Opinion

PA-American Water Co. v. PA PUC

Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
May 28, 2026
Status
Unpublished
Author
Dumas
On the bench
Dumas
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.7%

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania-American Water : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Company, :

Petitioner :

: No. 355 C.D. 2024

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Public Utility :

Commission, :

Respondent :

:

Borough of Brentwood, :

Petitioner :

: No. 356 C.D. 2024

v. :

: Argued: December 10, 2025

Public Utility Commission, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE DUMAS FILED: May 28, 2026

In these consolidated appeals, the Borough of Brentwood and

Pennsylvania-American Water Company (individually Borough and PAWC, and

collectively Petitioners) each petition for review of the Pennsylvania Public Utility

Commission’s (Commission) opinion and order (Opinion), issued on March 4, 2024.

Through that Opinion, the Commission denied PAWC’s request that it approve

PAWC’s proposed acquisition of the Borough’s municipal wastewater collection

system and grant PAWC a related certificate of public convenience (CPC).1 Upon

review, we are constrained to vacate the Commission’s Opinion and remand this

matter to the Commission for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND2

The Borough, which is located in Allegheny County, owns and operates

a public wastewater collection system that serviced approximately 4000 customers

as of February 2023. A large proportion of this system’s infrastructure is over 100

years old. Borough customers currently receive two bills: one from PAWC for clean

incoming water;3 and another from the Borough, which covers charges for

wastewater collection and refuse disposal, as well as charges from the broader

Allegheny County Sanitary Authority (ALCOSAN) for wastewater service. 4

In September 2019, the Borough began the process of assessing

whether it should either retain ownership of its wastewater collection system or

1

PAWC is a public utility whose provision of water-related services is regulated by the

Commission. See generally Phila. Suburban Water Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 808 A.2d 1044

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2002).

2

We draw the substance of this section from the Commission’s Opinion, as well as the

Recommended Decision that was issued by a Commission administrative law judge (ALJ). See

generally Recommended Decision, 1/17/24; Op., 3/4/2024.

3

PAWC provides such service within the Borough separately from the Borough’s municipal

wastewater collection system.

4

The Borough is a member of ALCOSAN, which provides wastewater conveyance and

treatment services for the Borough’s system, as well as for 82 other municipal systems in the area.

ALCOSAN, the Borough, and the City of Pittsburgh (City) are all signatories to the Pittsburgh

Zone Project Agreement of December 1, 1949, which allows ALCOSAN and the City to use the

Borough’s (and other municipalities’) systems to facilitate the flow of wastewater to ALCOSAN’s

treatment plants without the need for those municipalities’ express advance knowledge or consent.

2

endeavor to sell the system to another entity. The Borough ultimately concluded

that the latter option was the more prudent one and issued a request for bids regarding

the system’s assets on September 25, 2020, to which PAWC responded on October

28, 2020, by submitting an acquisition proposal. Borough Council then approved

the system’s sale to PAWC on December 7, 2020, whereupon the Borough and

PAWC entered into a purchase agreement for the Borough’s system on December

22, 2020.

PAWC then filed an application with the Commission on October 31,

2023, pursuant to Section 1329 of the Public Utility Code (Code),5 through which

PAWC sought approval of its acquisition of the Borough’s system and agreements

related thereto, as well as the granting of a CPC regarding the provision of

wastewater service within the Borough (Application).6 A Commission ALJ then

5

66 Pa.C.S. § 1329.

6

As our Supreme Court has aptly explained:

Section 1329 of the Code created a process where, upon agreement

of the acquiring and selling utilities engaged in a transaction for the

purchase of the selling utility, the parties can engage in a procedure

to determine the fair market value . . . of the selling utility. 66

Pa.C.S. § 1329(a). If the parties opt for this procedure, the

ratemaking base rate of the selling utility “shall be the lesser of the

purchase price negotiated by the acquiring public utility or entity

and selling utility or the fair market value of the selling utility.” Id.

§ 1329(c)(2). The selling utility’s ratemaking rate base shall then

be incorporated into the rate base of (1) the acquiring public utility

during its next base rate case or (2) the entity in its initial tariff filing.

Id. § 1329(c)(1)(i), (ii). Unlike Section 1327 [of the Code], Section

1329 does not limit the availability of the fair market valuation

method to small, nonviable selling utilities that are not providing

adequate service. See id. § 1329(g) (definitions of acquiring and

selling utilities).

