Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

VW CREDIT LEASING, LTD, No. 4:24-CV-00145

Plaintiff, (Chief Judge Brann)

v.

BOROUGH OF STATE COLLEGE,

PENNSYLVANIA,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MARCH 25, 2026

I. BACKGROUND

In mid-2022, parking authorities for the Borough of State College, Pennsylvania

(“State College”) called Karch Automotive (“Karch”) to tow an Audi S5 Coupe

(“Audi”) from a public parking garage after the registered owner—a lessee—had

accrued a number of parking violations and the Audi had been immobilized for several

days. Karch towed and stored the Audi, charging a daily fee as authorized by the State

College Municipal Code. Several months later, Karch identified Volkswagen Credit

Leasing, Ltd. (“VW”) as the Audi’s titled owner and reached out to it to demand

payment of the fees, which by that point were substantial. VW, which had not seen the

Audi for several years after the lessee stopped making payments and disappeared,

refused to pay the full fee to recover the Audi. Karch would not negotiate the price, so

VW sued.

After litigating against Karch for more than a year in state court and against State

College and Karch for two more years in federal court, VW moved for summary

judgment against State College on three constitutional claims. State College cross-

moved for summary judgment on the same issues. Both parties also cross-moved for

sanctions.

Those motions are now ripe for disposition; for the reasons below, both motions

for summary judgment are granted in part and denied in part, VW’s motion for sanctions

is granted to a very limited extent, and State College’s motion for sanctions is deferred

pending additional development of the issue of damages.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate

where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and

the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1 Material facts are those “that

could alter the outcome” of the litigation, “and disputes are ‘genuine’ if evidence exists

from which a rational person could conclude that the position of the person with the

burden of proof on the disputed issue is correct.”2 A defendant “meets this standard

when there is an absence of evidence that rationally supports the plaintiff’s case.”3

Conversely, to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must “point to admissible

1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

2 EBC, Inc. v. Clark Bldg. Sys., Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2010).

3 Clark v. Mod. Grp. Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 1993).

evidence that would be sufficient to show all elements of a prima facie case under

applicable substantive law.”4

In assessing “whether there is evidence upon which a jury can properly proceed

to find a verdict for the [nonmoving] party,”5 the Court “must view the facts and

evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”6

Moreover, “[i]f a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly

address another party’s assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c),” the Court may

“consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion.”7 Finally, although “the court

need consider only the cited materials, . . . it may consider other materials in the

record.”8

“This standard does not change when the issue is presented in the context of

cross-motions for summary judgment.’”9 “When both parties move for summary

judgment, ‘the court must rule on each party’s motion on an individual and separate

basis, determining, for each side, whether a judgment may be entered in accordance

with the Rule 56 standard.’”10

4 Id.

5 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Imp.

Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. 442, 448 (1871)).

6 Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., 951 F.3d 137, 144 (3d Cir. 2020).

7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); see also Weitzner v. Sanofi Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613-14 (3d

Cir. 2018).

8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).

9 Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Stevens & Ricci Inc., 835 F.3d 388, 402 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting

Appelmans v. City of Phila., 826 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1987)).

10 Id. (quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2720 (3d ed.

2016)).

B. Undisputed Facts

With that standard outlining the Court’s framework for review, I now turn to the

undisputed facts. The parties generally agree on all of the record evidence, and both

contend that no disputes of fact should preclude summary judgment here. Where there

are disputes about factual representations, the proposing party has failed to support its

contention and I thus construe the fact against it.

1. The Audi Lease

On October 11, 2017, Plaintiff Volkswagen Credit Leasing, Ltd. (“VW”) leased

a 2018 Audi S5 Coupe (“Audi”) to Yuchen Tang.11 On October 19, 2017, the

Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (“PennDOT”) issued a Certificate of Title

for the Audi listing VW as the owner and Mr. Tang as lessee.12 After extending the

lease agreement for several months,13 Mr. Tang attempted to return the Audi in April

of 2020, but the dealership was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.14 VW and Mr.

Tang agreed to an additional extension in late April or early May 2020,15 but Mr. Tang

stopped making payments and fell into default by June 2020.16 Under the terms of the

lease, VW was entitled to repossess the vehicle by virtue of Mr. Tang’s default.17 VW

11 Doc. 52 (Pl.’s SOUMF) ¶ 5; Doc. 50 (Def.’s SOUMF) ¶¶ 5-6. Technically the lease agreement

was drawn up by Audi Driscoll Automotive Group, LLC, see Doc. 52 ¶ 5, but the agreement’s

terms immediately sold the vehicle and assigned the lease agreement to VW. Id. ¶ 6.

12 Doc. 52 ¶ 7.

13 Id. ¶ 8.

14 Doc. 50 ¶ 9.

15 Doc. 52 ¶ 8; Doc. 50 ¶ 9.

16 Doc. 52 ¶ 10; Doc. 50 ¶ 10.

17 Doc. 52 ¶¶ 10, 11.

attempted to contact Mr. Tang to obtain payment or to repossess the vehicle, but Mr.

Tang proved unreachable.18 Because of Mr. Tang’s disappearance, VW lost track of the

Audi.19

2. The Tow

In February of 2022, the Audi resurfaced in a public parking garage in State

College, Pennsylvania.20 It remained in the garage for several months, apparently

abandoned and accruing parking violations, until July 8, when Borough authorities

booted the car and applied an immobilization notice to its windshield.21 The

immobilization notice stated that “[t]o secure release of this vehicle, payment must be

made for all outstanding parking violation notices, citations for unpaid parking

violations, and for applicable immobilization and impoundment fees.”22 It warned that

“any vehicle immobilized over 72 hours is subject to towing and impoundment,

resulting in additional fees.”23 State College also ran a search on the Audi’s tags, which

identified only the registered owner—Mr. Tang—and not the titled owner—VW.24

State College attempted to contact Mr. Tang but was unsuccessful.25

18 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 11-12.

