McClanahan

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

WESTERN DIVISION

DARRELL LEON MCCLANAHAN, III, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 6:25-cv-03399-DGK

)

MISSOURI SECRETARY OF STATE )

DENNY HOSKINS, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

This is a § 1983 civil rights action. Pro se Plaintiff Darrell Leon McClanahan, III, alleges

violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and also of Article I, Section 2, Clause

2 (the “Qualifications Clause”) of the United States Constitution, arising from his desire to file as

a Republican candidate for United States Representative for Missouri’s 4th Congressional

District in the August 2026 Republican primary. Plaintiff brings claims against Defendants

Missouri Secretary of State Denny Hoskins (“Secretary Hoskins”), the Missouri Republican

State Committee (“the MRSC”), and MRSC Chairman Peter Kinder (“Kinder”). Plaintiff claims

Defendants will inevitably violate (1) his right to seek office, (2) his right to freedom of

association, (3) his right to due process, (4) his right to equal protection, and (5) the United

States Constitution’s Qualifications Clause, because the MRSC threatens to refuse to give

Plaintiff a receipt for paying his candidate filing fee, and so Secretary Hoskins will refuse to put

Plaintiff on the Republican primary ballot for Missouri’s 4th Congressional District.

Now before the Court are Defendant Secretary Hoskins’ motion to dismiss all claims,

ECF No. 7, and Defendants MRSC and Kinder’s motion to dismiss all claims, ECF No. 15. For

the reasons stated below, the motions are GRANTED.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief.” A claim may be dismissed if it

fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a

motion to dismiss, a court “must accept as true all of the complaint’s factual allegations and view

them in the light most favorable to” the plaintiff. Stodghill v. Wellston School Dist., 512 F.3d

472, 476 (8th Cir. 2008).

To avoid dismissal, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim

has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The plaintiff need not demonstrate the claim is probable, only that it

is more than just possible. Id. Rule 8 “does not require detailed factual allegations” to show

facial plausibility, “but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me

accusation.” Id. “Asking for plausible grounds to infer [a defendant’s liable conduct] . . . simply

calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence”

thereof. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

In reviewing the complaint, a court construes it liberally and draws all reasonable

inferences from the facts in the plaintiff’s favor. Monson v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 589 F.3d

952, 961 (8th Cir. 2009). A court generally ignores materials outside the pleadings but may

consider materials that are part of the public record or materials that are necessarily embraced by

the pleadings. Miller v. Toxicology Lab. Inc., 688 F.3d 928, 931 (8th Cir. 2012).

Finally, the Court is mindful that a pro se complaint must be liberally construed, Estelle

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and “pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard

than other parties,” Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 402 (2008). “However, this

standard does not excuse pro se complaints from alleging sufficient facts to support the claims

advanced.” Gerstner v. Sebig, LLC, 386 Fed. App’x 573, 575 (8th Cir. 2010) (modified, citation

omitted).

Background

Plaintiff is an active member of the Republican Party who has served as a delegate at the

Missouri Republican State Convention and has run for Missouri-state and national office on

multiple occasions. He is an eligible candidate for Missouri’s 4th Congressional District seat in

the U.S. House of Representatives and intends to file as a candidate for that seat.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.357 requires potential candidates for the U.S. House of

Representatives to pay a $300 filing fee to the treasurer of the party for which the potential

candidate intends to run. Plaintiff intends to pay this fee to the MRSC Treasurer for the August

2026 primary election.

Secretary Hoskins is responsible for the ministerial task of ballot certification under Mo.

Rev. Stat. §§ 115.357 and 115.387. Section 115.387 requires “the secretary of state to transmit

to each election authority a certified list containing the name and address of each person who has

filed a declaration of candidacy in the secretary’s office and is entitled to be voted for at the

primary election . . . .”

After paying the filing fee to the MRSC, Plaintiff must present a receipt showing

payment of the fee to Secretary Hoskins. Without the receipt, Secretary Hoskins cannot put

Plaintiff’s name on the primary ballot as a Republican nominee. Alternatively, Plaintiff could

file as an independent candidate with no filing fee, § 115.357.4, provided he meets minimum

petition-signature requirements, §§115.321.4, 115.327.

