Ashfield

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JASON ASHFIELD, : Civ. No. 1:22-CV-1369

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)

SCHUYLKILL COUNTY, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

This case comes before us on a motion for summary judgment filed

by several defendants—Schuylkill County, Schuylkill County Prison

(“SCP”), Schuylkill County Prison Board (“SCPB”), David Wapinsky, and

Michael Buchanan.1 Ashfield asserts a claim of deliberate indifference

to his medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and related state law claims

arising out of an altercation that occurred while he was detained at SCP

in September of 2020.2 He also brings Section 1983 claims under a theory

of municipal liability and a failure to protect, intervene, and train and

1 Doc. 50.

2 Doc. 42.

supervise the SCP staff.3 Ashfield further asserts claims against various

correctional officer defendants, who he claims used excessive force

against him during the encounter at SCP.4

The defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment.5

After consideration, the motion for summary judgment will be granted in

part and denied in part.

II. Background6

Ashfield was incarcerated at SCP on September 2, 2020, after he

was arrested on an outstanding bench warrant regarding the

nonpayment of child support. On September 4, 2020, after his initial

check by medical, Ashfield requested a shower and a telephone call.

Correctional Officer Kayes denied Ashfield’s request and escorted him

back to his cell. According to the defendants, Ashfield resisted Kayes’

escort commands by pushing back into him, which Ashfield denies.

3

4

5 Doc. 50.

6 The factual background of this Memorandum Opinion is taken from the

parties’ submissions to the extent those submissions are consistent with

the evidence in the record. (Docs. 50-52, 60-64).

Kayes then performed a leg sweep to gain control over Ashfield, which

caused him to fall to the ground.

At this point, Correctional Officer Parker stepped in to assist Kayes

in restraining Ashfield. Kayes and Parker ordered Ashfield to cuff-up,

but he continued to combat their efforts to gain control over him.

Correctional Officer Rauco witnessed the incident and issued an all-

guards call. Correctional Officers Nitolo, Swatt, Broomall, Menne,

Kruss, Rodriguez, and Lieutenant Escalante responded and assisted in

restraining Ashfield. Parker, Swatt, Rodriguez, and Escalante each

reported that they secured Ashfield’s arm so they could cuff Ashfield’s

right wrist. Nitolo reported that she restrained Ashfield’s legs and feet.

Ashfield was double cuffed and escorted to medical.

Ashfield was treated by non-party medical staff, who noted a

laceration to the bottom lip; deformity and swelling in the left shoulder;

swelling in the right shoulder; swelling, deformity, and decreased range

of motion in the left elbow; and a bleeding and swollen nose. A Certified

Registered Nurse Practitioner ordered a shoulder, face, and elbow X-ray,

Ibuprofen, and an ice pack. Prior to Ashfield receiving x-rays, he was

released from SCP by court order. He sought and received medical

treatment at Lehigh Valley Health-Hazelton Emergency. Ashfield

alleges that he sustained a broken nose, injuries to his clavicle and

shoulders, and permanent injuries to his neck and acromioclavicular

joint from the incident with SCP staff.7

Ashfield initially brought this action against the defendants on

September 4, 2022.8 Ashfield’s second amended complaint asserts his

claims pursuant to Section 1983, alleging that this incident and the

injuries he suffered amounted to a violation of his constitutional rights.

With respect to the moving institutional and supervisory defendants,

Ashfield brings a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical

needs and a 9 claim, alleging a failure to protect, intervene, and

train and supervise the correctional officers. Ashfield further asserts a

claim of civil conspiracy to violate his federal and state civil rights

against these defendants.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that there

is no genuine dispute of material fact, and Ashfield’s claims fail as a

7 Doc 42.

8 Doc. 1.

9 , 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

matter of law.10 The motion also asserts that the correctional officer

defendants should be dismissed because they were never properly served

with the second amended complaint.11

After consideration of the record, we conclude that there are no

genuine disputes of material fact, and Ashfield’s claims against the

supervisory and institutional defendants fail. Accordingly, we will grant

summary judgment as to these defendants. However, we will deny the

motion with respect to the correctional officer defendants and, as

discussed in more detail below, will direct that these defendants waive

service and answer the second amended complaint.

