The opinion
J-S06041-26
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARVIN HILL :
:
Appellant : No. 172 WDA 2025
:
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 19, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0009072-2020
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARVIN HILL :
:
Appellant : No. 173 WDA 2025
:
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 19, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0007645-2023
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: May 26, 2026
Appellant, Marvin Hill, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County after a jury convicted him
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S06041-26
of Voluntary Manslaughter1 and Persons Not to Possess a Firearm.2 Sentenced
to a term of incarceration of 19-38 years’ incarceration, he raises issues
challenging both the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings, and he contends the prosecution suppressed exculpatory
video recordings of the events in question. We affirm.
The trial court opinion aptly summarizes the procedural history and
pertinent facts, as follows:
After a ten-day jury trial, the Defendant, Marvin Hill, [hereinafter,
“Hill”] was found guilty of Voluntary Manslaughter [] and Violation
of the Uniform Firearms Act: Person Not to Possess a Firearm[].
After the preparation of a Presentence Investigation Report, Hill
was sentenced on March 19, 2024, to serve a total period of
incarceration of 19-38 years.
A Post-Sentence Motion and a Supplemental Post-Sentence
Motion were filed. Both Motions were denied on November 19,
2024. After the reinstatement of Hill’s appellate rights, a timely
Notice of Appeal was filed on February 13, 2025.
Factual Summary
This case presents a true tragedy. On the evening of August 24,
2020, which was a hot, sunny day in the Spring Hill neighborhood
of the City of Pittsburgh, three men—Hill, Devon Thompson, and
Andre Crawford—decided to take the law into their own hands and
wantonly, but intentionally, discharge their unlawfully possessed
firearms within the [outdoor] confines of the Three Rivers Manor
housing complex.
Mr. Thompson, who pled guilty to Aggravated Assault, testified
that he was visiting with a couple of friends. One of them yelled
that “Smoke,” who he knew as Hill, had a gun and was chasing
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(a)(2).
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
-2-
J-S06041-26
people with it. He saw Hill running toward him with a rifle and he
fired his handgun toward Hill, wounding him.
Hill ducked into his apartment #132. Some minutes later, Hill
emerged from his apartment, armed with a rifle. He was
screaming obscenities and threatening to kill people and shoot up
the parking lot. Hill fired his rifle seven times in the direction of
apartment #127. This caused Andre Crawford, who pled guilty to
Voluntary Manslaughter, to return fire toward Hill. One of those
bullets traveled through the wall of apartment #128 2-C and hit
one-year-old Zykier Young in the head, killing him. ([N.T.
10/16/23 at 194-212; N.T. 11/01/23 at 327-342]).
Via the testimony of Detective Timothy Cole, the Commonwealth
presented video evidence from cameras owned and operated by
the city and cameras owned and operated by the housing
complex. (Exhibits 63-78). In time order on August 24, 2020,
the videos show the following:
at 4:52.17, Hill left his residence at #132 and
ascended a set of outdoor stairs, [] paused at the top
of the stairs, [] then ran back down the stairs, ducked
his head, and went into his apartment;
at 5:53.44, people in the neighborhood were reacting
to something, Hill was in the doorway of #132
arguing, [he] then left his apartment #132 with a rifle
in his hand, ran back up the outside stairs, then
descended backwards down the stairs [and,] [a]t the
bottom of the stairs, [] held the rifle in a “low ready
position”; and,
at 6:07.25, the door into #132 opened again and Hill
returned to his apartment. (N.T. 10/16/23 to
11/01/23, Vol III, pp. 614-629).
The video evidence was corroborated by ShotSpotter [(now,
Sound Thinking, Inc.)], which is a company that provides a gunfire
locator service. Per the [ShotSpotter] Report, there were three
different volleys of gunfire: 6:02.08 (5 gunshots); 6:07.35 (7
gunshots); and 6:07.46 (5 gunshots). According to the forensic
services manager from ShotSpotter, the location of the gunshots
can be skewed, but the time of the gunshots is 100% accurate.