The MRSC only accepts filing fees from—and thus only issues receipts to—potential

candidates who show sufficient adherence to the party’s ideological standards. To gauge this

adherence, the MRSC gives potential candidates a “Values Survey” detailing a potential

candidate’s policy positions; requires signing a Republican Candidate Statement, which affirms

alignment with the Republican party platform; uses third-party political scorecards; and does

criminal background and ethics checks. Potential candidates who fail this battery of tests receive

a rejection letter and are thus prevented from being placed on the Republican primary ballot.

Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of § 115.357.2 as applied to him. In particular,

he alleges violation of the right to seek office and of freedom of association under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments (Count I), violation of due process (Count II) and equal protection

(Count III) under the Fourteenth Amendment, and violation of the Qualifications Clause, U.S.

Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (Count IV), against Defendants. Plaintiff seeks (1) a declaration that Mo.

Rev. Stat. § 115.357.2 as applied violates the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of Plaintiff

and voters and the Qualifications and Supremacy Clauses of the U.S. Constitution; (2) permanent

injunctions (a) compelling the MRSC to accept Plaintiff’s filing fee and issue him a receipt, (b)

compelling Secretary Hoskins to accept his candidacy upon receiving Plaintiff’s filing fee

receipt, and (c) enjoining Defendants from enforcing ideological vetting requirements and

criminal history in accepting candidates for office; and (3) attorneys’ fees and costs. Secretary

Hoskins moves to dismiss for insufficient service of process, sovereign immunity, lack of

ripeness, lack of standing, and failure to state a claim. The MRSC and Kinder move to dismiss

for insufficient service of process and failure to state a claim.

Discussion

The Court first addresses the grounds for dismissal unique to Secretary Hoskins’ motion.

The Court then turns to the ground for dismissal—failure to state a claim—common to all

Defendants.1

I. Plaintiff has standing and the case is ripe.

Secretary Hoskins argues Plaintiff lacks standing and that his claim is not ripe. Plaintiff

disagrees.

a. Standing

“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement

of Article III.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To establish standing, “[a]

party invoking federal jurisdiction must show a right to assert a claim in federal court by

showing injury in fact, causation, and redressability.” Missouri Roundtable for Life v. Carnahan,

676 F.3d 665, 672 (8th Cir. 2012). “To seek injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show that he is

under threat of suffering injury in fact that is concrete and particularized; the threat must be

actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it must be fairly traceable to the challenged

action of the defendant; and it must be likely that a favorable judicial decision will prevent or

1 All Defendants also move to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)5 for insufficient service of process. Plaintiff

appears to concede insufficient service of process but argues that cure of defective service rather than dismissal is

the proper remedy. ECF No. 8 at 1–2, ECF No. 17 at 1. Indeed, Plaintiff alleges he attempted to serve Defendants

again on February 24, 2026. ECF 11 at 1–2. While insufficient service of process may be grounds for dismissal, it

does not compel dismissal, especially when a plaintiff can cure improper service. Froland v. Yamaha Motor Co.,

296 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1006– 07 (D. Minn. 2003) (citations omitted). Ordinarily, “when service is improper, it is

within the district court’s discretion to either (1) dismiss the suit, or (2) retain the suit, quash service, and allow the

plaintiff to re-serve the defendant.” United States ex rel. Murrill v. Midwest CES, LLC, No. 4:21-CV-00371-DGK,

2023 WL 2815863, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2023) (citing Adams v. AlliedSignal Gen. Aviation Avionics, 74 F.3d

882, 886 (8th Cir. 1996). However, because the Court finds that Secretary Hoskins is immune to suit and that

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court, in the interest of judicial economy, will not

require Plaintiff to properly serve Defendants. See Lamb v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 4:11-CV-819 CAS, 2012 WL

87146, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 11, 2012) (for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, “consider[ing] defendants’

arguments regarding proper service waived because defendants also move to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims on their

merits”).