When the parties proceed with Section 1329’s fair market valuation

process, the acquiring utility or entity must obtain a CPC from the

(Footnote continued on next page…)

3

held multiple public hearings and considered evidence and testimony submitted by

PAWC, as well as by a multitude of interested parties, including ALCOSAN, the

Borough, the Commission’s Bureau of Investigation and Enforcement, the Office of

Consumer Advocate (OCA), and the Office of Small Business Advocate (OSBA).

Thereafter, on January 17, 2024, the ALJ issued a recommended decision, in which

she advised the Commission to deny PAWC’s Application in full. This

recommendation was based upon the ALJ’s determination that PAWC had failed to

Commission in accordance with Section 1102 of the Code. See id.

§ 1329(d)(1), (e). Pursuant to Section 1102, a CPC is required

before a public utility may (1) provide services in a different

territory than it is currently providing those services or (2) acquire

from, inter alia, a municipal corporation title to property used to

provide public services. See id. § 1102(a)(1), (3). Hence, an

acquiring utility is required to obtain a new CPC prior to purchasing

the property of a selling utility or providing services to that selling

utility’s customers, even when the acquiring utility already holds a

CPC to provide those services in a different territory.

The procedure to obtain a CPC is set forth in Section 1103 of the

Code, id. § 1103. Pursuant to Section 1103, in order to obtain a

CPC, a public utility must file an application with the Commission.

The application shall be granted “only if the [C]ommission shall find

or determine that the granting of such certificate is necessary or

proper for the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the

public.” Id. § 1103(a). Moreover, to obtain the CPC, an applicant

has the burden, by a preponderance of evidence, to establish that it

is technically, legally, and financially fit to provide the proposed

service. McCloskey v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 195 A.3d 1055, 1058

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citing Seaboard Tank Lines, Inc. v. Pa. Pub.

Util. Comm’n, 502 A.2d 762, 763 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985)). A

certified public utility enjoys a presumption that it is fit. Id.

Furthermore, in granting a CPC, the Commission “may impose such

conditions as it may deem to be just and reasonable.” 66 Pa.C.S. §

1103(a).

Lawrence v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 348 A.3d 108, 113-14 (Pa. 2025) (cleaned up).

4

establish by a preponderance of the evidence that its acquisition of the Borough’s

system would substantially benefit the general public.

The Borough and PAWC then filed exceptions with the Commission

regarding the proposed decision. The Commission subsequently issued its Opinion

on March 4, 2024, through which it denied or deemed moot all of the exceptions and

adopted the ALJ’s recommended decision in full; in doing so, the Commission

agreed with the ALJ that PAWC’s proposed purchase of the system would not

provide a substantial affirmative public benefit. These appeals to our Court then

followed shortly thereafter.

II. DISCUSSION7

PAWC contests the Opinion on several grounds. First, PAWC states

that the Commission improperly evaluated the Application’s merits using the

standards for reasonableness it had set forth in a tentative supplemental

7

This Court reviews a Commission order

to determine whether the Commission’s findings of fact are

supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was

committed or whether constitutional rights were violated.

Popowsky v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 910 A.2d 38 (Pa. 2006). The

standard of review to be applied when reviewing a Commission

decision is that the Court should not substitute its judgment for that

of the Commission when substantial evidence supports the

Commission’s decision on a matter within the Commission’s

expertise. City of Lancaster (Water) v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 769

A.2d 567 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001) (citing Popowsky v. Pa. Pub. Util.

Comm’n, 706 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. 1997)). Substantial evidence is

such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

support a conclusion. Borough of E. McKeesport v.

Special/Temporary Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 942 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2008).

McCloskey v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 127 A.3d 860, 866 n.16 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (cleaned up).

5

implementation order. PAWC’s Br. at 14-19. Second, PAWC claims that the

Commission abused its discretion and committed errors of law by determining that

the proposed acquisition of the Borough’s system would not provide a substantial

affirmative public benefit. Id. at 19-57. Finally, PAWC contends that, in light of

that purportedly incorrect public benefit determination, the Commission erred by

concluding that all remaining issues regarding the Application had been rendered

moot. Id. at 57-58. Furthermore, PAWC requests that this Court address those

allegedly non-moot issues on their merits, rather than remanding this matter to the

Commission for additional consideration.8 Id. at 58-59.9

8

The allegedly non-moot issues identified by PAWC are as follows: whether (a) the

Application should be denied because some of the system’s assets are not used and useful, or

because PAWC will provide free service to other municipal systems that are upstream from the

Borough’s system; (b) an approval condition regarding a long-term infrastructure improvement

plan should be adopted; (c) ratemaking decisions regarding transaction and closing costs should

be made at this juncture; (d) a proposed rate freeze is to be considered a rate stabilization plan

pursuant to Section 1329 of the Code; (e) contractually time-limited rate freeze provisions should

be prohibited; (f) PAWC provided legally adequate notice to the Borough’s customers; (g) PAWC

should be required to provide notice to customers in future Section 1329 proceedings regarding a

range of rate impacts that would potentially result from approval of an application of this nature;

