Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF TEXAS CIVIL ACTION

PETROLEUM INVESTMENT COMPANY

NO. 24-2344

SECTION: “D” (2)

REASONS FOR ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Borrowed

Servant Status, filed by The Production Group, LLC and David Hayes (“TPG

Claimants”).1 Claimants George Walcott and Evelyn Walcott (“Walcott Claimants”)

have filed an opposition.2 Texas Petroleum Investment Company (“TPIC”) has also

filed an opposition.3 The TPG Claimants have filed a reply to both the Walcott

Claimants’ opposition4 and TPIC’s opposition.5

Also before the Court is TPIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment.6 The Walcott

Claimants have filed an opposition,7 and TPIC has filed a reply.8

After careful consideration of the parties’ memoranda, the record, and the

applicable law, the Court GRANTED the TPG Claimants’ Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on Borrowed Servant Status and DENIED TPIC’s Motion for

1 R. Doc. 143.

2 R. Doc. 179.

3 R. Doc. 182.

4 R. Doc. 186.

5 R. Doc. 187.

6 R. Doc. 146.

7 R. Doc. 180.

8 R. Doc. 184.

Summary Judgment during the Pretrial Conference in this matter.9 These Reasons

for Order follow.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a previous Order and Reasons,10 the Court has set forth the factual

background in this matter. The Court, however, will briefly recite the factual

allegations as pertinent to the instant Motion.

This limitation action arises out of an early morning April 10, 2024 allision

involving TPIC’s Vessel LA 939511 on the inland waters of Plaquemines Parish,

Louisiana (the “allision”).12 TPIC owned and operated South Pass 24 (“SP-24”), an oil

and gas production platform situated in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana.13 As a part

of a routine crew-change, the Vessel departed TPIC’s SP-24 in the predawn hours to

travel to Venice, Louisiana.14 David Hayes, a production operator employed by The

Production Group, LLC, operated the vessel, and George Walcott, a catering

hand/cooking steward employed by Taylors International Services, Inc., was a

passenger in the Vessel.15 While in route to Venice, the Vessel allided with a

submerged obstruction, allegedly injuring George Walcott.16

9 See R. Doc. 204.

10 R. Doc. 91.

11 Vessel La 9395 is also referred to as the M/V SYDNEY. The Court will refer to it as the “Vessel”

throughout this Order and Reasons.

12 R. Doc. 143-3 at p. 1.

13 Id.

14 Id.

15 Id.; R. Doc. 146-3 at p. 1.

16 R. Doc. 143-3 at p. 1.

A. The TPG Claimants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on

Borrowed Servant Status

On March 16, 2026, the TPG Claimants filed the instant Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on Borrowed Servant Status.17 The TPG Claimants ask the

Court to “enter judgment recognizing that Hayes was TPIC’s borrowed servant at the

time of the incident at issue.”18 The TPG Claimants contend that, “[a]pplying the Ruiz

factors to the undisputed facts of this case, the evidence overwhelmingly

demonstrates that David Hayes was acting as TPIC’s borrowed servant at the time

of the incident.”19 Thus, because all nine Ruiz factors weigh in favor of borrowed

servant status, the TPG Claimants assert that they are entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.20

The Walcott Claimants have filed an opposition, asserting that the TPG

Claimants’ Motion should be denied because genuine issues of material fact exist

regarding most of the Ruiz factors.21 Specifically, the Walcott Claimants argue that

“[t]he disputed Ruiz factors cannot be resolved on summary judgment—credibility

determinations and conflicting documentary and testimonial evidence require trial.

The MSA expressly disclaims any employment relationship between TPIC and

Hayes, which severely undermines any claim that TPIC intended to borrow him as

17 R. Doc. 143.

18 R. Doc. 143-2 at p. 19.

19 Id. at p. 6.

20 Id. at p. 19.

21 R. Doc. 179.

an employee.”22 Thus, the Walcott Claimants contend that the TPG Claimants’

Motion should be denied.23

TPIC has also filed an opposition.24 TPIC concedes that David Hayes’

