Hagan

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

Julie Hagan and Brandon Hagan, as parents

and next best friends of J.H., a minor; Ten-

nisha Cox, as mother and next best friend of

A.G., a minor; Pearl King, as mother and

next best friend of M.K., a minor; Mary

Terry, as parent and next best friend of Z.G.,

a minor; Brenda Haywood, as mother and

next best friend of M.M., a minor; Pamela

Kidd, as mother and next best friend of C.H.,

a minor; Donnette Bright, as mother and

next best friend of D.B., a minor; Parish

Bowen and Candace Bowen, as parents and

next best friend of J.B., a minor,

Plaintiffs, NO. 1:25-CV-05807

v. Judge Edmond E. Chang

City of Chicago Board of Education (a/k/a

Chicago Public Schools District 299), Jane

Doe Educator No. 1, and Jane Doe Educator

No. 2,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Plaintiffs are the parents or guardians of minor children who were taught

in a special-education classroom at John Whistler Elementary School. R. 20, Am.

Compl. ¶ 11.1 The parents and guardians sue their children’s special-education

teacher, school principal, and the City of Chicago Board of Education for alleged

1Citations to the record are “R.” followed by the docket entry number and, if needed,

a page or paragraph number. This Court has federal-question jurisdiction over the federal

law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

abuses and harassment in the classroom. Id. ¶ 88. The Plaintiffs bring state law

claims, as well as federal claims for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation

Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (commonly

known as the ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 89–118, 129–156. The Board

of Education moves to dismiss the federal claims. R. 35, Board’s Mot.2 Because plain-

tiffs plausibly state a cognizable claim under both statutes, the motion is denied.

I. Background

For the purposes of this motion, the Court accepts as true the factual allega-

tions in plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in their

favor. McGowan v. Hulick, 612 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Erickson v. Par-

dus, 551 U.S. 89, 90 (2007) (per curiam)).

The Plaintiffs are parents and guardians of minor children with various disa-

bilities and learning disorders, such as cerebral palsy, autism spectrum disorder, at-

tention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, and sensory processing disorder. Am. Compl.

¶ 30. The children are sensitive to loud sounds and require additional time to process

information, including requests to perform tasks. Id. ¶ 31. And some of the children

have impaired verbal and nonverbal communication abilities, meaning they cannot

speak. Id. As a result, the children were assigned to a special-education classroom for

2The Board also moves to dismiss plaintiffs’ Equal Protection claim. Board’s Mot. at

12–18. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the claim, R. 76, Pls.’ Voluntary Dismissal Mot., so

that aspect of the motion is moot, see R. 78, Dismissal Order.

2

kindergarteners through second graders at John Whistler Elementary in Chicago be-

tween 2017 and 2022. Id. ¶¶ 1–4, 11–12, 29.

The Plaintiffs allege that their children’s special-education teacher (whom the

parties call Jane Doe Educator No. 1, but the Court will call the teacher) created a

hostile and abusive classroom environment. Am. Compl. ¶ 88. The teacher would

“shout at and make demands of special education students that such students, with

learning and cognitive disabilities, could not possibly accomplish.” Id. ¶ 35. She would

also use offensive language and curse at the students. Id. ¶ 55. When the students

did not respond the way that she wanted, the teacher would strike them with wooden

rulers or other devices. Id. ¶¶ 38, 41–42, 50–54. And the teacher would isolate the

students in “time out” in the corner of the classroom for extended periods of time,

sometimes depriving the students of lunch and recess breaks. Id. ¶¶ 56, 58.

After their placement in the teacher’s classroom, the Plaintiffs noticed that the

children came home from school with bruises and other marks on their bodies. Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 40, 45, 47–49. They also noticed behavioral changes in their children. Id.

¶ 73. Some of the children would flinch in reaction to loud noises or when they made

a mistake, as if afraid of being hit. Id. ¶¶ 74, 78, 82. Others would cry and refuse to

go to school. Id. ¶¶ 74, 76–77, 79, 82. And some of the children began to throw tan-

trums and curse. Id. ¶¶ 76–77, 86–87.

The Plaintiffs further allege that the school’s principal (whom the parties call

Jane Doe Educator No. 2, but the Court will call the principal) knew about the

teacher’s conduct and did nothing. Am. Compl. ¶ 63. For example, they say that the

3

principal should have known about the teacher’s behavior because she passed the

students’ classroom multiple times a day and could see inside the room through a

large window. Id. ¶¶ 64–65. They also allege that the principal went into the class-

room on a weekly basis and told employees that she “knew everything that occurred

in the school.” Id. ¶¶ 66–67. Finally, the Plaintiffs say that they reported concerns

about the teacher and the marks on their children to the principal, and she declined

to do anything. Id. ¶¶ 69–70.