(N.T. 10/16-11/01/23, Vol. III, pp. 608-615; 703-725). A .9 mm
-3-
J-S06041-26
copper jacket fragment (Exhibit 81) and seven (7) .9 mm shell
casings (Exhibits 95-107, 114-120) were found in front of Unit
#132. (N.T. 10/16-11/01/23, Vol. II, pp. 271-275, 392-410).
Hill was arrested on August 26, 2020, at 10:45 p.m. on other
charges. He was found hiding in a closet at 2116 Lappe Lane in
the City of Pittsburgh. He was transported to headquarters. (N.T.
10/16-11/01/23, Vol III, pp. 599-603).
Detective Leonard Duncan, who was the lead detective on the
shooting at Three Rivers Manor, was notified that [Hill] was in the
building and had been placed in an interview room. At
approximately 11:35 pm, Detective Leonard and his partner,
Detective Robert Shaw, entered the interview room. Initially, they
inquired about [] Hill’s injury, as they were aware that he had
been shot. Hill stated that he had a “through and through”
gunshot wound to his right hip, and he declined medical attention.
They then questioned him about the shooting incident on August
24, 2020, which was video/audio taped. (Exhibit 147). Hill
acknowledged possessing a rifle, with .9 mm bullets, which he
maintained was to protect himself because people were shooting
at him. Hill denied firing the rifle at any point that evening. He
also denied that he was the person firing a rifle on August 20 or
21, 2020. (N.T. 10/16-11/01/23, Vol III, pp. 657-665).
At Hill’s request, he was interviewed again on September 2, 2020.
At that time, he stated that during this incident, he was shot at
15-17 times by “Rel” (William Wolford). He continued to deny
that he fired the rifle, but stated that it had .22 bullets, not .9 mm
bullets. He also stated that he could obtain the rifle that he
possessed that night but ultimately was unable to do so. (N.T.
10/16-11/01/23, Vol IV, pp. 773-802).
On direct examination, Hill stated that in the early evening of
August 24, 2020, he was at his apartment #132 in the Three
Rivers Manor housing complex. He heard gunshots, which is not
uncommon in that area. He went outside and was shot in the right
hip. He went back into his apartment. He did not seek medical
treatment because he had violated the provisions of his house
arrest, and he did not want to go back to jail.
He [testified that he] called a jitney with the idea of leaving the
area. Instead, he went to a nearby laundry room and obtained a
rifle. He opened the front door to his apartment and yelled to
-4-
J-S06041-26
“Rel,” “Why are you shooting at me?” [Hill testified that] “Rel”
responded that it was because he “shot up Unc’s truck.” Hill
[testified that he] yelled back that he “didn’t do that.” He
[testified that he] emerged from his apartment a second time with
the rifle “in the ready position,” but he did not fire it. He [testified
that he] returned the rifle to the laundry room[] and [] left the
area [at] about 2:50 a.m. (N.T. 10/16-11/01/23, Vol. V, pp.
1043-1112).
Trial Court Opinion, 04/22/25, at 1-4.
Hill raises the following issues for this Court’s review:
I. Was the evidence insufficient to support the conviction of
Voluntary Manslaughter where the Commonwealth failed to
prove specific intent, that is, that the [Appellant], Marvin
Hill, specifically intended to cause the death of Andre
Crawford or the victim?
II. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction of
Voluntary Manslaughter because the Commonwealth failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hill’s conduct
was a direct and substantial factor in causing the death of
the victim?
III. Was the evidence insufficient to support the conviction of
Persons Not to Possess a Firearm where Mr. Hill proved by
a preponderance of the evidence each and every element of
the defense of necessity.
IV. Did the [trial] court abuse its discretion in admitting
evidence pursuant to Pa.R.E. 404(b) relating to incidents
that purportedly occurred on August 21 and 22, 2020,
insofar as it was not relevant or material to whether Mr. Hill
fired a gun on August 24, 2020, and if relevant, its probative
value was outweighed by its prejudicial impact.