redress the injury.” Bernbeck v. Gale, 829 F.3d 643, 646 (8th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). The

elements of standing must be established “with the manner and degree of evidence required at

the successive stages of the litigation.” Bernbeck, 829 F.3d at 646 (citation omitted). Thus, “in

response to a motion to dismiss, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the

defendant’s conduct may suffice” to establish standing. City of Clarkson Valley v. Mineta, 495

F.3d 567, 569 (8th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). “[E]ven attenuated injuries are sufficient to

confer Article III standing at the motion-to-dismiss stage.” In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach

Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1161 (D. Minn. 2014) (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,

158 (1990)).

Secretary Hoskins argues Plaintiff lacks standing because, at the time he filed the

Complaint, he had not yet been denied a place on the Republican primary ballot and so has not

satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement.2 Alternatively, Secretary Hoskins argues Plaintiff could

run as an independent if he is denied a place on the Republican primary ballot and that Plaintiff’s

Complaint provides no plausible claim for relief because he provides no legal authority that

shows he has a right to be a candidate of the party of his choice. In response, Plaintiff invokes

his concrete and particularized interest in the rules that govern the election in which he seeks to

run, see Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 146 S.Ct. 513, 522–23 (2026), and his right to

bring a pre-enforcement challenge, see Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014).

2 The Court does not consider the alleged denial of Plaintiff’s filing fee on February 24, 2026, when considering

standing, because standing is determined at the time the complaint was filed, which was December 23, 2025. See

Inst. for Free Speech v. Ravnsborg, 416 F. Supp. 3d 894, 903 (D.S.D. 2019) (citing 13A Charles Alan Wright et al.,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531 (3d ed. Updated August 2019) (“Post-filing events that supply standing that

did not exist on filing may be disregarded, denying standing despite a showing of sufficient present injury caused by

the challenged acts and capable of judicial redress.”)).

Secretary Hoskins replies Plaintiff’s reliance on these cases is misplaced because they are

factually distinguishable.

The Court finds Plaintiff has satisfied the relatively low standard for establishing standing

at the motion-to-dismiss stage. “[A] potential candidate for public office has a legally protected

interest in becoming a candidate for public office sufficient to satisfy Article III,” Gralike v.

Cook, 996 F. Supp. 889, 895 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (citing Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 961–

62 (1982)). Plaintiff has plausibly pled the imminence of his alleged injury (even if it is

“attenuated”) with specificity, has tied that alleged injury to Secretary Hoskins through Mo. Rev.

Stat. § 115.357.2, and has plausibly alleged that an injunction would redress his injury.

b. Ripeness

Article III also limits federal jurisdiction to claims that are ripe, that is, “fit[] . . . for

judicial decision.” United States v. Gates, 915 F.3d 561, 563 (8th Cir. 2019). “Claims are not

ripe when they rest on ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may

not occur at all.’” Inst. for Free Speech v. Ravnsborg, 416 F. Supp. 3d 894, 902 (D.S.D. 2019)

(quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). “Ripeness often overlaps with the

injury-in-fact requirement of standing, particularly when plaintiffs challenge a statute that has yet

to be enforced against them.” Id. (citing Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 157

n.5 (2014)).

Secretary Hoskins’ ripeness argument is essentially the same as his standing argument,

that at the time Plaintiff filed the Complaint, he had not yet been denied a place on the

Republican primary ballot and so has not been injured. While “standing and ripeness are

technically different doctrines, they are closely related in that each focuses on whether the harm

asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention.” Johnson v. Missouri, 142

F.3d 1087, 1090 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, the Court also finds the case is ripe, even

though, at the time Plaintiff filed the Complaint, he had not yet been denied a place on the

Republican primary ballot. The specificity with which Plaintiff pled his imminent injury in the

election context and the nature of the relief sought make the case fit for judicial decision.

