The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania Housing Finance :
Agency, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Debra Cruel and Cruel and :
Associates, LLC (Office of :
Open Records), : No. 278 C.D. 2025
Respondents : Submitted: April 13, 2026
BEFORE: HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE STELLA M. TSAI, Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY FILED: May 28, 2026
The Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency (PHFA) petitions this
Court for review of the Office of Open Records’ (OOR) February 5, 2025 Final
Determination (Final Determination) granting Debra Cruel’s (Requester) and Cruel
and Associates, LLC’s (collectively, Respondents) appeal from the PHFA’s denial
of Requester’s request for records pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law (RTKL)1
(Request).2 Essentially, the PHFA presents one issue for this Court’s review:
whether the Request was sufficiently specific under Section 703 of the RTKL, 65
P.S. § 67.703.3 After review, this Court affirms.
1
Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.
2
It is unclear how Cruel and Associates, LLC became a party to this appeal, as Requester
alone submitted the Request to the PHFA. The OOR captioned its Final Determination naming
both Respondents and the parties did the same in the instant appeal.
3
In their Statement of Questions Involved, Respondents present three issues for this
Court’s review: (1) whether an RTKL request is sufficiently specific under Section 703 of the
On September 25, 2024, Requester submitted the Request to the PHFA,
which stated:
I am requesting documents related to purchasing the
former MaClay Street Apartments Phase I and II, now
known as Governor’s Square Apartments and Towns
[(Properties)]. The [P]roperties are at 501 MaClay Street
and 208 N[.] 5th Street in Harrisburg, [Pennsylvania].
Uptown Partners, LP, [Uptown Partners] and Landex of
MD, GP, own them. The [United States (U.S.)
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)]
Upfront Grant numbers are UPG03PA01325G and
UPG03PA02326. The [p]roject numbers are 034-35175
and 034-35211. The [P]roperties were sold to the
Harrisburg Redevelopment Authority on June 17, 2003,
and purchased by Uptown Partners on February 18, 2004.
Uptown Partners filed for bankruptcy in [the]
P[ennsylvania] Middle District Bankruptcy Court
[(Bankruptcy Court)], and the [P]roperties are being
offered for sale as a part of that bankruptcy proceeding.
The next [Bankruptcy] Court hearing is November 5,
2024. [Requester] ask[s] for expedited processing to
complete [her] purchase offer. The [P]roperties must be
repaired urgently, as the conditions impact the tenants’
safety and well-being. [Requester] hereby request[s] a
copy of the entire file, including but not limited to the
below-referenced info[rmation.]
Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 3a. Thereafter, the Request set forth 45 paragraphs
containing 44 separate items (Request Items).4 See R.R. at 3a-5a.
RTKL when it includes no date range, covers decades of potential records, seeks the entire file,
and is ambiguous concerning the agency transaction or activity for which records are requested;
(2) whether the act of interpreting an RTKL request to have an implied, albeit, very lengthy, finite
timeframe, is an impermissible modification or expansion of the request on appeal; and (3) whether
an RTKL request for a Commonwealth agency record under Section 102 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §
67.102, is an agency record when the documents requested do not describe the agency’s
transactions or activities, but instead those of third parties not under the agency’s jurisdiction or
control. See PHFA Br. at 4. PHFA’s issues are subsumed in the issue as stated by this Court and
will be addressed accordingly.
4
Request Paragraph 45 was a summary of the items sought.
2
On November 1, 2024, after invoking a 30-day extension to respond,
see Section 902(b)(2) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.902(b)(2), the PHFA denied the
Request, asserting that it was insufficiently specific under Section 703 of the RTKL.
In addition, the PHFA directed Requester to contact governmental creditors
participating in the bankruptcy process to obtain many of the requested records
because the PHFA did not provide financing or a grant for the subject project. On
November 25, 2024, Respondents appealed to the OOR, challenging the denial and
stating grounds for disclosure. The OOR invited both parties to supplement the
record and directed the PHFA to notify any directly interested third parties of their
ability to participate in the appeal. See Section 1101(c) of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §
67.1101(c).
On December 18, 2024, the PHFA submitted a position statement
reiterating its grounds for denial. The PHFA argued, inter alia, that the Request was
insufficiently specific and that a majority of the requested records were not PHFA
records. In support thereof, the PHFA submitted declarations of its Agency Open
Records Officer (AORO), Christopher Anderson (AORO Anderson) (Anderson
Attestation), and its Technical Services Representative, Ralph Shires (Shires)
(Shires Attestation).5 On December 19, 2024, Respondents filed two copies of a
position statement, therein asserting, among other things, that the Request was
sufficiently specific and sought records as that term is defined in Section 102 of the
RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.102. In addition, Respondents asked to amend the Request in
light of the PHFA’s acknowledgement of its role in issuing tax credits for the
Properties pursuant to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) Program.