III. Discussion

A. Motion for Summary Judgment – Standard of Review

The defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment

pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(a)

provides that a court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”12 The materiality of

10 Doc. 84.

11

12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

the facts will depend on the substantive law.13 Thus, “[o]nly disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law”

will preclude summary judgment.14 A dispute is only genuine if a

reasonable juror could find in favor of the nonmoving party.15

The moving party bears the initial burden to “demonstrate the

absence of a genuine issue of material fact,” relying on pleadings,

depositions, affidavits, and other evidence in the record.16 If the movant

“successfully points to evidence of all of the facts needed to decide the

case on the law,” the nonmovant can still defeat summary judgment by

pointing to evidence in the record which creates a genuine dispute of

material fact and from which a jury could find in its favor.17 However,

“[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,

summary judgment may be granted.”18 A court may not make credibility

13 , 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

14 .

15 .

16 , 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

17 , 479 F.3d 232,

238 (3d Cir. 2007).

18 , 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted).

determinations or weigh the evidence, but “must view the facts in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party.”19

B. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Will be Granted

in Part and Denied in Part.

As we will discuss, we will deny the motion as to the correctional

officer defendants and direct that these defendants waive service and

answer the second amended complaint. However, we conclude that there

are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to Ashfield’s claims

against the moving defendants. Accordingly, we will grant summary

judgment as to those defendants.

1. Failure to Serve the Correctional Officer Defendants.

Ashfield’s second amended complaint names Correctional Officers

Escalante, Kayes, Swatt, Broomall, Menne, Parker, Kruss, Rodriguez,

and Nitolo.20 The moving defendants argue the correctional officer

defendants should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction because

Ashfield failed to properly serve them.21 Ashfield contends that defense

19 , 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).

20 Doc. 42.

21 Doc. 52 at 5.

counsel agreed, in writing, to accept and waive service on behalf of these

defendants.22

We conclude that, as a technical matter, Ashfield failed to follow

the proper procedure when requesting a waiver of service for these

defendants.23 However, because “the defense of improper service involves

a matter in abatement and does not go to the merits of the action, . . . [it]

is improperly brought by a motion for summary judgment under Rule

56.”24 Moreover, district courts are given broad discretion when process

has not been properly served.25 Under the present circumstances, we find

it would be improper to dismiss the correctional officer defendants at this

juncture.

22 Doc. 63 at 12.

23 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1); , No. 07-CV-0188, 2007 WL

3033871, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2007), , 349 F. App’x 725 (3d Cir.

2009) (“Merely mailing a request for a waiver does not itself effect proper

service.”). We are further constrained to note defense counsel’s explicit

assertion to the plaintiff’s counsel that he was approved to represent

these defendants, that he would sign a waiver of service and appear on

their behalf, and that he would accept service via email and mail.

Doc. 60-1 at 38-39.

24 , 335 F. Supp. 95, 101 (E.D.

Pa. 1971).

25 , 969 F.2d 25, 30 (3d Cir. 1992).

We further find that it is more expeditious to direct

these defendants to waive service under Rule 4(d)—or show good cause

for failure to waive service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2)—than to require

Ashfield to effectuate proper service. The purpose of Rule 4(d) is to “avoid

unnecessary expenses of serving the summons.”26 Because counsel has

already indicated he would appear on behalf of the correctional officer

defendants,27 the expense of properly serving summonses would likely be

unnecessary. In similar circumstances, other courts in the Third Circuit

have either requested or directed defendants to waive service of process.28

Therefore, we will deny the moving defendants’ motion for summary

judgment for failure to serve and direct the correctional officer

defendants to waive service under Rule 4(d).

26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).

27 We recognize this is dependent upon which “Rodriguez” the plaintiff

intended to bring this action against. Doc. 60-1 at 38-39.

28 , No. 15-CV-1203-SLR, 2016 WL 1039462, at *3 (D.

Del. Mar. 15, 2016) (directing the Delaware Department of Corrections

and Delaware Department of Justice to waive service of process where

the plaintiff was proceeding ); , No. 3:16-CV-

2060, 2016 WL 6661156, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2016), , No. 21-1522,

2022 WL 1576758 (3d Cir. May 19, 2022) (specially appointing the Clerk

of Court to serve, among other things, a Request to Waive Service of

Summons (form AO 398) form on the defendant).

2. Claims against SCP and Schuylkill County

The plaintiff’s opposition brief concedes that SCP is not an entity

that can be sued under Section 1983.29 Additionally, while the plaintiff

continues to pursue his claims against SCPB and the individual

supervisory defendants, he concedes that “the record does not support a

claim against Defendant Schuylkill County.”30 Accordingly, the

claims against SCP and Schuylkill County will be dismissed.

