movement

of Mr. Taylor’s phone and, by extension, his Jeep. Utilizing that data, Mr. Taylor tracked

the location of his Jeep and relayed its location to law enforcement.

Investigator Bradley Lewis with the Jackson Police Department was on patrol when

he received a call over the police radio concerning “a stolen vehicle at Trinity Food

Market.” Shortly after the initial call, dispatch provided a possible address for the stolen

vehicle. Upon arriving at the location, which was located approximately three-quarters of

a mile away from the Trinity Food Market, Inv. Lewis discovered the stolen Jeep parked

behind a building. Inv. Lewis also observed the defendant “walking away from the

vehicle.” He ordered the defendant to stop and “get on the ground.” However, the

defendant refused the command and continued to walk away from Inv. Lewis and an

accompanying officer. In response, Inv. Lewis ran towards the defendant, physically took

the defendant into custody, and placed him under arrest. Pursuant to a search incident to

the defendant’s arrest, Inv. Lewis retrieved a cell phone from the defendant’s pockets. Inv.

Lewis testified that at no point did he notice any indications that the defendant was

intoxicated.

Shortly after the vehicle was discovered, officers transported Mr. Taylor to its

location. While there was no damage to the vehicle, Mr. Taylor noted several personal

items were missing: a pair of gym shoes, approximately five to six hundred dollars, and his

cell phone.2 He estimated the value of his gym shoes to be approximately $80 - $90 and

the value of his cell phone to be $1000. Mr. Taylor also testified that he had purchased the

1

Trinity Food Market was also referred to as Trinity Mart during trial. For purposes of this opinion

and for consistency, it will be referred to as Trinity Food Market.

2

Ultimately, Mr. Taylor’s cell phone was returned to him by the Jackson Police Department.

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2022 Jeep Wrangler approximately four or five months prior to the theft. He paid a down

payment of $11,000 and owed $22,000 on the vehicle.

Investigator Wade Arnold with the Jackson Police Department also responded to

the scene of the recovered vehicle. After speaking with the other officers, Inv. Arnold

transported the defendant to the police station in order to interview him. After being

advised of and waiving his Miranda3 rights, the defendant gave the following signed

statement:

I left Northwest [Correctional Complex]. I had to walk five miles to get to –

to get a check cashed. I had $175. I went to McDonald’s and a liquor store.

I was tired of walking. I went to the gas station. The vehicle was running. I

got in it, drove towards the bus stop, and left it behind the church. I took the

cellphone out of the car and a pair of shoes. I wasn’t trying to steal the car,

just getting a ride to the bus stop.

During his interview with the defendant, Inv. Arnold did not notice any signs that the

defendant was intoxicated.

At trial, the defendant testified that on the day in question he was attempting to

travel to Chattanooga. He stated that he possessed a bus ticket but “had to walk about, . . .

eight miles, I guess, to cash a check.” On his way back to the bus stop, the defendant

purchased a hamburger at McDonald’s and a bottle of rum at a liquor store. He went behind

the liquor store and “drunk it, about every bit of it.” As he continued toward the bus stop,

the defendant saw Mr. Taylor leave his Jeep running outside of the Trinity Food Market,

so, “I just got in it” and “drove towards the bus stop.” The defendant testified that he did

not intend to steal the Jeep but admitted to taking Mr. Taylor’s gym shoes, cash, and cell

phone. The defendant claimed he was not thinking clearly that day due to drinking a

“whole fifth of rum” and expressed remorse for his actions. However, on cross-

examination, the defendant agreed that he took the Jeep without Mr. Taylor’s permission

because he “was just tired of walking.”

Following deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty of theft of property

greater than $10,000, but less than $60,000.