19 See Doc. 50-1 (McGovern Dep.) at 21:8-21.

20 Doc. 50 ¶ 13; Doc. 52 ¶ 15.

21 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 18-19; Doc. 52 ¶ 16.

22 Doc. 50-4 (Immobilization Notice).

23 Id.

24 Doc. 52 ¶¶ 17-18; see Doc. 50 ¶¶ 46-49.

25 Doc. 52 ¶¶ 15-18.

After more than 72 hours with no response, State College had the Audi towed on

July 13, 2022.26 State College uses private companies for towing services,27 and it called

former Defendant Karch Automotive (“Karch”) to tow and store the Audi.28 On the day

of the tow, State College mailed out a letter to Mr. Tang providing information about

the tow and the process for recovering the vehicle.29 State College sent follow-ups to

Mr. Tang on July 21, August 18, and September 15, 2022, and unsuccessfully initiated

a magistrate action on October 12, 2022.30 Because State College’s searches had not

identified VW as the Audi’s titled owner, it did not provide any notice or information

to VW.31

3. State College’s Parking Ordinance

State College’s decisions to fine, boot, and tow the vehicle, as well as the process

it followed and the notices it sent, were all pursuant to its municipal ordinances.32 Under

26 Doc. 50 ¶ 21; Doc. 52 ¶ 19.

27 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 22-26.

28 Id. ¶ 27; Doc. 52 ¶ 19. VW and Karch negotiated a settlement, and I dismissed Karch as a

Defendant on May 1, 2025. Docs. 33, 34.

29 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 29-30; Doc. 52 ¶ 20. State College claims to have sent a copy of this form to

PennDOT, Doc. 50 ¶ 30, but the only evidence it identifies is a letter addressed solely to Mr.

Tang. Doc. 50-6. The deposition testimony of its designated representative nowhere suggests

that this form was sent to PennDOT. Doc. 46-6 at 91, 98. As I will explain later, it does not

appear that State College was required by law to send this form to PennDOT. Because State

College has only offered a conclusory statement that it submitted the form to PennDOT without

adequate supporting evidence, I reject its contention and deem undisputed that State College

did not send this form to PennDOT. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2); Nitkin v. Main Line Health, 67

F.4th 565, 571 (3d Cir. 2023). This is the main basis for VW’s motion for sanctions, see Doc.

65 (Mot. for Sanctions) at 7-11, and I view the decision to construe this fact against State

College as a sufficient sanction. See id. at 15-17 (agreeing that the appropriate sanction is in

“the Court’s sound discretion.”).

30 Doc. 52 ¶¶ 22-23; see Doc. 50 ¶¶ 50-55.

31 Doc. 52 ¶¶ 24, 49-51.

32 Doc. 50-5 (State College, Pa., Mun. Code ch. XI).

its Municipal Code, State College may immobilize (i.e. “boot”) a vehicle once it accrues

the requisite number of parking violations.33 The Municipal Code requires the Borough

to provide notice “on the vehicle, in a conspicuous manner,” of the reason for

immobilization and the process for boot removal.34 An owner is entitled to an “post-

immobilization hearing” to contest the validity of the booting, and may obtain removal

of the boot by answering the underlying citations (either by formally contesting or

paying the fines) and paying the booting fee.35 The Municipal Code also notes that

“[n]othing in this ordinance shall be construed to deprive any person of their

constitutional right to a hearing or trial as to the violations for which parking violation

notices or citations have been issued.”36

State College may remove “[a]ny vehicle parked on any . . . public property in

the Borough, which is parked in violation of any provision of the law or of any

ordinance of the Borough, or which has been immobilized in excess of 72 hours.”37

“Removal shall be done only . . . by a licensed towing company,” and “[a]ny vehicle

removed shall be impounded in a storage facility.”38 Upon application, State College

issues licenses to towing companies which meet the requisite qualifications to authorize

them to tow vehicles at the request of the Borough.39 The Municipal Code permits

33 State College, Pa., Mun. Code § 11-1002.

34 Id. § 11-1003.

35 Id. §§ 11-1004, 11-1005, 11-1007.

36 Id. § 11-1010.

37 Id. § 11-703(a); see id. § 11-1006

38 Id.

39 Id. §§ 11-705–11-706.

towing companies to charge vehicle owners a one-time fee for towing and a daily fee

for storage.40 “Towing and storage fees . . . shall be paid . . . before the owner or

authorized person of such vehicle shall be permitted to repossess or secure the release

of the vehicle.”41 If the Borough or the towing company determines that a vehicle was

towed in error, the towing and storage fees are waived.42 A vehicle owner may also pay

the fees “under protest” in order to secure release of the vehicle while fee disputes are

pending.43 Karch was a licensed towing company and had a valid “storage facility.”44

The Municipal Code contains several notice and recordkeeping provisions

related to towing. Within an hour of a tow, “the Centre County Emergency

Communications Center shall be notified” and must be provided with “the written

authorization” including details about the vehicle, tow, and location for recovery.45

Within one business day of a tow, the State College Police Department must send notice

of removal and impounding, including information for recovery, “to the registered

owner of the vehicle.”46 State College concedes that it did not send notice to titled but

non-registered owners.47

40 Id. §§ 11-708(i), 11-710.

41 Id. § 11-1006.

42 Id. §§ 11-708(h), 11-708(i).

43 Id. § 11-715.

44 See Doc. 50 ¶ 27.

45 State College, Pa., Mun. Code § 11-711.

46 Id. § 11-712.

47 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 47-48.