Based on the allegedly abusive and hostile classroom environment, the Plain-

tiffs sued the teacher, the principal, and the Board for various state law claims in

state court. R. 1-2, Exh. B, Compl. ¶¶ 25–43. The Plaintiffs later amended their com-

plaint to add federal law claims, R. 1-1, Exh. A, Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 62–129, and

the Defendants removed the case to federal court, R. 1, Notice of Removal.

II. Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint generally need only

include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must “give the de-

fendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (cleaned up).3 The Seventh Circuit has

explained that this rule “reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended

3This Opinion uses (cleaned up) to indicate that internal quotation marks, alterations,

and citations have been omitted from quotations. See Jack Metzler, Cleaning Up Quotations,

18 Journal of Appellate Practice and Process 143 (2017).

4

to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might

keep plaintiffs out of court.” Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)). At the same time, the Su-

preme Court instructs that “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible

claim for relief will … be a context-specific task ….” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

679 (2009). The Seventh Circuit has drawn a context-dependent distinction between

relatively straightforward employment discrimination claims versus more complex

claims. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404–05 (7th Cir. 2010).

“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Hallinan v. Fraternal Ord. of Police

of Chi. Lodge No. 7, 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). “[A] complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (cleaned up). These allegations “must be enough

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The

allegations that are entitled to the assumption of truth are those that are factual,

rather than mere legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

III. Analysis

The Board articulates several reasons why the federal law claims should be

dismissed. See generally Board’s Mot. The Court addresses each argument in turn

and, finding no merit in them, denies the motion to dismiss.

5

A. Hostile Learning Environment

The Board first argues that there is no such thing as a claim for “hostile learn-

ing environment” under Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. Board’s Mot.

at 3. The Plaintiffs respond that the Seventh Circuit has recognized hostile work en-

vironment claims under Title I of the ADA, and there is no reason why hostile envi-

ronment claims should be recognized at work but not in schools. R. 71, Pls.’ Resp. Br.

at 4–6.

Given the similarity in the governing statutory text, the Court agrees with the

Plaintiffs. For employment-based claims, Title I of the ADA prohibits “discrimi-

nat[ion] against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in … [the] terms, con-

ditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The Seventh Circuit has

held that “hostile work environment claims are cognizable” under this section of the

ADA. See Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 942 F.3d 839, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2019). In

other words, a hostile environment constitutes “discriminat[ion] against a qualified

individual on the basis of disability” in the workplace, and is therefore prohibited

under Title I. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added); see Ford, 942 F.3d at 851–52.

Title II of the ADA, which applies to public entities like public schools, contains

similar statutory text as Title I. Title II mandates that “no qualified individual with

a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.”

42 U.S.C. § 12132. The two ADA sections thus prohibit the same conduct—discrimi-

nation against an individual because of their disability—albeit in different settings

6

(the workplace versus public-entity programs). Indeed, Congress enacted the two sec-

tions to promote the ADA’s anti-discrimination purpose in both contexts. See id.

§ 12101(b)(1) (describing the ADA’s purpose “to provide a clear and comprehensive

national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with dis-

abilities”); id. § 12101(b)(4) (describing how Congress intended “to address the major

areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities”). Because the two

sections contain similar text and further the same purpose—and are part of the same

statutory framework—the scope of conduct they cover should be interpreted to be the

same, too. In other words, because a hostile environment constitutes disability dis-

crimination under Title I of the ADA, it also constitutes disability discrimination un-

der Title II.

The same reasoning applies to the Rehabilitation Act. Similar to Title II of the

ADA, the Rehabilitation Act states that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a

disability … shall, solely by reason of [their] disability, be excluded from the partici-

pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro-

gram or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (empha-

sis added). Both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act thus provide “expansive protections

from discrimination for individuals with disabilities.” A.H. by Holzmueller v. Ill. High

Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 592 (7th Cir. 2018). Because “[t]he relevant provisions and

implementing regulations of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA are materially iden-

tical[,] … courts construe and apply them in a consistent manner ….” Id. (cleaned up).

7

Thus, the Rehabilitation Act should be interpreted to cover the same discriminatory

conduct as Titles I and II of the ADA, including a hostile environment.