(g) PAWC should be required to treat ALCOSAN’s charges and discounts as its own operational

and maintenance expenses; (h) six contractual agreements that are necessary for PAWC to provide

service to the system’s customers should be approved; (i) PAWC should be required to provide a

cost of service study excluding certain system assets in every future rate case; (j) PAWC should

be required to hire a local agent to accept customer payments in the Borough; and (k) completing

the system’s sale should be conditioned upon adequate steps being taken to identify and secure all

necessary easements and property rights. PAWC’s Br. at 59-83.

9

PAWC puts forth two additional arguments in its reply brief. First, PAWC asserts that the

Commission contradicted itself in the Opinion by both deeming moot issues relating to non-

customers’ use of the Borough’s wastewater collection system and then addressing those issues on

their merits. Second, PAWC relatedly maintains that this Court cannot conduct proper appellate

review because the Opinion does not clearly articulate how the Commission elected to dispose of

those issues or how those dispositions affected the Commission’s broader determination that

PAWC’s proposed acquisition of the Borough’s wastewater collection system will not provide a

substantial affirmative public benefit. PAWC’s Reply Br. at 6-8.

6

As for the Borough, it adopts PAWC’s arguments by reference, see

Borough’s Br. at 27, and challenges the Commission’s Opinion on two additional

bases. First, the Borough asserts that Section 1329 of the Code mandates that the

Commission must approve an application of this nature if the underlying system sale

is “proper,” even if the sale is not strictly “necessary” and will result in rate increases

being imposed upon the system’s customers. Borough’s Br. at 30-42. Second, the

Borough maintains that the record is devoid of substantial evidence that supports the

Commission’s findings that the Borough has been providing system customers with

adequate service and is itself capable of implementing the system upgrades and

operational improvements proposed by PAWC. Id. at 43-48.

We need only address PAWC’s second argument at this juncture, due

to our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Pennsylvania Public Utility

Commission, 348 A.3d 108 (Pa. 2025),10 through which the higher court reversed

our disposition of Cicero v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 300 A.3d 116

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).11 In Cicero, Aqua Pennsylvania Wastewater, Inc. (Aqua) filed

a Section 1329 application, through which it sought the Commission’s approval of

10

On February 9, 2026, PAWC filed an unopposed application for relief (Application),

through which it requested leave to file a supplemental brief that addressed the effect of Lawrence

upon the matter sub judice. We granted the Application on February 13, 2026, and gave this

matter’s parties 30 days to file such briefs at their discretion. On March 16, 2026, the Borough,

the Commission, the OCA, and PAWC each elected to file such supplemental briefs.

11

Cicero was retitled as Lawrence after the former decision was appealed to the Supreme

Court, due to the fact that Darryl Lawrence had replaced Patrick Cicero as Pennsylvania’s

Consumer Advocate. See AG Sunday Nominates Darryl Lawrence to Permanent Post as

Pennsylvania Consumer Advocate, PA. OFF. OF CONSUMER ADVOCATE (March 18, 2025),

https://www.oca.pa.gov/ag-sunday-nominates-darryl-lawrence-to-permanent-post-as-

pennsylvania-consumer-advocate; Darryl Lawrence Confirmed by Pa. Senate as Pennsylvania’s

Consumer Advocate, PA. OFF. OF CONSUMER ADVOCATE (June 4, 2025),

https://www.oca.pa.gov/darryl-lawrence-confirmed-by-pa-senate-as-pennsylvanias-consumer-

advocate.

7

its plan to purchase East Whiteland Township’s (Township) municipal wastewater

system. 300 A.3d at 1110-15. The Commission granted Aqua’s application on the

basis that Aqua had established that the prospective affirmative public benefits of

the transaction outweighed its potential harms. Id. at 1115. The OCA then filed a

petition for review in our Court, which we ultimately resolved by reversing the

Commission’s decision. We justified this reversal by explaining that the

Commission had made two critical errors when considering the relative benefits and

harms of the proposed acquisition. First, we ruled that the Commission had

improperly based its approval upon “Aqua’s size and associated technical,

managerial, and financial fitness,” rather than benefits that would accrue due to

“Aqua’s acquisition of the [Township’s wastewater system] specifically.” Id. at

1118. On this point, we specifically stated that the Commission should not have

considered Aqua’s offers of enhanced customer care and operational upgrades as

public benefits in this context, because the Township was either already offering

service at the same level proposed by Aqua or was equally capable of doing so. Id.

at 1118-19. Second, we held that the Commission had incorrectly determined that

Aqua’s “aspirational statements” about the affirmative public benefits that would

accrue as a result of the acquisition “outweigh[ed] the known harm of increased rates

to the [wastewater system’s] customers[.]” Id. at 1120 (emphasis added).

