M.J.L. v. S.N.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0155-24

M.J.L.,1

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

S.N.,

Defendant-Respondent.

________________________

Argued May 11, 2026 – Decided May 21, 2026

Before Judges Natali, Walcott-Henderson and

Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Somerset County, Docket No. L-1728-19.

Michael Confusione argued the cause for appellant

(Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys; Michael

Confusione, of counsel and on the briefs).

1

We use initials to exclude from public access the identity of individuals

referenced in this dispute to maintain the confidentiality of their medical

information. R. 1:38-3(a)(2).

S.N., self-represented respondent, argued the cause

(Rajeh A. Saadeh and Alex Barrett Dowland, on the

brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, M.J.L, appeals from a September 16, 2024 final judgment issued

after a non-jury trial. The judgment memorialized the court's determination of

a no cause of action verdict with respect to the defamation claim asserted against

defendant S.N., and also granted defendant a $232,327.45 judgment, reflecting

$100,000 in compensatory damages, $100,000 in punitive damages, $31,852.45

in prejudgment interest and $475 in costs with respect to her counterclaim for

intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).

Plaintiff raises only the following three challenges to the court's final

judgment. First, she contends the court committed legal error when it denied

her application to dismiss defendant's counterclaim of IIED, which plaintiff

argues the statute of limitations barred despite the court's finding that its

predicate campaign of harassment began in 2015 and continued through 2020.

Second, she maintains the court abused its discretion when it reconsidered a

motion in limine and admitted certain evidence of that harassment. Third, she

contends the court failed to apply properly the New Jersey Tort Claims Act,

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N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to :12-3 (TCA) as a shield against civil liability. We discern no

merit to any of plaintiff's arguments and accordingly affirm the final judgment.

I.

The trial record reflects the following facts which we recount in detail,

and at a higher level of granularity than normal, as we deem it necessary to

address the nature and gravity of the continuing, egregious conduct perpetrated

by plaintiff upon defendant as found by the trial court and further confirmed by

the record.

Defendant met L.S. in 2012 or 2013, and their relationship was initially

platonic. The same year, she met plaintiff, a psychiatric nurse practitioner at

Rutgers United Behavioral Health (UBHC). At the time the parties met,

defendant and L.S. were twenty-one years old, and plaintiff was over fifty.

According to defendant, L.S. suffered "from bipolar disorder" and a

dependency on oxycodone. Defendant knew L.S. used drugs recreationally, but

was not specifically aware he was addicted to opiates. Defendant also knew

L.S. was in an "on and off" relationship with plaintiff, and that plaintiff was

"very generous" with gifts to him. Plaintiff bought L.S. a car, funded L.S. "tens

of thousands of dollars on one trip to Atlantic City," "offered to pay for his

college," and paid L.S.'s legal fees in DUI cases. Plaintiff was also "very close

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with his family," and loaned L.S.'s mother about $74,000 "for various reasons"

including to "pay off her mortgage."

Defendant also maintained plaintiff supplied drugs to L.S. and to his

cousin, who was in a relationship with plaintiff's sister. Defendant testified

L.S.'s cousin told her he was "grossed out" by L.S.'s relationship to plaintiff,

which he perceived to be an exchange of sex for drugs and money. Defendant

testified L.S. told her that his relationship with plaintiff "was purely

transactional" and "not romantic."

Defendant and L.S. began to date, while defendant grew increasingly

aware of L.S.'s drug problem and arrangement with plaintiff. She considered

plaintiff to be L.S.'s "sugar momma" who gave him money in return for sex. In

2014, L.S. confessed to defendant that plaintiff was prescribing him oxycodone,

and he was addicted to it.

Defendant ended her relationship with L.S. six months later and moved to

her mother's home in Virginia. Defendant came from a religious "Palestinian

background" that did not approve of dating absent marriage. Her parents were

"stricter than perhaps most American parents would be," and gave defendant a

"very sheltered" upbringing. For those reasons, when L.S. visited defendant in

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Virginia and proposed marriage to her, defendant's mother pressured her to

accept.

Plaintiff bought L.S. "a train ticket to New Jersey" a week later, but

defendant said she and L.S. lived together in Virginia for two or three months.

During this time, L.S. continued to use drugs. Defendant did not know where

L.S. obtained the drugs, but testified he often traveled to New Jersey for days at

a time. Defendant believed L.S. remained desperate for drugs throughout their

marriage and ultimately asked L.S. for a separation. L.S. returned to New Jersey

while defendant remained in Virginia. The pair never reunited, but remained

legally married until defendant filed for divorce in 2018 or 2019.

On or about January 6, 2015, plaintiff filed a criminal complaint against

L.S. and defendant. Plaintiff alleged defendant drove L.S. to plaintiff's office,

where he stole $200 and a prescription pad; and drove him to a pharmacy, where

he used the prescription pad to obtain opiates. When L.S. informed defendant

of the complaint, she was still living in Virginia. Defendant believed L.S.

committed the theft, but she did not contact the police.

The police discovered that "from 2011 through May 2015," plaintiff

"prescribed 96 prescriptions for oxycodone outside" the scope of plaintiff's

psychiatric practice. On March 7, 2015, plaintiff told the police there had been

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"nine fraudulent prescriptions passed on her prescription blanks in the name of

Alex Instodder Flasher Florino," and "Alex" was indicted. On March 26, 2015,

L.S. told the police plaintiff prescribed him "pain medication . . . even though

he was not in pain and she was not his doctor." "He stated he became addicted

and received prescriptions from" plaintiff "for oxycodone with the prescription

either completed by" plaintiff "or given to him to complete by forging the

signature." The ensuing investigation revealed the handwriting on certain

oxycodone prescriptions was plaintiff's, and that plaintiff "would not be within

the scope of her practice to issue a prescription for pain medications."