“relationship with TPIC and TPG satisfies a number of the Ruiz factors . . . .”25 TPIC

contends that “[t]he only factor where there appears to be an issue as to that status

for both Mr. Hayes and Mr. Walcott is the first Ruiz factor, which addresses control

over the employee.”26 Beyond the first Ruiz factor, TPIC concedes that the other Ruiz

factors “are essentially undisputed both as to Mr. Hayes and Mr. Walcott.”27

The TPG Claimants filed a Reply to the Walcott Claimants’ opposition.28 The

TPG Claimants argue that:

1) The terms of an MSA do not override the Firth [sic] Circuit’s

controlling test in Ruiz; 2) Plaintiffs do not create a genuine dispute as

to control; 3) their purported material factual disputes are neither

disputed nor material; and 4) the factors they claim are ‘neutral’ or lean

in their favor all decidedly favor borrowed servant status.29

The TPG Claimants have likewise filed a Reply to TPIC’s opposition.30 The TPG

Claimants argue that:

TPIC relies on a selected excerpt from Hayes’s deposition that shows, at

most, that Hayes worked the opposite watch of his TPIC supervisors and

exercised routine judgment during nighttime operations unless a matter

became serious enough to require escalation. That selective excerpt does

22 Id. at p. 13.

23 Id.

24 R. Doc. 182.

25 Id. at p. 2.

26 Id.

27 Id. at p. 4.

28 R. Doc. 186.

29 Id. at p. 1.

30 R. Doc. 187

not conflict with TPIC’s admissions as to control and is insufficient to

create a genuine issue of material fact.31

Therefore, according to the TPG Claimants, they are entitled to judgment as a matter

of law on their Motion.32

B. TPIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment

TPIC filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on March 16, 2026,

seeking an order finding that George Walcott was “a borrowed servant/statutory

employee of TPIC . . . .”33 TPIC asserts that:

[T]here exists no real factual dispute that Mr. Walcott meets all of the

requirements to be characterized as a borrowed employee of TPIC.

Furthermore, the decision by Taylors' compensation carrier to provide

Mr. Walcott LHWCA benefit does not legally foreclose the fact that he

is, in truth, an LWC employee thereby invoking the statutory employee

provisions of the TPIC/Taylors contact in connection with La. Rev. Stat.

23:1061 establishing the statutory employee law.34

Therefore, TPIC submits that its Motion should be granted.35

The Walcott Claimants oppose the Motion, arguing that TPIC unsuccessfully

“invokes every conceivable doctrine in an attempt to shield itself from tort liability

for Mr. Walcott’s injuries.”36 The Walcott Claimants advise as follows:

TPIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the issues of Mr. Walcott’s

borrowed employment should be denied because genuine issues of

material fact as to the issues of control, intent, and authority

predominate. Moreover, TPIC’s alternative argument that somehow its

statutory employer provision is valid fails because TPIC does not have

standing to challenge the proper application of the LHWCA in this

case.37

31 R. Doc. 187 at p. 1.

32 R. Docs. 186 and 187.

33 R. Doc. 146-4 at p. 1.

34 Id. at p. 16.

35 Id.

36 R. Doc. 180 at p. 1.

37 Id. at pp. 21–22.

TPIC has filed a Reply, arguing that the Ruiz factors favor the finding that

George Walcott was a borrowed employee of TPIC.38 TPIC specifically explains that:

Claimants' memorandum in opposition, supported by various exhibits,

does not change the undisputed facts that during his seven-day hitch,

Mr. Walcott lived, worked, ate and slept on TPIC's SP-24 structure all

of which clearly suggest that TPIC fully controlled his presence on

TPIC's structure during that work week. Further, common sense

dictates . . . Mr. Walcott's preparation of all meals for personnel on the

structure were absolutely essential to TPIC's ability to produce oil and

gas.39

Therefore, TPIC reiterates that its Motion should be granted.40

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56

“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”41 A dispute is “genuine” if it is

“real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham.”42 Further,

a fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing

law.”43 When assessing whether a genuine dispute regarding any material fact

exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrain[s] from

making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”44 While all reasonable

inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, a party cannot defeat

38 R. Doc. 184.

39 Id. at p. 10.

40 Id. at p. 10.

41 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).