V. Did the Commonwealth commit a Brady violation where the
Commonwealth failed to disclose the original videotape of
the scene to the defense in discovery or at any time during
trial, insofar as the tape would have shown that Mr. Hill did
not fire a gun, and would have established that the tape was
altered to exclude exculpatory footage?
-5-
J-S06041-26
Brief of Appellant, at 5.
In Mr. Hill’s first two issues, he assails his conviction for Voluntary
Manslaughter of the infant boy by arguing the Commonwealth proved neither
that he possessed the requisite specific intent to kill Andre Crawford or Devon
Thompson nor that he was a direct and substantial factor in causing the
infant’s inadvertent death by gunfire.3 We use the following standard of
____________________________________________
3 Mr. Hill also argues that jury acquittals on the charges of Aggravated Assault
and Attempted Murder are incompatible with, and invalidate, his verdict of
guilty for Voluntary Manslaughter, a charge that was prosecuted based on the
Commonwealth’s theory that he caused the infant’s death beyond a
reasonable doubt. He posits that if the jury found either that he did not fire
his gun at Crawford or that he lacked the specific intent to kill or inflict serious
bodily injury to Crawford—as he maintains must be inferred from the acquittal
verdicts—then one must conclude also that he could not have caused the
infant’s death.
Mr. Hill is mistaken. To the extent to which his verdicts are inconsistent, we
view them as simply a product of the jury’s lenity and, for that reason alone,
may reject Mr. Hill’s argument as meritless. Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court
made the following observation regarding inconsistent verdicts:
The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized that
inconsistent verdicts may be founded upon “mistake, compromise,
or lenity.” In order to ascertain the rationale underlying the
inconsistent verdict, a court would be forced to speculate about,
or probe into the jury's deliberations, an enterprise which courts
generally do not, and should not, undertake.
Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 335 A.3d 1047, 1059 (Pa. 2025) (quoting
United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65(1984)).
We turn, then, to address whether the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, proved that Hill’s actions
were taken with the specific intent to kill and were a direct and substantial
factor in causing the death of the infant, as was required to support a verdict
of guilty on the charge of Voluntary Manslaughter.
-6-
J-S06041-26
review when assessing sufficiency of the evidence challenges like those raised
here.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated[,] and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the [fact-finder,] while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2019).
The Commonwealth may prove the intent to kill through circumstantial
evidence alone. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 160 A.3d 127, 136 (Pa.
2017). The specific intent to kill may be inferred from the use of a deadly
weapon to inflict injury on a vital part of the body. See Commonwealth v.
Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 543 (Pa. Super. 2015).
Hill acknowledges that the jury received an appropriate instruction on
the charge of voluntary manslaughter. He posits, however, that evidence of
his specific intent to kill Crawford or Thompson was never introduced at trial.
His first argument to this effect, that he “never pointed his gun in the direction
-7-
J-S06041-26
of the building in which the [one-year-old] victim was struck with a bullet[,]”
Brief of Appellant at 30-31, is unavailing. Under the theories of transferred
intent and foreseeability, as discussed below, Hill’s specific intent to kill
Crawford with gunfire during a voluntary gunfight in a densely populated
housing community is transferred to the foreseeable death of the infant
neighbor struck by Crawford’s bullet fired in return.
Hill also argues that “no evidence was presented that [he] waved and/or
raised his gun towards anyone with the intent of killing them.” Brief of
Appellant at 31. He maintains, instead, that he only “pointed his rifle at a
building [Building 127] across the complex in order to scare off those who
posed a threat to him.” Id. He argues that his denial of firing his rifle was
supported by investigators’ failure to recover any .9 mm bullets or bullet
fragments near Building 127 or to detect any damage to the façade of Building
127 caused by bullet strikes from where Crawford and others were shooting
at him. Id. The jury rejected this defense.
At Hill’s trial, Commonwealth witness Andre Crawford testified that he
finished his 8-hour workday shift as a maintenance man and drove to Building
2129 Rhine Street, where he parked his vehicle and walked to Building 127
for the purpose of buying marijuana from someone named Marc. N.T. at 303.