State College also contends that it provides a hearing procedure to appeal the

parking violations which resulted in the vehicle’s immobilization and eventual tow.48

This process is less formal, but is noted on State College’s website and confirmed by

State College officials.49 State College asserts that the appeals process exists pursuant

to state law and that its decisions can be appealed to Pennsylvania state court.50

4. Pennsylvania Abandoned Vehicle Law

The parties dispute whether Pennsylvania’s Abandoned Vehicle laws apply to

this process in State College. VW argues that the Municipal Code fails to explicitly

incorporate the relevant provisions of state law, and contends as a factual matter that

State College failed to produce the state law in discovery.51 State College contends that

state law is both implicitly and explicitly incorporated into the Municipal Code and is

a matter of public record. I agree with State College that the Municipal Code

incorporates Pennsylvania law, but the factual record indicates that State College did

not immediately invoke the state law when it towed the Audi for parking violations.

The Municipal Code sections repeatedly cite to and incorporate sections of the

Pennsylvania Vehicle Code,52 and the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code states that it is to “be

48 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 56-65 (citing State College, Pa., Mun. Code § 11-1010); Doc. 52 ¶¶ 52-54.

49 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 57-61; Doc. 52 ¶¶ 52-53; see Doc. 46-6 at 101.

50 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 751-754; see Doc. 52 ¶ 52.

51 See Doc. 57 (Pl.’s Opp’n) at 10 (“The ordinance does not mention 75 Pa. C.S. § 7301 et. al.,

nor instruct State College police or its tow company to communicate with PennDOT at all.”).

52 Id. § 11-704 (defining “Vehicle Code” as “Title 75 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated

Statutes”); e.g. id. § 11-708(b), 11-708(c), 11-708(m), 11-708(p), 11-714(b), 11-722, 11-1001;

see id. § 11-101 (in “Ch. XI. Vehicles and Traffic” “Pt. A. General Regulations” “Words and

phrases, when used in this ordinance, shall have the meanings ascribed to them in

the Vehicle Code of Pennsylvania, as now in force, or as hereafter amended, enacted or

so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the

law throughout this Commonwealth and all political subdivisions.”53 Moreover, when

municipalities exercise their police power to regulate areas where the State has already

legislated, they may only “impos[e] restrictions which are in addition to, and not in

conflict with, statutory regulations.”54 Thus, local ordinances are merely “supplemental

or additional regulations” that rest on top of—and do not displace—the State code.55

The Pennsylvania Vehicle Code provides procedures for removal of “abandoned

vehicles,” defined, in relevant part, as “a vehicle . . . [that] has remained illegally on a

highway or other public property for a period of more than 48 hours.”56 When a vehicle

is abandoned, municipal officials must “complete an abandoned vehicle information

report” and provide it to the “salvor” (towing company).57 Within 48 hours of taking

possession of the vehicle, the salvor must “send an abandoned vehicle information

reenacted, except where the context clearly indicates a different meaning.”). These cross-

references all appear in the version of the Municipal Code that appears in the record, so VW

is simply incorrect when it claims that “[t]he statute’s alleged incorporation into State

College’s policy appears nowhere in the record.” Doc. 57 at 10. Moreover, state laws are

matters of public record, and Courts take judicial notice of such materials as a matter of course.

Junction R. Co. v. Bank of Ashland, 79 U.S. 226 (1870). The contention that these laws could

apply is a legal argument that State College had no obligation to disclose in discovery. See

NECA LLC v. Jazwares, LLC, 2025 WL 1189915, at *8 (D.N.J. Apr. 24, 2025). Nevertheless,

it is significant that State College never mentioned the Pennsylvania provisions in discovery

despite disclosing and discussing the Municipal Code at length. I need not dive into this issue,

however, because the facts show that the state law was not invoked until far later than State

College claims.

53 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 103 (emphasis added).

54 PPL Elec. Utils. Corp. v. City of Lancaster, 214 A.3d 639, 648 (Pa. 2019) (quoting Harris-

Walsh, Inc. v. Borough of Dickson City, 216 A.2d 329, 333-34 (Pa. 1966)).

55 See Skepton v. Borough of Northampton, 486 A.2d 1022, 1023-24 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985)

(citing Holland Enters., Inc. v. Joka, 439 A.2d 876 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982)).

56 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 102; see id. §§ 7301-7312.

57 Id. § 7303.1(a).

report to” PennDOT.58 PennDOT must then “notify by certified mail . . . the last known

registered owner of the vehicle and all lienholders of record that the vehicle is being

held as abandoned,” and the notice must include information about how to recover the

vehicle and challenge the municipality’s determination that the vehicle was abandoned,

which can result in a waiver of all fees and penalties.59 Upon recovery, the vehicle

owner must “pay the costs for towing and storage from the date the salvor submitted

the abandoned vehicle report to the department” unless they have been waived due to a

successful challenge.60

These provisions did not immediately come into play in this case, however,

because State College did not process the Audi as abandoned pursuant to Pennsylvania

law. The “abandoned vehicle information report” required by law to trigger the state

abandonment process is “prescribed by” PennDOT.61 That form appears to be a “PA

952”: a form that is provided by PennDOT and entitled “POLICE REQUEST FOR

REMOVAL OF ABANDONED VEHICLE.”62 Here, however, State College has only

58 Id. § 7304.

59 Id. § 7305. The statute provides for notice by publication as a fallback. Id. § 7305(c). VW

argues that the statutory term “lienholder” does not include titled owners who have leased the

vehicle, Doc. 57 at 11; Doc. 62 (Pl.’s Reply) at 5; see Doc. 65 at 12-13, but neglects that the

statute defines “owner” as “[a] person, other than a lienholder, having the property right in or

title to a vehicle. The term includes a person entitled to the use and possession of a vehicle

subject to a security interest in another person, but excludes a lessee under a lease not intended

as security.” Id. § 102 (emphases added).