A sentencing hearing was held on June 9, 2025. At the onset of the hearing, the

State introduced the defendant’s presentence report. To support its request to have the

defendant classified as a Range III, persistent offender, the State introduced certified copies

of five felony convictions:

3

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

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1. Case No. 7991; Offense Date 10/10/06; Agg. Burglary - Count 1; C Felony

2. Case No. 7991; Offense Date 10/10/06; Agg. Burglary - Count 2; C Felony

3. Case No. 8667; Offense Date 6/18/09; Agg. Burglary; C Felony

4. Case No. 9532; Offense Date 4/8/13; Agg. Burglary; C Felony

5. Case No. 11144; Offense Date 3/13/19; Theft of Prop Value 2,500 – 10,000; D

Felony

The defendant noted that two of these convictions were for offenses of aggravated

burglary committed within the same 24-hour period in 2006. Therefore, the defendant

argued, those convictions should merge and count as one for purposes of offender

classification and render the defendant a Range II offender. The State responded that

Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-107(4) added an exception to the 24-hour rule

for aggravated burglary in 2009, and that exception was in effect in 2024, when this offense

occurred. Ultimately, the trial court found that the defendant “would be sentenced based

on the law as it was in existence at the time he committed this offense.” Accordingly, the

trial court found the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a

Range III offender. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to twelve years in

confinement with the Tennessee Department of Correction.

The defendant filed a motion for new trial. After a hearing, the trial court denied

the motion, and this timely appeal followed.

Analysis

On appeal, the defendant asserts the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to

sustain his conviction because the State failed to prove that he had the requisite intent and

that the vehicle had a value greater than $10,000; consequently, he argues the proof at trial

was only sufficient to establish the offense of joyriding. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-

106. The State responds that the jury could have reasonably concluded from several points

of evidence that the defendant maintained the requisite intent to deprive the victim of his

vehicle. The State also argues the jury could have reasonably concluded the value of the

vehicle was greater than $10,000.

Additionally, the defendant contends the trial court erred in classifying him as a

Range III, Persistent offender, arguing his two aggravated burglary convictions in 2006

should have merged because they occurred in the same 24-hour period. The State counters

that the twenty-four-hour merger rule explicitly exempts aggravated burglary from merger,

and thus, the trial court did not err in classifying the defendant as a Range III offender.

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In the alternative, the defendant argues that a retroactive application of the 2009

amended twenty-four-hour merger rule which excludes aggravated burglary is an ex post

facto application of law. The State responds that the defendant has waived that argument

for failing to preserve it in the trial court.

Upon review, we agree with the State that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the

defendant’s conviction for theft of property valued over $10,000. However, we agree with

the defendant that the trial court erred in classifying him as a Range III offender.

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, the relevant question of the

reviewing court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Tenn.

R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury

shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact

of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn.

1992); State v. Anderson, 835 S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). All questions

involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and

all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620,

623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge,

accredits the testimony of the witnesses for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of

the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). Our Supreme

Court has stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound foundation. The trial judge and the

jury see the witnesses face to face, hear their testimony and observe their

demeanor on the stand. Thus, the trial judge and jury are the primary

instrumentality of justice to determine the weight and credibility to be given

to the testimony of witnesses. In the trial forum alone is there human

atmosphere and the totality of the evidence cannot be reproduced with a

written record in this Court.

Bolin v. State, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tenn. 1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 370 S.W.2d 523

(1963)). “A jury conviction removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant

is initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant

has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639

S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982).

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Guilt may be found beyond a reasonable doubt where there is direct evidence,

circumstantial evidence, or a combination of the two. State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d 776,

779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1977);

Farmer v. State, 343 S.W.2d 895, 897 (Tenn. 1961)). The standard of review for

sufficiency of the evidence “is the same whether the conviction is based upon direct or

circumstantial evidence.” State v. Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting

State v. Hanson, 279 S.W.3d 265, 275 (Tenn. 2009)). Moreover, the jury determines the

weight to be given to circumstantial evidence and the inferences to be drawn from this

evidence, and the extent to which the circumstances are consistent with guilt and

inconsistent with innocence are questions primarily for the jury. See id. at 379.

Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to support a conviction. State v.