The video played for the jury showed Crawford arriving at Building 127, and
he narrated from the witness box as his actions were depicted. Id. The video
showed him carrying an unlicensed gun, a Smithfield .45 caliber, “for
protection,” he testified. He saw several longtime friends, including Devon
-8-
J-S06041-26
Thompson, N.T. at 306, before he returned to his car and relocated it to a
parking space at the Building 132 and 126 area at about 5:38 p.m. N.T. at
312-313. Crawford testified that shortly afterward, Hill fired his rifle while
screaming from outside his residence at Building 132 towards Building 127,
and Crawford returned gunfire in what he believed was self-defense. N.T. at
315.
To support this testimony that Hill fired his rifle multiple times, the
Commonwealth admitted into evidence crime scene photographs of seven
spent .9 millimeter Luger RP shell casings recovered from the ground in front
of Hill’s Building 132, from where he allegedly fired his .9 mm rifle. (Cmwlth
Ex. 95-107). N.T. 400 to 410. Testifying to the recovery of these seven shell
casings was Pittsburgh Police Detective Joanna Osz, who was part of a unit
that arrived at the scene shortly after the gunfire exchange. Id.
Commonwealth witness Devon Thompson testified that he was at the
housing complex on the day in question when he overheard a “commotion,”
where people were screaming about Hill displaying a gun and chasing others.
N.T. at 195. Thompson, who lived at the complex for over 30 years and was
acquainted with Hill, said he went towards the commotion at Building 127 and
saw several younger men running. N.T. at 196-97. After checking on the
playground, Thompson ran near Building 126 to gain a vantage point of
Building 132 and 138, where Hill was screaming and yelling “I am going to kill
you mother fuckers,” or words to that effect if his quotation of Hill was not
precise, Thompson clarified. N.T. at 207.
-9-
J-S06041-26
Displayed for the jury during Thompson’s testimony was a video
recording of the events being recounted by Thompson, and he explained that
the video showed Buildings 126 and 127 Rhine Place, which are on higher
ground, and Building 132, where Hill resided, which is on lower ground. N.T.
at 208-209. Thompson testified that when he rounded the corner near 126
and 127, he saw “[Hill] running towards [him] with a rifle, running towards
127.” N.T. at 209-10. Thompson testified that his mindset at that moment
was to defend himself with his firearm if Hill raised the rifle and pointed it at
him. N.T. at 210. Six seconds later, the video shows Thompson firing at Hill.
Thompson fired “about four or five shots.” N.T. at 242. Thompson testified
that he fired because Hill raised the rifle while backing up and looked like he
was preparing to fire at people in front of Building 127. N.T. at 210, 239.
Thompson admitted on cross-examination that the video shows Hill
descending the steps when aiming his rifle at Building 127, but he repeated
that, “It is on the camera. He [Hill] lifted the gun up towards and he was
displaying towards 127 and that’s when I made a foolish decision [to fire at
him.]” The video shows that Thompson ran away immediately afterward. N.T.
at 212. Thompson admitted he did not see Hill fire the rifle at that time, N.T.
at 240, but he explained his mindset was “[i]f I gave him time to fire a weapon,
what could have happened?” N.T. at 240. He emphasized that he saw others
running away from Hill as Hill approached them while holding a rifle and
screaming threats. N.T. at 248-249, 257. “I got family and friends that live
- 10 -
J-S06041-26
in 127, so it was – my intention was to stop him from harming them.” N.T.
at 251.
The jury accepted Thompson’s and Crawford’s account of Hill’s conduct,
even after learning they had entered a plea deal conditioned on their providing
testimony at Hill’s criminal trial that would be consistent with their post-arrest
statements to police investigators.4 Thus, the jury received sufficient evidence
to conclude that Hill unjustifiably perpetuated a gun fight by shooting at an
armed Crawford with the intent to kill him, such that the transferred intent
applicable to the death of the infant in this case was, appropriately, the specific
intent to kill.