II. The case is not moot.

In response to an alleged attempt to file for the Republican primary on February 24,

2026, where the MRSC allegedly refused to accept his filing fee, Plaintiff filed a motion for a

temporary restraining order in which he sought, in general terms, to avoid missing the March 31,

2026, filing deadline due to the pendency of this litigation. He sought, among other things, a

court order enjoining the enforcement of § 115.357.2’s receipt requirement against Plaintiff or

ordering the MRSC to accept Plaintiff’s filing fee and issue a receipt. ECF No. 10. The Court

found Plaintiff failed to meet the demanding standard for a TRO—especially the irreparable-

harm and success-on-the-merits factors—and denied the motion. ECF No. 19.

The March 31, 2026, filing deadline has now passed, and though no Defendant raises the

issue of mootness, because mootness is jurisdictional, the Court must consider whether this case

is now moot. See Perficient, Inc. v. Munley, 973 F.3d 914, 916 (8th Cir. 2020) (“We must

consider the jurisdictional issue of mootness sua sponte.”). As the Eighth Circuit has observed,

“[f]ederal courts are not empowered to give opinions upon moot questions . . . . A narrow

exception to the mootness doctrine exists when a dispute is capable of repetition yet evades

review. A dispute is capable of repetition yet evades review when the challenged action is too

short in duration for timely review and a reasonable expectation exists that the complaining party

will be subject to the same action again.” Republican Party of Minn., Third Cong. Dist. v.

Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

The Court finds this case is not moot due to the continued effect of Missouri’s filing-fee

statute. Because of the repetitive nature of election cycles and the various deadlines that govern

them, which often, as here, do not align neatly with the timeframes of litigation, Plaintiff’s

alleged injuries are “capable of repetition yet evading review.” Indeed, “[e]lection issues are

among those most frequently saved from mootness by this exception.” Missourians for Fiscal

Accountability v. Klahr, 830 F.3d 789, 795 (8th Cir. 2016).

III. Secretary Hoskins is immune to suit under sovereign immunity.

Secretary Hoskins argues he is immune from suit due to sovereign immunity because his

role in registering candidates for elected office is only administrative or ministerial in

ascertaining whether a potential candidate has met the filing requirements of Mo. Rev. Stat.

§ 115.357.2. Plaintiff counters that Secretary Hoskins enforces the Republican Party’s “purity

test,” which sets “unconstitutional additional qualifications” for federal office, through Mo. Rev.

Stat. §§ 115.357 and 115.387.

“Generally, States are immune from suit under the terms of the Eleventh Amendment and

the doctrine of sovereign immunity.” Minnesota RFL Republican Farmer Lab. Caucus v.

Freeman, 33 F.4th 985, 989 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Under Ex parte Young, however,

“certain private parties [can] . . . seek judicial orders in federal court preventing state executive

officials from enforcing state laws that are contrary to federal law.” Whole Woman’s Health v.

Jackson, 595 U.S. 30, 39 (2021) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908)). That

means that, “at the motion to dismiss stage,” “sovereign immunity does not bar . . . suit against”

“an . . . official who may or must take enforcement actions against [parties] if they violate the

terms of [the challenged state law].” Id. at 45–46. However, “[t]he Ex parte Young exception

only applies against officials who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a

civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the

Federal Constitution.” Minnesota RFL Republican Farmer Lab. Caucus, 33 F.4th at 990.

But state officials who implement state statutes “in an administrative or ministerial sense

and . . . not [in a way] analogous to enforcing the statute[s] . . . through a civil or criminal

prosecution” are not proper Ex parte Young defendants. Balogh v. Lombardi, 816 F.3d 536, 546

(8th Cir. 2016); see also Bio Gen LLC v. Sanders, 142 F.4th 591, 605–06 (8th Cir. 2025)

(holding that Arkansas Attorney General was not a proper Ex parte Young defendant because his

statutory role of certifying to the legislature that certain provisions of a state law were being

enjoined so that other parts of the law would become effective was “a ministerial task relating to

the implementation of [the law]—not an act enforcing the law against noncompliant persons”).

When Ex parte Young does not apply, and a suit against a State official is therefore barred by

sovereign immunity, “that suit . . . must be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.” Seminole Tribe

of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).

