Stephens

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

GLENN H. STEPHENS, Ill, :

Petitioner : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-337

V. : (JUDGE MANNION)

DENISE DIETER, Magisterial :

District Judge, et al.,

Respondents

MEMORANDUM

Currently before the Court are the following applications, petitions, and

motions filed by pro se Petitioner Glenn H. Stephens, Ill (“Stephens”): (1) an

application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Application”); (2) a

“Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Petition of [sic] Emergency Writ of

Habeas Corpus’ under 28 U.S.C. §2241; (3) a notice of removal of a pending

state criminal case; (4) an amended Section 2241 habeas petition; (5) a

hybrid motion seeking habeas and mandamus relief; (6) a motion for

summary judgment; (7) a “Motion for Expedited Mediation of Combined

(Joined) Cases”; and (8) a motion to stay. For the reasons set forth below,

the Court will: (1) grant the IFP Application; (2) deem withdrawn Stephens’s

motions for a preliminary injunction and mandamus relief; (3) deny his

motions to stay, “Motion for Expedited Mezdiation of Combined (Joined)

Cases,” and motion for summary judgment; (4) strike his purported notice of

removal; (5) dismiss without prejudice his amended Section 2241 petition;

(6) decline to issue a certificate of appealability; and (7) direct the Clerk of

Court to close this case.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Underlying State Court Proceedings

According to the Unified Judicial System of Pennsylvania Web Portal

(https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/CaseSearch), Stephens is facing criminal

charges in the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County (“CCP”) for: (1)

one count of criminal attempt to commit theft by extortion (18 Pa. C.S.

§§901(a), 3923(a)(2)); two counts of stalking (18 Pa. C.S. §2709.1(a)(2)):

and (3) two counts of harassment (18 Pa. C.S. §2709(a)(7)). See

Commonwealth v. Stephens, No. CP-41-CR-1498-2024 (Lycoming Cnty. Ct.

Com. PI.).' It does not appear that a trial date has been set in the case. See

id. However, the docket reflects that Stephens is currently incarcerated in the

Lycoming County Prison (“LCP”) after the CCP revoked his bail on June 16,

' The Court takes judicial notice of the docket for Stephens’s underlying

criminal case. See, e.g., Orabi v. Att'y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537

n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (unpublished) (“We may take judicial notice of the contents

of another Court’s docket.”); Mickell v. Lycoming Cnty. Cent. Collections Off.

& Admin., 821 F. App’x 74, 75 (3d Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (taking “judicial

notice of the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County criminal docket”

for plaintiff's underlying criminal case).

-2-

2025. See id. It also appears that he is proceeding pro Se in his criminal case.

See id.

B. Stephens’s Submissions in This Case

Stephens commenced the instant action by filing a document titled,

“Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Petition of [sic] Emergency Writ of

Habeas Corpus,” which the Clerk of Court docketed on February 25, 2025.

(Doc. 1.) In this submission, Stephens, who identifies himself as “a Berkeley

Law School graduate and member-in-good-standing in E.D. FDC Michigan,”

generally asserts that he has been wrongfully imprisoned in Lycoming

County. (/d. at 1.) In particular, he describes the criminal proceedings against

him as follows:

Like his candidacy for Magisterial District Judge and his earlier

whistleblower campaign against a landlord ignoring city and PA

code — CO [sic] alarms — and the attempted criminal activity of

that landlord and his property manager, this motion/petition

arises from interrelated campaigns-free speech (in emails)

against a landlord ignoring renter safety (black mold) and this

criminal activity of that landlord (a bounced check of $500 as part

of a breach of an exit agreement from the black mold infested

rental) which generated Stephens [sic] lawful repeated request

[sic] for restitution. The unlawful retaliatory criminalization of

Stephens [sic] restitution efforts, intalaced [sic] with his ADA/Fair

Housing Act complaint and opposition[] by Lycoming County Law

Enforcement + [sic] Judge is the real reason he is in prison.

(Id. at 2.)

-3-

Stephens argues that a Lycoming County Judge held “an

unconstitutional ultra vires bail hearing” in which the Judge raised

Stephens’s bail from $15,000 to $25,000. (/d. at 3.) Stephens believes that

this $25,000 bail is excessive and retaliatory, causing him to “remain{]

wrongfully incarcerated.” (/d.) He identifies other cases where similar bail

amounts were ordered and appears to argue that the charges in those cases

were more serious than his charges, and he even provides his own “expert

statistical analysis” of his allegedly excessive bail. (/d. at 3, 5-8, 10-13.)

For relief, Stephens seeks a stay or injunction of his Lycoming County

criminal proceedings, an order requiring “all Lycoming County law

enforcement and judges to cease and desist” until this Court resolves his

habeas petition, and his immediate release from incarceration. (/d. at 14.)

Regarding his request for a stay or an injunction, Stephens argues that

abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) does not apply in his

case because “the balancing of equities and irreparable harm favor{[s] federal

court action” and Younger “is inappropriate where state proceedings

advance to harass or [are conducted] in bad faith.” (/d. at 1-2.)