3. Medical Deliberate Indifference

The amended complaint alleges that the defendants were

deliberately indifferent to Ashfield’s medical needs. Ashfield asserts that

the defendants knew he was injured and needed medical attention but

chose to release him to obtain medical treatment at his own expense. At

the outset, we note that while Ashfield was a pretrial detainee at the time

of the events in the complaint, and the Supreme Court has held that

pretrial detainee claims fall under the Fourteenth rather than the Eighth

Amendment, courts in this circuit have continued to apply Eighth

29 Doc. 63 at 13.

30 at 16.

Amendment standards in the context of medical care provided to pretrial

detainees.31

Ashfield faces a high burden to show that these defendants violated

the Eighth Amendment by exhibiting deliberate indifference to his

medical needs. The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from “cruel and

unusual punishment.”32 Prison officials have a duty to provide inmates

with “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take

reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’”33 To be

liable for an Eighth Amendment violation, prison officials must have “a

sufficiently culpable state of mind,”34 which, in the prison context, is one

of “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health and safety.”35

In the medical context, an inmate alleging an Eighth Amendment

violation must demonstrate that prison officials were deliberately

indifferent to a serious medical need.36 Accordingly, an inmate asserting

31 , 711 F. Supp. 3d 256, 275 (M.D. Pa. 2024)

(collecting cases).

32 U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

33 , 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting

, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).

34 , 511 U.S. at 834.

35 , 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation

omitted).

36 , 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).

a claim of deliberate indifference must establish that he had a serious

medical need, and that prison officials, by affirmative acts or omissions,

were deliberately indifferent to that serious medical need.37 Deliberate

indifference in this context can be shown by a failure to provide care, the

delay of medical care for non-medical reasons, or denial of reasonable

requests for treatment.38 However, mere disagreement over a course of

treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference.39 Further, non-

medical correctional staff cannot be deemed to be deliberately indifferent

“absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or

their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.”40

Here, we cannot conclude that the moving defendants were

deliberately indifferent to Ashfield’s serious medical needs. Ashfield

claims that, rather than get him help for his medical issues, the

defendants released him. This characterization completely overlooks the

undisputed fact that immediately after the underlying altercation,

Ashfield was taken to the medical department and treated by medical

37 , 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).

38 , 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993).

39 , 230 F. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007).

40 , 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).

staff. Further, with respect to his assertion that the defendants “fast

track[ed]” his release “so he could receive medical treatment at his own

expense,”41 it is undisputed that Ashfield was released by court order.42

Further, in his response to the defendants’ statement of material facts,

Ashfield conceded that that neither the Warden or Deputy Warden

personally acted to deny Ashfield medical treatment.43

Given these undisputed facts, we cannot conclude that the

individual moving defendants, non-medical correctional officials, were

deliberately indifferent to Ashfield’s serious medical needs. As we have

noted, it is well settled that non-medical correctional staff cannot be

deemed to be deliberately indifferent “absent a reason to believe (or

actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating

(or not treating) a prisoner.”44 Here, Ashfield was seen by medical staff

who addressed his injuries but he was released by court order that same

day. There is no evidence that the moving defendants had reason to

believe, or actual knowledge, that medical staff were not properly

41 Doc. 63 at 5.

42 Doc. 60, Ex. 1.

43 Doc. 51 ¶¶ 11-18; Doc. 60 ¶¶ 11-18.

44 , 372 F.3d at 236.

treating Ashfield and thus, were deliberately indifferent to his serious

medical needs.

Nor can we conclude that releasing Ashfield constitutes deliberate

indifference to a serious medical need. As we have explained, the

correctional officers took Ashfield to the medical department

immediately after the altercation and he was treated for his sustained

injuries. Further, Ashfield proffered evidence establishing his release

resulted simply from a court order stemming from the fulfillment of his

financial obligations. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Ashfield’s

release constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Thus,

Ashfield’s medical deliberate indifference claims fail as to the moving

defendants.45

45 To the extent Ashfield brings his conspiracy claim against these

defendants based on these assertions, such a claim fails, as the plaintiff

has conceded these individual defendants were not present nor had

knowledge of the alleged excessive force incident, and we have concluded

that these defendants were not deliberately indifferent to his medical

needs. Further, to the extent this claim is brought against SCPB, it is

well settled that “allegations that an entity conspired with its employees

fails to meet the first requirement of a civil conspiracy.”

, 600 F. Supp. 3d 550, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2022). Accordingly, any

conspiracy claim against SCPB fails.

