Jo Kelly Stephenson v. 2300 & 2306 SSR Property Trust

05/21/2026

N THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs April 30, 2026

JO KELLY STEPHENSON v. 2300 & 2306 SSR PROPERTY TRUST ET

AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 24-0277-I Patricia Head Moskal, Chancellor

___________________________________

No. M2026-00621-COA-T10B-CV

___________________________________

Plaintiff appeals the denial of her motion to recuse the trial court judge, which raised

allegations of bias related to, inter alia, the treatment of her pro se status and her lack of

personal notice of court filings, the lack of response to her ex parte communication, the

failure to report alleged attorney misconduct, and the entry of certain court orders.

Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10 B Interlocutory Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery

Court Affirmed and Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT, JR. C.J., and KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., joined.

Jo Kelly Stephenson, Madison, Tennessee, Pro se.

OPINION

I.

This case began in March 2024, when Plaintiff/Appellant Jo Kelly Stephenson

(“Plaintiff”) filed a complaint against Defendants 2300 & 2306 SSR Property Trust, Erian

Goda, and Titi Properties & Preservation, Inc. (“Titi Properties”, and collectively

“Defendants”) in the Davidson County Chancery Court (“the trial court”). Attorney

Matthew A. Moushon signed the complaint on behalf of Plaintiff. In May 2024, Defendants

filed an answer to the complaint, by and through their counsel, Attorney Douglas

Waterman. The case lay dormant for nearly a year until the trial court entered a case

management order and the parties agreed to a scheduling order.

In November 2025, Plaintiff, by and through counsel, filed a motion to amend her

ad damnum clause, along with some other filings in support of her claim. According to

Plaintiff, some purported filings were not properly filed or omitted pages. For example,

although it appears that Plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, Plaintiff

contends that this motion is not included in the stamp-filed documents that were later made

available to her from the Clerk & Master. And a declaration that was filed in support of the

motion for summary judgment omitted certain pages/paragraphs in the interior of the

document.

On December 15, 2025, Attorney Mark T. Freeman filed a notice of appearance on

behalf of 2300 & 2306 SSR Property Trust and Erian Goda, as well as a proposed agreed

order for substitution of counsel. On December 18, 2025, Attorney Waterman and Attorney

Cody Johnson filed a proposed order substituting Attorney Johnson as counsel for Titi

Properties.

A hearing on Plaintiff’s motion to amend her ad damnum clause was held on

December 19, 2025; Plaintiff’s counsel was present but she was not. On December 30,

2025, the trial court entered an order noting that while a proposed order of substitution was

filed by Attorney Freeman, no motion to withdraw had been filed by the counsel of record

for 2300 & 2306 SSR Property Trust and Erian Goda, Attorney Waterman. Attorney

Waterman had also not signed the proposed order and Defendants were not served with a

copy. So the trial court directed Attorney Waterman to file a motion to withdraw.

According to Plaintiff, Attorney Waterman never did so. Eventually, Attorney Johnson

filed a motion to withdraw.

On January 13, 2026, Attorney Moushon filed a motion to indefinitely continue any

hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment due to the shuffling of counsel;

according to Plaintiff, she did not consent to this action.

On January 20, 2026, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend her ad

damnum from $400,000.00 to $2 million. The order stated that Plaintiff could file a First

Amended Complaint containing the amendment “within 10 days after entry of this Order.”

This included handwritten alterations from the proposed order, which stated that Plaintiff

could file the amended complaint “upon entry of this Order.” According to Plaintiff, no

amended complaint was filed in the following ten days.

At this time, Plaintiff asserts that she terminated Attorney Moushon “for cause.” In

furtherance of that action, Plaintiff contends that she emailed both the trial court judge,

Chancellor Patricia H. Moskal, and the Clerk & Master, Maria M. Salas, to inform them

that she had terminated Attorney Moushon’s representation. The email sent by Plaintiff is

not included in the documents on appeal. According to Plaintiff, on February 27, 2026, she

appeared at the Davidson County courthouse “to report the attorney misconduct and

termination in person, register for pro se representation, and gain access to her case

documents for the first time since she was unable to view them electronically.” While

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Plaintiff was allegedly physically present at the courthouse, Ms. Salas responded to her

email as follows:

[Plaintiff] — I have been asked to reach out to you regarding an email you

sent yesterday to Chancellor Patricia Moskal regarding the above-referenced

case. The email indicated a copy was sent to me also, but I have not received

it.