In addition to his emergency motion/habeas petition, Stephens filed his

IFP Application. (Doc. 4.) Unfortunately, he did not submit a certified prisoner

trust fund account statement with his IFP Application as required by the in

-4-

forma pauperis statute, see 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2) (requiring that when

applying for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, an incarcerated litigant must

submit “a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional

equivalent) for the [litigant] for the 6-month period immediately preceding the

filing of the [petition], obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at

which the [litigant] is or was confined”); as such, an Administrative Order

issued requiring the Warden of LCP to submit Stephens’s certified account

statement to the Clerk of Court. (Doc. 5.) Stephens’s certified account

statement was docketed on March 14, 2025. (Doc. 6.)

In early to mid-June 2025, Stephens filed three (3) submissions with

the Clerk of Court. The first of those submissions is a purported notice of

removal in which Stephens claims to have removed his Lycoming County

criminal case to this civil habeas docket. (Doc. 7.) The second submission is

a completed form petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Section 2241,

which the Court construes as an amended Section 2241 habeas petition.

(Doc. 8.) In his amended petition, Stephens appears to assert that he, inter

alia, properly rernoved his criminal case to this Court, has been the victim of

abuses of process, has been unlawfully imprisoned since August 2025

despite a lack of probable cause to arrest and imprison him, and is being

unlawfully retaliated against for running for ‘a magisterial district judge seat

-5-

in Lycoming County and advocating on behalf of “poor renters.” (/d. at 1-7.)

For relief, Stephens seeks to have the Court: (1) issue a temporary

restraining order “staying all state court actions, warrants, bench warrants,

etc. until after’ the November 2025 magisterial district judge election; (2)

release him into the custody of federal Marshals “if [he is] seized”; (3) deny

any “remand motion” because he cannot “get a fair trial in Lycoming County”;

and (4) join this federal case with his state criminal case “if [he is] tried for

crimes [he] did not commit.” (/d. at 7.) As for the third of Stephens’s

submissions, it consists of forms from the Lycoming County Board of

Elections seemingly related to his nomination petition for a magisterial district

judge election. (Doc. 9.) The Court presumes that Stephens intended that

these documents serve as supporting exhibits to his amended Section 2241

petition and will consider them as such.

On August 8, 2025, Stephens filed a “Memorandum on Black Mold”

(Doc. 10), and a “Motion” in which he both sought habeas relief and a writ of

mandamus ordering “defendants to cease and desist all constitutional

retaliation againts [sic] him until after November 5, 2025” (Doc. 12). Less

than a week later, on August 14, 2025, Stephens filed a motion for summary

judgment (Doc. 13) and a document titled, “Attachment Iqbal [sic] Twombley

[sic] Addendum to Privileges and Immunities Clause Complaint” (Doc. 14).

-6-

Stephens then filed a brief in support of his motion for summary judgment on

August 20, 2025. (Doc. 15).

Stephens continued submitting documents in this case in September

2025, when he first filed a document titled, “Evidentiary Supplement,” on

September 3, 2025. (Doc. 16.) He then filed a document titled, “Additional

Vicarious Admission — Memorialization for Purposes of Summary Judgement

[sic],” on September 26, 2025. (Doc. 17.) On November 4, 2025, Stephens

filed a document titled, “Motion for Expedited Mediation of Combined

(Joined) Cases,” along with a supporting brief. (Docs. 18, 19.) On February

18, 2026, Stephens filed a motion to stay and a brief in support of his motion.

(Docs. 20, 21.) Stephens’s applications, motions, and petitions are ripe for

review.

ll. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Applications for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(1), a district court “may authorize the

commencement. . . of any [civil] suit, .. . without prepayment of fees or

security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a

-7-

statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to

pay such fees or give security therefor.”* /d. This statute

“is designed to ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful

access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,

324, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). Specifically,

Congress enacted the statute to ensure that administrative court

costs and filing fees, both of which must be paid by everyone

else who files a lawsuit, would not prevent indigent persons from

pursuing meaningful litigation. [Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d

1080, 1084 (3d Cir. 1995)]. Toward this end, §1915(a) allows a

litigant to commence a civil or criminal action in federal court in

forma pauperis by filing in good faith an affidavit stating, among

other things, that [they are] unable to pay the costs of the lawsuit.

Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 324, 109 S.Ct. 1827.

Douris, 293 F. App’x at 131-32 (unpublished).

B. Preliminary Review of Section 2241 Habeas Petitions

Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts, applicable to Section 2241 petitions through

Rule 1(b), see R. 1(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254 (“The district court may apply

any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not [involving a petition

under 28 U.S.C. §2254].”): see also In re Gorbey, 833 F. App’x 371, 372 (3d

Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (“As the District Court noted in its October 13, 2020

order, the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases are applicable to §2241

2 “The reference to prisoners in §1915(a)(1) appears to be a mistake.

In forma pauperis status is afforded to all indigent persons, not just

prisoners.” Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130, 132 n.1 (3d Cir.

2008) (unpublished).

-8-

petitions by Rule 1(b).” (citing Bowers v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, Warden, 760

F.3d 1177, 1183 n.8 (11th Cir. 2014))), this Court must examine a Section

2241 habeas petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the

petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.”