In September 2015, the State indicted plaintiff on charges related to fraud;

the manufacture and distribution of controlled dangerous substances; and

"hindering" or "false information." The State denied plaintiff's request for

pretrial intervention. Plaintiff notified the Board of Nursing of the arrest on or

about the day it occurred.

The police also arrested L.S. The police did not charge, arrest, question,

or contact defendant. Even so, someone—who defendant claimed, and the court

found, was plaintiff—began "taunting" defendant by alleging there was an

incriminating video that would put defendant "in some kind of crazy trouble."

Plaintiff publicly tweeted "images" of defendant "walking in a pharmacy" and

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stated L.S. would "be the subject of the day." Defendant began to receive

messages on Twitter stating: "If you think for one minute you're getting out of

stealing my prescription pads with your husband, this is just getting started ."

Plaintiff contacted defendant "incessantly every single day" to say defendant

was "going to be exposed" and that plaintiff wanted defendant dead. These

"relentless" messages came from fifteen different Twitter accounts, and plaintiff

also sent "14 different messages on Facebook to" defendant's "family and

friends." These messages began a campaign of harassment that started in 2015

and lasted through "the pandemic."

Following the tweets in 2015, defendant received messages stating she

would not "like the next page." In 2016, plaintiff created multiple Instagram

pages with composite images of defendant's face on the "nude" bodies of other

women with defendant's "skin tone." One composite image placed defendant's

face on a woman's "spread eagle" nude body with "a penis in the mouth."

Another had "a vagina flailed open." A third image placed "an eggplant emoji

near" defendant's "mouth to indicate" defendant was "engaging in oral sex."

These pages had usernames such as "Sara Whore," which rhymes with

defendant's name, and the accounts' public-facing "profile photo" would show

defendant's face with a penis in defendant's mouth. From these pages, plaintiff

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"requested" defendant's friends, coworkers, and family members, including

defendant's parents. Defendant's family saw the images and did not know they

were composites. Even defendant did not know, at the time, if plaintiff intruded

into defendant's home to photograph defendant secretly.

As 2016 continued, plaintiff contacted defendant's mother and sister to tell

them defendant was a "criminal," a "thief," and a "homewrecker." Plaintiff sent

defendant text messages about "You," a television program about a stalker who

murders his victims. Plaintiff continued to tweet about defendant from multiple

accounts, one of which had the username "Rutgers58." For example, plaintiff

tweeted: "On July 29th your video will be the subject of the day. Why don't

you show up? . . . Use your Virginia plates." Plaintiff tweeted a copy of

defendant and L.S.'s marriage certificate with the caption: "@S[N.] . . . XOXO,

same address on forged Rx to Elmwood Park. I told you I'd see you in court ."

Plaintiff also tweeted: "@S[N.], you better pray your email address wasn't

involved with . . . wire fraud attempts your husband tried with my bank. It's

next." Plaintiff continued to tweet about defendant throughout that summer.

Defendant's friends saw the tweets.

Using five pictures of defendant and the username "ArabianDollXO,"

plaintiff created an account on "Seeking Arrangement," a website that permits

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"sugar baby" users "to solicit older men for sex" in exchange for money.

Plaintiff gave defendant's phone number or email to men seeking to cheat on

their wives with a "sugar baby." At "every time of the day," defendant would

receive solicitations for sex "from old men." This "lasted for weeks," and

defendant received hundreds of such messages. Defendant felt "worthless,"

"cheap," and "like I was for sale."

Defendant began "rotating" addresses and changing telephone numbers to

avoid plaintiff, but plaintiff "would be aware of every single" such change.

Defendant believed plaintiff received this up-to-date information by

"conducting some form of a background check." In January 2017, Rutgers

UBHC terminated plaintiff and she later went into private practice. That year,

plaintiff created "a public Instagram account" impersonating defendant stating,

"Stealing your man plus your money." The account posted another composite

photograph of defendant's face on another woman's nude body, displaying "a

zoomed up, close-up shot of the vagina." Plaintiff began sending messages to

defendant's professional connections, including clients and investors. Although

defendant had been able to maintain various sales jobs for a time, defendant

ultimately needed to seek financial support from her mother and younger sister,

L.N., beginning in 2017.

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Plaintiff's unrelenting, outrageous conduct continued and, according to

defendant, 2018 was "the most distressing" time. L.N. noticed that defendant,

who had been outgoing and creative, and once sought to become a lawyer,

became withdrawn. After "[Plaintiff] entered her life," L.N. saw defendant

become "isolated," reluctant to socialize, and "easily panicked," in particular by

unexpected phone calls. L.N. invited defendant to live with her. That January,

between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., plaintiff sent frequent text messages to defendant

about the television program "You." Plaintiff sent defendant and L.N. text

messages accusing defendant of being "a thief" and sleeping "on an air mattress"

in L.N.'s home. Defendant was, in fact, sleeping on an air mattress in L.N.'s

home, "which suggested that [plaintiff] had . . . seen inside the windows of the

house she was in." Plaintiff sent the two sisters "disgusting" photographs of a

man holding a "rat penis." Defendant "became a shut-in" and "wasn't really able

to function because" the communication "was so incessant."

L.N. was, in contrast to her sister, "more of a science geek" who had

intended to apply to medical school. But although L.N.'s ambitions lay

elsewhere, L.N. agreed to start "a real estate business" with defendant.

Plaintiff's messages "graduated to physical threats." Plaintiff sent L.N.

about fifteen sexually explicit text messages, such as asking, "does your ass

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come with the home?" "And then she would text" defendant to state: "I'm going

to show up at your next showing and F you up." Defendant "feared that

[plaintiff] would make an appointment and come and attack her and perhaps kill

her." The sisters ended their real estate venture after "about a month" and made

about $20,000.