Richmond, 7 S.W.3d 90, 91 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). This Court, when considering the

sufficiency of the evidence, shall not reweigh the evidence or substitute its inferences for

those drawn by the trier of fact. Id. This Court will not exchange its “inferences for those

drawn by the trier of fact from circumstantial evidence.” State v. Matthews, 805 S.W.2d

776, 779 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

i. Intent to Permanently Deprive

A person “commits theft of property if, with intent to deprive the owner of the

property, the person knowingly obtains or exercises control over the property without the

owner’s effective consent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-103(a). In addition, “‘deprive’

means to,” as relevant to this case, “withhold property from the owner permanently or for

such a period of time to substantially diminish the value or enjoyment of the property to

the owner.” Id. § 39-11-106(a)(9)(A). “The intent to deprive may be based solely upon

circumstantial evidence, and a ‘jury may infer a . . . defendant’s intent from the surrounding

facts and circumstances.’” State v. Smith, W2023-00482-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 863301,

at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 29, 2024) (quoting State v. Stewart, No. M2019-01421-CCA-

R3-CD, 2020 WL 6494838, at *11 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2020) (omission in

original)). “Moreover, the fact that the [defendant] did not possess the owner’s property

for an extended period ‘does not preclude a jury from finding that he possessed the requisite

intent for theft.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hicks, No. W2022-00920-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL

4230430, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2023)).

After examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude

the proof was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant possessed the requisite “intent to deprive” Mr. Taylor of his Jeep as defined in

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106(a)(9)(A). The evidence produced at trial

established that the defendant found the Jeep running outside of the Trinity Food Market.

Because he was “tired of walking,” the defendant took the Jeep without Mr. Taylor’s

permission, drove toward the bus stop, and concealed it behind a building. Shortly

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thereafter, the Jeep and the defendant were quickly discovered. From these facts, when

taken in the light most favorable to the State, it is reasonable for a jury to infer that the

defendant had the intent to permanently deprive Mr. Taylor of his vehicle, but he was

“captured too early in the criminal act.” State v. Reed, No. M2020-00677-CCA-R3-CD,

2021 WL 4987974, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 27, 2021). Accordingly, the evidence

was sufficient to find the defendant possessed the requisite intent to deprive under

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-103(a) and, therefore, sufficient to sustain the

jury’s verdict.

The defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial only supports a conviction

for “joyriding,” in which the defendant need not have an intent to permanently deprive the

victim of his property. Joyriding is defined as the taking of “another’s automobile, . . . or

another vehicle without the consent of the owner and the person does not have the intent

to deprive the owner thereof.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-106. In support of this argument,

the defendant relies upon his own testimony that he “didn’t intend to keep the car” and his

statement to Inv. Arnold that he was “just getting a ride to the bus stop.” However, this

Court has recognized that the State is only required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the defendant intended to deprive the owner of the vehicle the moment he drove it

away, not that the defendant intended to permanently possess it. See Reed, 2021 WL

4987974, at *2 (There is no requirement that a defendant deprive an owner of property for

a prolonged period for the jury to find the defendant possessed the requisite intent for

theft.); see also State v. Smith, No. W2023-00482-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL 863301, at *7

(Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 29, 2024) (A jury can infer that a defendant was captured too early

in the criminal act to accomplish a permanent deprivation.). Further, this Court has

acknowledged that juries are not required to accredit a defendant’s testimony that he did

not intend to deprive the victim of their vehicle. Reed, 2021 WL 4987974, at *2.

Here, a reasonable juror could have concluded that when the defendant drove Mr.

Taylor’s vehicle away from the Trinity Food Market without his permission and concealed

it behind a building, he had the intent to deprive Mr. Taylor of his vehicle. Moreover, the

jury was within its discretion not to accredit the defendant’s testimony to the contrary.

Accordingly, the defendant is not entitled to relief.

ii. Value of the Vehicle

Although the statute defining theft does not contain “an element regarding the value

of the property stolen,” the value “must be determined in order to establish the grade of the

theft offense.” State v. Moats, No. E2019-02244-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 6392483, at *3

(Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2020) (quoting State v. Jones, 589 S.W.3d 747, 756 (Tenn.