R. 4, 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254. If it appears that the petitioner is not entitled to

relief, “the judge must dismiss and petition and direct the clerk to notify the

petitioner.” /d.; see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994)

(explaining that district courts are “authorized to dismiss summarily any

habeas petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.” (citing R. 4, 28

U.S.C. foll. §2254)).

C. Habeas Petitions Filed by State Pretrial Detainees

When a judgment against a habeas petitioner in a state criminal

proceeding has not yet been entered and the petitioner files an application

for a writ of habeas corpus while in pretrial detention, jurisdiction for federal

habeas review arises under Section 2241, not 28 U.S.C. §2254, because

Section 2254 requires that the petitioner be “in custody pursuant to the

judgment of a State Court.” 28 U.S.C. §2254(a) (emphasis added): see also

Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 441 (3d Cir. 1975) (“For state prisoners,

federal habeas corpus is substantially a post-conviction remedy... .”

(citations and footnote omitted)). Section 2241 provides that “[w]rits of

-Q-

habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice thereof,

the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions.”

28 U.S.C. §2241(a). In addition, the writ of habeas corpus under Section

2241 may extend to a prisoner in pretrial detention if they are “in custody in

violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” /d.

§2241(c)(3); see also Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App’x 3, 4 (3d Cir. 2010)

(unpublished) (“[Sjection 2241 authorizes a federal court to issue a writ of

habeas corpus to any pre-trial detainee who is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Although federal courts have jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas

corpus before a judgment is entered in a state criminal proceeding pursuant

to Section 2241, see, e.g., Moore, 515 F.2d at 443, in the pretrial setting,

“federal habeas corpus does not lie, absent ‘special circumstances’ to

adjudicate the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior

to a judgment of conviction by a state court.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of

Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 489 (1973); see also Moore, 515 F.2d at 443

(“[JJurisdiction without exhaustion should be exercised at the pre-trial state

unless extraordinary circumstances are present.”). Disfavor of pretrial

intervention in state criminal proceedings is based on the notion of comity,

-10-

“a principle of deference and ‘proper respect’ for state government functions

in our federal system.” Evans v. Ct. of Com. PI. Del. Cnty., Pa., 959 F.2d

1227, 1234 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971));

see also Duran, 393 F. App’x at 4 (explaining that Section 2241 jurisdiction

“must be exercised sparingly in order to prevent in the ordinary circumstance

‘pre-trial habeas interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of

state criminal processes” (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 445—46)).

DISCUSSION

A. The lFP Application (Doc. 4)

After reviewing the IFP Application and Stephens’s prisoner trust fund

account statement, the Court finds that he cannot prepay the fee for this

action. Therefore, the Court will grant the IFP Application and permit

Stephens leave to proceed in forma pauperis in this habeas case.

B. Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (Doc. 1)

Stephens filed a motion for a preliminary injunction along with his

petition for an emergency writ of habeas corpus, the latter of which the Court

construes as his initial Section 2241 habeas petition. (Doc. 1.) As for his

motion for a preliminary injunction, Stephens niever filed a brief in support of

the motion as required by the Court’s Local Rules. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.5

(“Within fourteen (14) days after the filing cf any motion, the party filing the

-11-

motion shall file a brief in support of the motion. .. . A brief shall not be

required: (a) In support of a motion for enlargement of time if the reasons for

the request are fully stated in the motion, (b) In support of any motion which

has concurrence of all parties, and the reasons for the motion and the relief

sought are fully stated therein, or (c) In support of a motion for appointment

of counsel.”). Therefore, the Court will deem the motion for a preliminary

injunction withdrawn due to Stephens’s failure to file a supporting brief. See

id. (“If a supporting brief is not filed within the time provided in this rule the

motion shall be deemed to be withdrawn.”).

C. “Motion” Seeking Immediate Release and Mandamus Relief

(Doc. 12)

Stephens filed a submission which he titled as a “Motion,” in which he

sought an Order directing his immediate release from confinement as well

as an Order granting his “petition for a writ of mandamus” to require

“defendants” to “cease and desist all constitutional retaliation against [him]

until after November 5, 2025.” (Doc. 12 at 1.) The Court will deem this

“Motion” withdrawn to the extent it seeks any form of relief because Stephens

did not file a supporting brief within fourteen days of filing the “Motion,” as

required by Local Rule 7.5. See M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.5. Furthermore, even if the

Court would not deem withdrawn Stephens’s “Motion” seeking, inter alia,

mandamus relief, he has not stated any grounds upon which this Court would

-12-

grant him mandamus relief. See Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep't

of Health & Hum. Servs., 2 F.4th 121, 132 (3d Cir. 2021) (explaining that for

mandamus to issue, “a litigant must satisfy three requirements that courts

have characterized as jurisdictional: (1) a clear and indisputable right to

relief, (2) that the government agency or official is violating a clear duty to

act, and (3) that no adequate alternative remedy exists” (citation omitted)).