Please be advised that an email to a Chancellor or to this office is not

considered a filing with the court and no action is taken on such emails. Any

matter to be addressed by the Court should be filed in the case with the case

caption and include a signature of a party or attorney and a certificate of

service for opposing counsel or party.

It is my understanding the email indicated you have terminated your

relationship with your attorney Matt Moushon. However, as Mr. Moushon is

still your counsel of record in the case, I have copied him on this email to

you. Again, no action other than this courtesy response is being taken on your

February 26, 2026 email to Chancellor Moskal.

Plaintiff further alleges that she met with Ms. Salas in person on that date, where Ms. Salas

“denied Plaintiff’s request to register for pro se e-filing access, advising that Plaintiff must

have an attorney to access the system.”

Plaintiff asserts that on March 2, 2026, she attempted to file a notice of pro se

appearance and a “Motion for Protective Stay” electronically, but both were rejected by

the clerk. On the same day, Attorney Moushon filed a motion to withdraw “at the request

of the Plaintiff.” Plaintiff thereafter appeared in person to personally file a notice of pro se

appearance, a motion for a protective stay of proceedings seeking a sixty day continuance

to retain new counsel and review the case file for irregularities, and a waiver of notice and

hearing regarding Attorney Moushon’s motion to withdraw, consenting to the withdrawal

and asking that the trial court enter an order of withdrawal immediately.

On March 26, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion to recuse Chancellor Moskal. The

motion was accompanied by a declaration under penalty of perjury and argued that recusal

was necessary because she had been “systematically excluded from the judicial process.”

Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that her case “has proceeded in a ‘Shadow Docket’ designed

to exclude the Plaintiff”; that she had been subject to “an information blackout, as prior

counsel suppressed court filings” and failed to give Plaintiff notice; that the online

electronic record of the case was inaccurate and “contained zero (0) uploaded documents

and zero contact information for the Plaintiff” resulting in Plaintiff lacking proper notice

and being denied due process; and that “ghost attorneys” had been allowed to operate in

the case despite never properly filing notices to appear. According to Plaintiff, the fact that

this case was “conducted almost entirely off-book” indicates “a pervasive lack of

impartiality” in violation of the Judicial Code of Conduct.

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The motion also made allegations against Ms. Salas, the other attorneys who had

been involved in the case, and Attorney Moushon—including that he suppressed evidence.

Plaintiff further took issue with the trial court judge’s use of electronic signatures, as she

asserted that this was part of a “Settlement Shell Game.” And Plaintiff asserted that the

trial court judge had ultimate responsibility for all of the alleged failures in this case and

should therefore be removed from this matter due to the disparate treatment exacted upon

Plaintiff.

The next day, Plaintiff filed a notice that she was opposing Attorney Moushon’s

motion to withdraw “as written” and rescinding her waiver. In the same document,

however, Plaintiff also terminated Attorney Moushon’s permission to act in any way on

her behalf. Plaintiff further suggested that Attorney Moushon had no authority to act on

her behalf because he filed no notice of appearance.

The trial court denied Plaintiff’s motion to recuse by order of April 7, 2026. First,

the trial court noted that because Attorney Moushon’s motion to withdraw had not yet been

ruled on, Plaintiff was technically not permitted to file a pro se motion to recuse. See Tenn.

Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 1.01. The trial court nevertheless thoroughly considered the substance

of Plaintiff’s recusal motion, as a motion to withdraw was pending and Plaintiff had

requested that Attorney Moushon no longer represent her.

The trial court judge next ruled that, subjectively, she could be impartial in this

matter. The trial court judge noted that she had no personal connection to the case or the

parties, no personal knowledge of the facts of the case, and no ill will toward Plaintiff or

the attorneys involved.