On January 2, 2025, the PHFA submitted correspondence to the OOR,
declaring, inter alia, that the instant appeal was untimely. The PHFA also offered a
5
The Anderson and Shires Attestations were made subject to the penalties for unsworn
falsifications to authorities. See Section 4904 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904.
3
second declaration of AORO Anderson, who attested that the Respondents
acknowledged that November 22, 2024, was the final day for Respondents to file an
appeal. On January 7, 2025, Respondents filed correspondence contending that their
appeal was timely filed on November 25, 2024. On February 5, 2025, the OOR
granted Respondents’ appeal and directed the PHFA to conduct a search and provide
to Respondents all records responsive to the Request within 30 days, or, in the
alternative, a sworn affidavit or statement made under the penalty of perjury
demonstrating that the records do not exist. The PHFA appealed to this Court.6, 7
Initially,
[u]nder the RTKL, records in a government agency’s
possession are presumed to be public records, accessible
for inspection and copying by anyone requesting them,
and must be made available to a requester unless they fall
within specific, enumerated exceptions or are privileged.
Off. of the Dist. Att’y v. Bagwell, 155 A.3d 1119, 1129 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2017). Because of this presumption, the agency
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that a record is exempt or privileged. Am. Civ.
6
In appeals from final determinations of the OOR regarding RTKL
requests submitted to Commonwealth agencies, this Court is the
ultimate fact[-]finder, and [it] exercise[s] a de novo standard of
review. Section 1301 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. § 67.1301. [This Court]
accordingly do[es] not afford deference to the OOR’s fact[-]finding
or conclusions of law and may substitute [its] own in whole or in
part. Bowling v. Off[.] of Open Rec[s.], . . . 75 A.3d 453, 474 ([Pa.]
2013); W[.] Chester Univ[.] of [Pa.] v. Browne, 71 A.3d 1064, 1067
n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). [This Court] further exercise[s] the
broadest scope of review over all justiciable issues raised and
preserved below. Bowling, 75 A.3d at 477; Payne v. [Pa.] Dep[’t]
of Health, 240 A.3d 221, 225 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). In the event
that [it’s] review requires further supplementation of the record,
[this Court] may conduct a hearing or remand for the OOR to do so.
W[.] Chester Univ[.], 71 A.3d at 1067 n.4.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, 337 A.3d 575, 584 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025).
7
On April 17, 2026, Respondents filed an Application for Leave to file a Supplemental
Brief.
4
Liberties Union v. Pa. State Police, . . . 232 A.3d 654, 658
([Pa.] 2020) (citing Section 708(a)(1) of the RTKL, 65
P.S. § 67.708(a)(1)). A preponderance of the evidence is
such evidence as would lead a fact[-]finder to find that the
existence of a contested fact is more probable than the
nonexistence of the contested fact. Bagwell, 155 A.3d at
1130. The question of whether a record or document is
exempt from disclosure is, thus, a factual one. Bowling v.
Off. of Open Recs., . . . 75 A.3d 453, 476 ([Pa.] 2013).
Posey v. Dep’t of Corr., 329 A.3d 864, 869 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025).
The PHFA argues that the Request seeks the entire file, identifying
various categories of documents concerning at least one, but potentially five or more,
transactions without identifying a finite period of time for which the records were
requested. The PHFA contends that by interpreting the Request to contain an
implied timeline, the OOR erred as to a finding of fact concerning the timeline, and
as a matter of law regarding the Request’s specificity. The PHFA further asserts
that, under existing precedent, the OOR is not permitted to modify or expand an
RTKL request on appeal. The PHFA insists that because the Request did not include
a timeline, the OOR’s interpretation that the Request had an implied, albeit very
lengthy, finite timeframe was an impermissible modification, creating a timeline not
reasonably discernable from the Request.
The PHFA further emphasizes that the Request included an extensive
list of different document types, including those created and maintained by third
parties named in the Request. The PHFA claims that because the Request sought
documents of transactions or activities of those third parties, not all of the documents
the Request sought are PHFA records and, therefore, are not subject to access under
the RTKL unless the PHFA has possession or control of them.