That year, defendant also attempted a "business sales opportunity with"

C.L., an "influencer" with 6.7 million followers on social media. Defendant

sought to help "connect businesses to him" for "exposure" on C.L.'s popular

webpages. Plaintiff told C.L. defendant had "sticky fingers," yeast infections,

and "gonorrhea;" was "using" C.L. "for fame and money;" and was "mooching

off" L.N. Defendant and C.L. completed one deal and ceased their relationship.

Defendant continued to receive text messages. One message dated March

1, 2018, stated: "You dumb whore. Stop acting like you're a good Muslim girl

when you suck dick and get fucked, and not only sucking my man's dick, but

everyone else's." On April 2 and 3, 2018, defendant received "incessant" phone

calls "in the middle of the night" and other "text messages stating, 'Baby girl, I

miss you and that ass. My angel.'" Beginning in June 2018, defendant received

"constant" text messages from a self-described "anonymous notification tool"

warning that a "sexual partner recently tested positive for an STD" and

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defendant should also get tested. On October 8, 2018, defendant received "a

direct message on Instagram" from an account purporting to be L.S.'s then-

current girlfriend, stating:

You bitch. You will still stalk my grave because you

want to live in my box. You're obsessed with me. Go

find someone who will keep you around longer than a

month. [L.S.] abused you and you know that, but talk

about me? Do you even have a job or work? Are you

done putting up a front? I dare you to even call my job.

I will come to your house again. If you come out this

time, I will run you over. That's if you don't shoot me

since you make threats. Dirty bitch. Go clean your

cottage ass and your purple pussy.

Another text message read:

You're 30 and still no husband. It's because you know

no Muslim man will want your rancid vagina. You're

an embarrassment to your own kind or any kind because

you're an armpit smelling ho that smells like cold cuts

in your vagina that's purple roast beef mixed with

Victoria's Secret body spray because you're still living

off [L.N.]. She kicked you out again last week. Sleep

on an air mattress.

On January 31, 2019, C.L. received "an explicit image saying 'Put the

whole thing in your mouth? Give me some sugar.'" At the same time, the

"incessant" messages and calls to defendant continued. Defendant "would

receive thousands and thousands and thousands of messages telling me to kill

myself at various times of the day." Defendant used TrapCall, "an app that

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detects phone numbers," to trace the messages and calls to plaintiff's number.

Some messages contained information that defendant could not tell how plaintiff

knew: for example, what home defendant lived in or what car defendant drove.

Other messages were ethnically or racially charged, such as one text message

sent in January 2019, which stated:

You're such a ho. You love it. Proud ho who sucks

everyone's fat Joe and maybe even their toe if they feed

your bum ass. Watch out. You're going to get beat up

heffy heifer. You horny hippo ho. I heard more guys

explode in you than Gaza, ho. Don't get beat up again.

Defendant received more than one text message mocking defendant for

being "on Medicaid" and having an HPV infection, which plaintiff described as

having a "purple P-U-S-S." Defendant was taken aback that "the text message

I had received had indicated the form of insurance I used and my medical

condition." Defendant believed that plaintiff, as a former employee of Rutgers

UBHC, would have had access to defendant's medical records, and may have

accessed them to discover embarrassing information about defendant.

Up until that point, defendant had not reported plaintiff's communications

to the police "every single time" they occurred. Defendant testified "I wanted

to extend grace and think that, you know, maybe she's just going through a hard

time," or "maybe she's lonely." Defendant also testified that "at this time I was

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moving around a lot, which also made it difficult to file reports in different

municipalities, and also harassment in general is a difficult complaint just in

general to prove." That said, defendant explained when plaintiff's conduct "only

grew more aggressive and more concerning, I was left with no choice ."

Defendant testified that when "you knew my location, you knew the car I drove,

you started saying that you want me dead, have I watched the show 'You,' it

started becoming really concerning." Defendant did complain to the police in

May or June 2019 and ultimately obtained a "no-contact order" against plaintiff.

Defendant also sought mental health treatment in 2019, which defendant

had "never required" before. Defendant testified that the only local provider

that accepted her insurance, Medicaid, was Rutgers UBHC. Rutgers UBHC was

"less than five minutes away" from where defendant lived, and defendant knew

plaintiff "was no longer employed there."

On July 8, 2019, defendant enrolled as a patient at Rutgers UBHC. During

the "basic assessment," defendant stated: "I've been feeling anxious and

paranoid about [plaintiff] harassing my life." Defendant stated that plaintiff

"sends her offensive text messages, contacts her employers, and somehow had

access to her health records and would disclose information" even "after she

divorced her husband at age 24." Defendant described "paranoid thoughts"

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about the court system; "anxiety, especially for court dates;" loss of sleep; lost

work; "strong emotional responses;" and "explosive" behavior.

On or about October 31, 2019, defendant filed a complaint with "the Board

of Nursing" putting forth plaintiff's harassment and slander from "2014 through

2019." Defendant attached a "not identifiable" but large number of text

messages. Plaintiff testified the report accused her of: making "countless fake

Instagram accounts, dating accounts, . . . pornographic photos," texts, and

telephone calls; and contributing to defendant's "ex-husband's legal trouble . . .

by prescribing opiates, although he was never" plaintiff's patient. The report

also accused plaintiff of "illegally" accessing defendant's "medical records" to

discover and reveal "embarrassing medical information" about defendant.

Defendant testified plaintiff's harassment continued through "the

pandemic." Defendant attended appointments at Rutgers UBHC on March 23,

2020; March 23, 2021; April 8, 2021; May 19, 2021; July 26, 2021; and August

24, 2021. On April 8, 2021, defendant explained to the Rutgers UBHC therapist

that she had "been avoiding individual therapy" because "she's being stalked by

a mental health professional."

Defendant was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD),

depression, "general anxiety disorder," insomnia, and "binge eating." These

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diagnoses resulted from various psychological harms defendant had suffered

since plaintiff's activity began, including: weight gain; nightmares;

dissociation; flashbacks; feelings of embarrassment, isolation, shame, and

helplessness; outbursts of anger; trust issues; an inability to socialize; and

feelings that she was unable to support L.N., who had cancer at the time of trial.