Next, Mr. Hill challenges the sufficiency of evidence that he caused the
infant’s death, as he disputes that he was “a direct and substantial factor in
causing the death” of the baby under the facts. Because a death can have
multiple direct causes, our jurisprudence recognizes that a defendant may be
deemed “a direct and substantial factor in producing the death” of a victim
even if other direct causes contributed. Commonwealth v. Nunn, 947 A.2d
756, 760 (Pa. Super. 2008); Commonwealth v. Rementer, 598 A.2d 1300,
1305–07 (Pa. Super. 1991).
____________________________________________
4 Crawford was charged with aggravated assault for shooting at Hill. N.T. at
295. He acknowledged that he was offered the opportunity to plead guilty to
Voluntary Manslaughter and Person Not to Possess, with the Aggravated
Assault charge dropped, in exchange for testifying against Marvin Hill, but with
no promises on sentencing, making a 27-year aggregate sentence still a
possibility. Id.
- 11 -
J-S06041-26
Hill’s first causation argument states that the Commonwealth failed to
establish that his actions were an antecedent, but for which the death of the
victim would not have occurred. Brief of Appellant at 38. The basis of this
argument is twofold.
First, he relies, again, on a meritless position that evidence was
insufficient to prove he fired gunshots and engaged in the gunfight in question.
Brief for Appellant at 34-35. This position is at odds with both testimonial
evidence and physical evidence that he fired his rifle multiple times during a
gunfight with Crawford and Thompson, who testified that Hill was a willing
participant and an aggressor in the gunfight.
Second, he maintains the Commonwealth failed to establish that the
victim’s death was a natural or foreseeable consequence of his conduct. We
disagree. Hill rejects Crawford’s and Thompson’s testimonies as “corrupt” and
notes that “Crawford acknowledged that he had three years to get his story
together.” Brief of at 35. Hill contends, “Crawford fired the bullet that killed
the victim[,] he was facing a general charge of Criminal Homicide and
Aggravated Assault[, and] had a strong motive for fabricating his story insofar
as he was offered a deal in exchange for testifying against Hill. Brief of
Appellant, at 35-36.
The jury was made aware of the charging and sentencing arrangements
between the Commonwealth and witnesses Crawford and Thompson, it
received their testimonies, and it reviewed the security video evidence
depicting the actions of those involved in the gunfight. In its deliberations,
- 12 -
J-S06041-26
the jury elected to credit their testimonies that Hill fired his rifle at them
without necessity or justification. Additionally, Officer Osz’s testimony that
she collected from the grounds in front of Hill’s residence seven spent .9 mm
shell casings that ballistics analysis determined matched Hill’s .9 mm rifle,
further undermined the defense position that evidence of Hill’s participation in
the gunfire was lacking.
Accordingly, we discern no merit to Hill’s claim that the Commonwealth
failed to present sufficient evidence that he voluntarily engaged in a gun fight
with two armed men and fired his rifle multiple times within a multi-family
residential housing complex. Under these facts, the jury reasonably concluded
that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Hill was a
direct and substantial cause of one-year-old Zykier Young’s death by gunfire.
In Hill’s next issue, he posits that the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence relating to his purported illegal and destructive use of a
gun on two occasions just days before the August 24th fatal shooting.
Specifically, he contends that the evidence violated Rule of Evidence 404(b),
prohibiting evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, and that it did not
qualify as an exception to the rule. Because such prior bad act evidence was
neither relevant to whether he provoked the fatal shooting in question nor
sufficiently probative to outweigh the prejudicial impact it had, he argues, its
admission in his trial constituted reversible error.
The Commonwealth argues that evidence of the truck shooting two days
earlier, wherein Hill was believed to be responsible for shooting the truck of
- 13 -
J-S06041-26
Crawford’s uncle who was running a dice game in which Hill did poorly, was
relevant and highly probative to understanding both the res gestae of the
subject feud and Crawford’s and Thompson’s states of mind upon seeing Hill
bearing a rifle while issuing threats of violence, as Hill had shown himself
capable of engaging in destructive gunfire when angry.