2019)); see also State v. Sumpter, No. W2021-00119-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 946570, *11

(Tenn. Crim. App. March 30, 2022). “Whenever a determination of value is necessary to

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assess the class of an offense in this code or the level of punishment, the determination of

value shall be made by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.” Tenn. Code Ann. §

39-11-115. Theft of property valued at greater than $10,000, but less than $60,000, is a

Class C Felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-105(a)(4).

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-11-106 defines “value” as “(i) [t]he fair

market value of the property of service at the time and place of the offense; or (ii) [i]f the

fair market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of replacing the property within a

reasonable time after the offense[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-106(a)(39)(A). The fair

market value of property is a question of fact for the jury. State v. Stitts, No. W2011-

02673-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 257069, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 23, 2013). “The

market value of the article stolen, and not its original cost, is the true criterion when it is

necessary to establish the value of the property in order to fix the grade of the offense[.]”

Id. (citing State v. Hamm, 611 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Tenn. 1981)). “This court has concluded

that a property owner’s testimony regarding value is sufficient, standing alone, to support

a conviction for the theft of that value of property.” State v. Smith, No. M2024-01108-

CCA-R3-CD, 2026 WL 637323, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2026). Additionally,

the jury can use its “common sense” in making its determination regarding the value of

stolen goods. See State v. Sydnor, No. M2007-02393-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 366670 at

*20 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 2, 2010).

At trial, Mr. Taylor testified that he purchased the 2022 Jeep Wrangler for $33,000

four or five months prior to the theft. At the time of purchase, Mr. Taylor paid $11,000 as

a down payment and still owed $22,000. The State also introduced a photograph of the

Jeep reflecting the condition of the vehicle along with the victim’s testimony that the Jeep

had no damage prior to or after the theft. Additionally, the record clearly established that

the Jeep was operable as Mr. Taylor drove to the gas station that day, the defendant was

able to drive the vehicle from the station, and Mr. Taylor was able to drive it from the scene

after the Jeep was located by law enforcement. Provided with the “purchase price, the

condition of the vehicle, and length of ownership,” a reasonable juror could have

determined the value of the Jeep. State v. Logue, No. W1999-01795-CCA-R3-CD, 2000

WL 1843248, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 15, 2000).

In addition, the defendant admitted to intentionally taking other items belonging to

Mr. Taylor, estimated to be valued at approximately $1580 - $1690.4 The jury, as the trier

of fact, is entrusted with determining the value of the theft, the weight of the evidence, and

evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Based on the verdict, the jury found the value of

the vehicle, as well as Mr. Taylor’s personal belongings and cash, to be greater than

4

Specifically, Mr. Taylor testified that his gym shoes were valued at $80 - $90, his cell phone was

valued at $1000, and the missing cash in the vehicle was approximately $500 - $600.

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$10,000. Accordingly, the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict and the

defendant, therefore, is not entitled to relief on this issue.

II. Offender Classification

The defendant argues the trial court erred in classifying him as a Range III,

persistent offender. Specifically, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding

the State carried its burden in proving the defendant’s convictions were sufficient to qualify

as a Range III offender, arguing his two aggravated burglary convictions from 2006 should

have merged for the purposes of classification. The State insists the trial court properly

interpreted the merger rule and, therefore, did not err in classifying the defendant as a

Range III offender. We agree with the defendant.

Initially, the parties question the appropriate standard by which this Court should

review the trial court’s determination of offender classification. Recognizing there is a

split of authority among this Court, the defendant urges this Court to review a trial court’s

range determination by conducting a de novo review with the presumption that the court’s

factual determinations are correct. See State v. Anderson, No. E2024-01131-CCA-R3-CD,

2025 WL 2433781 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 25, 2025), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 25,

2026 (citing State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 885 (Tenn. 1993)). The State, however,

insists that this Court should review a trial court’s range determination decision for an

abuse of discretion, with a presumption of reasonableness. State v. Garrens, No. W2024-

00258-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 1307696, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 6, 2025) (quoting

State v. Christian, No. M2018-00320-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 3948933, at *5 (Tenn. Crim.