Defendant also received therapy and prescriptions for several medications

including antidepressants, anxiety medication, and "Vyance for binge eating,

which is something [plaintiff] would constantly shame me for, is the 50-pound

weight gain in the past few years."

Doctor Roy Lubit testified at trial "as an expert in psychiatry and

emotional trauma." Lubit opined defendant "meets the criteria for major

depression" and chronic PTSD. PTSD involves a panoply of symptoms

including "allostatic attrition, which . . . means that the person's ability to deal

with a certain stressor decreases." Allostatic attrition created "secondary

problems" for defendant such as social withdrawal, binge eating, irritability, and

shame. Additionally, a "lack of trust is classic" in PTSD patients, "and it is a

huge issue, because that leads to withdrawal, failure to get medical care." Lubit

explained another symptom of the illness is "[l]earned helplessness," meaning

the individual loses the ability often to protect

themselves, that they start questioning themselves,

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wondering is it their fault, which is actually one of the

symptoms that often occurs, is the person starts blaming

themselves and thinking what's wrong with me? Why

did this happen to me? What have I done that caused

this? And it's a pretty serious symptom.

In Lubit's opinion, defendant "has not improved over time despite therapy

and despite time and she is continuing to suffer a great deal." Although Lubit

would hope "that things were going to go better" with therapy, "they haven't ."

"Prognosis is unfortunately poor, because after ten years, it's greatly weakened

her." Lubit opined defendant will "indefinitely" suffer damage to "cognition

and memory and ability to think." "The proximate cause" of all this damage

would be "the harassment, which she reports to me she suffered at the hands of

[plaintiff]."

Lubit opined defendant requires a "well trained" doctor to conduct years

of "intensive trauma therapy," but even with therapy, defendant will "probably

need to be on medication the rest of her life." "This many years of depression

and PTSD leave ongoing changes in the brain." "And we know that people who

have suffered especially complex trauma as she has, that they have far more

medical problems as time goes on." Lubit also recommended "couples therapy

to try to undo some of the damage to" defendant's current relationship. And

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defendant "needs help with her weight," requiring "a nutritionist and" a "gym

membership."

Lubit estimated the cost of defendant's therapy, going forward, to be

"about $180,000." Defendant's psychopharmacology appointments and

medication will cost about $80,000. Couples therapy will cost about $30,000 .

Lubit did not estimate the cost of a nutritionist or gym membership

As noted, the court found there was an "overwhelming amount of

evidence" proving "very clearly and certainly" that plaintiff "was the person

behind the series of severe, outrageous communications." The court premised

this conclusion on: the communications themselves, which sometimes

referenced events only plaintiff knew of; the social media usernames of the

harassing accounts, which sometimes contained plaintiff's name; the syntax and

word choice in some messages, which suggested someone pretending to be

younger and/or Middle Eastern; plaintiff being "perhaps the only person who

would have had the motive" for this conduct; references in the messages to

seeing defendant before a judge; L.N.'s credible testimony that she spoke with

plaintiff on the phone, and then identified plaintiff at trial; C.L.'s credible

testimony that plaintiff called him and "introduced herself by name" before

texting him from several "bogus" numbers; defendant's testimony that she

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identified plaintiff's telephone number with an app called TrapCall; anonymous

or impostor social media accounts that responded when defendant called them

by plaintiff's real name; and that in 2019, defendant obtained "a no-contact order

against [plaintiff] . . . , and magically the communications" generally "stopped."

II.

In her first argument, plaintiff contends the court erred by applying the

continuous tort doctrine to permit "defendant to base her claims on conduct that

occurred outside the two-year statutory period." Plaintiff maintains defendant

should not have been able to recover for "conduct that occurred before February

3, 2018" because the continuing violation doctrine applies only "to workplace

discrimination and harassment claims." Alternatively, plaintiff contends the

facts did not demonstrate plaintiff's "wrongful acts" were "so interconnected and

continuous that they cannot be separated into discrete actionable events but,

rather, are parts of one alleged wrong."

We disagree with all of these arguments. First, we reject plaintiff's legal

argument that the continuing violation or continuous tort doctrine applies only

to workplace discrimination and harassment claims. Second, contrary to her

factual argument, the trial record, which we recounted above, indisputably

established plaintiff's actions were part of an interconnected and continuous

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campaign of harassment which permitted defendant to recover damages for such

conduct.

Plaintiff raised the issue on the third day of trial when she made a "motion

to dismiss" which the court found was "in reality . . . a motion to exclude

evidence under the [c]ontinuing [t]ort [d]octrine." The court apparently

reserved judgment on the motion at that time and addressed it "within" its

ultimate decision on plaintiff's claims and defendant's counterclaims. In that

decision, the court considered "the statute of limitations for bringing" an IIED

claim that alleged plaintiff waged "a years-long campaign, primarily from

approximately 2016 into 2019 . . . of harassing phone calls, text messages," and

offensive, "disparaging and false social media posts." The court recited that

N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 provides "general torts which include the claims of intentional

infliction of emotional distress are governed by a two-year statute of

limitations."

In rejecting plaintiff's application, the court relied on an unpublished

decision from our court which "analyzed a similar issue and . . . also recognized

that the [c]ontinuing [t]ort or [c]ontinuing [v]iolation [d]octrine provides an

exception to the statute of limitations for the claim of intentional infliction of

emotional distress." The court explained that the unpublished authority "also

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observed that when an individual is subject to a continual, cumulative pattern of

tortious conduct, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the action

ceases."

Accordingly, the court held "as far as the beginning of that statute of

limitations period, it would begin running from the date that the pattern of

tortious conduct ceases." The court found in this case, defendant's proofs

established "the statute of limitations would not have even begun running until

some point 2019 [sic] at its earliest" and "would not close until some date in

2021." "[Defendant] instituted suit on her counterclaim for intentional infliction

of emotional distress in February of 2020, well within the statute of limitations

period."