42 Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cnty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Wilkinson v. Powell,

149 F.2d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 1945)).

43 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

44 Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398-99 (5th Cir. 2008)

(citations omitted).

summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or “only

a scintilla of evidence.”45 Instead, summary judgment is appropriate if a reasonable

jury could not return a verdict for the nonmoving party.46

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden

of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.”47 The

non-moving party can then defeat summary judgment by either submitting evidence

sufficient to demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact or by

“showing that the moving party’s evidence is so sheer that it may not persuade the

reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving party.”48 If, however,

the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial on the dispositive issue,

the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in

the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving

party’s claim.49 The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who must go beyond

the pleadings and, “by her own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.’”50

45 Id. (quoting Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotations

omitted).

46 Id. at 399 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).

47 Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991).

48 Id. at 1265.

49 See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.

50 Id. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).

III. ANALYSIS

“Both federal and Louisiana law use the same criteria for determining whether

an employee is a borrowed employee.”51 As the parties correctly recognize, the Fifth

Circuit’s decision in Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co. governs the borrowed servant analysis.52 In

Ruiz, the Fifth Circuit enumerated nine factors for courts to consider when analyzing

whether the borrowed employee doctrine applies.53 Such factors include:

(1) Who has control over the employee and the work he is performing,

beyond mere suggestion of details or cooperation?

(2) Whose work is being performed?

(3) Was there an agreement, understanding, or meeting of the minds

between the original and the borrowing employer?

(4) Did the employee acquiesce in the new work situation?

(5) Did the original employer terminate his relationship with the

employee?

(6) Who furnished tools and place for performance?

(7) Was the new employment over a considerable length of time?

(8) Who had the right to discharge the employee?

(9) Who had the obligation to pay the employee?54

“While the courts do not use a fixed test and do not decide the issue based on one

factor, the courts place the most emphasis on the first factor, control over the

51 Capps v. N.L. Baroid-NL Industries, Inc., 784 F.2d 615, 616 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986)(citing Lorton v.

Diamond M Drilling Co., 540 F.2d 212, 213 n. 1 (5th Cir.1976)).

52 Ruiz v. Shell Oil Co., 413 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1969).

53 Id. at 312–13.

54 Melancon v. Amoco Production Co., 834 F.2d 1238, 1244 (5th Cir. 1988)(citing Ruiz, 413 F.2d at 312–

13).

employee.”55 Additionally, “[t]he central question in borrowed servant cases is

whether someone has the power to control and direct another person in the

performance of his work.”56 The Fifth Circuit has long noted that, “a careful

distinction must be made between authoritative direction and control, and mere

suggestion as to details or the necessary co-operation, where the work furnished is

part of a larger undertaking.”57 Further, a borrowing employer “gives direct orders

to its borrowed servant.”58 “The district court decides the borrowed employee issue

as a matter of law . . . and, if sufficient basic factual ingredients are undisputed, the

court may grant summary judgment.”59

The TPG Claimants seek summary judgment declaring that David Hayes was

acting as TPIC’s borrowed servant at the time of the allision.60 TPIC, in turn, seeks

summary judgment finding that George Walcott was a borrowed servant of TPIC.61

The Court first addresses each Ruiz factor as it pertains to David Hayes.

Subsequently, the Court’s analysis as to George Walcott starts – and ends – with the

first two Ruiz factors. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that summary

judgment is inappropriate as to George Walcott. The Court further finds that David

Hayes is a borrowed employee of TPIC.

55 Capps, 784 F.2d at 617 (citing Ruiz, 413 F.2d at 312).

56 Mays v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 938 F.3d 637, 641-42 (5th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Hebron v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 634 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks

omitted).

57 Mays, 938 F.3d at 643-44 (quoting Ruiz, 413 F.2d at 313) (internal quotation marks omitted).

58 Mays, 938 F.3d at 644 (citing authority).

59 Id. (citing Gaudet v. Exxon Corp., 562 F.2d 351, 358–59 (5th Cir. 1977)).

60 R. Doc. 143.

61 R. Doc. 146.

A. David Hayes is a borrowed employee of TPIC.

1. Who has control over the employee and the work he is performing?

The first Ruiz factor asks who has control over the employee and the work he

is performing. The TPG Claimants state that “[b]ecause TPIC—not TPG—directed

and controlled Hayes’s day-to-day work activities, the first and most important Ruiz

factor strongly supports a finding that Hayes was TPIC’s borrowed servant.”62 In

opposition, the Walcott Claimants disagree, providing that:

Given the MSA’s unequivocal disclaimer of TPIC control and the

distinction between the activities Hayes performed that TPIC actually

undertook to control (production operations) versus what Hayes was

actually doing that gave rise to the incident (driving a boat back to the

dock for a crew change), this control element is neutral, or at the very

least presents genuine issues of material fact preclusive of summary

judgment at this juncture.63

TPIC, in turn, contends that David Hayes’ TPIC supervisors “were sleeping when he

was typically doing is work[,]” and therefore TPIC “exercised little or no control over

his daily activities as a night time facility operator[.]”64

The record evinces, and the TPG Claimants concede, that The Production

Group, LLC “had no supervisory personnel at the TPIC facility.”65 The record further

demonstrates that TPIC Field Foremen control David Hayes’ daily activities, his

work shift, and his work instructions.66 This has also been corroborated by deposition

62 R. Doc. 143-2 at p. 8.

63 R. Doc. 179 at p. 9.

64 R. Doc. 182 at pp. 2–3.

65 R. Doc. 179 at p. 8.

66 See R. Doc. 143-4 at pp. 9–10, February 6, 2026 Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Travis Wells, TPIC’s

Corporate Representative.

testimony from David Hayes67 and Tommy Lejuene.68 Therefore, the Court finds the

first Ruiz factor to support borrowed servant status.

2. Whose work is being performed?

The TPG Claimants assert that David Hayes was performing TPIC’s work

located on TPIC’s SP-24.69 Both the Walcott Claimants70 and TPIC concede this

point.71 As such, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of borrowed servant

status.

3. Was there an agreement between the original and borrowing employer?

The TPG Claimants assert that The Production Group, LLC and TPIC entered

into a Master Services Agreement (“MSA”), and the “facts demonstrate that both

companies understood the nature of the arrangement: TPG supplied personnel, and

those personnel would perform production work within TPIC’s offshore operations

under TPIC supervision.”72 The Walcott Claimants argue that although there was a

MSA between The Production Group, LLC and TPIC, “[t]here is no written agreement

designating Hayes as TPIC’s borrowed employee or employee of any kind.”73 TPIC

concedes that David Hayes’ presence on TPIC’s SP-24 was pursuant to the MSA

between The Production Group, LLC and TPIC.74

67 See R. Doc. 143-6 at pp. 12–13, August 19, 2025 Deposition of David Hayes.

68 See R. Doc. 143-7 at pp. 5–8, March 2, 2026 Deposition of Tommy Lejuene. Tommy Lejuene is TPIC’s

Production Superintendent.

69 R. Doc. 143-2 at p. 9.

70 R. Doc. 179 at p. 9.

71 R. Doc. 182 at p. 4.

72 R. Doc. 143-2 at p. 11.

73 R. Doc. 179 at p. 11.

74 R. Doc. 182.

The Court agrees with the TPG Claimants and TPIC. The record evidence

demonstrates that there was an MSA in effect between The Production Group, LLC

and TPIC,75 and David Hayes was performing work on TPIC’s SP-24 pursuant to that

MSA.76 Nonetheless, the Court acknowledges that the MSA between The Production

Group, LLC and TPIC contains a contract provision purporting to prohibit borrowed

employee status.77 The Fifth Circuit has held that such provisions can raise factual

disputes that should be determined by a factfinder.78 The third Ruiz factor therefore

is neutral toward borrowed servant status.

4. Did the employee acquiesce?

The fourth Ruiz factor asks whether the employee acquiesced in the new work

situation. The TPG Claimants contend that “Hayes had worked in the South Pass

field since approximately 2018 and that, during that time, he continued performing

work for TPIC in that field even as staffing companies changed.”79 The Walcotts

assert that “Hayes never consented to borrowed employee status and understood

himself to be ‘contracted to TPIC’ and not ‘employed by TPIC.’”80 TPIC concedes that

David Hayes “clearly” acquiesced to the work situation.81

75 See R. Doc. 143-5.

76 See R. Doc. 143-3 at ¶¶ 9–11.

77 See R. Doc. 179-4 at p. 5.

78 Brown v. Union Oil of Calif., 984 F.2d 674, 678 (5th Cir. 1993). The Fifth Circuit in Brown further

recognized, however, “that the terms of a contract and the related factual issues do not automatically

prevent summary judgment or direct verdict. If the remaining borrowed employee factors

overwhelmingly point to borrowed employee status, a summary judgment or direct verdict is

appropriate.” Id. at 678 n.5.