D. Motion to Stay (Doc. 20)

Stephens filed a motion to stay Local Rule 7.10, which pertains to

motions for reconsideration,? until the United States Supreme Court reviews

his petition for a writ of certiorari that he apparently filed or, alternatively,

extend the deadline for filing a motion for reconsideration to thirty days if the

movant is a pro se prisoner. See (Docs. 20 at 1; 21 at 1-8). It is unclear why

Stephens filed this motion in this case because he has not filed any motion

for reconsideration, and it appears that he primarily focuses his motion on

another of his several civil actions he has filed in this district over the past

year, see Stephens v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2356 (M.D. Pa.), which is assigned

to the Honorable Julia K. Munley. See, e.g., (Doc. 21 at 7 (“[MJovant seeks

3 Local Rule 7.10 states that “[a]ny motion for reconsideration or

reargument must be accompanied by a supporting brief and filed within

fourteen (14) days after the entry of the order concerned. This rule is not

applicable to a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.

59.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 7.10.

-13-

the evitable [sic] relief of 30 days (calendar) to move for reconsideration of

4:25-cv-2356 from today.”)). Regardless, since there is no pending motion

for reconsideration in this case, there is no basis for this Court to apply, much

less discuss, Local Rule 7.10. As such, at least as it pertains to this case,

Stephens’s motion to stay is frivolous. Accordingly, the Court will deny the

motion to stay.

E. “Motion for Expedited Mediation of Combined (Joined)

Cases” (Doc. 18)

Stephens moves to have the Court jain all pending cases he has filed

in this District, except for three of those cases, “into one complaint.” (Doc. 19

at 11.) Although Stephens does not identify all his cases in his motion or his

supporting brief, the Court notes that he has filed the following actions in this

District since July 1, 2025: (1) Stephens, III v. Dieter, et al., No. 25-cv-1261-

MEM (M.D. Pa. filed July 11, 2025); (2) Stephens v. Marino, et al., No. 25-

cv-1761-KMN (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 22, 2025); (3) Stephens v. Ogden

Newspapers, Inc., et al., No. 25-cv-1824-JFS (M.D. Pa. filed Sept. 30, 2025);

(4) Stephens v. Welickovitch, et al., No. 25-cv-1825-JPW (M.D. Pa. filed

Sept. 30, 2025); (5) Stephens, et al. v. Wascher, et al., No. 25-cv-1907-PJC

(M.D. Pa. filed Oct. 10, 2025): (6) Stephens v. UPMC-Williamsport, No. 25-

cv-2069-KM (M.D. Pa. filed Nov. 3, 2025); (7) Stephens v. Epic Games, Inc.,

No. 25-cv-2081-JFS (M.D. Pa. filed Nov. 4, 2025); (8) Stephens v. Keller,

-14-

No. 25-cv-2266-KMN (M.D. Pa. filed Nov. 26, 2025); (9) Stephens v. Trump,

No. 25-cv-2356-JKM (M.D. Pa. filed Dec. 9, 2025); and (10) Sfephens v.

Bench, U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D. Pa., No. 26-cv-652-JKM (M.D. Pa. filed Mar. 13,

2026). All the above actions are non-habeas civil actions in which Stephens

filed a complaint, and several of them are already closed. See Stephens, III

v. Dieter, et al., No. 25-cv-1261-MEM (M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 9; Stephens v.

Welickovitch, et al., No. 25-cv-1825-JPW (M.D. Pa.), ECF Nos. 23, 24:

Stephens v. Epic Games, Inc., No. 25-cv-2081-JFS (M.D. Pa.), ECF No. 6;

Stephens v. UPMC-Williamsport, No. 25-cv-2069-KM (M.D. Pa.), ECF No.

7; Stephens v. Trump, No. 25-cv-2356-JKM (M.D. Pa.), ECF Nos. 7, 8;

Stephens v. Bench, U.S. Dist. Ct., M.D. Pa., No. 26-cv-652-JKM (M.D. Pa.),

ECF No. 4; Stephens v. Marino, et al., No. 25-cv-1761-KMN (M.D. Pa.), ECF

No. 16. Therefore, considering that these other actions are not habeas cases

and many of them are already closed, this Court will not consolidate any of

them with the instant Section 2241 habeas case. Moreover, Stephens has

failed to articulate any plausible reason to submit this case for mediation.

Accordingly, the Court will deny Stephens’s “Motion for Expedited Mediation

of Combined (Joined) Cases.”

-15-

F. Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 13)

Stephens moves for summary judgment on the ground that Lycoming

County’s “[b]ails [sic] violate the Privileges and Immunities Clause and, in

turn, . . . the [Eighth] Amendments [sic] [p]rohibition [a]Jgainst excessive

[b]ails [sic].” (Doc. 15 at 1.) Stephens asserts that his bail was set at $25,000

even though he has no criminal record, he has been wrongfully accused of

nonviolent crimes, he is not a flight risk, and he is domiciled in Virginia. See

(id.). He claims that he can provide “several dozen examples” of Lycoming

County residents who were accused of violent offenses and did not have

their bail set as high as Stephens’s bail. See (id. at 1-2). This information is

allegedly set forth in the Williamsport Gazette case reports, and Stephens

requests that the Court take judicial notice of this information. See (id. at 2).

For the reasons stated below, the Court will cleny this motion.

Motions for summary judgment are governed by Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56, and district courts may apply those Rules to Section 2241

habeas petitions “to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any

statutory provisions or’ the Rules themselves. R. 12, 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254:

see also R. 1(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. §2254 (“The district court may apply any or

all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not covered by Rule 1(a).”).