The court also held defendant's IIED claim succeeded, given: there was

an "overwhelming amount of evidence" proving "very clearly and certainly" that

plaintiff "was the person behind the series of severe, outrageous

communications;" plaintiff's "campaign of mental torture was extremely

egregious;" defendant suffered damages "as a direct and proximate result of the

years-long campaign of harassment;" and "the emotional distress was so severe

that it genuinely would have caused substantial emotional distress and mental

harm to the average person."

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The court recited defendant sought compensation for emotional distress;

pain and suffering; economic losses, including lost income; "medical expenses,

including the future medical expenses"; out-of-pocket expenses; and punitive

damages. As noted, the court awarded defendant $100,000 in general damages,

and $100,000 in punitive damages. The court did not award damages for

defendant's economic losses or medical expenses.

The court awarded defendant "actual general damages" to compensate for

"the pain and suffering caused by the intentional infliction of emotional

distress." The court found defendant's own testimony established "the mental

anguish, pain and suffering she endured for several years and which she still

experiences." The court also found Lubit's testimony established defendant

suffers "from chronic post-traumatic stress disorder" with "severe and

permanent" damages and a "poor" prognosis "given the length of time she has

had to endure the stress." The court explained for these reasons and based on

the "proofs presented, this Court finds that the award of $100,000 is the amount

of money to adequately compensate" defendant "for the damages caused by

plaintiff's intentional conduct."

The court also awarded punitive damages. The court found plaintiff had

"specialized training and years of experience in the field" of psychiatry and

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"employed it as a weapon to attack the person whom she blamed for causing her

loss of her romantic partner" as well as "for her legal troubles including criminal

arrest, prosecution, and conviction." "When a person trained to help people with

mental health issues does everything in her power to torment another person

over a long and repetitive campaign," the court found that person knows "the

likelihood that serious harm would result." The court credited L.N.'s testimony

that defendant's "personality and demeanor changed for the far worse the longer

[plaintiff] tortured her." The court also credited defendant's testimony "that she

started questioning whether [plaintiff] was right about her."

The court declined to award defendant "any special or economic pecuniary

losses" because defendant "failed to demonstrate any such damages by a

preponderance of the evidence." The court also declined to award "the

calculated medical expenses" because defendant "failed to present any quantum

of proof as to that amount of money expended solely for medical treatment

related to the emotional distress caused by [plaintiff], and" Lubit's "calculations

as to what her future mental health treatment would cost" were "very

speculative," given it "appeared that the calculations were being made right from

the witness stand rather than based on a sound and reasoned analysis ."

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III.

We review a court's factual findings under a deferential standard, Balducci

v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 595 (2020), and defer "to the trial court that heard the

witnesses, sifted the competing evidence, and made reasoned conclusions ," In

re Twp. of Bordentown, 471 N.J. Super. 196, 217 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting

Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)). We do not disturb

the court's factual findings unless they are "so manifestly unsupported by or

inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to

offend the interests of justice." Ibid. (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs.

Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)); accord Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414,

428 (findings "by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by

adequate, substantial, credible evidence.").

We review "questions of law," including "the application of a statute of

limitations," however, under a de novo standard. Smith v. Datla, 451 N.J. Super.

82, 88 (App. Div. 2017). A "trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special

deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J.

366, 378 (1995).

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Finally, to any extent plaintiff is appealing from an evidentiary decision,

such "decisions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard . . . . " Est.

of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384 (2010). "A court

abuses its discretion when its 'decision is made without a rational explanation,

inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible

basis.'" State v. Chavies, 247 N.J. 245, 257 (2021) (quoting State v. R.Y., 242

N.J. 48, 65 (2020)). A "functional approach to abuse of discretion examines

whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to defer to the particular

decision at issue." R.Y., 242 N.J. at 65 (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty.

Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002)).

To recover for IIED, a party must show (1) intentional or reckless conduct

"(2) outrageously and (3) proximately caused (4) severe distress." G.D. v.

Kenny, 411 N.J. Super. 176, 194 (App. Div. 2009); accord Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181

N.J. 70, 77 (2004). The conduct complained of must be "so outrageous in

character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of

decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized

community." Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc'y, 111 N.J. 355, 366 (1988)

(quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d (1965)). In addition, "the

emotional distress suffered . . . must be 'so severe that no reasonable [person]

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could be expected to endure it.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. j).

IIED claims have a two-year statute of limitations. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. The

limitations period generally serves "to cut off a claim that is filed more than two

years after the complained-of" conduct. Roa v. Roa, 200 N.J. 555, 566 (2010).

This doctrine reflects the "unfairness and injustice which stem from litigation

based on distant circumstances and faded memories." Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J.

422, 430-31 (1979).

Time passing between the accrual of a claim and the filing of a complaint

may threaten a party's "fair opportunity to defend" against the claim. Id. at 430.

Limitations periods thus seek to protect this opportunity and "promote repose

by giving security and stability to human affairs." O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 83 N.J.

478, 490-91 (1980) (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)).

Hence, "considerations of individual justice as well as the broader

considerations of repose coincide to bar" the action of a claimant who

"voluntarily sleeps on his rights." Ferdinandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 438 (1961).

"The continuing violation doctrine" may offer "an exception to that

limitations period." Shepherd v. Hunterdon Developmental Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 18

(2002). The doctrine provides that when a claimant "is subject to a continual,

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cumulative pattern of tortious conduct, the statute of limitations does not begin

to run until the wrongful action ceases." Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, 158 N.J.

263, 272 (1999). That is, although the limitations period for a tort claim is

generally two years, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2, the continuing violation doctrine

provides "the entire claim may be timely if filed within two years of 'the date on

which the last component act occurred,'" Alexander v. Seton Hall Univ., 204

N.J. 219, 229 (2010) (quoting Roa, 200 N.J. at 567).