79 R. Doc. 143-2 at p. 12.

80 R. Doc. 179 at p. 11.

81 R. Doc. 182 at p. 4.

The Court finds that the record reflects that David Hayes acquiesced to

working within TPIC’s operational structure.82 The focus of this factor is whether the

employee was aware of his work conditions and chose to continue working in them.83

Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has held that one month is a sufficient amount of time for

an employee to appreciate his new work conditions.84 Prior to the allision, David

Hayes worked on TPIC’s SP-24 for roughly six years,85 and the record shows that

David Hayes was aware of his assignment to TPIC’s SP-24 and continued to

voluntarily work at SP-24.86 Thus, this factor weighs in favor of borrowed servant

status.

5. Did the original employer terminate his relationship with the employee?

The fifth Ruiz factor asks whether the original employer terminated his

relationship with the employee. According to the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he emphasis when

considering this factor should focus on the lending employer’s relationship with the

employee while the borrowing occurs.”87 The TPG Claimants argue that “Hayes

worked under TPIC’s supervision, reported to TPIC personnel in the field, and had

no daily reporting relationship with TPG. Because TPG ceased control in its

relationship with Hayes while the borrowing occurred, the fifth Ruiz factor weighs

strongly in favor of borrowed servant status.”88 The Walcott Claimants assert that

82 R. Doc. 143-3 at ¶ ¶ 12–13.

83 In re Weeks Marine, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 3d 593, 599 (M.D. La. 2015) (quoting Brown, 984 F.2d at 678

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

84 Brown, 984 F.2d at 678.

85 R. Doc. 143-3 at ¶ ¶ 12–13.

86 R. Doc. 143-6 at p. 7, August 19, 2025 Deposition of David Hayes.

87 Brown, 984 F.2d at 678 (quoting Melancon v. Amoco Production Co., 834 F.2d 1238, 1246 (5th Cir.

1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

88 R. Doc. 143-2 at p. 14.

“TPG maintained core employment functions (benefits, payroll, resume confirmation,

hiring).”89 TPIC concedes that, “as evidenced by the respective pleadings on this

issue,” The Production Group, LLC did not perform “any significant oversight” over

David Hayes while on SP-24.90

The Court finds that the record demonstrates that TPIC directed David Hayes’

daily activities and that The Production Group, LLC did not have any supervisors on

location at TPIC’s SP-24.91 Indeed, the Walcott Claimants have conceded this fact.92

Accordingly, the fifth Ruiz factor also favors borrowed servant status.

6. Who furnished the tools and place for performance?

The TPG Claimants assert that, aside from personal protection equipment and

a uniform, The Production Group, LLC did not provide David Hayes with any

equipment to perform his job at TPIC’s SP-24.93 The Walcott Claimants counter that

“TPG was instrumental in providing Hayes with all personal protective equipment

he needed to perform his production operator functions. TPIC did not provide these

core tools and equipment. TPG provided Hayes’s uniform which bore TPG—not

TPIC’s—logo.”94 TPIC concedes that the tools David Hayes used for its performance

of work on TPIC’s SP-24 were provided by TPIC.95

89 R. Doc. 179 at p. 12.

90 R. Doc. 182 at p. 5.

91 See R. Doc. 143-4 at pp. 18, 20, February 6, 2026 Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Travis Wells, TPIC’s

Corporate Representative.

92 R. Doc. 179 at p. 12.

93 R. Doc. 143-2 at p. 15.

94 R. Doc. 179 at p. 12 (emphasis original).

95 R. Doc. 182 at p. 5.

The Court agrees. The record is clear that the place for performance for David

Hayes was TPIC’s SP-24.96 Further, the record is clear that, other than personal

protection equipment and a uniform, TPIC provided all tools for David Hayes’ work.

Thus, this factor supports borrowed servant status.97

7. Was the new employment over a considerable length of time?

The TPG Claimants assert that David Hayes was working at TPIC’s SP-24 for

numerous years prior to the allision. Both the Walcott Claimants98 and TPIC concede

this point.99 As such, the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of borrowed

servant status.