Under Missouri law, “[t]he vast majority of the duties assumed by the Secretary of State

are ministerial. . . . This is especially true with regard to election related duties.” Vowell v.

Kander, 451 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014) (citing In re Impeachment of Moriarty, 902

S.W.2d. 273, 277 (Mo. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). “In fact, the Missouri

Supreme Court has intimated that the Secretary of State’s duty to certify a name for a ballot is

‘purely ministerial.’” Id. As such, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.387, which requires the Secretary of

State to “transmit to each election authority a certified list . . . of each person who has filed a

declaration of candidacy in the secretary’s office and is entitled to be voted for at the primary

election,” “simply requires [the Secretary of State] to certify that filers have timely filed their

declaration of candidacy with all the information required. In other words, it is a certification

that the declarant’s paper work is in proper order and was timely filed.” Id. at 275.

Secretary Hoskins’ role in administering Missouri’s elections for federal office is

ministerial, as the Complaint itself alleges. See ECF No. 1 at ¶ (“Defendant Hoskins is

responsible for the ministerial tasks of ballot certification under Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 115.357 and

115.387.”). His ministerial duty of receiving confirmation of filing fees and then sending a list

of names to election authorities is not a “threat[]” that Secretary Hoskins is “about to commence

proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature to enforce against” Plaintiff the challenged

candidate certification provisions. Minnesota RFL Republican Farmer Lab. Caucus, 33 F.4th at

990. Secretary Hoskins’ ministerial implementation of §§ 115.357.2 and 115.387 is not

“analogous to enforcing the statute[s] . . . through a civil or criminal prosecution.” Balogh, 816

F.3d at 546. Therefore, Secretary Hoskins is not a proper Ex parte Young defendant in this case

and is immune from suit under sovereign immunity. Id. Accordingly, the case against him must

be dismissed. Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 76.

IV. Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983.

“To establish a § 1983 claim, [Plaintiff] must . . . show that [he] ha[s] been deprived of a

constitutional right by a person acting under color of state law.” Sabri v. Whittier All., 833 F.3d

995, 999–1000 (8th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). All Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Secretary Hoskins argues Plaintiff

provides “[n]o . . . legal authority [that] impairs the operation of parties to set requirements,

standards, or to choose who will be its candidates,” and therefore there is no “legal basis that is

plausible” to support his claim. ECF No. 7 at 10. The MRSC and Kinder argue “Plaintiff

provides no legal authority . . . that he has a right to be a candidate for the party of his own

choosing apart from the party’s decision, standards, and requirements.” ECF No. 15 at 6–7.

Conversely, they argue “[t]he MRSC has a First Amendment right to freedom of association and

can choose with whom it wishes to associate or not associate.” Id. at 7. Plaintiff responds that

Defendants are impermissibly adding qualifications for federal office through the MRSC’s

candidate vetting process. ECF No. 17 at 4–6.

“Federal pleading rules call for ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2); they do not countenance dismissal of a

complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v.

City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014). Even so, Plaintiff must plausibly allege he has a

constitutional right of which he has been—or is about to be—deprived. In this case, the Court

“must . . . determine if the factual allegations pleaded in [Plaintiff’s] complaint are sufficient to

invoke a constitutional claim against [D]efendants,” Wells v. Walker, 852 F.2d 368, 371 (8th Cir.

1988), for administration of § 115.357.2 (Secretary Hoskins) and the Republican Party’s vetting

process (MRSC and Kinder).

Plaintiff fails to state a claim for multiple reasons. Plaintiff’s factual allegations fail to

invoke a constitutional claim to appear on the Republican primary ballot under either the First or

Fourteenth Amendment. They fail to show the MRSC’s internal candidate-vetting procedures

are state action. And they fail to show that MRSC’s vetting procedures add qualifications for

office within the meaning of U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2.

a. Plaintiff’s factual allegations fail to invoke a constitutional claim to appear

on the Republican primary ballot.

In “constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a State’s election laws . . . a court . .

