Kim v. United States

In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 26-157

Filed: May 21, 2026

SOPHIRIAN KIM,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

Sophirian Kim, Rancho Cucamonga, CA, Pro Se Plaintiff.

L. Steven Schifano, Trial Attorney, Jason Bergmann, Assistant Director, Joshua Wu, Deputy

Assistant Attorney General, Tax Litigation Branch, Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney General,

Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TAPP, Judge.

In February 1848, as the Mexican War drew to a close, Mexico and the United States

signed a treaty that transferred a vast stretch of the southwest, including the future state of

California, to the United States. CAL. DEP’T OF PARKS & REC., California Admission Day

September 9, 1850, https://www.parks.ca.gov/?page_id=23856 [https://perma.cc/7A9F-N5PE ]

(last visited May 20, 2026). Days before that treaty was finalized, gold was discovered along the

American River near Sacramento, and the frenzy that followed propelled California toward rapid

settlement and an urgent push for statehood. Id. California entered the Union as a free state,

becoming the nation’s thirty-first on September 9, 1850. Id. Eighteen years later, the Fourteenth

Amendment was ratified, providing that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein

they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added). Although the historical backdrop

is straightforward, it underscores a central point: California has been a state of the Union for

more than 175 years, and the Fourteenth Amendment leaves no room for a separate, non-federal

“Californian” citizenship. Although it is unclear whether Plaintiff challenges California’s

statehood or the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment, she asserts that she is a citizen of

California but not of the United States. That assertion is legally untenable, as the former cannot

be true without the latter. Because her claim rests entirely on this erroneous premise, and because

federal rights and responsibilities—including tax obligations—apply to all United States citizens,

her Complaint must be DISMISSED.

Plaintiff, Sophirian Kim (“Ms. Kim”), seeks a tax refund of $152,871 for tax year 2020.

(Compl., ECF No. 1). While her Complaint contains minimal factual allegations, she supports

her claim with an Amended Tax Return (“Form 1040X”) for tax year 2020 and a two-page

“Casework and Privacy Authorization Form” submitted to a congressional office

(“Congressional Casework Form”). 1 (Compl. Ex., ECF No. 1-2). 2 The Form 1040X reverses all

income and deductions previously reported for 2020 and asserts that Ms. Kim had “no trade or

income from U.S. sources” because she has “never been a U.S. citizen, always a Citizen of

California, or simply a Californian.” (Compl. Ex. Form 1040X at 2). Her Congressional

Casework Form expounds on these assertions:

(Compl. Ex. Casework Form at 2).

1

For purposes of the Motion, the Court assumes the authenticity of these documents and that the

Form 1040X was filed with the IRS.

2

In lieu of traditional pagination, Ms. Kim designates the four pages attached to her Complaint

as separate exhibits, though they appear in a single CM/ECF entry. The first two pages—labeled

Exhibits A and B—contain her Form 1040X, and the remaining two pages—Exhibits C and D—

are excerpts from her Congressional Casework Form. For clarity, the Court refers to these

materials collectively as one exhibit, (“Compl. Ex.”), and cites them by document name (“Form

1040X;” “Casework Form”) and page number.

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The United States seeks dismissal of Ms. Kim’s Complaint on the ground that her

asserted exemption from federal income tax, premised on her claimed status as a “citizen of

California” rather than a citizen of the United States, is legally frivolous. (Def.’s Mot., ECF No.

5). In response, Ms. Kim emphasizes her pro se status and argues that, at this early stage, her

burden is only to plead a plausible claim. (Pl.’s Resp., ECF No. 10). Although plausibility is the

governing standard, a claim grounded in a legally frivolous theory cannot meet it. Because Ms.

Kim’s asserted basis for a refund rests on a misunderstanding of the law, her claim is not

plausible.

When considering dismissal under RCFC 12(b)(6), the Court “must presume that the

facts are as alleged in the complaint, and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

Cary v. United States, 552 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing Gould, Inc. v. United States,

935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). It is well-settled that a complaint should be dismissed

“when the facts asserted by the claimant do not entitle him to a legal remedy.” Lindsay v. United

States, 295 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2002). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] a

context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Id. at 679. This requires “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has

acted unlawfully,” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to

state a claim, the Court “primarily consider[s] the allegations in the complaint,” but is not limited

to the pleading’s four corners and may also look to the “matters incorporated by reference or

integral to the claim[.]” Dimare Fresh, Inc. v. United States, 808 F.3d 1301, 1306 (Fed. Cir.