Respondents rejoin that the OOR correctly determined that the Request
was sufficiently specific, as it identified a clear subject matter (the Properties, with
specific addresses, grant numbers, and project numbers), a defined scope (44 discrete
5
categories of records, including redevelopment contracts, inspection reports,
correspondence, and financial documents), and a reasonable timeframe (from June
17, 2003, to the present), thereby satisfying the three-prong test under Pennsylvania
Department of Education v. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 119 A.3d 1121 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2015). Respondents further retort that the requested documents qualify as records
under Section 102 of the RTKL, as they document the PHFA’s transactions or
activities and/or the PFHA created, received, or retained them in connection with
such transactions or activities. Respondents also assert that the PHFA’s appeal is
frivolous and filed in bad faith, as evidenced by its failure to comply with the OOR’s
order, improper submission of over 400 pages of new materials not presented below,
and refusal to conduct a good-faith search or review, thereby warranting an award
of reasonable attorney’s fees, litigation costs, and civil penalties under Sections 1304
and 1305 of the RTKL, 65 P.S. §§ 67.1304-1305, in Respondents’ favor.
Section 102 of the RTKL defines a record as:
Information, regardless of physical form or
characteristics, that documents a transaction or activity
of an agency and that is created, received[,] or retained
pursuant to law or in connection with a transaction,
business[,] or activity of the agency. The term includes
a document, paper, letter, map, book, tape, photograph,
film or sound recording, information stored or maintained
electronically[,] and a data-processed or image-processed
document.
65 P.S. § 67.102 (emphasis added). The fact that many of the Request Items seek
records that appear to relate to transactions or activities of a lender or HUD, does
not mean that they are not PHFA records under the RTKL. If the PHFA received
and/or retained the Request Items in connection with the PHFA’s involvement in
allocating tax credits for the Properties under the LIHTC Program, then they are
records of the PHFA under the RTKL.
6
Further, Section 703 of the RTKL provides, in relevant part: “A written
request should identify or describe the records sought with sufficient specificity to
enable the agency to ascertain which records are being requested . . . .” 65 P.S. §
67.703 (emphasis added). To determine whether a request is sufficiently specific,
the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette Court established a three-prong test “examining the
extent to which the request sets forth[:] (1) the subject matter of the request; (2) the
scope of documents sought; and (3) the timeframe for which records are sought.”
Id. at 1124.
This Court expounded:
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette sets forth a useful framework in
that it provides us a vocabulary as to three specific features
of requests [this Court] may need to consider in
determining whether a request is sufficiently specific
under Section 703 [of the RTKL]. However, Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette did not set forth a conjunctive, bright-line
rule requiring each “element” of the test to be satisfied;
rather, it set forth a flexible approach, consistent with the
cases it summarized. Bagwell underscored the flexibility
of the test, and the post-Pittsburgh Post-Gazette vitality of
[Montgomery County v.] Iverson[, 50 A.3d 281 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2012)], noting that “although Iverson was
decided prior to this Court’s clear recitation of the
sufficiently specific test in Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, the
reasoning in Iverson highlights the flexible, case[-]by[-
]case, contextual application of the test.” Bagwell, 155
A.3d at 1144-45 . . . . Indeed, [this Court] agree[s] that
“[t]here is no bright-line rule absolutely requiring a
requester to precisely identify the subject matter of the
requested record. The absence of a stated subject matter
is but one factor to consider[.]” Methacton [Sch. Dist. v.
Off. of Open Recs. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 250 C.D. 2021, filed
Dec. 28, 2021)8], slip op. at 3-4.
8
An unreported panel decision of this Court, “issued after January 15, 2008,” may be cited
“for its persuasive value[.]” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating
Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
7
Pa. Off. of the Governor v. Brelje, 312 A.3d 928, 937 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (emphasis
added; footnote omitted).
Here, although the 44 Request Items do not identify timeframes, the
Request expressly states: “The [P]roperties were sold to the Harrisburg
Redevelopment Authority on June 17, 2003, and purchased by Uptown Partners
on February 18, 2004.” R.R. at 3a (emphasis added). Further, Request paragraph
45 specifies:
In short, this [R]equest should include the original
designation as affordable housing, sale to Uptown
Partners, all [P]roperty rehab plans, environmental
studies, financing details, rehab details, purchase and sale
agreements, new construction details, [P]roperty
compliance inspections, maintenance records, code
violations, communications associated with the
bankruptcy proceedings, documented resident complaints,
upfront grant agreements, bonds and bond exercise
records, letters of credit[], use of funds records, draw
records, payment records, grant balance, loan payments
due, audited (G[enerally] A[ccepted] A[ccounting]
P[rinciples]) accounting records, annual reports, site visits
and audits, updated data related to occupancy, program
evaluations, and homes sold. Please include any and all
communications discussing HUD and [the] PHFA’s
desired outcomes related to the bankruptcy sale.