60 Id. § 7306.

61 Id. § 7303.1(a); id. § 102 (defining “department” as “[t]he Department of Transportation of

the Commonwealth”).

62 Am. Honda Fin. Corp. v. Twp. of Aston, 546 F. Supp. 3d 371, 375 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (citing Doc.

27-25).

produced its own local form numbered “SCPD-20,” entitled

“ABANDONED/TOWED/IMMOBILIZED/IMPOUNDED/SNOW EMERGENCY

NOTIFICATION FORM.”63 In addition to the fact that it is not a form “prescribed by”

PennDOT,64 the SCPD-20 is significantly less detailed than a PA 952, and therefore

cannot reasonably be presumed to function interchangeably with the state form.

Even if there were some doubt about whether the SCPD-20 could satisfy 75 Pa.

Cons. Stat. § 7303.1(a), the actual form here indicates that State College did not invoke

the state abandonment law in this matter. Form SCPD-20 contains several check boxes

to describe the action taken on the vehicle at issue.65 Here, the box for “Removing and

Impounding of Illegally Parked and/or Immobilized Vehicles” citing “Borough

Ordinance 1524, Ch. XI, Part H, Section 4,” is checked.66 Conspicuously unchecked is

the box for “Abandonment of Vehicles,” citing “Title 75, Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle

Code.”67 Thus, it does not appear that the vehicle was initially towed as abandoned

under Pennsylvania law, but was instead removed only for violations of the State

College ordinances.

State College’s ordinances confirm that they have modified Pennsylvania’s

abandonment rules to accommodate their parking ordinances. Rather than treating

63 Doc. 50-6. State College misleadingly describes the “forms and notices” it prepared as

complying with “state law,” but the actual documents it cites do not comport with state law.

See Doc. 50 ¶ 30. Moreover, I have determined that, for the purposes of this motion, State

College did not send this form to PennDOT. Supra note 29.

64 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7303.1(a).

65 Doc. 50-6.

66 Id.

67 Id.

illegally parked vehicles as abandoned after 48 hours,68 State College charges the

vehicle with violations, and then begins its immobilization procedures once the

requisite number have accrued.69 State College then tows pursuant to its own policies,70

and provides that “[v]ehicles unclaimed within 45 days of towing and storage shall be

deemed abandoned and subject to disposal, as such, in the manner authorized by law.”71

Because of State College’s policies, Karch did not “tak[e] possession of [the]

vehicle pursuant to section 7303.1,” and was not required to “within 48 hours after

taking possession send an abandoned vehicle information report to [PennDOT].”72 That

does not preclude the State abandonment procedure from taking effect—Karch could

have begun the abandonment process once the Audi had been on its lot for 45 days.73

But, based on the record, the abandoned vehicle procedure was not immediately

employed by State College, and it therefore is not entitled to rely on the notice that

procedure would have provided.74 And even if it could, that notice would have come no

sooner than 45 days after the tow.75

68 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 102.

69 State College, Pa., Mun. Code § 11-1002.

70 Id. § 11-1006.

71 Id. (emphasis added).

72 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7304.

73 State College, Pa., Mun. Code § 11-1006; see 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7311.1(b)(1) (providing that

an abandoned vehicle “includes a vehicle towed to a salvor’s property that has remained on the

salvor’s property for a period of 20 days”).

74 This review of the record explains why Karch and PennDOT apparently did not notify VW of

the tow. Doc. 49 (Def.’s Mot.) at 3.

75 State College, Pa., Mun. Code § 11-1006; see 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7311.1(b)(1).

5. Impoundment and Fees

Eventually, Karch determined that VW owned the Audi, and on December 9,

2022, called to request payment of the outstanding fees.76 Specifically, Karch requested

$12,119: $2,844 owed to State College and $60 to Karch for each day of storage.77 VW

attempted to negotiate the fees and recover the Audi, but Karch was unreceptive.78 In

any event, the record suggests that Karch would have needed State College’s approval

to release the Audi.79 It does not appear that there were any additional substantial

attempts to recover the Audi without litigation.80

6. Post-Settlement Recovery

VW eventually settled with Karch and recovered the Audi.81 It then sold the Audi

at auction for $29,900.82 VW compares that price to the J.D. Power Used Car Guide’s

“Average Auction Value” of $35,725 for an Audi S5 on the week of the impoundment,83

and asserts that its damages are the difference: $5,825.84

76 Doc. 50 ¶ 32; Doc. 52 ¶¶ 25-26.

77 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 33-34; Doc. 52 ¶¶ 26-27.

78 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 35-38; Doc. 52 ¶¶ 26, 28.

79 Doc. 52 ¶¶ 34-35.

80 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 38-39; Doc. 52 ¶ 28. VW asserts that it “continued to seek to recover the Vehicle

from State College and Karch” after Karch refused to negotiate, Doc. 52 ¶ 28, but its only

evidence of these efforts is an entirely conclusory statement. Doc. 46-5 ¶ 16. That is

insufficient, Nitkin, 67 F.4th at 571, and I therefore deem it undisputed that VW did not attempt

to secure release of the Audi without litigation after Karch refused to negotiate. Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(e)(2).

81 Doc. 33 (Stipulation of Dismissal); Doc. 52 ¶ 62.

82 Id. ¶ 63.

83 Doc. 52 ¶ 65. VW’s SOUMF erroneously states that it used the “Average Auction Value” for

“the week of July 13, 2023,” id. (emphasis added), but the relevant declaration and exhibit

clarify that it is using the Average Action Value from the week of July 13, 2022. Doc. 46-5

(McGovern Decl.) ¶ 20; id. at 26 (“Period: July 13, 2022”).