. must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by

the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify

and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden

imposed by its rule.” Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 213–14 (1986)

(citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s argument founders at the very outset. At bottom, Plaintiff argues that his right

to appear on the Republican ballot in the Republican primary for Missouri’s 4th Congressional

District depends exclusively on his satisfaction of the age, citizenship, and inhabitancy

qualifications of U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. In other words, if Defendants refuse to place

Plaintiff on the Republican primary ballot for any reason other than the constitutional

qualifications, they violate his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights and the Qualifications

Clause. And insofar as Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.357.2 allows them to do so, the statute is

unconstitutional. But Plaintiff’s claim fails because he does not have a constitutional right to

appear on the Republican Party primary ballot.

Plaintiff’s claim rests on his contention that the Republican primary in Missouri’s 4th

Congressional District is “the dispositive election” for the seat because the District is

“overwhelmingly Republican.” ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 29, 30. But this is irrelevant to any right

Plaintiff might assert. An “individual” does not have a “constitutional right to have a ‘fair shot’

at winning the party’s nomination,” Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 205, or even to be a candidate for

a specific party at all, see Duke v. Massey, 87 F.3d 1226, 1234 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Undeniably,

[David] Duke has a First Amendment right to express his political beliefs free from state

discrimination no matter how repugnant his beliefs may be to others. It is equally clear,

however, that he does not have a First Amendment right to express his beliefs as a presidential

candidate for the Republican Party.” (citations omitted)). While “the First Amendment [provides

a] right to run for office,” McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 50 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring),

Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to run for office as a Republican in the Republican

primary without satisfying the Republican Party’s internal procedures for nominee selection.

Further, it is well established that political parties’ First Amendment right to association protects

their internal procedures for choosing nominees for office.

[T]he First Amendment protects the freedom to join together in furtherance of

common political beliefs, which necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify

the people who constitute the association, and to limit the association to those

people only. That is to say, a corollary of the right to associate is the right not to

associate. Freedom of association would prove an empty guarantee if associations

could not limit control over their decisions to those who share the interests and

persuasions that underlie the association’s being. In no area is the political

association’s right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its

nominee. That process often determines the party’s positions on the most

significant public policy issues of the day, and even when those positions are

predetermined it is the nominee who becomes the party’s ambassador to the

general electorate in winning it over to the party’s views.

California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574–75 (2000) (citations and quotation

marks omitted); see also Democratic Party of U. S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S.

107, 126 (1981) (holding Wisconsin could not enforce a statute forcing the Democratic Party to

seat delegates at its National Convention contrary to the party’s own rules); Tashjian, 479 U.S. at

224 (A party’s “determination . . . of the structure which best allows it to pursue its political

goals, is protected by the Constitution.”); Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm.,

489 U.S. 214, 223, 233 (1989) (holding California prohibition against party-endorsement of

primary candidates violates parties’ right of association, because it “prevents party governing

bodies from stating whether a candidate adheres to the tenets of the party”).

b. Even if Plaintiff had a right to be on the Republican primary ballot,

Plaintiff’s factual allegations fail to show the MRSC’s internal candidate-

vetting procedures are state action.

“Section 1983 provides a cause of action against ‘[e]very person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State’ deprives someone of a federal

constitutional or statutory right. As its text makes clear, this provision protects against acts

attributable to a State, not those of a private person.” Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194 (2024)

(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, emphasis added in the original). In § 1983 cases, “the conduct

allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [must] be fairly attributable to the State.”

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). “An act is not attributable to a State

unless it is traceable to the State’s power or authority. Private action—no matter how ‘official’ it

looks—lacks the necessary lineage.” Lindke, 601 U.S. at 198. To be attributable to the State, (1)

“the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State”;

and (2) the person depriving another of a right “must be a person who may fairly be said to be a

state actor,” due, for example, to concerted action with or aid from the State. Lugar, 457 U.S. at

937. “By contrast, when the challenged conduct entails functions and obligations in no way

dependent on state authority, state action does not exist.” Lindke, 601 U.S. at 198–99.