The Board notes that the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit have not specif-

ically recognized claims for hostile learning environments under the ADA and Reha-

bilitation Act. Board’s Mot. at 3–4; R. 87, Board’s Reply at 3–5.4 But the Board pro-

vides no reason to distinguish hostile learning environments from hostile work envi-

ronments (or any other hostile-environment claim). There is no textual basis to treat

the two settings differently. As just described, Title I of the ADA, Title II, and the

Rehabilitation Act each contain similar, broad language prohibiting disability dis-

crimination. And each statute promotes the same purpose: the prevention of disabil-

ity discrimination. So the Board provides the Court with no reason to conclude that

claims of disability-based harassment and abuse are cognizable in the workplace, but

not in schools. Indeed, “[h]arassment based on disability is no less potent, disruptive,

or discriminatory … in a classroom than on an assembly line or in a boardroom.” See

Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 957 F. Supp. 306, 313–14 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that

a hostile learning environment claim is cognizable under Title III of the ADA, which

prohibits disability discrimination in public accommodations).

4The Board relies on A.H. by Holzmueller to argue that the Seventh Circuit has not

recognized hostile learning environment claims. Board’s Mot. at 3. But that case did not ad-

dress this issue. See A.H. by Holzmueller, 881 F.3d at 592–93 (describing several different

theories of discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, including disparate treat-

ment, disparate impact, and failure to accommodate, but not addressing hostile learning en-

vironment claims).

8

What’s more, courts have recognized hostile-environment claims in the educa-

tion context under two other anti-discrimination statutes. Title VI and Title IX of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 require that “[n]o person … be excluded from participation

in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or

activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance” on the basis of race, color, or national

origin, and sex, respectively. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Hostile

learning environment claims are recognized under both statutes. See Doe v. Galster,

768 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2014). Because those statutes contain “analogous lan-

guage and policies” to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, and they allow for hostile

learning environment claims, those statutes bolster the conclusion that the hostile-

environment claims are cognizable. Cf. Guckenberger, 957 F. Supp. at 313–14; Werth

v. Bd. of Dirs. of Pub. Schs. of Milwaukee, 472 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1126–28 (E.D. Wis.

2007).

The Board cites a few cases in which courts have declined to recognize a hostile

learning environment claim under the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the ADA .

Board’s Mot. at 3–4; see, e.g., Toma v. Univ. of Haw., 304 F. Supp. 3d 956, 962–64 (D.

Haw. 2018). But those cases are not persuasive. First, they are out-of-circuit district

court cases and thus are not binding. Second, the cases contain little reasoning. In

each case, the court simply declines to recognize a hostile learning environment claim

given the lack of binding precedent. See, e.g., Stevens v. Brigham Young Univ. –

Idaho, 588 F. Supp. 3d 1117, 1131–32 (D. Idaho 2022) (“Based on the lack of Ninth

Circuit or other controlling authority recognizing a claim for § 504 hostile educational

9

environment, the Court declines to recognize such a claim here ….”); Toma, 304 F.

Supp. 3d at 963–64 (same). But as discussed earlier, an examination of the statutory

text and purpose of Title I of the ADA, and of the same for analogous statutes forbid-

ding discrimination in education, leads to the conclusion that the hostile learning

environment claims are cognizable under the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the

ADA.

B. Failure to State a Claim

The Board next argues that, even if the hostile-environment claims are cog-

nizable, the Plaintiffs fail to adequately state a claim for two reasons. Board’s Mot.

at 4–8. First, the Board argues that the Plaintiffs fail to plausibly allege that the

students’ teacher created a hostile learning environment because of the students’ dis-

abilities. Id. at 4–7. Second, the Board contends that the Plaintiffs fail to plausibly

plead that a school official with authority to act on the Board’s behalf had actual

knowledge of the teacher’s alleged conduct. Id. at 4–5, 7–8.

1. Causation

The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination against an individual “solely

by reason of” their disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Title II of the ADA similarly says

that no “individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability,” be subjected

to discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Seventh Circuit has thus “consistently held

that the statutory language in both the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA requires proof

of causation.” A.H. by Holzmueller, 881 F.3d at 593. So to adequately state a claim

under either statute, the Plaintiffs must plausibly allege that, but for the students’

10

disability, their teacher would not have subjected them to a hostile learning environ-

ment. Id. The Board contends that the Plaintiffs have failed to allege causation be-

cause, even if the teacher’s actions were abusive and hostile, the Plaintiffs offer no

factual allegations to suggest that she was motivated by the students’ disabilities.