84 Doc. 50 ¶ 65-66.

7. Procedural History

On July 24, 2023, VW filed suit against Karch in the Court of Common Pleas of

Centre County, Pennsylvania.85 On January 24, 2024, VW filed the instant suit against

Karch and State College.86 On December 20, 2024, VW voluntarily dismissed the

Centre County action.87

The parties proceeded to discovery and, following mediation,88 VW and Karch

settled.89 VW and State College thereafter filed cross-motions for summary judgment,

which are now fully briefed and ripe for resolution.90 Both parties also filed motions for

Rule 11 sanctions, which are under advisement and will be decided separately.91

C. Analysis

Remaining in this litigation are VW’s claims against State College for violations

of the Fourth (unreasonable seizure), Fifth (uncompensated taking), and Fourteenth

Amendments (procedural due process) to the United States Constitution brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

To make out a section 1983 claim, the Plaintiff must prove “(1) that the conduct

complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that

the conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

85 Doc. 50 ¶ 66.

86 Id. ¶ 69; see Doc. 1 (Compl.).

87 Doc. 50 ¶ 68.

88 See Doc. 25 (Order Referring Case for Mediation).

89 Doc. 33 (Stipulation of Dismissal).

90 Docs. 46, 48 (Mots. for Summ. J.).

91 Docs. 61, 64 (Mots. for Sanctions).

Constitution or laws of the United States.”92 Because it is a municipality, State College

“may be held liable only if its policy or custom is the ‘moving force’ behind [the]

constitutional violation.”93

Although State College briefly argues that the conduct at issue was carried out

independently by Karch, the “state action” aspect of the first element is met here

because Karch “acted at [State College’s] behest—the Borough’s ordinances and

officers direct [Karch] when to tow, when to notify owners and drivers, whom it must

notify, and how much it can charge for its services.”94

Moreover, this holding also establishes that, if a constitutional violation

occurred, State College’s policies were the cause.95 And although I have determined

that the process of towing the Audi was pursuant solely to State College’s own

Municipal Code, a municipal policy of applying state law in a distinctive way—here,

towing based on local parking violations and retaining local authority over when the

vehicle can be released—is just as actionable as local law.96 So the analysis here focuses

solely on whether VW’s constitutional rights were violated.

92 Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 319 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176,

184 (3d Cir. 1993)).

93 Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Bd. of Cnty. Commn’rs of Bryan

Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997)); see Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of N.Y.,

436 U.S. 658 (1978).

94 Honda Lease Tr. v. Malanga’s Auto., 152 F.4th 477, 484 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing Stypmann v.

City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 557 F.2d 1338, 1341 (9th Cir. 1977)).

95 Am. Honda Fin. Corp. v. City of Revere, 471 F. Supp. 3d 399, 404 (D. Mass. 2020)

96 Id. (holding that municipality’s “application of the [state] Statute is municipal policy” that is

actionable in Monell claim); see Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171 F.3d 858, 868 (3d Cir. 1999); Rios

v. Martin, 2025 WL 2484260, at *6-7 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 28, 2025).

VW’s arguments are not entirely clear. In its motion it describes purported

Constitutional violations throughout State College’s towing and impoundment process,

both before and after the tow.97 In subsequent briefs, it walks those contentions back

and focuses on: (1) the lack of post-deprivation notice and hearing and (2) the

requirement of payment before the Audi was returned.

1. Fourteenth Amendment – Due Process

In its motion for summary judgment, VW stakes out maximalist positions,

arguing that State College’s policy violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment as a matter of law because it did not provide any notice to VW that the

Audi had been towed or any hearing to challenge the tow or the fees. VW also contends

that State College was required to provide a hearing before “permitting Karch to assert

a possessory lien and threaten to sell the vehicle.”98

State College’s response is essentially entirely focused on its argument that it

provides notice through state law. It concedes that its local process did not give any

notice to lienholders like VW.99

As I have stated, the tow at issue was effectuated pursuant to State College

Municipal Code provisions that could not trigger the Pennsylvania notice procedure

until 45 days after the tow.100 Thus, I consider whether VW’s Due Process rights were

violated both before and after the 45-day deadline for abandonment.

97 See Doc. 51 (Pl.’s Mot.) at 11 (challenging reasonableness of initial seizure).

98 Id. at 23.

99 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 47-48.

100 Supra at 12-14.

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “imposes constraints on

governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’

interests.”101 “A Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim consists of three

elements: (i) a deprivation of life, liberty, or property; (ii) by a state actor; (iii) without

due process of law.”102

As to the first factor, the Third Circuit recently held that a titled owner “has a

private interest at stake” in the impoundment of a vehicle it has leased out “because of

its ‘property interest in the present value of a seized vehicle.’”103 That is VW’s interest:

“[w]hen the [Audi] was on [Karch’s] lot, [VW] had a right to possess it but could not

because it did not know of the impoundment.”104

The second factor is established by the state actor analysis supra.105

Turning to the third factor, in Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court noted that

“due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular

situation demands.”106 To determine how much process is due in a given case, the

Supreme Court explained that courts should consider three distinct factors: “[f]irst, the

101 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).

102 Parker v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm'n, 158 F.4th 470, 481 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing Reed v. Goertz,

598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023)); Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006)

(stating test with two factors: “(1) [Plaintiff] was deprived of an individual interest that is

encompassed within the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of life, liberty, or property, and

(2) the procedures available to him did not provide due process of law.”).

103 Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 484 (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co. v. NYC Police Dep’t, 503 F.3d

186, 191 (2d Cir. 2007)).

104 Id.; see Am. Honda Fin. Corp. v. Twp. of Aston, 546 F. Supp. 3d 371, 379 (E.D. Pa. 2021); see

Am. Honda Fin. Corp. v. City of Revere, 471 F. Supp. 3d 399, 406 (D. Mass. 2020).