8. Who had the right to discharge the employee?

The TPG Claimants submit that TPIC had the authority to discharge David

Hayes and terminate his services with TPIC.100 The Walcott Claimants, in turn, state

that “TPIC could remove Hayes from assignment with TPIC but could not terminate

his employment with TPG.”101 TPIC argues that it could ask The Production Group,

LLC to no longer have David Hayes work for TPIC.102

“[T]he proper focus when considering who has the right to discharge the

employee is whether the purported borrower had the right to terminate the worker’s

services with itself, not his employment with the lending employer.”103 Here, the

96 R. Doc. 143-3 at ¶ 12; R. Doc. 143-6 at pp. 6–7.

97 See R. Doc. 143-4 at p. 22; R. Doc. 143-6 at pp. 13–14.

98 R. Doc. 179 at p. 12.

99 R. Doc. 182 at p. 5.

100 R. Doc. 143-2 at p. 17.

101 R. Doc. 179 at p. 12.

102 R. Doc. 182 at p. 5.

103 Mays v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 938 F.3d 637, 646 (5th Cir.

2019)(citation modified).

record demonstrates that TPIC had the authority to remove David Hayes from his

assignment with TPIC.104 All parties concede this point as well.105 Thus, this factor

favors borrowed servant status.

9. Who had the obligation to pay the employee?

The ninth and final Ruiz factor asks who had the obligation to pay the

employee. The TPG Claimants state that “[a]lthough TPG issued Hayes’s paycheck,

TPIC controlled and approved the hours for which Hayes was paid and funded

Hayes’s work in the South Pass field.”106 In contrast, the Walcott Claimants assert

that “TPG issued Hayes’s paychecks, provided him with a benefits package

(health/dental/vision), and handled payroll administration.”107 TPIC concedes that

David Hayes would “submit a time sheet for approval to the TPIC field foreman who,

would then, send it to the payroll employer who, based upon the time submitted,

would present an invoice to TPIC who would then satisfy the invoice and the men

would be paid their salaries through that avenue.”108

“Typically, the distinguishing factor is the basis on which the purported

borrower makes its payments.”109 The Fifth Circuit has found borrowed servant

status where “the borrower paid the nominal employer based on the number of hours

the borrowed servant worked, and then the nominal employer paid the borrowed

104 R. Doc. 143-3, ¶ 23; R. Doc. 143-4 at p. 11, February 6, 2026 Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of Travis Wells,

TPIC’s Corporate Representative; R. Doc. 143-7, March 2, 2026 Deposition of Tommy Lejuene.

105 R. Doc. 143-2 at p. 17; R. Doc. 179 at p. 12.; R. Doc. 182 at p. 5.

106 R. Doc. 143-2 at p. 19.

107 R. Doc. 179 at p. 12.

108 R. Doc. 182 at p. 5.

109 Mays, 938 F.3d at 646.

servant a percentage of that payment.”110 Here, the record demonstrates the precise

scenario envisioned by the Fifth Circuit. Hayes would submit a timesheet for

approval to TPIC who then transfer it to The Production Group, LLC, the payroll

employer, who would then compensate David Hayes for his work on TPIC’s SP-24.111

Accordingly, this factor supports borrowed servant status.

In sum, the Court finds that the record evidence supports, without any genuine

dispute of a material fact, that eight Ruiz factors weigh in favor of a borrowed servant

status.112 Notably, the first factor – control – heavily favors finding a borrowed

servant relationship. Accordingly, the Court finds that David Hayes was TPIC’s

borrowed servant and that the TPG Claimants are entitled to summary judgment on

this issue.

B. TPIC is not entitled to summary judgment as to George

Walcott’s status.

1. Who has control over the employee and the work he is performing?

TPIC contends that it controlled the daily activities of George Walcott because

TPIC would have informed George Walcott if he was not doing his job properly, the

TPIC Field Foreman actively interacted with George Walcott regarding feeding TPIC

110 Id. at 646–47 (citing Capps, 784 F.2d at 618; Melancon, 834 F.2d at 1246).

111 See R. Doc. 143-3 at ¶ 3; R. Doc. 143-4 at pp. 20–21, February 6, 2026 Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of

Travis Wells, TPIC’s Corporate Representative.