Board’s Mot. at 6.

That is wrong: throughout the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that

the teacher made inappropriate demands of the students given their disabilities. See,

e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 71 (alleging that the teacher “demanded that a non-verbal child

respond to questions when the student could not do so”); see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 31,

33, 35, 51, 53 (similar allegations). And when the students could not perform to the

teacher’s standards, the Plaintiffs allege, the teacher responded with verbal and

physical abuse. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 38 (alleging that the teacher “often struck

students with wooden rulers or other devices, when the special education children

had difficulty completing assignments or tasks”); Am. Compl. ¶ 51 (alleging that the

teacher “yelled, screamed, and threatened” one student “in response to him coloring

with a yellow crayon as opposed to a red crayon, and repeatedly struck him with a

wooden ruler as a means of gaining compliance”); see also Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37, 53–54,

58 (similar allegations). In short, the Plaintiffs allege that the students did not be-

have the way the teacher desired because of their disabilities, causing her to harass

and abuse them—again, because of their disabilities. See Zimny v. Geneva Comm.

Unit Sch. Dist. 304, 718 F. Supp. 3d 766, 783–84 (N.D. Ill. 2024) (holding that plaintiff

adequately pleaded causation because he alleged that he was harassed for the way

11

he walked, and he walked differently because he was disabled). Viewing the Amended

Complaint as a whole, these allegations raise a reasonable inference that the teacher

harassed and abused the students because of their disabilities. See id.

In arguing otherwise, the Board demands too much at the pleading stage. For

example, the Board notes that there are no allegations that the teacher treated sim-

ilarly situated non-disabled students differently. Board’s Mot. at 6. But identifying

comparators like that are not necessary at the pleading stage. See Freeman v. Metro.

Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi., 927 F.3d 961, 965 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding

that because plaintiffs “need not allege each evidentiary element of a legal theory to

survive a motion to dismiss,” the failure to plead comparators “is not fatal”). At most,

comparators might be relevant at the summary judgment stage, if the Plaintiffs try

to offer a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a summary judgment motion.

Comparators are generally not needed at the pleading stage.

The Board also relies on Funes ex rel. C.F. v. Gardner Consol. Sch. Dist. 72C,

2022 WL 1556104 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2022), but that case is distinguishable. Board’s

Mot. at 6. There, the district court dismissed the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims

because there was no evidence that the plaintiff’s harassers even knew of the plain-

tiff’s disability, let alone harassed the plaintiff because of disability. Funes, at *6. In

contrast, here of course the teacher clearly knew about her students’ disabilities—

she taught in a special-education classroom. Am. Compl. ¶ 15. And the Plaintiffs al-

lege that she abused the students because they behaved in certain ways due to their

12

disabilities. See id. ¶¶ 30, 37–38, 51, 53–54, 58. The Plaintiffs thus plausibly allege

but-for causation.

2. Deliberate Indifference

To recover compensatory damages under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, a

plaintiff must allege intentional discrimination. Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 847,

862–63 (7th Cir. 2018). “A plaintiff can establish intentional discrimination … by

showing deliberate indifference,” which “requires both (1) knowledge that a harm to

a federally protected right is substantially likely, and (2) a failure to act upon that

likelihood.” Moore v. W. Ill. Corr. Ctr., 89 F.4th 582, 595 (7th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up).

So to adequately state a claim for compensatory damages against the Board, the

Plaintiffs must allege that the Board was deliberately indifferent to the teacher’s har-

assment and abuse.

The Board further contends that, to plead deliberate indifference, the Plaintiffs

must allege actual knowledge of the teacher’s conduct by a school official with author-

ity to take corrective measures on the Board’s behalf. Board’s Mot. at 7–8. In re-

sponse, the Plaintiffs note that this is not a settled proposition of law. Pls.’ Resp. Br.

at 10–11. Title IX requires actual knowledge of discriminatory conduct by a school

official to prove a school board’s deliberate indifference. Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Chi-

cago, 611 F. Supp. 3d 516, 528 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (“[T]here is no vicarious liability under

Title IX, so the Plaintiffs must adequately allege that a school official with authority

to take corrective measures on the Board’s behalf had actual notice of and was delib-

erately indifferent to [the] alleged sexual abuse.”). But the Supreme Court and

13

Seventh Circuit have not addressed whether the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the

ADA also contain an actual-knowledge requirement, and circuits are split on the is-

sue. Id. at 531. Still, as described previously, Title IX, the ADA, and Rehabilitation

Act have virtually identical language, and courts have consistently relied on case law

developed under each statute to interpret the other two. See id.; see also Foss v. City

of Chicago, 817 F.2d 34, 36 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Because the program-specific lan-

guage of Title IX is identical to that of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme

Court has consistently relied on case law developed under Title IX in interpreting

§ 504.” (cleaned up)). And it appears probable that, like Title IX, neither the ADA nor

the Rehabilitation Act permit vicarious liability. See Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 611 F.