Although it appears that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to address

-16 -

this issue, at least three other circuit courts of appeal have concluded that

Rule 56 applies to habeas cases. See Brandt v. Gooding, 636 F.3d 124, 132

(4th Cir. 2011) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ‘applies to habeas

proceedings.” (quoting Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407, 412 (4th Cir.

1991))); Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764-65 (5th Cir. 2000) (“As a

general principle, Rule 56 . . . applies with equal force in the context of

habeas corpus cases.” (citations omitted)); McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962,

969 (11th Cir. 1994) (“As a general principle, Rule 56... . is applicable in

habeas corpus cases.” (citations omitted)). On the other hand, one circuit

court of appeals has concluded that summary judgment principles do not

apply when a federal district court is ruling on the merits of a federal habeas

claim. See Black v. Carpenter, 866 F.3d 734, 742-43 (6th Cir. 2017)

(concluding that “[s]ummary-judgment procedures simply do not apply to a

federal habeas court's final adjudication of a [habeas] claim” because [the

petitioner has] the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that [they are] entitled to relief’ (citations ornitted)). Judges in this District

have reached conflicting decisions on the applicability of Rule 56 to habeas

proceedings. Compare Stinson v. Wakefield, No. 07-cv-1237, 2010 WL

1462536, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2010) (“Summary judgment is appropriate

in a habeas proceeding ... .”), with Meade v. Spaulding, No. 16-cv-2212,

-17-

2017 WL 3425181, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 9, 2017) (denying motion for

summary judgment as unnecessary in Section 2241 habeas action).

This Court is persuaded by the reasoning of those cases that have

determined that summary judgment motions are “superfluous and

unnecessary in determining the merits of a habeas corpus petition.” Levack

v. Burton, No. 16-cv-125, 2018 WL 11648114, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 2,

2018); see also Scott v. FC! Fairton, No. 09-cv-929, 2010 WL 2540456 at *3

(D.N.J. June 16, 2010) (“In a habeas proceeding, the petitioner does not

proceed to trial. Therefore, Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is

improper. For all practical purposes, summary judgment is equivalent to the

Court's [sic] making a determination on the merits of a habeas petition. As

the Court will rule on the petition for writ of habeas corpus in due course, a

motion for summary judgment in a habeas proceeding serves no purpose.”),

aff'd, 407 F. App’x 612 (3d Cir. 2011) (unpulblished). Moreover, even if the

Court would consider a motion for summary judgment in a Section 2241

proceeding, Stephens’s motion is premature insofar as the Court has not yet

directed Respondents to file a response to his habeas petition. Therefore,

the Court will deny Stephens’s motion for sunnmary judgment.

-18-

G. Notice of Removal (Doc. 7)

Stephens filed a “Notice of Removal by Plaintiff,” which the Clerk of

Court docketed on June 6, 2025. (Doc. 7.) In this single-page (excluding the

certificate of service) notice, Stephens seeks to remove his CCP criminal

case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1332, 1441, and 1446. See (id.

at 1). He claims that he has satisfied the “procedural requirements for

removal” and asserts that this Court “has subject-matter and diversity

jurisdiction” over his criminal case. (/d.) He also claims that “[s]ervice of this

notice of removal immediately divests the State [sic] court of jurisdiction,

rendering void any orders or warrants it issues [and t]o regain jurisdiction the

[s]tate must successfully move the District Court for a remand.” (/d.) As

explained below, Stephens’s notice is improper, ineffective, and inaccurate.

Under 28 U.S.C. §1455, a criminal defendant may remove a criminal

prosecution from a state court, see 28 U.S.C. §1455(a) (indicating that

“defendant or defendants desiring to remove any criminal prosecution from

a State court” must file notice of removal with district court “for the district

and division within which such prosecution is pending”). A defendant seeking

to remove a criminal prosecution in a state court must file the notice of

removal “not later than 30 days after the arraignment in the State court, or at

any time before trial, whichever is earlier, except that for good cause shown

-19-

the United States district court may enter an order granting the defendant . .

. leave to file the notice at a later time.” 28 U.S.C. §1455(b)(1). The criminal

defendant desiring to remove a criminal prosecution must also file, along with

the notice of removal, “a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served

upon such defendant or defendants in such action.” 28 U.S.C. §1455(a).

After receiving a notice of removal, “[t]he . . . district court. . . shall

examine the notice promptly[, and it clearly appears on the face of the

notice and any exhibits annexed thereto that removal should not be

permitted, the court shall make an order for summary remand.” 28 U.S.C.

§1455(b)(5). “The removing party .. . carries a heavy burden of showing that

at all stages of the litigation the case is properly before the federal court.

Removal statutes are to be strictly construed, with all doubts to be resolved

in favor of remand.” Brown v. Jevic, 575 F.3d 322, 326 (3d Cir. 2009) (infernal

citations omitted). Nevertheless, because Stephens is a pro se litigant, the

Court is mindful that his allegations and claims in the notice of removal must

be liberally construed. See, e.g., Vogt v. Weizel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir.