The trial court judge further ruled that she could preside over the case under an

objective standard. The trial court judge noted that Plaintiff’s allegations “are less than

clearly stated and are not supported by specific facts” but largely focused on “Attorney

Moushon, her former attorney who has moved to withdraw, the attorneys for Defendants

regarding service of papers, and the Clerk & Master’s website and the Chancery Court’s

electronic filing system.” The trial court found that while Plaintiff appeared to complain

that she is not listed in the court’s e-filing system for purposes of receiving notice, at all

times in the matter, she was represented by counsel and all papers were properly sent to

Attorney Moushon. The trial court also noted that so long as Plaintiff was represented by

counsel, only her attorney could be contacted by opposing counsel under the Tennessee

Rules of Professional Conduct. The trial court judge further remarked that to the extent that

Plaintiff has complaints about the e-filing system, these complaints are not “directed to the

presiding Chancellor as grounds for disqualification and recusal. None of these complaints

implicate any impartiality or bias by the Court. These complaints instead indicate her

unfamiliarity with and lack of understanding of the Court’s e-filing system, the Rules of

Civil Procedure, and the Rules of Professional Conduct.”

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To the extent that Plaintiff was complaining about discrepancies between the court

record in the electronic filing system and the Clerk & Master’s website, the trial court noted

that the Clerk & Master’s website “plainly states that it is not the Court’s official record.”

The trial court further addressed Plaintiff’s allegation that the Clerk & Master excluded her

from litigating the case, noting that Plaintiff’s email to the trial court judge was an improper

ex parte communication that was properly returned to Plaintiff by the Clerk & Master. The

trial court judge also noted that she had “no knowledge of any of [Plaintiff’s] interactions

with the Clerk & Master or staff members in her office.” Moreover, the trial court judge

found that “none of [Plaintiff’s] complaints directed to the Clerk & Master [] implicate the

Court’s impartiality and do not provide a basis for the Court’s recusal.”

The trial court also addressed Plaintiff’s contention that Attorney Moushon and

Attorney Waterman were permitted to operate as “ghost attorneys” having never filed a

notice of appearance in the matter. But the trial court noted that “[u]nder the Rules of Civil

Procedure, Attorney Moushon’s signing and filing the complaint on her behalf was the

entry of his appearance as her counsel in this case. Similarly, Attorney Waterman’s signing

and filing an answer on behalf of Defendants constituted his entry of appearance as

Defendants’ counsel.” The trial court further rejected an allegation that Attorney Johnson

acted improperly by leaving out the initial zero in his Tennessee Board of Professional

Responsibility (“Board of Professional Responsibility”) number. And the trial court noted

that certain proposed orders were properly excluded from the official record because they

had not yet been signed by the trial court judge.

Next, the trial court addressed the allegations against Attorney Moushon, which it

ruled were not directed to the judge and therefore did not serve as a basis for recusal. To

the extent that Plaintiff asserted that the trial court’s use of electronic signatures was

improper and part of the “shadow docket” and “settlement shell game,” the trial court judge

ruled that her orders are part of the public record. The trial court finally rejected Plaintiff’s

argument under the “open courts” clause of the Tennessee Constitution as unsupported by

specific facts. From this order, Plaintiff now appeals.

II.

Our sole concern in this interlocutory appeal is whether the trial court erred in

denying Plaintiff’s motion for recusal. See Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2012). Appeals from orders denying a motion to recuse are governed by Rule 10B of

the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. Under section 2.01 of

Rule 10B of the Tennessee Supreme Court, a party is entitled to “an accelerated

interlocutory appeal as of right” of an order denying a motion to recuse. The party effects

an accelerated appeal by filing a petition for recusal appeal with this Court, accompanied

by “a copy of the motion and all supporting documents filed in the trial court, a copy of the

trial court’s order or opinion ruling on the motion, and a copy of any other parts of the trial

court record necessary for determination of the appeal.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.03. “If

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the appellate court, based upon its review of the petition for recusal appeal and supporting

documents, determines that no answer from the other parties is needed, the court may act

summarily on the appeal.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.05. In this case, we have determined

that no answer from Defendants is necessary, and we choose to act summarily on this

appeal. See also Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B, § 2.06 (stating that a 10B accelerated appeal should

be decided on an expedited basis).

III.