We review a trial court's decision to admit certain evidence according to
the following standard:
[T]he admissibility of evidence is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only where there
is a clear abuse of discretion. Our standard of review of a
challenge to an evidentiary ruling is therefore limited. Abuse of
discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but rather where
the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not
applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 273 A.3d 13, 19 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation
omitted).
Under Rule 404(b)(1), “[e]vidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is
not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1). The evidence may, however, “be admissible for another
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Pa.R.E.
404(b)(2). “Other acts evidence is admissible under the res gestae exception
where it formed a part of a chain, or was one of a sequence of acts, or became
part of the history of the event on trial, or was part of the natural development
- 14 -
J-S06041-26
of the facts.” Commonwealth v. Carter, 320 A.3d 140, 149 (Pa. Super.
2024).
Thus, under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior bad acts “is not admissible
for the sole purpose of demonstrating a criminal defendant's propensity to
commit crimes” but “may be admissible in certain circumstances where it is
relevant for some other legitimate purpose and not utilized solely to blacken
the defendant's character.” Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 358
(Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc) (citations omitted). Evidence may be admitted
under Rule 404(b)(2) only “if the probative value of the evidence outweighs
its potential for unfair prejudice.” Id. (quoting Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2)).
The trial court aptly summarizes the testimony at trial relevant to this
issue:
In the early morning hours of August 20th, [Appellant Hill] was
involved in a dice game in the neighborhood with Jacob
Hornbuckle (known as “Unc”), who is Devon Thompson’s uncle.
“Unc” and [Hill] got into a heated argument regarding the dice
game. Mr. Thompson saw [] as he was leaving the dice game.
After [Hill] left the dice game/argument, ShotSpotter reported
gunshots at 4:44 a.m. When the police arrived, they recovered
13 spent .9 mm shell casings. The next night, the police
investigated another report of gunfire, and they discovered a
vehicle, belonging to “Unc,” with three bullet holes and a flat tire.
They recovered 29 spent shell casings near the scene. (N.T.
10/16-11/01/23, Vol I, pp. 97-102, 122-136, 200-201; Vol III,
pp. 522-528, 529-532, 536-540) (Exhibits 33-61, 85, 86, 87, 114-
120).
First, there was no testimony directly linking [Hill] to the shootings
that occurred on the 20th and 21st; however, the circumstantial
evidence demonstrated that the 9 shell casings recovered on the
20th and 12 of the shell casings recovered on the 21st matched the
.9 mm shell casings recovered on the night of the homicide in the
- 15 -
J-S06041-26
location where [Hill] was shooting his rifle. (N.T. 10/16-11/01/23,
Vol III, pp. 522-528, 529-532, 536-540) (Exhibits 33-61, 85, 86,
87, 114-120).
Second Mr. Thompson testified that he believed that it was [Hill]
who “shot up” his uncle’s truck. The [trial court] interrupted Mr.
Thompson’s testimony to give the jury this cautionary instruction:
This testimony that Mr. Thompson believed that Mr.
Hill shot his uncle’s truck, you are not to consider that
for whether it is true that Mr. Hill shot Mr. Thompson’s
uncle’s truck. It is being admitted into evidence for
you to consider the effect that it had on Mr.
Thompson’s state of mind. So, it is not evidence that
Mr. Hill actually shot the truck. It is only evidence of
Mr. Thompson’s state of mind. (N.T. 10/16-11/01/23,
Vol I, p. 217).
In order for the jury to understand why Mr. Thompson fired his
handgun at [Hill] on the 24th, they had to hear his testimony about
wanting to avenge the damage to his uncle’s truck, which he
believed was caused by [Hill] two days prior to the night of the
homicide.
Trial Court Opinion at 7-8.