"The doctrine is based on the premise that the conduct becomes tortious

and actionable precisely because 'of its continuous, cumulative, synergistic

nature.'" Bolinger v. Bell Atl., 330 N.J. Super. 300, 306 (App. Div. 2000)

(quoting Wilson, 158 N.J. at 273). It permits "the aggregation of acts, each of

which, in itself, might not have alerted the" claimant "of the existence of a claim

. . . ." Roa, 200 N.J. at 569.

Over 100 years ago, without giving this rule an explicit name, the Court

of Errors and Appeals recognized a defendant's "persistence in" a "wrongful"

trespass left a claimant "entitled to recover" for harm suffered outside the

bounds of the limitations period. Morey v. Essex Cnty., 94 N.J.L. 427, 430 (E.

& A. 1920). In that case, the defendant constructed part of a highway on

plaintiffs' land "in direct violation of the property rights of plaintiffs." Id. at

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428. The plaintiffs brought suit outside the statute of limitations, but the court

instructed the "jury that the statute of limitations was no bar to the action . . . ."

Id. at 430. The Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed. Ibid. It held the "right

of action of the plaintiffs does not rest entirely upon the original tortious entry

and partial destruction of their property, but upon the continued occupation and

user of the property by the defendant following the original entry." Ibid. "In

other words, the constant repetition of the defendant's unlawful acts, its

persistence in its wrongful occupation of plaintiffs' land, constituted continuous

trespass, and the plaintiffs were entitled to recover from the defendant the

damages sustained by them for all six years" before plaintiffs ultimately filed

suit. Ibid.

This court later described the rule in Morey as "the concept of continuing

wrong . . . ." Stanley Dev. Co. v. Millburn Twp., 26 N.J. Super. 328, 331-32

(App. Div. 1953). In Stanley, the defendant installed a "storm sewer" that

blocked an adjoining parcel of land from accessing or using the nearby "sanitary

sewer . . . ." Id. at 330. Thirty-seven years after both sewers were constructed,

the plaintiff took title to the adjoining land and constructed "another outlet" to

the blocked sanitary sewer. Id. at 330-31. The plaintiff brought suit to recover

its construction costs, arguing it had a viable claim under Morey. Ibid. This

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court declined to apply Morey, finding the plaintiff did not allege "a trespass"

or demonstrate damages. Id. at 331. In dicta, the panel noted that "even where

the concept of continuing wrong has been applied, recovery is ordinarily

permitted only with respect to damages sustained during the period of

limitations preceding the suit." Id. at 331-32.

While Stanley suggested Morey's rule was limited to trespass actions, this

court and the Supreme Court proceeded to recognize the doctrine—which this

court called "the concept of 'continuous tort'"—in other circumstances, such as

a continual "inverse condemnation," "negligent representation by an attorney,"

or "course of negligent treatment by a physician . . . ." Giovine v. Giovine, 284

N.J. Super. 3, 37 (App. Div. 1995) (citing Russo Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Bd. of

Educ., 280 N.J. Super. 320, 327-28 (App. Div. 1995); Aykan v. Goldzweig, 238

N.J. Super. 389, 392 (Law Div. 1989); Tortorello v. Reinfeld, 6 N.J. 58, 66

(1950)).

In Russo Farms, the plaintiff farmers alleged "the improper siting and

construction of a public high school across the street" caused the farm to flood.

280 N.J. Super. at 323-24. The flooding began before August 1987, ended "by

May 1990," and in July 1990, the farmers filed a complaint against defendants

alleging, among other claims, inverse condemnation. Id. at 326. The trial court

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granted defendants summary judgment "on the ground that every claim was

barred by a statute of limitations, a statute of repose, or the notice provisions of

the Tort Claims Act." Id. at 324. We reversed. Id. at 331. The decision noted

a "separate cause of action" for inverse condemnation "accrued with each

incursion of floodwater." Id. at 326. The decision adopted the dicta in Stanley

by holding that even "where the concept of continuing wrong has been applied,

recovery is ordinarily permitted only with respect to damages sustained during

the period of limitations preceding the suit." Id. at 328 (quoting Stanley Dev.

Co., 26 N.J. Super. at 331-32).

Language used in the "continuous tort" cases, such as Morey and Russo

Farms, generally mirror the standards formulated in the "continuing violation"

cases, such as Wilson and Roa. Compare Morey, 94 N.J.L. at 430 (recovery for

"constant repetition of the defendant's unlawful acts" beyond limitations period)

with Wilson, 158 N.J. at 273 (recovery for "continuous, cumulative, synergistic"

acts beyond limitations period); compare Russo Farms, 280 N.J. Super. at 326

(a "separate cause of action accrued with each incursion of floodwater") with

Roa, 200 N.J. at 569 (citation omitted) (each "discrete . . . act starts a new clock

for filing charges alleging that act.").

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As such, we accept that the line of "continuous tort" cases apply to this

case so long as defendant can demonstrate a "constant repetition of . . . unlawful

acts." Morey, 94 N.J.L. at 430. On this point, the court's factual findings that

plaintiff's conduct involved the constant repetition of wrongful acts are

overwhelmingly supported by the trial record.

By way of summary, plaintiff accused defendant of being a criminal or

thief in 2015, and 2016, and 2018. Plaintiff taunted defendant on social media

in 2015, in 2016, and until at least 2017. Plaintiff contacted defendant

relentlessly and at inconvenient hours beginning in 2015, throughout 2018, and

in 2019. These communications often suggested a racial or ethnic hostility, such

as the "ArabianDollXO" username on Seeking Arrangements, the text telling

defendant to stop "acting like you're a good Muslim girl" in 2018, and the text

stating "more guys explode in you than Gaza" in 2019. Plaintiff degraded

defendant sexually by making and broadcasting composite photographs of

defendant's face on other women's nude bodies in 2016 and 2017, creating a

"sugar baby" profile on Seeking Arrangements, texting defendant warnings

about sexually transmitted diseases in 2018, and mocking defendant's HPV

diagnosis in 2018 and 2019. Throughout all of 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, and

2019, plaintiff contacted defendant's family, friends, and professional

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connections seeking to frighten or humiliate defendant. The "incessant" nature

of these communications was the reason defendant gave for becoming "a shut -

in" who was unable to function. Given "the constant repetition" and

"persistence" of plaintiff's wrongful acts, we are convinced the continuous tort

doctrine permitted defendant to bring the IIED claim based on conduct occurring

before February 2018. Morey, 94 N.J.L. at 430.