2021) (explaining that court must construe pro se filings liberally). Yet,

despite the liberal construction afforded to pro se filings, pro se litigants such

as Stephens “cannot flout procedural rules—-they must abide by the same

-20-

rules that apply to all other litigants.” /d. (quoting Mala v. Crown Bay Marina,

Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)).

In this case, the Court has reviewed Stephens’s purported notice of

removal pursuant to Section 1455(b)(5) and finds that it clearly appears on

the face of the notice that removal should not be permitted for several

reasons. First, Stephens attempts to remove his criminal case into an

ongoing Section 2241 habeas action. Stephens has not identified, and this

Court has not located, any statute, rule, or case, which would permit a state

criminal defendant to remove their criminal case into an ongoing civil case,

even if that case involves a Section 2241 habeas petition challenging the

ongoing state criminal case. If Stephens wanted to properly remove his state

criminal case, he needed to do so as an entirely new action. Based on this

defect alone, the Court would be warranted in striking the notice from the

docket as having been improperly filed.

Second, Stephens has not identified a legitimate ground for removal in

the notice. He attempts to remove this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1332,

1441, and 1446 (Doc. 7 at 1), none of which are applicable here. Section

1441 relates to removing civil actions generally, Section 1446 sets forth the

procedure for removing civil actions, and Section 1332 provides for diversity

jurisdiction in civil actions. See 28 U.S.C. §§1332, 1441, 1446; New York v.

-21-

Milchamot, No. 24-cv-9296, 2024 WL 5119327, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16,

2024) (rejecting state criminal defendant’s attempt to remove his criminal

case to federal court under, inter alia, (1) Section 1332 because it “describes

federal district courts’ jurisdiction in civil actions [and the] case [wa]s a

criminal matter” and (2) Section 1446 “because it is about the procedure for

removing civil cases to federal district court[s and, a]s already explained,

[the] case [wa]s a criminal matter”); Sabino v. Port Auth. Police Dep't, No.

21-cv-5731, 2022 WL 2441021, at*1 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2022) (“[Section] 1441

is not a basis for removal of the State Criminal Proceeding because [Section]

1441 only provides for the removal of ‘civil actions.’”” (footnote omitted)).

Although the instant Section 2241 habeas case is a civil action, Stephens is

attempting to remove a criminal case. Therefore, none of these statutes

provide grounds or jurisdictional bases for the removal of Stephens’s criminal

case to this Court.

Third, the notice of removal does not comply with Section 1455(a)

insofar as it does not include “a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders

served upon” Stephens in his criminal case. See 28 U.S.C. §1455(a). Fourth,

the notice of removal is untimely as the publicly available docket entries show

that Stephens was arraigned in December 2024, and yet he did not attempt

to remove the case until more than six (6) months later. See 28 U.S.C.

-22-

§1455(b)(1) (stating that notice of removal must be filed “not later than 30

days after the arraignment in the State court, or at any time before trial,

whichever is earlier’). This untimely filing is not excusable because Stephens

has not set forth good cause to file the belated notice. See id. (providing that

“for good cause shown in the United States district court may enter an order

granting the defendant. . . leave to file the notice at a later time’). In fact,

Stephens does not acknowledge that his notice of removal is untimely.

Fifth, and finally, contrary to Stephens’s assertions in his notice of

removal and amended Section 2241 petition, the filing of the notice of

removal has no impact on his underlying state-court criminal proceedings. In

this regard, “[t]he filing of a notice of removal of a criminal prosecution shall

not prevent the State court in which such prosecution is pending from

proceeding further, except that a judgment of conviction shall not be entered

unless the prosecution is first remanded.” 28 U.S.C. §1455(b)(3) (emphasis

added). As such, the Court of Common Pleas was not prohibited from

continuing with Stephens’s criminal proceedings despite his unsuccessful

attempt at removal.

Overall, Stephens improperly filed a notice of removal in this habeas

case. As such, the Court will direct the Clerk of Court to strike it from the

docket in this case.

-23-

H. Section 2241 Habeas Petitions (Docs. 1, 8)

Preliminarily, the Court notes that it is unclear from Stephens’s

submission of a completed Section 2241 habeas petition using the Court’s

standard form, which was docketed on June 13, 2025 (Doc. 8), whether he

intended it to be an amended petition or a supplement to his emergency

petition (Doc. 1). Nevertheless, as indicated above, the Court will construe

the completed form Section 2241 habeas petition as an amended petition

because it is a fully completed petition and Stephens did not require leave of

Court to file it, which he would have needed to do if he wanted to supplement

his original petition. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1) (providing that “[a]

party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course no later than (A)

21 days after serving it, or (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive

pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21

days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is

earlier’), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (“On motion and reasonable notice, the

court may, on just terms, permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading

setting out any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date

of the pleading to be supplemented.” (emphasis added)). So construed, the

-24-

Court will dismiss without prejudice the amended Section 2241 petition due

to Stephens’s failure to exhaust his state-court remedies prior to filing it.