As the Tennessee Supreme Court explained regarding recusal:

“Tennessee litigants are entitled to have cases resolved by fair and

impartial judges.” Cook v. State, 606 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tenn. 2020) (citing

Davis [v. Liberty Mut. Ins.], 38 S.W.3d [560,] 564 [(Tenn. 2001)]); see also

State v. Griffin, 610 S.W.3d 752, 757–58 (Tenn. 2020). To preserve public

confidence in judicial neutrality, judges must be fair and impartial, both in

fact and in perception. Cook, 606 S.W.3d at 253; Kinard v. Kinard, 986

S.W.2d 220, 228 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). To these ends, the Tennessee Rules

of Judicial Conduct (“RJC”) declare that judges must “act at all times in a

manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and

impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance

of impropriety.” Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, RJC 1.2. Another provision declares

that judges “shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of

judicial office fairly and impartially.” Id., RJC 2.2.

To act “impartially” is to act in “absence of bias or prejudice in favor

of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance

of an open mind in considering issues that may come before a judge.” Id.,

Terminology. “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding

in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id., RJC

2.11(A).

Rule of Judicial Conduct 2.11 “incorporates the objective standard

Tennessee judges have long used to evaluate recusal motions.” Cook, 606

S.W.3d at 255. “Under this objective test, recusal is required if ‘a person of

ordinary prudence in the judge’s position, knowing all of the facts known to

the judge, would find a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s

impartiality.’” Id. (quoting Davis, 38 S.W.3d at 564–65).

The intermediate appellate courts have explained that the proponent

of a recusal motion bears the burden of establishing that recusal is

appropriate and that any alleged acts of bias or prejudice arise from

extrajudicial sources rather than from events or observations during the

litigation of the case. Tarver v. Tarver, No. W2022-00343-COA-T10B-CV,

2022 WL 1115016, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2022). A trial judge has a

duty to serve unless the proponent establishes a factual basis warranting

recusal. Raccoon Mtn. Caverns & Campground, LLC v. Nelson, No.

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E2022-00989-COA-T10B-CV, 2022 WL 3100606, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Aug. 4, 2022) (quoting Rose v. Cookeville Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. M2007-

02368-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 2078056, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 14,

2008)).

Adams v. Dunavant, 674 S.W.3d 871, 878–79 (Tenn. 2023) (per curiam). We review the

trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal under a de novo standard of review. Tenn. S. Ct.

R. 10B, § 2.06.

The source of the alleged bias alters the burden that the party seeking recusal must

bear. If the alleged bias originates during the course of the proceedings, “the party seeking

recusal has a greater burden to show bias that would require recusal, i.e., that the bias is so

pervasive that it is sufficient to deny the litigant a fair trial.” Runyon v. Runyon, No.

W2013-02651-COA-T10B-CV, 2014 WL 1285729, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31,

2014) (quoting McKenzie v. McKenzie, No. M20140-00010-COA-T10B-CV, 2014 WL

575908, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2014)). This Court has described a “pervasive” bias

as one that “reflect[s] an utter incapacity to be fair.” Groves v. Ernst-W. Corp., No. M2016-

01529-COA-T10B-CV, 2016 WL 5181687, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2016).

On appeal, Plaintiff raises multiple classes of allegations: (1) allegations of bias due

to the trial court judge’s failure to report alleged attorney misconduct; (2) allegations of

bias regarding the trial court’s orders; (3) allegations of bias related to Plaintiff not

receiving personal notice of documents filed in this case; (4) allegations of bias related to

the handling of Plaintiff’s February 2026 email; and (5) allegations of bias for allegedly

treating Plaintiff differently than represented parties. As we perceive it, none of these

allegations involve an extrajudicial source and therefore Plaintiff bears the burden to

demonstrate a pervasive bias. After a thorough review of Plaintiff’s petition for recusal

appeal and supporting documents, we conclude that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate “any

evidence that the trial judge’s actions in this case were the result of bias, prejudice,

impropriety, or harassment.” Watson v. City of Jackson, 448 S.W.3d 919, 933 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2014).

As an initial matter, we note that some of Plaintiff’s arguments, such as her

argument that the trial court judge should not have imposed a ten-day filing requirement

on the filing of an amended complaint increasing the ad damnum clause, take issue with

the trial court’s rulings in this matter. We note, however, that “[r]ulings of a trial judge,

even if erroneous, numerous and continuous, do not, without more, justify

disqualification.” Id. at 933 (citing Duke v. Duke, 398 S.W.3d 665, 671 (Tenn. Ct. App.