Further, the court's damages award was entirely consistent with the

holding in Russo Farms that "recovery is ordinarily permitted only with respect

to damages sustained during the period of limitations preceding the suit" in

continuous tort cases. 280 N.J. Super. at 328 (quoting Stanley Dev. Co., 26 N.J.

Super. at 331-32). The court premised its award of damages on the "severe"

pain and suffering defendant "still experiences" and which has caused

"permanent" damage to defendant with a "poor" prognosis, which defendant

necessarily suffered within the limitations period.

We note as a matter of policy that defendant suffered "[l]earned

helplessness" due to PTSD, and complained of "paranoid thoughts" about the

court system following the harassment. Because the record demonstrated

defendant did not "voluntarily" sleep on her rights, we also conclude the policy

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considerations underpinning our limitations periods would not be served by

barring this claim. Ferdinandi, 35 N.J. at 438.

IV.

We next consider, and reject, plaintiff's argument that the court committed

error when it ostensibly granted her motion in limine to exclude evidence, only

to later rely on those proofs when considering the timeliness of defendant's IIED

claim. Specifically, plaintiff maintains defendant attempted to marshal

unauthenticated text messages, but then later withdrew the "request to admit"

them.

First, we stress that the court never granted plaintiff's motion in limine.

The court originally ruled the issue was moot, but after trial, the court

reconsidered the motion and denied it, which Rule 4:25-8(d) expressly permitted

the court to do. In the alternative, even if it was error for the court to admit the

three messages plaintiff highlights on appeal, it was not plain error given the

overwhelming evidence against plaintiff in this matter.

Before trial, plaintiff moved in limine to exclude certain text messages

and social media posts, asserting—among other things—that because many of

the text messages came from "random" phone numbers, they could not be

authenticated without metadata. Exhibit A to the motion, condensed into eight

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pages of plaintiff's appendix, contained two screenshots of social media posts

and about thirty-six text messages. At oral argument, the defense "withdrew

their intention to utilize those text messages," citing difficulties obtaining their

metadata, and the court ruled the motion was "moot."

The court noted the withdrawal and said defense counsel "stipulate[d] that

those text messages will not be admitted into evidence." The court held "that

motion moot" and informed plaintiff that "by bringing that motion, that would

have meant that you also would not be able to reference those text messages ."

Later that day, the court reiterated the motion in limine to exclude text messages

and Twitter screenshots was moot because "defendant withdrew their intention

to utilize those text messages." In its ultimate decision, by contrast, the court

held: "There was a motion in limine by the plaintiff filed July 8th to exclude

the defendant's texts and the Twitter screenshots. That motion is denied. That

material had been provided and, in fact, that material was utilized effectively by

the plaintiff during the course of the trial."

This court reviews the trial court's rulings on "in limine motions

adjudicating the admissibility of evidence" for an abuse of discretion. Primmer

v. Harrison, 472 N.J. Super. 173, 187 (App. Div. 2022); accord Brenman v.

Demello, 191 N.J. 18, 31 (2007). "A court abuses its discretion when its

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'decision is made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from

established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Chavies, 247 N.J. at

257 (quoting R.Y., 242 N.J. at 65). A "functional approach to abuse of

discretion examines whether there are good reasons for an appellate court to

defer to the particular decision at issue." R.Y., 242 N.J. at 65 (quoting Flagg,

171 N.J. at 571).

A motion in limine is a "pretrial request that certain inadmissible evidence

not be referred to or offered at trial." Black's Law Dictionary 1109 (9th ed.

2009); accord Conforti v. County of Ocean, 255 N.J. 142, 170 (2023). Rule

4:25-8, which governs motions in limine, provides the "court shall rule on all

motions submitted under this rule in a timely manner based on the issue raised

in the particular motion." R. 4:25-8(a)(4). That said, a "trial court's ruling on a

motion in limine shall not preclude the court from reconsidering or modifying

that ruling, sua sponte or at the request of a party, based on later developments

at trial." R. 4:25-8(d). And while it did not expressly remind plaintiff of this

provision at the time of its initial ruling, the court did inform plaintiff, on a

separate motion in limine not appealed, that the ruling was open to

reconsideration.

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Plaintiff accuses the court of legal error by granting the motion and then

denying it. That did not happen: the court never granted the motion, and

repeatedly stated it was moot. But even if the court had taken the action plaintiff

described, it did not constitute reversible error. The Court Rules permit the court

to reconsider or modify a ruling "based on later developments at trial," as the

court stated it had done here. R. 4:25-8(d).

In any event, even accepting plaintiff's argument that the court erred, it

did not constitute plain error. A predominant theme of defendant's trial

testimony was that someone sent "incessant," and ultimately perhaps

"thousands," of antagonistic text messages to her "on a daily basis." Defendant's

extensive recitation of these messages included a description (but not a full

quotation) of certain text messages accusing her of having HPV, described as a

"purple P-U-S-S;" being "broke" or jobless; and using Medicaid. Exhibit A did

contain similar messages, but according to defendant, these were representative

of many others she received across a period of years. Plaintiff did not object to

this description when defendant offered it, and later in the trial, herself

marshaled text messages which read: "You should take yourself to get checked

for your pussy. . . . You have HPV . . . and a purple pussy and the purple cow

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nipples." Otherwise, our review of the trial indicates the exact messages in

Exhibit A were kept out of the record.