Plaintiff argues Secretary Hoskins’ enforcement of Mo. Rev. Stat. § 115.357.2 transforms

the MRSC’s vetting process for certifying candidates into state action so that it is actionable

under § 1983. Citing Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953), which declared the Jaybird

Democratic Association’s exclusion of black voters from its state-permitted “duplicat[e]”

primaries on account of their race, to be a violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, id. at 469,

Plaintiff argues the MRSC’s control over ballot access in the Republican primary election

constitutes “state action.” See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 127, 128.

Plaintiff’s argument fails. As the Supreme Court has clarified, Adams “held only that,

when a State prescribes an election process that . . . ‘enforces’ . . . [racial] discrimination[,] . . .

the parties’ discriminatory action becomes state action under the Fifteenth Amendment. [Adams

does] not stand for the proposition that party affairs are public affairs, free of First Amendment

protections.” California Democratic Party, 530 U.S. at 573. That is, when states allow political

parties to use the State election process to deny the right to vote to a class of people on account

of color or race, this allowance becomes state action and violates the Fifteenth Amendment.

Plaintiff’s claim is entirely different.

Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege that the MRSC vets candidates pursuant to “some

right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State,” Lugar, 457

U.S. at 937. Neither does he allege that the MRSC “has acted together with or has obtained

significant aid from state officials,” id., in conducting its vetting process. On the contrary, the

MRSC’s internal processes for determining which candidates will run for the Party’s nomination

are “in no way dependent on state authority.” Lindke, 601 U.S. at 198–99. As such, “state action

does not exist,” id. at 199, and Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Even construing the MRSC’s vetting activity as operating in virtue of the § 115.357.2

filing-fee statute, the statute itself cannot be invalidated on that basis. Cases invalidating ballot-

access requirements “have focused on the requirements themselves, and not on the manner in

which political actors function under those requirements.” Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. at 205.

Plaintiff only seeks relief with respect to § 115.357.2 in relation to the manner in which the

MRSC functions under its requirements. Plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to establish that

the MRSC’s actions in relation to § 115.367.2 can be fairly attributed to Missouri. Because the

MRSC’s “pursuit of its political goals,” Tashjian 479 U.S. at 224, through vetting the views of

its candidates cannot be attributed to the State of Missouri, there is no basis for granting him

relief under § 1983.

c. The MRSC’s vetting procedures are not additional qualifications for office

within the meaning of Art. I, § 2, cl. 2.

The Constitution sets exclusive age, citizenship, and habitation requirements for holding

office in the House of Representatives. U.S. Const. art I, § 2, cl. 2; see U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.

Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995). This does not mean, however, that states cannot regulate

ballot access in ways that fall short of either directly or indirectly adding qualifications for

holding office. See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 727 (1974) (upholding, over a Qualifications

Clause challenge, a one-year party “disaffiliation requirement” for potential independent

candidates to appear on the ballot); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (upholding a 5%

petition-signature requirement for candidates to appear on the ballot); Munro v. Socialist

Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (upholding 1% signature requirement).

Plaintiff does not challenge the Missouri statute requiring a filing fee, he challenges the

MRSC’s vetting process to assure nominees on the primary ballot espouse the political positions

the MRSC prefers. This is, indeed, “viewpoint discrimination,” as Plaintiff alleges, ECF No. 1 at

¶ 6, but it is permissible. Indeed, it is the nature of party politics. See, e.g., LaRouche v. Fowler,

152 F.3d 974, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is the sine qua non of a political party that it represent a

particular political viewpoint. And it is the purpose of a party convention to decide on that

viewpoint, in part by deciding which candidate will bear its standard.”).

Because the MRSC’s “pursuit of its political goals,” Tashjian 479 U.S. at 224, through

vetting the views of its candidates does not add qualifications for office within the meaning of

Art. I, § 2, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim that the MRSC’s vetting procedure

violates the Qualifications Clause.

For all of these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ motions are GRANTED, and all claims are

DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 27, 2026 /s/ Greg Kays

GREG KAYS, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT