Morgan

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

LEE MORGAN, : Civ. No. 3:23-CV-1635

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)

:

ECTV NETWORK, :

:

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

I. Introduction

Presently before the court is a motion for reconsideration filed by

the plaintiff, Lee Morgan.1 Morgan moves under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 602 for reconsideration of our Memorandum Opinion and

Order granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgement.3 For

the following reasons, we will deny the motion.

1 Doc. 80.

2 While we recognize that Morgan brings his motion pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60, given the plaintiff’s status, we

will also consider Morgan’s motion under Rule 59.

3

II. Background

Morgan filed the instant action on October 3, 2023, and filed an

amended complaint on July 22, 2024, which named the City of Scranton,

its mayor, Lackawanna County, and ECTV as defendants.4 In his

amended complaint, Morgan alleged that his show, “Voice of the People,”

which was aired on ECTV’s public access channel, was taken off the air

because his political views did not align with those of the County and City

defendants.5 Morgan asserted that ECTV was controlled by the City

and County, in part through funding and the board of directors.6 He

asserted his claims against the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

asserting violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.7

The County, the City, and Mayor Cognetti filed motions for

judgment on the pleadings, which were granted after Morgan failed to

oppose the motions.8 ECTV filed an answer to the amended complaint,

and after discovery concluded, filed a motion for summary judgment.9

4 Doc. 1.

5 Doc. 35 ¶¶ 11, 24-25, 34, 36-37.

6 ¶¶ 19-22.

7 Doc. 35.

8 Docs. 48-49, 55-56.

9 Docs. 46, 70.

2

We granted ECTV’s motion for summary judgment, finding that ECTV

was not a “state actor” for purposes of Section 1983, and thus, Morgan’s

claims against it failed as a matter of law.10

The plaintiff has now filed a motion to reconsider.11 Morgan’s

motion rehashes his arguments in opposition to the defendant’s motion,

and further, reargues that he should have been granted additional

discovery.12 After consideration, we will deny the motion.

III. Discussion

A. Motion to Reconsider Under Rule 59(e) – Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a court to “alter or

amend a judgment [.]”13 A motion to alter or amend the judgment under

Rule 59(e) is “a ‘device to relitigate the original issue’ decided by the

district court, and used to allege legal error.”14 Thus, the court may

alter a judgment if the moving party shows: “(1) an intervening change

in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was not

10 Docs. 77, 78.

11 Doc. 80.

12

13 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).

14 , 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting

, 853 F.2d 155, 158–59 (3d Cir. 1988)).

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available when the court granted the motion [ ]; or (3) the need to correct

a clear error of law or fact or to prevent manifest injustice.”15 While the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals has “never adopted strict or precise

definitions for ‘clear error of law or fact’ and ‘manifest injustice’” in this

context, it has “suggested that there is substantial, if not complete,

overlap between these two concepts” and that to succeed on such a

showing requires a movant to identify “a ‘direct, obvious, [or] observable

error’ . . . of at least some importance to the larger proceedings.”16

A 59(e) motion “is not to be used as a means to reargue matters

already argued and disposed of or as an attempt to relitigate a point of

disagreement between the Court and the litigant.” 17 Similarly,

“reconsideration motions may not be used to raise new arguments or

present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of

judgment.”18

15 , 176 F.3d 669,

677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).

16 ., 904 F.3d 298, 311–12 (3d Cir.

2018) (citation modified).

17 , 226 F. Supp. 2d 588, 606 (M.D. Pa.

2002).

18 ., No. 1:05-CV-1148, 2006 WL 529044, at *2 (M.D.