The Commission, the Township, and Aqua each filed separate petitions

for allowance of appeal with our Supreme Court, which granted those petitions and

subsequently overturned Cicero via Lawrence. The Lawrence Court explained that

this was necessary because of flaws present in our interpretation and application of

the affirmative public benefits test. First, though the Court agreed that this test is

not satisfied “merely because the acquiring utility is legally, technically, and

8

financially fit to provide the proposed services,” it held that we had erred by failing

to recognize that the Commission may nevertheless “consider benefits deriving from

that size and fitness in its affirmative benefits analysis.” Lawrence, 348 A.3d at 129.

Second, the Court concluded that we had improperly reweighed the record evidence

through our analysis of Aqua’s and the Township’s comparative service capabilities,

in contravention of our limited standard and scope of review. Id. at 130-31. Finally,

the Court ruled that we had inaccurately characterized rate increases as a “known

harm,” because “a transaction does not only satisfy the affirmative public benefits

test if it results in lower rates for consumers.” Id. at 131. Instead, we should have

acknowledged that “a transaction’s impact on rates is just one of many factors the

Commission is to consider in determining whether a transaction [in toto] will result

in affirmative public benefits.” Id.; see also id. (quoting Popowsky v. Pa. Pub. Util.

Comm’n, 937 A.2d 1040, 1056 (Pa. 2007)) (noting that “[the] potential rate impact

of a transaction is only ‘a component of a net benefits assessment’”). Accordingly,

the Supreme Court reversed our Cicero decision and remanded the matter to our

Court for further proceedings. Id. at 133.

Lawrence is of critical salience here, not only because it addressed a

similar Section 1329 matter, but also because the Commission relied upon Cicero

when denying PAWC’s application. In doing so, the Commission predicated its

disposition of the application’s merits to a not insignificant degree upon our since-

overruled articulation of which elements may constitute substantial affirmative

public benefits in a Section 1329 transaction, as well as our inaccurate assessment

of which elements may qualify as a known harm. See Op. at 14, 59-61, 67-80. The

9

Commission’s denial of PAWC’s Application was therefore in error, because it did

not apply the correct legal standard during its evaluation of the Application.12

III. CONCLUSION

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we are constrained to vacate

the Commission’s Opinion and to remand this matter for further proceedings,

through which the Commission must issue a new opinion and order that comports

with Lawrence and the analytical guidance provided therein. On remand, the

Commission shall give the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefs. In

addition, the Commission may allow the parties to present additional evidence, in

the event it concludes that Petitioners’ exceptions to the ALJ’s Recommended

Decision cannot be properly addressed through the record as currently constituted.13

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

12

An appellate decision that, like Lawrence, neither “involve[s] a new principle of law which

overrules clear past precedent, nor . . . decide[s] an issue of first impression whose resolution was

not clearly foreshadowed” should be applied retroactively to pending matters. Batoff v. Bureau of

Pro. & Occupational Affs., State Bd. of Psych., 631 A.2d 781, 784 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993); accord

Blackwell v. State Ethics Comm’n, 589 A.2d 1094, 1098-1102 (Pa. 1991); August v. Stasak, 424

A.2d 1328, 1330-32 (Pa. 1981).

13

Given our disposition of this matter, we decline to address the remainder of Petitioners’

appellate issues.

10

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Pennsylvania-American Water : CASES CONSOLIDATED

Company, :

Petitioner :

: No. 355 C.D. 2024

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Public Utility :

Commission, :

Respondent :

:

Borough of Brentwood, :

Petitioner :

: No. 356 C.D. 2024

v. :

:

Public Utility Commission, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 28th day of May, 2026, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission’s (Commission) opinion

and order, issued on March 4, 2024, is VACATED;

2. This matter is REMANDED to the Commission, with instructions

that it issue a new opinion and order after remand that comport with the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission,

348 A.3d 108 (Pa. 2025), and the analytical guidance provided therein;

3. The Commission shall give the parties an opportunity to file

supplemental briefs. In addition, the Commission may allow the parties to present

additional evidence, in the event it concludes that Pennsylvania-American Water

Company’s and Borough of Brentwood’s respective exceptions to the administrative

law judge’s Recommended Decision cannot be properly addressed through the

record as currently constituted.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

2

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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