R.R. at 5a. Given the listed dates and summary, the Request clearly sets forth the
parameters for the Requested Items.
In addition,
the OOR did not, as [the PHFA] suggests, modify, narrow,
or refashion the Request to make it sufficiently specific.
Instead, the OOR balanced the three Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette factors and determined that [the PHFA] need only
search for the specific categories of records . . . between
specifically identified [dates] . . . . The OOR did not
supply any additional qualifications or limiting language,
8
but rather interpreted the [Request] Items in context. The
OOR’s Final Determination in this respect was appropriate
and supported by the record.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Anderson, 337 A.3d 575, 590 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025).
Moreover, “[t]he size of the request is not dispositive of specificity
under Section 703 of the RTKL[,]” and “the fact that a request is burdensome does
not in itself render the request not specific.” Greim v. Pa. State Police, 329 A.3d
873, 882 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025). The OOR concluded: “Although the Request does
include a lengthy implied timeframe of over [20] years, when read as a whole, it
sufficiently identifies a subject matter and scope(s) that enable the PHFA to ascertain
which records are being requested.” Final Det. at 12. This Court discerns no error
in the OOR’s conclusion.
Regarding Respondents’ argument that this appeal is frivolous and the
PHFA filed it in bad faith and, thus, Respondents are entitled to attorney’s fees,
costs, and penalties, the PHFA rejoins that the record and the PHFA’s brief
demonstrate that the PHFA acted in good faith throughout this process. Specifically,
the PHFA insists it acted in good faith by: (1) first providing Requester with an
opportunity to revise the Request; (2) before the OOR, claiming contradictions and
ambiguities, indefinite timeframe, and third-party documents not in its possession as
reasons Requester should revise the Request; and (3) in the PHFA’s brief,
supplementing those good faith arguments with public records, freely available from
the Dauphin County Recorder of Deeds, to provide context in which to evaluate the
Request’s specificity. The PHFA maintains that the opportunity remains for
Requester to submit a more specific request.
Section 1304 of the RTKL provides:
(a) Reversal of agency determination.--If a court
reverses the final determination of the appeals officer or
grants access to a record after a request for access was
deemed denied, the court may award reasonable attorney
9
fees and costs of litigation or an appropriate portion
thereof to a requester if the court finds either of the
following:
(1) the agency receiving the original request
willfully or with wanton disregard deprived the
requester of access to a public record subject to
access or otherwise acted in bad faith under the
provisions of th[e RTKL]; or
(2) the exemptions, exclusions[,] or defenses
asserted by the agency in its final determination
were not based on a reasonable interpretation of
law.
(b) Sanctions for frivolous requests or appeals.--The
court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs of
litigation or an appropriate portion thereof to an agency or
the requester if the court finds that the legal challenge
under this chapter was frivolous.
(c) Other sanctions.--Nothing in th[e RTKL] shall
prohibit a court from imposing penalties and costs in
accordance with applicable rules of court.
65 P.S. § 67.1304.
Section 1305 of the RTKL states:
(a) Denial of access.--A court may impose a civil penalty
of not more than $1,500[.00] if an agency denied access to
a public record in bad faith.
(b) Failure to comply with court order.--An agency or
public official who does not promptly comply with a court
order under this act is subject to a civil penalty of not more
than $500[.00] per day until the public records are
provided.
65 P.S. § 67.1305.
This Court has explained:
Before imposing costs, fees, or penalties under either
Section 1304 [of the RTKL] or Section 1305 [of the
RTKL], [this Court] must make findings of fact that an
agency has acted in bad faith. [Bagwell], 155 A.3d [at]
10
1140 . . . . Bad faith includes an agency’s failure to
conduct a good faith search for responsive records to a
request and determine whether they are public. Id. at
1140-41; Uniontown Newspapers[, Inc. v. Pa. Dep’t of
Corr., 243 A.3d 19, 34 (Pa. 2020)]. It also includes a
failure to comply with a final determination of the
OOR. Bagwell, 155 A.3d at 1141. By way of example,
in Bagwell, [this Court] found bad faith where a district
attorney’s office[:] (1) based its request denial on the
identity of the requester and the presumed intended use of
the records; (2) failed to cite any legal authority in support
of its denial; (3) did not make a good faith search for the
requested records; and (4) misrepresented binding RTKL
precedent and the state of the law throughout the
proceedings. Id. at 1142.