Pa. Mar. 3, 2006) (

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B. Motion to Reconsider Under Rule 60(b)(1) – Standard of Review

Rule 60(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “permits ‘a

party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his

case, under a limited set of circumstances.’”19 Those circumstances are

described in Rule 60(b)’s enumerated sub parts, and “[u]nder Rule

60(b)(1), a party may seek relief based on ‘mistake, inadvertence,

surprise, or excusable neglect.’”20 Legal error by a judge qualifies as

such a mistake.21

C. The Motion to Reconsider will be Denied.

Morgan’s motion to reconsider does not raise specific grounds for

reconsideration and instead reiterates much of his argument in

opposition to the defendant’s summary judgment motion. Additionally,

Morgan again asserts that he was improperly denied an extension of the

discovery deadlines and should have been permitted to serve additional

discovery on the defendant.

., 817 F. Supp. 538, 541 (M.D. Pa. 1993)).

19 , 596 U.S. 528, 533 (2022) (

, 545 U.S. 524, 528 (2005)).

20 .

21 . at 535.

5

We consider Rule 59(e) first. Morgan has not alleged new law or

that previously unavailable facts have emerged. Rather, his arguments

appear to be based on “the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or

to prevent manifest injustice.”22 Morgan asserts that the decision in

was limited to the

facts of that case and “is not meant to be applied to other matters.”23 But

Morgan misunderstands our reliance on . While the Supreme

Court decided that case on the facts before it, the analysis and reasoning

of the majority decision applies equally to this matter.

As we explained in our Memorandum Opinion, Morgan’s

allegations regarding government control of ECTV were insufficient to

show that ECTV was a state actor. Morgan alleged that ECTV received

funding from the City, but the fact that a government contracts with a

private actor does not transform that private actor into a state actor.24

22 , 176 F.3d at 677.

23 Doc. 80 at 4.

24 , 587 U.S. 802, 814 (2019); , No. 21-

CV-875, 2021 WL 5356804, at *4-5 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 17, 2021) (applying

and concluding that allegations that a private corporation

receives government funding is insufficient to establish it is a state actor

for purposes of Section 1983).

6

Morgan provided no evidence to establish that ECTV received

government funding, and further, that the funding permitted

government control of ECTV’s public access channel. Further, while

Morgan alleged in a conclusory fashion that ECTV was directed by

someone in the City or County government to remove his show, Morgan

conceded that he had no information that the City controlled ECTV.25

Accordingly, the analysis and reasoning of , as applied to the facts

before us in this case, led us to conclude that ECTV was not a state actor

for purposes of Section 1983.26 As such, Morgan has failed to show the

need to correct a clear error of law or fact.

Morgan also again asserts that he should have been permitted to

conduct additional discovery, and that he was disadvantaged as a

litigant because his request for an extension of time was denied.27 We

construe this as asserting a “manifest injustice” argument for

reconsideration. As we noted in our Memorandum Opinion, Morgan’s

request for an extension of the deadlines came just one day prior to the

25 Doc. 71-1 at 44.

26 Doc. 77.

27 Doc. 80 at 2, 5.

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close of fact discovery, the undersigned held a telephone conference

with Morgan and defense counsel three weeks prior. During this

conference, both parties indicated there were no outstanding discovery

issues, and Morgan did not request an extension of the discovery

deadlines at that time. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that our denial

of Morgan’s belated request for an extension of the deadlines was a

manifest injustice that prohibited him from conducting adequate

discovery in this case. We find this argument unavailing.

Finally, under Rule 60(b)(1), we consider if there has been a

showing of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.”28 As

discussed, “mistake” includes a judge’s error of law.29 This is a heavy

burden to carry.30 We conclude the analysis above suffices to show no

error of law was made here. For all these reasons, we will deny the

motion for reconsideration.

28 Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 60(b)(1).

29 596 U.S. at 534.

30 ., 379 F.2d 15, 17 (3d Cir. 1967).

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IV. Order

Having found that Morgan failed to identify grounds for

reconsideration under either Rule 59(e) or 60(b), we will DENY the

motion and decline to reopen the case.

So ordered this 25th day of March 2026.

Daryl F. Bloom

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

9