4. Claims

Ashfield’s complaint also asserts claims against SCPB,

Warden Wapinsky, and Deputy Warden Buchanan. A municipal entity

may be liable for a constitutional violation under Section 1983 if the

violation was a direct result of the entity’s policy, custom or practice.46

However, an entity may not be held liable “solely because injuries were

inflicted by its agents or employees.”47 Rather, a plaintiff must

demonstrate a “direct causal link” between the alleged constitutional

violation and the municipal policy or custom.48 A plaintiff may show that

either an official policy of the municipality was the moving force behind

the violation, or that the municipality had an informal custom such that

it operated as the municipality’s policy.49 In either scenario, the plaintiff

has the burden to show that the policy or custom was implemented by or

acquiesced to by a policymaker.50

46 , 436 U.S. at 695.

47 , 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007).

48 , 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

49 , 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986); , 436

U.S. at 690.

50 , 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990).

To state a failure to protect claim, the plaintiff must show “(1) he

was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm, (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk

to his health and safety, and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference

caused him harm.”51 Deliberate indifference under this standard

requires a prison official to “have known or been aware of the excessive

risk to inmate safety.”52 Additionally, a supervisor may be held liable for

a failure to intervene to stop unconstitutional conduct when they had a

reasonable opportunity to intervene and failed to do so.53

Further, in cases where a plaintiff is alleging a failure to train

officers, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “municipality’s failure

to train [] officers . . . amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of

persons with whom the police come into contact.”54 To establish such a

claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate “contemporaneous knowledge of

the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar

incidents,” coupled with “circumstances under which the supervisor’s

51 , 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012)

52 (quoting , 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir.

2001)).

53 , 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002).

54 , 489 U.S. at 388.

actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a message of

approval to the offending subordinate.”55

Finally, to establish individual supervisory liability for such claims:

The plaintiff must identify a supervisory policy or practice

that the supervisor failed to employ, and then prove that: (1)

the policy or procedures in effect at the time of the alleged

injury created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional

violation; (2) the defendant-official was aware that the policy

created an unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was

indifferent to that risk; and (4) the constitutional injury was

caused by the failure to implement the supervisory practice or

procedure.56

In the instant case, Ashfield asserts a claim and a failure to

protect, intervene, and train against SCPB, Warden Wapinsky, and

Deputy Warden Buchanan, alleging that 37 Pa. Code § 91.6 and the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy DC-ADM 201 set forth

use of force standards, which the defendants violated. But Ashfield fails

to show how these policies, which instruct on the proper use of force, were

the “moving force” behind the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Additionally, Ashfield concedes that “this [is] a single incident matter

55 , 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing

, 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).

56 , 766 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing

, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989));

, 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001)).

where there is no record of prior similar instances,”57 and relies solely on

his own experience in this isolated case, which is insufficient to state a

claim.58

Additionally, liability under Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to

show that the defendant had personal involvement in the alleged

constitutional violation.59 Personal involvement may be shown through

allegations regarding the defendant’s own conduct, or that the defendant

had knowledge of the unconstitutional conduct and acquiesced in the

behavior.60 Accordingly, a supervisor cannot be held liable under Section

1983 merely because a subordinate committed a constitutional violation,

as “liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of

.”61 Here, Ashfield proffered no evidence that the supervisory

57 Doc. 60 at 16.

58 , 802 F. App’x 701, 706 (3d Cir. 2020)

(granting summary judgment for the defendant where the plaintiff had

“not identified any policies or customs that extended beyond his own

experience underlying his claims against the City.”);

, No. 23-CV-4031, 2023 WL 7329497, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov.

6, 2023) (dismissing a Monell claim premised on “allegations [that] [we]re

pled in a generalized manner and appear[ed] to be predicated almost

entirely on [the plaintiff's] own experiences, which are insufficient bases

for a plausible Monell claim.”).

59 , 845 F.2d 1195, 1207–08 (3d Cir. 1988).

60

61 at 1207.

defendants had knowledge of the unconstitutional conduct other than the

fact they permitted him to be released. In fact, Ashfield conceded that

neither the Warden or Deputy Warden were physically present or had

contemporaneous knowledge of the alleged use of force incident, or that

they personally acted to deny Ashfield medical treatment.62

Accordingly, we find that Warden Wapinsky, Deputy Warden

Buchanan, and SCPB, are not liable under , and these claims will

be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment will

be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. The motion will be GRANTED with respect to the claims against

SCP, SCPB, Schuylkill County, Warden Wapinsky, and Deputy

Warden Buchanan; and

2. The motion will be DENIED with respect to the plaintiff’s claims

against the correctional officer defendants.

An appropriate order follows.

Daryl F. Bloom

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

62 Doc. 51 ¶¶ 11-18; Doc. 60 ¶¶ 11-18.