2012)). Moreover, “[p]ursuant to [Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B], we may not

review the correctness or merits of the trial court’s other rulings[.]” Duke, 398 S.W.3d at

668. We do note, however, that trial courts are under no obligation to accept agreed orders

and may alter agreed orders to reflect their independent judgment. Cf. Smith v. UHS of

Lakeside, Inc., 439 S.W.3d 303, 314 (Tenn. 2014) (holding that a trial court’s order should

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be “the product of the trial court's independent judgment”). The fact that the trial court

judge granted Plaintiff’s motion to amend with slightly altered conditions than proposed

by the parties is simply not evidence of bias or “asymmetrical” treatment of Plaintiff

compared to the other parties.1

Plaintiff’s various arguments concerning alleged mistakes or inaction by Attorney

Moushon are also without merit.2 We agree with the trial court that many of these

allegations are not related to any actions on the part of the trial court judge and therefore

do not demonstrate any bias or prejudice that would require her disqualification.3 We also

agree that many of Plaintiff’s arguments appear to stem from a fundamental

misunderstanding of how notice of appearances and service of papers operate in the trial

court. Importantly, Tennessee law generally provides that a notice of appearance may be

had by “filing any pleading.” Patterson v. Rockwell Int’l, 665 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tenn. 1984)

(“It has been said that the filing of any pleading, making or resisting of any motion, filing

of exceptions to a Master’s report, taking of depositions to be read in a cause, making of

any agreement with plaintiff or his attorney relative to any proceeding in a cause, or any

other act in the cause, between the filing of the complaint and rendition of the final decree,

whereby pendency of the suit is recognized, expressly or by implication, will, if there be

record evidence of the fact, constitute a general and unlimited appearance, unless limited

by express declaration or by necessary implication.”). Indeed, the local rules of practice for

Davidson County explicitly state that “[e]ntry of an appearance will be made in one of the

following ways: . . . the filing of pleadings.” Davidson County Local Rule 5.01. Here,

Attorney Moushon filed the complaint on behalf of Plaintiff; the filing of the complaint

therefore served as formal notice of his appearance on behalf of Plaintiff in this matter.4

Because Attorney Moushon was Plaintiff’s counsel of record, he was therefore the

individual that was served notices as Plaintiff’s representative in this case. Rule 5.02 of the

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly states that “[w]henever under these rules

service is required or permitted to be made on a party represented by an attorney, the

service shall be made on the attorney unless service on the party is ordered by the court.”

Similarly, the Davidson County local rules provide that “[i]f a party does not have counsel

of record, copies of the pleadings filed will be furnished to the party. If a party does not

1

Although the documents provided to us do not demonstrate that an amended complaint was filed

in the time permitted by the trial court, it is unclear if there has been an attempt to file an amended complaint

outside that window that was prohibited by the trial court due to the expired deadline. As such, we are not

aware of any ruling that actually prohibits Appellant from increasing the damages she is claiming.

2

Appellant’s complaints include continuing any hearing on her motion for summary judgment,

omitting pages from filed documents, and failing to file the amended complaint in the prescribed time

period.

3

The same is true concerning any interactions that Plaintiff personally had with members of the

Clerk & Master’s staff.

4

Attorney Waterman’s representation in answering the complaint similarly served as a notice of

appearance on behalf of Defendants.

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have counsel of record, opposing counsel will call that fact to the attention of the court

before any action is taken on any pleading filed which substantially affects the case.”

Davidson County Local Rule 5.03. Indeed, as the trial court pointed out, other attorneys

were not permitted to contact Plaintiff directly so long as she is represented by counsel.

See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 4.2 (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate

about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented

by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is

authorized to do so by law or a court order.”). So then, so long as Plaintiff was represented

by counsel, the law did not require, and sometimes even prohibited, that she be personally

served with the papers associated with this case. And while Plaintiff complains that neither

her nor Attorney Moushon’s contact information was included in the electronic Odyssey

filing system, Appellant has not pointed to a single order entered in this case by the trial

court that was neither signed by Attorney Moushon nor served on him as evidenced by a

certificate of service. As a result, it appears that Appellant, by and through her counsel of

record, was receiving proper notice of orders entered by the trial court in this case

regardless of whether contact information was listed in the electronic filing system.