The admission of evidence of episodes of gunfire on the 20th and 21st
for the limited purpose of understanding Mr. Thompson’s state of mind on the
24th when he encountered an armed Mr. Hill between Buildings 132 and 127
was appropriate. The jury instruction accompanying the admission of such
evidence clearly explained its limited purpose and thus enabled the jury to
view such evidence only as part of the recent history between the men leading
up to the gunfight in question. As such, we agree that the Commonwealth’s
evidence was properly admitted under a res gestae exception to Rule 404(b).
In Mr. Hill’s next issue, he asserts that trial evidence established his
affirmative defense of necessity with respect to the charge of his unlawfully
- 16 -
J-S06041-26
possessing a firearm under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105, Persons Not to Possess a
Firearm. On this point, he disputes neither that he possessed a firearm on
the 24th nor that he was legally prohibited from possessing a firearm. See
Brief of Appellant, at 51. He argues, instead, that he believed resorting to his
rifle was necessary and justifiable given the threat of serious harm posed by
Crawford and Thompson, who attacked him with gunfire that included one
bullet grazing his hip and causing a minor wound while he had been standing
outside of his home. Id; N.T. at 801. Such evidence, he maintains, supported
his actions of retrieving his rifle and returning outside in what he describes as
an act of self-defense and, thus, negated the intent element necessary to
convict him of unlawful possession.
The Commonwealth agrees that Hill was under fire by Crawford and
Thompson, but it argues that Hill unnecessarily forwent the opportunity to
adopt a self-defense posture by taking shelter inside his residence with the
rifle and placing a 9-1-1 emergency phone call for police intervention.
Instead, he chose to emerge from his residence with a loaded rifle and take
matters into his own hands by engaging the two armed men in a gun fight in
a closely quartered residential neighborhood.
The defense of justification can apply to a Section 6105 charge where
the defendant's possession of a firearm occurred during an act of self-defense.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miklos, 159 A.3d 962, 968-69 (Pa. Super.
2017). However, the defendant must offer evidence to show (1) that he was
faced with a clear and imminent harm, not one which is debatable or
- 17 -
J-S06041-26
speculative; (2) that he could reasonably expect that his actions would be
effective in avoiding this greater harm; (3) that there is no legal alternative
which will be effective in abating the harm; and (4) that the Legislature has
not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding
the values at issue. Commonwealth v. Billings, 793 A.2d. 914, 916 (Pa.
Super. 2002); Commonwealth v. Wright, (non-precedential decision) No.
2841 EDA 2024, 2026 WL 687565, at *5–6 (Pa. Super. filed Mar. 11, 2026).5
In the case sub judice, the trial court opines that Mr. Hill failed to show
there was no legal alternative which would have been effective in abating the
harm:
Although [Hill] has arguably proven the first element as the
evidence demonstrated that Devon Thompson was shooting at
him, he has failed to prove that he did not have other legal
alternatives such as, calling the police, having someone else call
the police, staying inside his residence, or leaving the area. These
were all viable options. Instead, [Hill] made a conscious choice to
go to a nearby laundry room, retrieve a high-caliber rifle, exit the
building, and randomly shoot several times toward a neighboring
building, even though he knew that the building was occupied,
and he could injure an innocent bystander.
Trial Court Opinion, at pp. 6-7. We agree that the facts adduced at trial failed
to support the defense position that he could not have abated the harm either
by adopting one of the legal alternatives identified by the trial court or by
taking the rifle from the building’s laundry room and arming himself in a self-
____________________________________________
5 Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, we may cite
nonprecedential memorandum decisions of this Court that were filed after
May 1, 2019, for their “persuasive value.” Pa.R.A.P. 126(b)(1)-(2).
- 18 -
J-S06041-26
defense posture inside his apartment while placing an emergency phone call
requesting a police presence. Therefore, this issue affords him no relief.
In Mr. Hill’s final issue, he argues that the Commonwealth committed a
Brady6 violation when it did not provide the defense with what he contends
was an exculpatory original video recording from the camera covering the
front of Building 132. In Brady, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused...violates due process
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment....” Id., 373
U.S. at 87. To prove a Brady violation, a criminal defendant must
demonstrate the following:
(1) the prosecutor has suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence,
whether exculpatory or impeaching, is helpful to the defendant,
and (3) the suppression prejudiced the defendant. Prejudice is
demonstrated where the evidence suppressed is material to guilt
or innocence.