Anderson, 337 A.3d at 597-98 (emphasis added).
In Anderson,
although the OOR granted [the r]equester’s appeal, in part,
regarding [the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority’s (]SEPTA[)] blanket denial on specificity
grounds, the OOR did conclude that portions of the 20-
[i]tem [r]equest were insufficiently specific, a conclusion
that is not challenged in this Court. Further, SEPTA
included detailed legal argument in its initial denial, [its]
position statement before the OOR, and [its] brief to this
Court. SEPTA also has manifested throughout these
proceedings a willingness to resolve this matter amicably.
As part of that process, SEPTA has attempted to search for
and identify responsive records and log possible
exemptions to disclosure. It also has made a colorable,
rational argument identifying the difficulty in
simultaneously asserting a blanket specificity objection
and arguing for the applicability of Section 708 [of the
RTKL] exemptions[, 65 P.S. § 67.708]. Although [this
Court] ultimately reject[s] that argument, it is not so bereft
of merit to indicate bad faith on SEPTA’s part[,] either in
conducting its initial search or litigating the appeals before
the OOR and this Court. [This Court] therefore will not
find that SEPTA has acted in bad faith, and [this Court]
accordingly den[ies] [the r]equester’s requests for an
award of attorney[’s] fees and the imposition of civil
penalties.
11
Id. at 598.
Here, in its original denial, the PHFA stated, in relevant part:
As th[e] [R]equest is expansive, seeking the entire file
rather than a type of record or recipient, and does not limit
its scope to a finite time, it is denied for insufficient
specificity. See id.
Please note: the [PHFA] allocated low-income housing tax
credits to Uptown Partners[], but has not provided it with
financing or a grant. Many of the items identified as
within the scope of the [R]equest appear to be records that
would be maintained by a lender or grant provider. As
PHFA is not a lender to th[e subject] project, [it]
encourage[s] [Requester] to contact any governmental
creditors participating in the bankruptcy process, as they
are more likely to possess the records you seek.
R.R. at 13a. Further, before the OOR, the PHFA provided legal argument, see R.R.
at 17a-18a, the Anderson Attestation, see R.R. at 27a-29a, and the Shires Attestation,
see R.R. at 31a-33a, supporting its position that the Request was insufficiently
specific and that the Request Items were not records under the RTKL. In addition,
the PHFA included a copy of an email it sent to Requester recommending that she
contact “[Shires who] is a technical services representative at PHFA [who] is
familiar with any records [it] might have related to th[e subject] development. He
and the tech services team will be able to work with and help assist you directly.”
R.R. at 35a. Accordingly, as in Anderson, here, this Court holds that
although the OOR granted Requester’s appeal . . .
regarding the [PHFA’s] blanket denial on specificity
grounds . . . [the PHFA] included detailed legal argument
in its initial denial, [its] position statement before the
OOR, and [its] brief to this Court. [The PHFA] also has
manifested throughout these proceedings a willingness to
resolve this matter amicably. As part of that process, [the
PHFA has offered information to help narrow the search
and offered Shires help to aid Requester in obtaining the
records she is seeking]. It also has made a colorable,
12
rational argument [before the OOR and this Court].
Although [this Court] ultimately reject[s] that argument, it
is not so bereft of merit to indicate bad faith on [the
PHFA’s] part either in conducting its initial search or
litigating the appeals before the OOR and this Court. [This
Court] therefore will not find that [the PHFA] has acted in
bad faith, and [this Court] accordingly den[ies]
Requester’s requests for an award of attorney[’s] fees and
the imposition of civil penalties.
Anderson, 337 A.3d at 598.
For all of the above reasons, the OOR’s Final Determination is
affirmed.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
13
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania Housing Finance :
Agency, :
Petitioner :
:
v. :
:
Debra Cruel and Cruel and :
Associates, LLC (Office of :
Open Records), : No. 278 C.D. 2025
Respondents :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 28th day of May, 2026, the Office of Open Records’
February 5, 2025 Final Determination is AFFIRMED. Debra Cruel’s and Cruel and
Associates, LLC’s Application for Leave to File a Supplemental Brief is DENIED
as moot.
_________________________________
ANNE E. COVEY, Judge