App. Aug. 21, 2019)), no perm. app. filed. Additionally, the State argues that this Court

need not resolve the split in authority “because the defendant’s argument fails under any

standard.” While we agree with the State that resolution of the split of authority is not

necessary to resolve the issue in this case, we disagree with the State’s claim that the

defendant cannot prevail. Rather, upon our review of the record and the applicable law,

the defendant prevails on his claim regardless of which standard we apply.

A Range III, persistent offender is defined as “a defendant who has received . . .

[a]ny combination of five (5) or more prior felony convictions within the conviction class

or higher or within the next two (2) lower felony classes, where applicable . . . .” Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-35-107(a)(1). A Range II, multiple offender, is a “defendant who has

received a minimum of two (2) but not more than four (4) prior felony convictions within

the conviction class, a higher class, or within the next two (2) lower felony classes[.] Tenn.

Code Ann. § 40-35-106(a)(1). At the time of the defendant’s 2006 convictions, the twenty-

four-hour merger rule stated,

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In determining the number of prior felony convictions a defendant has

received[,] . . . [e]xcept for convictions for which the statutory elements

include serious bodily injury, bodily injury, threatened serious bodily injury,

or threatened bodily injury to the victim or victims, convictions for multiple

felonies committed within the same twenty-four-hour period constitute one

(1) conviction for the purpose of determining prior convictions[.]

Id. § 40-35-107(b)(4) (2005).

In 2009, the twenty-four-hour merger rule was amended to specifically exclude

aggravated burglary. Id.; see also 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 603, § 1 (eff. July 1, 2009).

The legislature made clear that aggravated burglaries “occurring on or after August 17,

2009, shall count as [separate] prior convictions for purposes enumerated in this act.” State

v. Click, No. E2015-01769-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 1189750, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App.

Mar. 30, 2017), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Patterson, 564 S.W.3d 423 (Tenn.

2018); see also 2009 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 603, § 4 (eff. July 1, 2009) (“This act shall take

effect July 1, 2009, the public welfare requiring it and all convictions for the offense of

aggravated burglary under Section 39-14-403, occurring on or after such date shall count

as prior convictions for the purposes enumerated in this act.”). The Compiler’s Notes to

the amended version of the statute make it clear that only aggravated burglaries “occurring

on or after August 17, 2009, shall count as prior convictions for the purposes enumerated

in this act.” Id.; see also State v. Kenneth Edward Watts, No. E2010-00553-CCA-R3-CD,

2011 WL 5517000, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 8, 2011) (noting this change to the

twenty-four-hour merger rule). Therefore, although the legislature amended the twenty-

four-hour merger rule to exclude aggravated burglary in 2009, the amendment only applies

to convictions occurring after August 17, 2009.

In the case at bar, the defendant’s 2006 aggravated burglary convictions occurred

within the same twenty-four hours and before the 2009 amendment. Therefore, the

defendant’s 2006 convictions for aggravated burglary “constitute one (1) for purpose of

determining prior convictions.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-107(b)(4); See State v. Borden,

No. W2021-00305-CCA-R3-CD, 2022 WL 839891, *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 21, 2022);

see also State v. Gordon, No. W2021-01190-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 2375707, at *6 fn.2

(Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 7, 2023). As such, the record only establishes four prior felony

convictions that may be counted in the offender classification. Accordingly, the trial court

erred in classifying the defendant as a Range III offender, and we remand for resentencing

the defendant as a Range II offender.

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Conclusion

Based on the foregoing authorities and reasoning, we affirm the defendant’s

conviction for theft of property valued greater than $10,000, but less than $60,000. We

reverse the trial court’s sentencing of the defendant as a Range III offender and remand for

resentencing of the defendant as a Range II offender.

S/ J. ROSS DYER _

J. ROSS DYER, JUDGE

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