Commonwealth v. Koehler, 36 A.3d at 133 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).
Importantly,
favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results
from its suppression by the government, if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.
Id. (citation omitted).
____________________________________________
6 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963).
- 19 -
J-S06041-26
According to Hill, he relies on “common sense” to conclude the
Commonwealth unlawfully modified and therefore suppressed the original
security video recording because it “would have: 1) impeached Crawford’s
incriminating testimony that he saw Mr. Hill fire a gun at 127; 2) shown that
Mr. Hill did not exit Building 132 at 6:07:35, was not holding a gun at or after
that time, and did not fire a gun at or after that time on August 24, 2020;
and, 3) revealed that the shell casings found near building 132 were there
prior to the [sic] when the shooting started on August 24, 2020.” Brief of
Appellant at 55.
Specifically, Mr. Hill speculates that “the original videotape was altered,
and the doctored copy was provided to him and presented to the jury.” Brief
of Appellant at 56. Segments were added, he claims, to show someone
standing in the doorway of [Building] 132 at a particular time stamp to suggest
Mr. Hill occupied the spot from where gunfire emanated, and at other
moments, he continues, the recording was redacted to remove portions that
would have clearly shown he was not firing a gun in front of 132 at the relevant
time “as the Commonwealth alleged.” Id. at 56. He concludes, “There is a
reasonable probability that if the original footage had been disclosed, the
result of trial would have been different.” Id. at 57.
The Commonwealth responds that this issue is wholly frivolous and
unsupported by the record, as the Commonwealth never possessed or deleted
the surveillance video recording that Hill believes existed. It refers this Court
to the testimony of Detective Cole of the Pittsburgh Police Department, who
- 20 -
J-S06041-26
explained that he retrieved and downloaded all relevant crime scene video
recorded by the camera system operating at Three Rivers Manor and furnished
it to the department detectives and the District Attorney’s Office. N.T., Vol I,
at pp. 157-58, 160. Any gaps in the recordings, in Detective Cole’s opinion,
were attributable to the poor quality of the recording system. N.T. at 165.
On this issue, the trial court observes,
[Mr. Hill] bases this tampering claim on his belief that “logic and
reason” do not support the fact that the video evidence, which is
extensive, fails to show him firing the rifle. While it would have
been very helpful to the Commonwealth if there was a video
showing [Hill] either firing or not firing his rifle, the fact that such
a video does not exist does not lead to the conclusion that the
Commonwealth altered the video evidence. Such a conclusion is
quite a stretch. Rather, the testimony from Sergeant Timothy
Cole, of the Computer Crime Unit, that the video cameras installed
by the city are “poorly made” and they often have “blips” and
blackouts caused by birds, wind, leaves, etc. is a much more likely
explanation for the missing video segment. Sergeant Cole further
explained the “skips” in the videos, when he testified “it could be
a multitude of different reasons; it could be power fluctuations, it
could be overloading the system . . . it could be a wi-fi drop.”
(N.T. 10/16-11/01/23 , Vol II, pp. 160-64, 180, 645-646).
TCO at 9.
Mr. Hill’s argument consists of unsubstantiated claims that the original
video would have depicted his justifiable conduct, but the deliberate and illegal
redactions and alterations performed by the Commonwealth to inculpate him
resulted in the adulterated video shown to the jury. He has not, however,
proven the suppression and alteration of such evidence as he must do to
prevail on his Brady claim. Though he communicated these claims through
questions asked during examinations and cross-examination of witnesses, the
- 21 -
J-S06041-26
jury accepted the testimony of Commonwealth witnesses who accused Hill of
firing his rifle at Crawford and Thompson during the exchange of gunfire that
resulted in the death of one-year-old Zykier Young. As such, this claim fails.
Judgment of sentence is Affirmed.
5/26/2026
- 22 -