112 Insofar as the Walcott Claimants argue that the language in the MSA between The Production

Group, LLC and TPIC creates a material factual dispute, the Court agrees with another Section of this

Court that “[t]he Fifth Circuit has held that ‘a contract provision purporting to prohibit borrowed-

employee status’ creates an issue of fact as to the third factor, such that summary judgment would be

appropriate only when ‘the remaining factors clearly point to borrowed-employee status.’” Washington

v. Fieldwood Energy LLC, Civil Action No: 15-6615, 2018 WL 263230, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 2,

2018)(Milazzo, J.)(quoting Billizon v. Conoco, Inc., 993 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1993)). Accordingly,

because the Court finds all other factors favor borrowed servant status, summary judgment is

appropriate.

personnel, TPIC set George Walcott’s schedule, and the TPIC Field Foreman would

answer any of George Walcott’s work related questions.113 In contrast, the Walcott

Claimants assert that TPIC “did not have any authoritative control over the manner

in which he cooked,” George Walcott “came up with his own menu and cooked meals

the way he wanted to cook them, and that no one from TPIC supervised the way he

cooked or prepared meals or the way he cleaned.”114 Further, the Walcott Claimants

submit that if George Walcott “had a question about whether he should perform a

certain requested task, he would consult with Taylors, not TPIC.”115

The Court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to George

Walcott’s borrowed employment status, thereby precluding summary judgment.

Although TPIC asserts that it had control over George Walcott’s daily activities, the

record does not reflect such assertion. In a March 11, 2026 affidavit, Randy Seal, a

Field Foreman employed by TPIC, attested to the fact that George Walcott “did not

need anyone telling him the specific details on how to cook the food or to clean utensils

or manage the galley.”116 To that end, in a March 30, 2026 affidavit, George Walcott

attested as follows:

17. TPIC personnel did not train me to perform my steward duties and

did not supervise the details of how I performed those duties on a day-

to-day basis.

18. To the extent TPIC personnel communicated with me. [I]t was

generally limited to coordinating meals and purchasing/providing

necessary groceries I requested. lodging, or general logistics, rather than

directing the manner and method of my work.

113 R. Doc. 146-4 at p. 7.

114 R. Doc. 180 at p. 9

115 Id. at p. 10.

116 R. Doc. 146-6 at p. 2.

. . . .

21. TPIC never communicated any oral or written procedures with

respect to my cooking, cleaning or hospitality services.

22. I came up with my own menu and cooked meals the way I wanted to

cook them; no one from TPIC supervised the way I cooked and prepared

meals. or the way I cleaned.117

Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to TPIC’s control over George

Walcott’s daily activities. The record evinces that George Walcott had a greater level

of autonomy compared to that of David Hayes. And herein lies the fundamental

distinction between the two. David Hayes, a Production Operator, was under the

control of TPIC while located on TPIC’s SP-24 – a production facility. George Walcott,

however, was a catering hand assigned to work on SP-24. The Court agrees with

another Section of this Court that “[c]ooking and cleaning cannot be said to be an

essential aspect of oil and gas production. In addition, the maintenance of production

equipment is far less incidental to that production than cooking and cleaning for the

crew.”118 Accordingly, this distinction also raises a genuine issue of material fact as

to the second factor – whose work is being performed.

As a final point, the MSA between Taylors and TPIC contains a contract

proviso purporting to prohibit borrowed-employee status.119 The Fifth Circuit has

stated that, when such provision exists, summary judgment is appropriate only

“when the remaining factors clearly point to borrowed-employee status.”120 The Court

117 R. Doc. 180-2 at pp. 2–3.

118 Washington, 2018 WL 263230, at *3.

119 R. Doc. 146-8 at p. 5.

120 Billizon, 993 F.2d at 106.

has found, as it pertains to George Walcott, that at least two genuine issues of

material fact exist regarding the first two Ruiz factors. Accordingly, as instructed by

the Fifth Circuit, the Court deems that summary judgment is inappropriate as to

George Walcott.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the TPG Claimants’ Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment on Borrowed Servant Status!2! is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that TPIC’s Motion for Summary Judgment!22

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, May 15, 2026.

(land , 5 Vitter

WENDY B.VITTER

United States District Judge

22 Doc. 146.

20