Regarding exhaustion, Section 2241 does not contain a statutory

exhaustion requirement like Section 2254, see 28 U.S.C. §2254(b)(1)(A)

(‘An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody

pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it

appears that[] .. . the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the

courts of the State... .”); nevertheless, “an exhaustion requirement has

developed through decisional law, applying principles of federalism.” Moore,

515 F.2d at 442. Moreover, “although there is a distinction in the statutory

language of [Sections] 2254 and 2241, there is no distinction insofar as the

exhaustion requirement is concerned.” /d. Accordingly, a Section 2241

habeas petitioner must have exhausted their state-court remedies regarding

their claims before the federal court can consider their merits. /d.; see

Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e have consistently

applied an exhaustion requirement to claims brought under §2241.”).

4 Even if the Court construed Stephens;’ form Section 2241 petition as

a supplement to the original emergency petition, it would not alter the

ultimate result.

-~25 -

To properly exhaust state remedies, a Section 2241 habeas petitioner

must invoke “one complete round of the state’s established appellate review

process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). The petitioner

bears the burden of showing that all claims alleged have been “fairly

presented” to the state courts, and “it is not enough that the petitioner

presents to the state court the facts upon which a federal claim is based.”

Brown v. Cuyler, 669 F.2d 155, 158 (3d Cir. 1982) (per curiam).

Here, Stephens has not shown that he exhausted his available state

remedies in his amended Section 2241 petition. See Lambert v. Blackwell,

134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The habeas petitioner carries the burden

of proving exhaustion of all available state remedies.” (citation omitted)).

Instead, he points out that he raised a claim about his allegedly excessive

bail and unlawful seizure through various “internal prison requests” on

several dates from January through March 2025. (Doc. 8 at 2.) Filing such

internal prison requests, or even grievance documents within the prison

system, is insufficient to satisfy the exhaustion requirement for habeas

claims because those are not state courts. See O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845

(explaining that Section 2241 habeas petitioners must invoke “one complete

round of the state’s established appellate review process” to exhaust their

state remedies); see also Battle v. Eagleton, No. O07-cv-1841, 2008 WL

-26 -

2952349, at *5 n.3 (D.S.C. July 28, 2008) (“The distinction between

administrative remedies which must be exhausted under the [Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)] in [42 U.S.C. §1983] cases .. ., and state

court remedies which must be exhausted in habeas cases are different.

Exhaustion under the PRLA ends at the issuance of the [prison’s] final

response in non-habeas prison condition cases. However, judicial review

remains a necessary step in the exhaustion of state court remedies required

in habeas matters.”), aff'd, 308 F. App’x 692 (4th Cir. 2009).

Stephens does not aver that he first raised any of his claims for habeas

relief in his underlying criminal proceedings and identify how the Court of

Common Pleas addressed those claims. In addition, although the publicly

available docket entries for Stephens’s criminal case show that he has filed

numerous pro se pretrial motions in his criminal case, the CCP has

addressed only a motion for recusal and a motion to modify bail (both of

which it granted). See CCP Dkt. Thus, it appears that Stephens may still

raise his constitutional claims pertaining to, inter alia, his arrest and any

seizures in the Court of Common Pleas and then challenge any adverse

rulings therein in the Pennsylvania state appellate courts.

-27-

Stephens attempts to avoid the exhaustion requirement by arguing that

exhaustion would be futile. (Doc. 8 at 2.) Even if the Court presumes that

futility serves as an exception to the exhaustion requirement as it does in

Section 2254 cases, see Roman v. DiGuglielmo, 675 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir.

2012) (discussing futility exception to exhaustion of state remedies in Section

2254 habeas cases), Stephens has not provided the Court with any evidence

showing that exhaustion would be futile. Instead, he merely speculates that

exhaustion is futile. Furthermore, he has yet to receive a ruling on any of his

habeas claims in the CCP in the first instance, much less appealed from any

adverse decisions to the Pennsylvania appellate courts. Merely filing

documents within the prison and not receiving responses, as well as filing

motions which are still pending before the CCP, does not equate to his state-

court remedies being unavailable or ineffective. See Moore, 515 F.2d at 444—

45 (finding petitioner failed to exhaust because his motions for interlocutory

review constituted neither a ruling on the merits of his constitutional claim

nor an opportunity to consider the merits); see also Cuevas v. Pennsylvania,

No. 19-cv-1733, 2020 WL 1911511, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2020)

(concluding that Section 2241 habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief on

his claims for excessive bail, speedy-trial violations, and challenges to his

arrest, due his failure to exhaust state-court remedies, because, inter alia,

- 28 -

the petitioner's charges were still pending and “[h]is various pro se appeals

of the trial court’s interlocutory orders denying his pro se motions,” which

were all quashed, “do not constitute rulings by the state courts on his

claims”). Therefore, Stephens’s futility argument is meritless.

Stephens has also failed to show that his criminal case presents the

type of “extraordinary circumstances” necessary to excuse his failure to

exhaust. Accordingly, because Stephens has not exhausted his state-court

remedies, demonstrated that those state-court remedies are unavailable or

ineffective, or shown extraordinary circumstances to excuse his failure to

exhaust, the Court will dismiss his Section 2241 petition without prejudice to

him refiling it if he fully exhausts his state-court remedies. See Callwood, 230

F.3d at 634 (vacating district court's order dismissing Section 2241 habeas

petition on the merits and remanding with instructions to the district court to

“dismiss for failure to exhaust [state] remedies without prejudice to

Callwood’s refiling his challenge under §2241 after exhaustion”); see □□□□

Lambert, 134 F.3d at 513 (“The exhaustion requirement does not foreclose

federal relief, but merely postpones it.”).