Supp. 3d at 531. It is thus likely that the ADA and Rehabilitation Act require actual

knowledge by a school official to prove the Board’s deliberate indifference. See id.

The Court need not opine on this issue further because even if there is an ac-

tual-knowledge requirement, the Plaintiffs adequately allege actual knowledge here.

Specifically, they point to the school principal, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 64–70, who is a school

official with authority to take corrective action on behalf of the Board, see C.S. v.

Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 34 F.4th 536, 545 (7th Cir. 2022). The only question is

whether plaintiffs raise a reasonable inference that the principal had “actual

knowledge” of the teacher’s behavior. Board’s Mot. at 7–8.

“School administrators have actual knowledge only of the incidents that they

witness or that have been reported to them.” Galster, 768 F.3d at 618. Some of the

Plaintiffs’ allegations raise only an inference that the principal should have known

14

about the teacher’s conduct, not that she actually knew about it. See Am. Compl.

¶¶ 64–67 (alleging that the principal routinely walked past or into the students’ class-

room, and therefore “knew or must have known about the conduct occurring therein”).

Those allegations, taken alone, are insufficient. See Hansen v. Bd. of Trs. of Hamilton

Se. Sch. Corp., 551 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court has flatly re-

jected applying a ‘knew or should have known’ standard.” (cleaned up)). But the

Plaintiffs further allege that they “reported concerns about” the teacher to the prin-

cipal. Am. Compl. ¶ 69. The Plaintiffs then met with the principal, who declined to

address their concerns and “made excuses for injuries” to the students. Id. ¶¶ 69–70.

These are plausible allegations that the principal was notified of the teacher’s conduct

and attempted to cover it up, which raises an inference of actual knowledge of the

alleged hostile learning environment. See Seiwert v. Spencer-Owen Cmty. Sch. Corp.,

497 F. Supp. 2d 942, 954 (S.D. Ind. 2007). Viewing the Amended Complaint as a

whole, the Plaintiffs thus adequately allege deliberate indifference.

C. Duplicative Claims

Even if the Plaintiffs have adequately stated claims under the ADA and Reha-

bilitation Act, the Board asks the Court to dismiss one or the other of those claims

because they are duplicative and may result in juror confusion or double recovery for

the same injury. Board’s Mot. at 8–10. But the Plaintiffs can plead claims in the al-

ternative if each claim is plausible. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(3); In re MultiPlan Health

Ins. Provider Litig., 789 F. Supp. 3d 614, 645 (N.D. Ill. 2025). And claims under the

ADA and Rehabilitation Act are not actually 100% identical. See Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of

15

Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing how, compared to the ADA, “the

Rehabilitation Act includes as an additional element the receipt of federal funds”).

What’s more, even if both claims reach a jury, the Court will issue jury instructions

and a verdict form to prevent juror confusion or double recovery. See City of Chicago

v. Smollett, 421 F. Supp. 3d 565, 576 (N.D. Ill. 2019). Because the Court can deal with

the Board’s concerns at a later stage, if necessary, it is premature to dismiss either

claim. See id.; see also Cesca v. W. Ill. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 716 F. Supp. 3d 696, 713 (C.D.

Ill. 2024).

D. Damages

Finally, the Board argues for dismissal because (1) the Plaintiffs have not ad-

equately alleged deliberate indifference, which is required to receive compensatory

damages, and (2) the Plaintiffs cannot receive damages for emotional distress under

the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. Board’s Mot. at 10–12. The Court has already de-

cided that Plaintiffs adequately allege deliberate indifference. See supra Section

III.B.2. And the Plaintiffs concede that they are not seeking damages for emotional

distress under their federal law claims. Pls.’ Resp. Br. at 13. These grounds are not

bases for dismissal of the claims outright.

16

IV. Conclusion

The Board’s motion to dismiss, R. 35, is denied.

ENTERED:

s/Edmond E. Chang

Honorable Edmond E. Chang

United States District Judge

DATE: March 30, 2026

17