Of course, it now appears that Plaintiff has terminated the services of Attorney

Moushon.5 But Plaintiff’s own actions have somewhat muddied this issue. After the

termination, Attorney Moushon filed a notice to withdraw, which Plaintiff initially

consented to. Thereafter, however, Plaintiff withdrew her consent based, apparently, on the

verbiage used in Attorney Moushon’s motion. As such, any resolution of the question of

Attorney Moushon’s representation was delayed by Plaintiff’s own actions.6 When the

petition for recusal appeal was filed, Attorney Moushon continued to serve as attorney of

record for Plaintiff. As a result, all of Plaintiff’s complaints stemming from the lack of

notice to her individually and her alleged prohibition from litigating pro se while still

technically represented by Attorney Moushon not only do not show evidence of bias by the

trial court but are also fundamentally incorrect.

Plaintiff also appears to take issue with the fact that the trial court judge declined to

recuse after receiving an ex parte communication from Plaintiff. Respectfully, we disagree.

First, we note that because the email from Plaintiff is not included in the documents

included with Plaintiff’s petition for recusal appeal, we are unable to review it. Importantly,

certain types of ex parte communications are not prohibited, such as those involving

administrative issues. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, Canon 2.9(A)(1) (describing certain

exceptions to the prohibition on ex parte communications, such as scheduling or

administrative issues). It is true, however, that even under these circumstances, the judge

5

For this reason, the trial court proceeded to consider Plaintiff’s motion to recuse in spite of the

prohibition in Rule 10B. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10B § 1.01(“A party who is represented by counsel is not

permitted to file a pro se motion under this rule.”). We follow the same reasoning in this appeal.

6

Plaintiff filed a motion for a stay with this Court, stating that the trial court had set Attorney

Moushon’s motion to withdraw for hearing on May 15, 2026. Thus, Plaintiff asked to delay that hearing

even further. We denied the stay by order of May 4, 2026.

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is generally required to notify all parties of these types of communications, and it does not

appear that Defendants were notified of the communication until it was referenced in the

motion to recuse. Id. 2.9(A)(1)(b). But nothing in Plaintiff’s petition for recusal appeal

suggests that Defendants objected to the lack of communication about this email, largely

unrelated to their interests as it was.

Moreover, even when the trial court judge participates in a prohibited ex parte

communication, recusal is only required “where [the communication] creates an

appearance of partiality or prejudice against a party so as to call into question the integrity

of the judicial process.” Holsclaw v. Ivy Hall Nursing Home, Inc., 530 S.W.3d 65, 72

(Tenn. 2017) (quoting Runyon, 2014 WL 1285729, at *9). We do not conclude that this

standard has been met in this case. For one, parties are generally not entitled to manufacture

grounds for recusal. See United States v. Owens, 902 F.2d 1154, 1156 (4th Cir. 1990)

(“Parties cannot be allowed to create the basis for recusal by their own deliberate actions.”).

Here, it was Plaintiff who attempted to communicate with the trial court judge outside of

the official record and she was promptly informed by the Clerk & Master that her email

was not a proper way to communicate with the court; it is unclear what more that could

have been done to ameliorate any harmful effect in this situation. Moreover, absolutely

nothing in the record indicates that because of this communication, an appearance of bias

or partiality has been created. Here, Plaintiff simply made a communication to the trial

court that was not proper, was informed of the impropriety, and directed how to properly

file things with the court. Nothing untoward occurred in this situation such that an

appearance of impropriety was created.

To the extent that Plaintiff contends that the trial court judge created an appearance

of impropriety in not accepting her complaint against Attorney Moushon, tolerating

Attorney Moushon’s alleged dilatory conduct, and not reporting Attorney Moushon for his

alleged misconduct, we likewise conclude that these allegations do not necessitate recusal.

In essence, Plaintiff lists Attorney Moushon’s alleged missteps in this case, all of which

she asserts have caused her harm, and asserts that the trial court’s refusal to take action,

either by reporting Attorney Moushon to the Board of Professional Responsibility or taking

other action, creates the appearance of bias or partiality. We respectfully disagree.