105 Supra at 17.

106 424 U.S. at 334 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).

private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an

erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable

value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the

Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative

burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”107 “The

‘core’ process due under the Constitution is ‘notice and a meaningful opportunity to be

heard.’”108 But, based on the circumstances of a given case, “the usual requirement of

written notice may be relaxed, and the timing and content of a hearing may vary.”109

To the extent VW argues that State College should have provided pre-tow notice

and a hearing, it is wrong. “Not every deprivation of a property interest requires a pre-

deprivation hearing.”110 Post-deprivation hearings are generally considered sufficient

in the context of vehicular towing.111 Nevertheless, the post-towing notice and hearing

must be “prompt,” if they are to be “meaningful.”112 In Malanga’s the Third Circuit

107 Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)); Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at

484-85 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).

108 Parker v. N.J. Motor Vehicle Comm’n, 158 F.4th 470, 482 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing LaChance v.

Erickson, 522 U.S. 262, 266 (1998)); Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 484-85 (quoting Mathews, 424

U.S. at 333 and Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).

109 Propert, 948 F.2d 1332 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576 (1975) and Mathews, 424

U.S. 347-49); Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 421 (3d Cir. 2000).

110 Parker, 158 F.4th at 482 (citing Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 930 (1997)).

111 Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 484-85 (quoting Propert v. District of Columbia, 948 F.2d 1327, 1332-

33 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); Shaheed v. City of Wilmington, 2022 WL 16948762, at *6 (D. Del. Nov.

15, 2022) (citing Sutton v. City of Milwaukee, 672 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1982) and Abernathy

v. City of Pittsburgh, 795 F. App’x 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2020)); Abernathy, 795 F. App’x at 87

(citing City of Los Angeles v. David, 538 U.S. 715, 719 (2003)).

112 Propert, 948 F.2d at 1332 (Cokinos v. District of Columbia, 782 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).

accepted the concession that post-deprivation notice to a lessor “within a month

timeline would be perfectly acceptable.”113

Within that framework, I apply the Mathews factors and find that State College’s

process was lacking as to the period before Pennsylvania’s abandonment law would

provide notice, but the post-abandonment process is constitutionally sufficient.

a. Pre-Abandonment

As to the first factor, before the vehicle is considered abandoned pursuant to the

State College Municipal Code, VW’s private interest, although not as significant as “the

driver who must use his vehicle to get to work” and is therefore entitled to speedy

notice,114 “is still considerable.”115 VW has an interest in the present value of the Audi

and its use as a business commodity. Thus, this factor turns in VW’s favor.116

On the second Mathews factor, before abandonment, the deprivation is solely

that of “the continual depreciation of the [Audi]’s value and the denial of an income

stream to [VW].”117 Because State College concedes that it does not provide notice until

Pennsylvania’s abandonment laws can trigger—45-days after the tow118—State

College’s policies “create a risk of erroneous deprivation” of the present value of the

vehicle, opportunities to use it for profit, and the significant “storage fees” charged by

113 Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 486.

114 Id. at 486 (citing Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 261 (8th Cir. 1994) and Stypmann, 557 F.2d

at 1344).

115 Ford Motor Credit Co. v. NYC Police Dep’t, 503 F.3d 186, 194 (2d Cir. 2007); Twp. of Aston,

546 F. Supp. 3d at 380.

116 See City of Revere, 471 F. Supp. 3d at 407-08.

117 Twp. of Aston, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 380.

118 See State College, Pa., Mun. Code § 11-1006.

towing companies.119 Given the entire lack of notice to lienholders during this 45-day

period, and the consequences of the delay before notice eventually issues, I find that

this factor cuts in favor of VW for the pre-abandonment deprivation.120

As to the third factor, “providing prompt notice to lienholders would not

substantially burden” State College.121 As many courts have now noted, in the modern

age it is not difficult for a municipality to identify every party with a security interest

in a vehicle.122 Indeed, State College believed that it was already identifying all

interested parties when it towed vehicles for parking violations, and, because of this

litigation, “now takes more steps to identify the record owner.”123 So the burden of

providing better, more timely notice is minimal, and this factor cuts in VW’s favor.

b. Post-Abandonment

Turning to the post-abandonment process under state law, when total sale of the

vehicle is permitted, VW’s interest is in its possession of the vehicle at all, which is

119 Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 484, 488; see Brite Fin. Servs., LLC v. Bobby’s Towing Serv., LLC,

461 F. Supp. 3d 549, 560-61 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (holding unconstitutional law that caused

“vehicle owner [to] go without notice of the tow for a minimum of seven days”).

120 See Twp. of Aston, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 379-80 (finding that “ongoing economic harm during

this [25-day] delay: fees accumulated while the Accord’s value depreciated, and the Company

was denied income by selling or leasing the car,” cut in favor of lienholder); Ford Motor Credit

Co., 503 F.3d at 194 (“The risk of delay under the current procedures is thus substantial.”).

This is true even if “for many of its towed vehicles [VW] will not have a right to possession

because the driver will not have defaulted on payment,” because State College has no way to

determine when the circumstances would entitle VW to immediate position, thus creating a

risk of erroneous deprivation. See Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 486.

121 Twp. of Aston, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (citing DCFS USA v. District of Columbia, 803 F. Supp.

3d 29, 42 (D.D.C. 2011)); Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 488 (noting the “relatively light burden on

Butler to change its notice policies”).

122 Twp. of Aston, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 380.

123 Doc. 50 ¶ 48.

significantly higher than the mere use of the vehicle.124 Thus, this factor is even more

in VW’s favor than in the pre-abandonment context.