2015) (citations omitted); see also Terry v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 645, 652 (2012) (the court

may consider the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint,

public records of which the court may take judicial notice, and documents appended to the

motion to dismiss that are central to plaintiff’s complaint).

The Court is mindful that a pro se plaintiff like Ms. Kim may lack the formal expertise to

frame legal issues with the exacting precision of an attorney. See Roche v. U.S. Postal Serv., 828

F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Although pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards

than those drafted by attorneys, they must still satisfy the basic pleading requirements and must

present a cognizable legal theory. Henke v. United States, 60 F.3d 795, 799 (Fed. Cir. 1995);

Stephanatos v. United States, 306 F. App’x 560, 564 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (stating that arguments

should be “fleshed out.”). The Court may not supply missing legal elements or rewrite a

complaint to create a claim where none exists. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.

1991) (the Court cannot “assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant.”). Moreover,

“frivolous” legal theories—those foreclosed by the Constitution, statute, or binding precedent—

cannot survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“[A]

finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the

irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to

contradict them.”); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (holding that a pleading is

frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, and recognizing that Rule 12(b)(6)

allows dismissal when claims are based on “an outlandish legal theory or on a close but

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ultimately unavailing one.”); In re Cashion Fam. Tr., 669 B.R. 341, 384 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2025)

(holding that pleadings and allegations are frivolous when they are baseless and made without a

reasonable and competent inquiry).

The United States argues that Ms. Kim’s refund claim fails as a matter of law because it

rests entirely on the assertion that she is not a citizen of the United States and therefore not

subject to federal income tax. (Def.’s Mot. at 3). According to the United States, this theory has

been uniformly rejected by federal courts for decades. (Id. at 4); see Rev. Rul. 2007-22, 2007-1

C.B. 866, 2007 WL 777485 (2007) (citing United States v. Hilgeford, 7 F.3d 1340, 1342 (7th

Cir. 1993) (“The Defendant in this case apparently holds a sincere belief that he is a citizen of

the mythical ‘Indiana State Republic’ and for that reason is an alien beyond the jurisdictional

reach of federal courts. This belief is, of course, incorrect.”); United States v. Gerads, 999 F.2d

1255, 1256 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[We] reject appellants’ contention that they are not citizens of the

United States, but rather ‘Free Citizens of the Republic of Minnesota’ and, consequently, not

subject to taxation.”); O’Driscoll v. I.R.S., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9829, *5–6 (E.D. Pa. July 16,

1991) (“Despite Plaintiff’s linguistic gymnastics, he is a citizen of both the United States and

Pennsylvania, and liable for federal taxes.”)). The United States also relies on the Fourteenth

Amendment and emphasizes that courts have repeatedly held that individuals cannot avoid

federal taxation by claiming citizenship solely in a particular state. (See Def.’s Mot. at 4

(citations omitted)). Because Ms. Kim’s refund request depends entirely on this theory, the

United States contends that the Complaint fails to state a claim and should be dismissed with

prejudice. (Id.). The Court agrees.

Ms. Kim explains that she lacks legal training but maintains that she has presented the

“truth of what occurred” and stated her claim “in plain English.” (Pl.’s Resp. at 1). She asserts

that it is enough to claim that the United States is in possession of her “property/money” and

refuses to return it; she further emphasizes that she corrected her citizenship status with the

Social Security Administration before filing her Form 1040X. (Id. at 1). Ms. Kim characterizes

her claim as “straightforward,” contends that her exhibits demonstrate its plausibility, and argues

that she has met the low threshold required at this stage of the litigation. (Id. at 1–2). She

therefore asks the Court to deny the United States’ Motion or, alternatively, to grant her leave to

amend. (Id. at 2).