Although the Court will dismiss Stephens’s amended habeas petition

due to his failure to exhaust, the Court also notes that some district courts in

the Third Circuit will abstain from considering Section 2241 habeas petitions

-29 -

filed by petitioners with unresolved state criminal charges pursuant to

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971):

Where, as is the case here, state-court remedies are

unexhausted, “principles of federalism and comity require district

courts to abstain from enjoining pending state criminal

proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.” Younger v.

Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Moore, 515 F.2d at 447-48. Younger

abstention will apply when: “(1) there are ongoing state

proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state proceedings

implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings

afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claims.”

Lazardis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting

Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 408

(3d Cir. 2005)). If the three Younger requirements are satisfied,

abstention is required unless the petitioner demonstrates that the

state proceedings are motivated by bad faith, the state law being

challenged is patently unconstitutional, or there is no adequate

alternative state forum where the constitutional issues can be

raised. /d. at 670 n.4 (citing Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106

(3d Cir. 1989)). These exceptions are to be construed “very

narrowly” and invoked only in “extraordinary circumstances.” /d.;

Moore, 515 F.2d at 448[; sjJee also Brian R. Means,

POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES, §10.3 Westlaw (database

updated June 2021).

Arrington v. Commonwealth, No. 21-cv-1282, 2022 WL 317147, at *3 (W.D.

Pa. Jan. 13, 2022) (citing Pa. R. Crim. P. 576(4), (5)), report and

recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 314675 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2022).

If the Court analyzed whether to abstain from resolving this case under

Younger, abstaining would be appropriate. Initially, there is an ongoing

judicial proceeding insofar as there is a criminal prosecution in the Lycoming

County Court of Common Pleas. Granting habeas relief here would interfere

- 30 -

with those criminal proceedings. Additionally, the Commonweaith’s criminal

case against Stephens implicates important state interests because the

Commonwealth has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal laws. Finally,

as already explained, there is no indication that Stephens will not have the

opportunity to raise claims challenging his arrest, any searches, and any

evidence obtained by the Commonwealth in his criminal proceedings. See,

e.g., Pa. R. Crim. P. 578 (requiring that all requests for pretrial relief, such

as those seeking the “suppression of evidence” or “to quash or dismiss an

information,” to be “included in one omnibus motion”). Therefore, Stephens’s

claims relating to his state-court criminal proceedings aiso meet the

requirements for Younger abstention, despite his unpersuasive and

conclusory arguments that Younger is inapplicable in this case.

l. Certificate of Appealability

Because Stephens is a state pretrial detainee, the Court presumes that

he requires a certificate of appealability (“COA”) should he decide to appeal

from this decision. See 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that unless a

circuit justice or judge issues a COA, a petitioner may not appeal from “the

final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained

of arises out of process issued by a State court”); Reese v. Pennsylvania,

No. 19-cv-775, 2019 WL 5746276, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019) (concluding

-31-

that COA requirement applies to Section 2241 petitions filed by state pretrial

detainees); see also Harris v. Pike Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 20-cv-962, 2021

WL 880477, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2021) (declining to issue COA as part of

dismissal of state pretrial detainee’s Section 2241 petition). A COA may

issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a

constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c)(2). When deciding whether to issue

a COA after a dismissal on procedural grounds, the Court applies the

following standard:

[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural

grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional

claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least,

that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition

states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that

jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court

was correct in its procedural ruling. ... Where a plain procedural

bar is present and the district court is correct to invoke it to

dispose of the case, a reasonable jurist could not conclude either

that the district court erred in dismissing the petition or that the

petitioner should be allowed to proceed further. In such a

circumstance, no appeal would be warranted.

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

In this case, jurists of reason would not find the ultimate disposition of

this case debatable, e., that Stephens failed to exhaust his state-court

remedies as to any cognizable claims prior to filing his Section 2241 petition

here, and that he failed to present extraordinary circumstances to warrant

this Court considering the petition. See, e.g., Burley v. Superintendent Forest

- 32 -

SCI, No. 22-2719, 2023 WL 2560361, at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 3, 2023)

(unpublished) (denying COA because “reasonable jurists would not debate

the conclusion that there was no reason for the District Court to exercise

jurisdiction over Appellant’s current [Section 2241] habeas petition because

he failed to establish that (1) he exhausted his state-court remedies or (2)

his case presents ‘extraordinary circumstances.” (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d

at 443)). Accordingly, the Court will not issue a COA in this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, the Court will: (1) grant the IFP Application; (2)

deem withdrawn Stephens’s motions for a preliminary injunction and

mandamus relief; (3) deny his motions to stay, “Motion for Expedited

Mediation of Combined (Joined) Cases,” and motion for summary judgment;

(4) strike his purported notice of removal; (5) dismiss without prejudice his

amended Section 2241 petition; (6) decline to issue a certificate of

appealability; and (7) direct the Clerk of Court to close this case. An

appropriate Order follows.

United States District Judge

pate: 3AS/26

25-0337-01

- 33 -