With regard to the second factor, it is well established that “as a lienholder, [VW]

should have received adequate notice and had the opportunity for a hearing before the

Vehicle was put up for sale.”125 Under the policies at issue here, however, there was not

a serious risk of erroneous total deprivation. State College’s Municipal Code does not

directly authorize disposal of a seized vehicle. Instead, it provides that “[v]ehicles

unclaimed within 45 days of towing and storage shall be deemed abandoned and subject

to disposal, as such, in the manner authorized by law.”126 The disposal procedures

“authorized by law” in Pennsylvania are those set forth in the state code, and require

the salvor to submit an abandoned vehicle report to PennDOT, after which PennDOT

will provide notice to the owner and lienholders of the vehicle including information

about where the vehicle is held, how it can be recovered, and their right to a hearing.127

An abandoned vehicle can only be disposed of “after the expiration of 30 days from the

date of notice sent by certified mail to the registered owner and all lienholders of

record.”128

124 See DCFS, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 38.

125 City of Revere, 471 F. Supp. 3d at 409 (citing Ford Motor Credit Co. v. NYC Police Dep’t, 394

F. Supp. 2d 600, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 503 F.3d 186); see Propert, 948 F.2d at 1335

(reasoning that municipality “may not . . . act to destroy the car without affording the owner

post-towing notice and an opportunity to be heard”); DCFS, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 40.

126 State College, Pa., Mun. Code § 11-1006.

127 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 7303.1, 7304, 7305

128 Id. § 7307.

Although that procedure does not appear to have been followed here even after

the 45-day period, no one disputes that VW did receive notice—albeit informally—

before Karch considered selling the Audi at auction.129 And, although VW takes issue

with the format, State College does provide several opportunities for an informal

hearing before State College’s head of parking enforcement to challenge

immobilization, a tow, and attendant fines and storage fees, which is then appealable to

the Pennsylvania courts,130 and state law offers a hearing to challenge the abandonment

determination, which can result in waiver of all towing and storage fees.131 I find that

the hearings offered by State College, though informal, satisfy due process with regard

to the risk of total deprivation.132 Given that there will eventually be notice and an

opportunity for a hearing, there is not a relevant risk of erroneous permanent

deprivation.133

129 See DCFS, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 39-40 (“That the District violated the notification requirements

outlined in its own laws or regulations, however, does not itself mean that it deprived DCFS

of procedural due process.”).

130 State College, Pa., Mun. Code §§ 11-1005; 11-1010; 2 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 751-754.

131 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7305(b)(5).

132 See J.W. Gant & Assocs., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1022, 1028 (D.

Del. 1992) (“Due process does not require a particular form or manner of hearing, but rather

requires only an opportunity to be heard appropriate to the circumstances.”); Fraser v. Pa.

State Univ., 654 F. Supp. 3d 443, 458-60 (M.D. Pa. 2023) (explaining that administrative

decisionmakers “are ‘presumed to be impartial, and only evidence of actual bias or a likelihood

of bias can support a due process claim.’” (quoting Park v. Temple Univ., 757 F. App’x 102,

106 (3d Cir. 2018))); see Morris v. City of Danville, Va., 744 F.2d 1041, 1044-45 (4th Cir.

1984).

133 See City of Revere, 471 F. Supp. 3d at 408 (“If it is unlikely that property would ultimately be

sold without notice to all interested parties, courts will tend to uphold policies that provide a

substantial benefit to the government.”); Twp. of Aston, 546 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (reasoning that

“Aston’s delay in notifying Honda did not itself increase the risk of an erroneous deprivation”);

Abernathy v. City of Pittsburgh, 795 F. App’x 85, 87 (3d Cir. 2020) (holding that state

abandonment procedure satisfies due process).

Finally, as to the third factor, given my determination that State College must

provide better notice before the 45-day period has run, I find that no additional steps

are necessary to ensure that the state abandonment process is timely. Under that regime,

all interested parties will receive notice that the vehicle has been seized well before

abandonment is even possible, and will again receive notice once the abandonment

process has begun. That is sufficient notice, and no further steps are necessary.

* * *

The Mathews factors tilt decisively for VW on the issue of pre-abandonment

notice, and I therefore grant VW’s motion for summary judgment on the Due Process

claim, and deny State College’s motion on this count. I nevertheless stress the limit of

this holding. State College simply did not provide sufficient notice to VW that its

property had been seized, such that it could take timely steps to recover that property

before its value had depreciated and significant fees accrued. State College has

apparently already remedied this issue of its own accord, although that does not resolve

the harm that VW has already suffered. But no greater notice is required to protect

against complete deprivations than the existing Pennsylvania abandoned vehicle

procedures.

2. Fourth Amendment – Unreasonable Seizure

In its motion, VW argues that State College violated the Fourth Amendment both

by initially seizing the Audi and by unlawfully retaining it beyond any warrantless

seizure justification. Nevertheless, I do not analyze the validity of the initial seizure (the

tow). Despite VW’s argument in its opening brief that the initial seizure was

unconstitutional,134 it entirely abandoned that point in its reply and criticized State

College for focusing on this “irrelevant” issue.135 By disavowing this point, VW has

waived it.136 In any event, I would agree with State College that initial warrantless

seizure was justified by the community caretaking exception.137

As to prolonged detention, the Third Circuit in Malanga’s explained that “when

the government seizes property, the Fourth Amendment requires that its initial seizure

and continued retention be reasonable.”138 Under similar circumstances to the case at

bar, the Court held that it is reasonable for a municipality to retain possession of a

vehicle seized pursuant to the community caretaking exception until a lienholder

“requested its release.”139 Here, VW requested Karch to release the Audi, and Karch

refused to do so until VW paid the storage fees and fines in full.140 The issue for VW is

that “[a]lthough the tower retains the vehicle and thus plays a central role in the

governmental appropriation of property, he is not in a position to provide the procedural

134 Doc. 51 at 11-12.

135 Doc. 61 (Pl.’s Reply) at 11 (“State College focuses entirely on its removal of the Vehicle from

a parking garage when arguing that its actions fall within the community caretaking exception.