Even affording Ms. Kim’s pro se filings the liberal construction they are due, the Court

cannot accept a legal theory that is foreclosed by the Constitution and binding precedent. The

Fourteenth Amendment establishes that a person born in California is a citizen of both California

and the United States. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This Court has consistently rejected the

argument that state citizenship alone exempts an individual from federal taxation. Walby v.

United States, 144 Fed. Cl. 1, 10 (2019), aff’d, 957 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2020); Brown v. United

States, 35 Fed. Cl. 258, 268 (1996), aff’d, 105 F.3d 621 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Ms. Kim’s position

cannot be reconciled with the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, by

asserting that she is a “Californian” by birth, Ms. Kim necessarily accepts that she is also a

citizen of the United States; she must abide by the responsibilities that accompany that status.

Simply stated, individuals born in a state of the Union are subject to federal income tax

regardless of how they choose to characterize their citizenship. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1(c) (defining

citizen for tax purposes); Bruyea v. United States, 174 Fed. Cl. 238, 240 (2024) (citing Kappus v.

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Comm’r, 337 F.3d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“All American citizens are subject to U.S. taxes,

regardless of where they live or earn their income. Citizens living and working abroad must

therefore report their foreign-source income to the Internal Revenue Service.”)); Lonsdale v.

United States, 919 F.2d 1440, 1448 (10th Cir. 1990) (rejecting argument that individual who is a

citizen of a state is not a person under Internal Revenue Code as “completely lacking in legal

merit and patently frivolous”).

Ms. Kim’s filings do not identify any alternative legal basis for a refund. Her assertion

that the government “has [her] property/money” is not, by itself, a cognizable claim for relief.

See Am. Bankers Ass’n v. United States, 932 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (the court is “not

required to accept the asserted legal conclusions” in a plaintiff’s complaint when assessing a

motion to dismiss). A tax refund requires a showing that the IRS collected tax not legally owed.

Pennoni v. United States, 86 Fed. Cl. 351, 360 n.11 (2009) (explaining that a refund claim turns

not on the taxpayer’s theory for why the amount was not owed, but on whether the IRS collected

the disputed sum pursuant to its tax‑collection authority). Because Ms. Kim’s sole stated basis

for asserting that no tax was owed is a legally untenable theory, the Complaint does not state a

plausible claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Court acknowledges Ms. Kim’s request for leave to amend. However, where the

defect in a complaint is legal rather than factual, amendment would be futile. Dixon v. United

States, 158 Fed. Cl. 80, 86 (2022) (“When a proposed amendment would be subject to the same

defect as the original Complaint, leave to amend may be denied.”) (citing Cultor Corp. v. A.E.

Staley Mfg. Co., 224 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (affirming denial of leave to amend in a

patent case when same claim construction would apply to plaintiff’s amended complaint); Alaska

v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 276, 280 (1988) (the Court may deny leave to amend the complaint if

the amended complaint seeks to add information that has already been adequately addressed in

the prior filing); Mitsui Foods, Inc. v. United States, 867 F.2d 1401, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).

Because the underlying theory cannot be cured by additional factual allegations, dismissal is

warranted.

Because Ms. Kim’s claim is not legally plausible, her Complaint fails. The United States’

Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 5), is GRANTED. The Clerk SHALL enter judgment accordingly.

The Clerk is directed to REJECT any future submissions in this case unless they comply with

this Court’s rules regarding post-dismissal submissions. 3

Further, Ms. Kim’s publicly filed response includes redacted versions of the exhibits to

her Complaint, rendering the substantive contents of those exhibits part of the public record.

(Pl.’s Resp. at 3–6). As a result, there is no longer good cause to maintain any portion of the

3

This provision does not act as an anti-filing injunction or a sanction. Allen v. United States, 88

F.4th 983, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (holding that courts must provide pro se plaintiffs with notice and

opportunity to be heard before issuing an anti-filing injunction). Plaintiff is not enjoined from

proper post-dismissal filings in this case, nor is Plaintiff required to seek leave before filing

future actions in this Court. See id. This provision is a mechanism to reject non-compliant filings

in the above-captioned action once it is dismissed.

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United States’ opening brief under seal. The Clerk shall UNSEAL the United States’ Motion to

Dismiss, (ECF No. 5).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

David A. Tapp

DAVID A. TAPP, Judge

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