Regarding the supposedly random phone numbers from which those text

messages emanated, defendant testified she believed plaintiff used a "third-party

application to change her number" so that text messages would seem to pour in

from anonymous strangers, L.S.'s new girlfriend, or a "notification tool" for STI

diagnoses. Yet, defendant explained she knew plaintiff authored these messages

because of "the context" they arrived in; because they "stopped once the case

started;" and because they were written in a consistent voice, often repeating

uncommon phrases like "heifer" or "purple pussy." Defendant explained:

I know it's [plaintiff]. I don't know if I'm allowed to

say that, but I know it's [plaintiff] because the wording

on all of [plaintiff]'s messages to me are always

redundant. She always says that I put my hands in

people's wallets. She always says I'm a whore. It's

always redundant. And there’s hundreds of other

messages where she repeats the exact same claims

dating from 2015.

Later, by way of another example, defendant pointed out that some of the

anonymous text messages would use the word

"Vallaj," which is the Albanian way to say "Vallei,"

(phonetic) which means I swear to god, which is a very

interesting thing. . . . I have many Albanian Muslim

friends and never have I heard them referring to

swearing to God and telling someone to kill themselves

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in the same sentence. So it's obvious that's not coming

from someone who is an Albanian or of Muslim descent

....

BY [PLAINTIFF]:

Q You're aware I'm not Albanian, correct?

A Yes, I'm aware.

That is: defendant testified the misuse of an Albanian Muslim oath

indicated the anonymous author of these text messages was not Albanian, and

plaintiff then elicited testimony that she was not Albanian.

On appeal, plaintiff argues it was error for the court to grant the motion in

limine, then deny the motion in its final decision, and so rest its holding on a

tweet, an Instagram message, and a text message not included in Exhibit A but

"essentially the same" as those in Exhibit A. The tweet read: "If you think for

one minute you're getting out of stealing my prescriptions with your husband

. . . just getting started." The Instagram message read: "Donnie [sic] abused

you and you know that" and "I dare you to even call my job. I will come to your

house again. If you come out this time, I will run you over. That's if you don't

shoot me, since you make threats, dirty bitch." The text message read: "You

fucked him for my money, you slut. You are basically my hooker."

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Apart from not including these writings in Exhibit A, plaintiff did not

object to their admission at trial, and does not claim to have done so on appeal.

As such, the plain error standard governs review. R. 2:10-2. That standard

provides any "error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court

unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an

unjust result." Ibid.

Given the overwhelming nature of the remaining evidence against

plaintiff—including evidence regarding the voluminous number of similar text

messages sent to defendant, L.N., and C.L., whose admissibility plaintiff does

not contest—the three she highlights on appeal were not clearly capable of

producing an unjust result. Cf. State v. Sui Kam Tung, 460 N.J. Super. 75, 98-

99 (App. Div. 2019) (under the plain error standard, "a reviewing court may

consider whether, absent the evidence admitted in error, there was

overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt.").

V.

Finally, plaintiff argues the court erred by failing to find the TCA

immunized her from civil liability. Plaintiff contends that immunity applied

because defendant premised her counterclaim "in part on" an allegation that

plaintiff wrongfully retrieved defendant's medical records while employed at

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Rutgers UBHC. Plaintiff also argues defendant failed to show plaintiff's

"conduct was outside the scope of her employment or willful, wanton, or grossly

negligent" as required to bring the counterclaim beyond the TCA's scope. In

addition to disagreeing with these arguments as a matter of law, we note the

court declined to find plaintiff accessed defendant's medical records.

As noted, defendant alleged that plaintiff, as a former employee of Rutgers

UBHC, accessed defendant's medical records to discover, and later disseminate,

embarrassing information about defendant. Plaintiff filed a pre-trial motion to

dismiss, which stated the TCA "covered" both the "public entity" holding

defendant's medical records and plaintiff, as an employee of that entity.

The court's final decision noted defendant testified "the person harassing

her was putting information into the social media posts that could only have

come from her medical records," and defendant also testified plaintiff had

"access to medical records" as an employee of Rutgers UBHC. From these

premises, defendant "deduced and argued that it had to be [plaintiff] who

somehow accessed" the medical records. Yet, the court rejected that deduction,

concluding the evidence "hardly amounts to any level of proof" necessary "to

make the leap of faith to conclude that there could be no one else who could

have accessed those medical records other than [plaintiff], and then the

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additional leap of faith to conclude that the shared information could have only

come from [defendant's] medical records."

On appeal, plaintiff presented us with selective quotes from the court's

recitation of defendant's testimony, but omitted the paragraphs which

immediately follow it, in which the court explicitly rejected the inferences

defendant urged it to make. The court held the IIED claim succeeded

notwithstanding defendant's unproven allegation regarding the medical records,

not because of the allegation. It rejected the one fact which would, per plaintiff's

argument, implicate the TCA.

Additionally, we note plaintiff's conduct was clearly outside the scope of

her employment. See Velez v. City of Jersey City, 358 N.J. Super. 224, 239

(App. Div. 2003) (quoting N.J.S.A. 59:3-14) ("Nothing in this act shall

exonerate a public employee from liability if it is established that his conduct

was outside the scope of his employment or constituted a crime, actual fraud,

actual malice, or willful conduct."). As the trial court articulated, plaintiff had

"specialized training and years of experience in the field" of psychiatry and

"employed it as a weapon to attack the person whom she blamed for causing her

loss of her romantic partner" as well as "for her legal troubles including criminal

arrest, prosecution, and conviction." "When a person trained to help people with

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mental health issues does everything in her power to torment another person

over a long and repetitive campaign," that person knows "serious harm" would

likely result.

To the extent we have not addressed the remaining arguments raised by

plaintiff it is because we have determined they lack sufficient merit to warrant

further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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