But State College’s other actions are the problem.”); id. at 12 & n.5 (describing towing cases

focusing on the initial seizure as “irrelevant”); see also Doc. 57 (Pl.’s Opp’n) at 6 (focusing on

“continued retention” (emphasis in original)).

136 See Simko v. United States Steel Corp., 992 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2021) (“Waiver is the

intentional abandonment of an argument.” (citing Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Directors of Panther

Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 146-47 (3d Cir. 2017))

137 Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 489 (citing United States v. Smith, 522 F.3d 305, 313 (3d Cir. 2008)).

138 Id.

139 Id. at 489-90. The panel specifically noted that delay in the lienholder’s ability to request

release which was caused by a failure to provide it with notice was “properly rectified as part

of [the lienholder’s] due process claim.” Id. at 90 n.2.

140 Doc. 50 ¶¶ 34-36, 38.

avenue by which the vehicle may be released.”141 Only the municipality is in a position

to determine the validity of the tow and thus whether the fees are properly charged,142

so the request for release of the vehicle must be addressed to the municipality itself.143

That is especially true here, where everyone agrees that Karch could not release the

vehicle without State College’s permission.144 The record contains no evidence to show

that VW ever asked State College to release the vehicle.145 With no properly made

request for release, “it was reasonable for [State College] to retain possession of the

vehicle.”146

VW also argues that State College violated the Fourth Amendment by retaining

the Audi “to force payment.”147 This framing mischaracterizes the facts of this case.

The issue of how an owner can recover a vehicle is a due process question,148 and it is

well established that a “pre-payment requirement” to recover a seized vehicle is

“constitutional so long as there is an opportunity to post a bond in the same amount.”149

That is State College’s process. The Municipal Code permits payment of fees “under

141 Mays v. Scranton City Police Dep’t, 503 F. Supp. 1255, 1264 (M.D. Pa. 1980).

142 Id.

143 See Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 489-90 (reasoning that there was no Fourth Amendment violation

even though tower refused to return the vehicle even after “borough officials . . . issued the

necessary release form”).

144 Doc. 46-6 at 94.

145 See supra note 80 (deeming as admitted that VW did not communicate with State College

about releasing the Audi).

146 Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 489.

147 Doc. 51 at 15.

148 See Breath v. Cronvich, 729 F.2d 1006, 1011 (5th Cir. 1984).

149 Brite Fin. Servs., 461 F. Supp. 3d at 562 (collecting cases); Sheller v. City of Phila., 2012 WL

4754820, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2012) (citing Breath, 729 F.2d at 1011 and Stypmann, 557

F.2d at 1343-44).

protest,”150 which will secure release of the vehicle while the legitimacy of the fees is

litigated.151 Given that there is a process for “the vehicle owner [to] be relieved of any

fees or costs associated with the towing and storage” if they occurred wrongfully,152

there is no constitutional violation in requiring payment of a bond equal to those fees

and costs while that determination is made.

Accordingly, State College’s motion for summary judgment on the Fourth

Amendment claim is granted, and VW’s motion on the same count is denied.

3. Fifth Amendment – Unlawful Taking

Given the Fourth Amendment analysis, Malanga’s entirely resolves VW’s Fifth

Amendment claim. State College’s “Fourth Amendment justification never ‘ran out’

because it was reasonable for it to keep possession of the vehicle until [VW] sought its

return,” and VW failed to make such a request.153 “Thus, no taking occurred.”154

Moreover, Karch never actually attempted to sell the Audi, and would have had to go

through the state process, which offers notice and a hearing, to do so. State College “did

not give [Karch] title to the vehicle, only a lien,” and that lien could be erased if VW

showed that it was erroneously imposed.155 There was no Fifth Amendment violation

150 State College, Pa., Mun. Code § 11-715.

151 Id. § 11-1006.

152 Sheller, 2012 WL 4754820, at *7.

153 Malanga’s, 152 F.4th at 490.

154 Id.

155 Id.

here. State College’s motion for summary judgment on this count is granted, and VW’s

motion for summary judgment is denied.

4. Damages

Having prevailed on its Due Process claim, VW is entitled to at least nominal

damages.156 Regarding compensatory damages, however, I find VW’s evidence facile.

Simply comparing the average auction value of models like the Audi to the Audi’s

auction value fails to consider that the Audi in this case was entirely unaccounted for

from May 2020 until February 2022 and apparently sat unattended in a public parking

garage from February 2022 until July 2022. The Court is left with no way to determine

whether (or how much of) the depreciation in the Audi’s value resulted from the period

before State College towed it, for which State College cannot be liable, as opposed to

after the tow, for which it can.157 If it still wishes to pursue compensatory damages, VW

may renew its request to address these questions either by presenting proof that the

depreciation in value was due to State College or by contending that such proof is not

necessary.

Because State College’s motion for sanctions is directly related to the issue of

damages,158 I defer that matter and will consider it once the parties have set forth a plan

for further damages briefing.

156 Am. Honda Fin. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 3d at 384 (citing Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d

279, 284 (3d Cir. 2008)).

157 Id. (“Exactly what part of the economic harm Honda sustained between August 2018 and

January 2021 is attributable to Aston’s wrongful actions is unclear.”).

158 See generally Doc. 66 (Mot. for Sanctions).

III. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, both motions for summary judgment are granted in

part and denied in part. VW’s motion for sanctions is granted. State College’s motion

for sanctions is deferred. A declaratory judgment will be issued in VW’s favor on the

Due Process count.

An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

Chief United States District Judge