Before addressing the merits of this argument, we note that it does not appear that

Plaintiff argued in her recusal motion that the trial court judge was obligated to report

Attorney Moushon’s alleged misconduct or that her apparent refusal to do so was evidence

of bias or prejudice. Instead, it appears that this particular argument has been raised for the

first time on appeal. But we generally do not entertain arguments that were not first raised

in the trial court. See Beaman v. Beaman, No. M2018-01651-COA-T10B-CV, 2018 WL

5099778, at *12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2018) (noting “the well-settled proposition that

issues not raised at the trial level are considered waived on appeal”); see also Vazeen v.

Sir, No. M2022-00273-COA-R3-CV, 2023 WL 6160350, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 21,

2023) (waiving an argument in a recusal appeal that was raised for the first time on appeal).

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This is even more true here, as Plaintiff is essentially complaining that the trial court

refused to take action that she has not shown she ever requested from the trial court.7 Even

considering this argument, however, we conclude that it does not establish a pervasive bias

or appearance of partiality such that recusal is mandated.

The appellant in a recent case employed a similar argument. See Schmeeckle v.

Hamilton Cnty., No. E2023-01533-COA-T10B-CV, 2023 WL 8093111 (Tenn. Ct. App.

Nov. 20, 2023). In Schmeeckle, the appellant attempted to bring to the trial court’s

attention what he characterized as attorney misconduct that occurred in his case. Id. at *3.

The trial court denied the request to raise the issue of misconduct, explaining that the issue

was not properly before her, and also found that the attorney had not committed misconduct

in the case so far. Id. at *2. Like Plaintiff here, the appellant in Schmeeckle argued that the

trial court’s action failed in her duty to report misconduct to the Board of Professional

Responsibility. See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 10, RJC 2.15(B) (“A judge having knowledge that a

lawyer has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a

substantial question regarding the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer

in other respects shall inform the appropriate authority.”).

We held, however, that the trial court’s actions did not warrant recusal. As we

explained,

[The] [a]ppellant has cited no law that mandates that a trial court must serve

as a conduit for a litigant to make allegations against an attorney for

professional misconduct when that issue is not presently before the court

pursuant to a pending motion for sanctions or other relief, in an apparent

effort to force the trial judge to make a complaint against the attorney; as the

trial court stated, if [a]ppellant believed that professional misconduct

occurred, he was free to raise those allegations to the Board of Professional

Responsibility himself. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that

these facts would lead an ordinary person to question the trial judge’s

impartiality.

Id. at *7.

The same is true in this case. If Plaintiff believes that Attorney Moushon has

committed misconduct in this case, it is her prerogative to file a complaint against him with

the Board of Professional Responsibility. The trial court’s refusal to entertain Plaintiff’s

complaints against Attorney Moushon, to make a complaint against Attorney Moushon

7

In fact, while we assume for purposes of this appeal that the trial court judge has not reported any

alleged misconduct by Attorney Moushon to the Board of Professional Responsibility, the record does not

reflect definitive proof that no complaints have been made. Of course, we offer no opinion as to whether

anything that occurred in this case rises to the level of misconduct.

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under Rule 2.15 (particularly when Plaintiff never requested that relief), or to take other

action in light of Plaintiff’s complaints simply would not lead an ordinary person to

question the trial court judge’s impartiality.

In sum, we conclude that, after reviewing all of Plaintiff’s arguments, Plaintiff has

not met her burden to show either a pervasive bias or an appearance of impropriety in this

case. We sympathize with Plaintiff’s frustrations as to how this case has lingered without

resolution. However, it is not the trial court judge’s duty to prosecute a case for its litigants.

Here, the trial court judge has done nothing to indicate that under an objective standard,

she cannot preside over this case with fairness and integrity. The trial court judge’s denial

of Plaintiff’s recusal motion is therefore affirmed.

IV.

The judgment of the Davidson County Chancery Court is affirmed, and this cause

is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are taxed to

Appellant Jo Kelly Stephenson, for which execution may issue if necessary.

S/ J. Steven Stafford

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

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