The opinion
05/19/2026
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs January 21, 2026
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. KELLEY IRENE ENGEL GAMBILL
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County
No. 2022-B-1125 Jennifer Smith, Judge
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No. M2025-00227-CCA-R3-CD
___________________________________
The Defendant, Kelley Gambill, appeals her Davidson County Criminal Court conviction
of aggravated cruelty to animals, for which she received a sentence of two years’ supervised
probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court misconstrued the statute's
“no justifiable purpose” language and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
her conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
STEVEN W. SWORD, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT H.
MONTGOMERY, JR., and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.
Nathan Cate, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Kelley Irene Engel Gambill.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Park Huff, Assistant Attorney General;
Glenn R. Funk, District Attorney General; and Deborah Housel, Assistant District Attorney
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 15, 2022, the Defendant was charged by indictment with one count of
aggravated cruelty to animals1 based upon her alleged amputation of a portion of a kitten’s
leg. The kitten subsequently died. The Defendant waived her right to a trial by jury. A
bench trial was held on February 20, 2024.
The facts in this case are generally undisputed. Kelsey Carlin testified that she
worked as the intake coordinator at the non-profit Nashville Humane Association (NHA)
in Davidson County. She stated the NHA was open seven days a week, from 10:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m. She testified that although the facility was not open to the public on Mondays,
it was fully staffed, and a staff member would still answer the phone or the door if
contacted. She explained that her job included the initial review of every animal that came
into the facility to determine if the facility could take it in and provide treatment if needed.
Ms. Carlin testified that on Tuesday, May 10, 2022, at approximately 3:00 p.m., the
Defendant came to the NHA with a kitten in a box. The Defendant told Ms. Carlin that she
had amputated the kitten’s leg at her home. The Defendant further stated that she had
watched a video on Google before the amputation. Ms. Carlin testified that she
immediately asked to take the kitten to see the staff veterinarian, but the Defendant tried to
stop her to explain what had happened and why she had amputated the kitten’s leg. Ms.
Carlin stated that she recognized the kitten’s “dire need,” told the Defendant to stop
explaining and said that they could talk in a moment because the kitten needed to go to the
NHA’s clinic to be assessed. While Ms. Carlin took the kitten to the clinic, someone else
took the Defendant to Ms. Carlin’s office.
Ms. Carlin then returned to her office and spoke at length with the Defendant.
There, the Defendant told her that a young boy had brought the injured kitten to her home
and that she had amputated his injured leg. The Defendant told her that the kitten had been
meowing a lot when she first saw it. Because Ms. Carlin was not a veterinarian, she asked
the Defendant to write out what had happened, and the Defendant did so. In addition, Ms.
Carlin was present when the Defendant made a recorded statement to both her and Dr.
Megan Anderson, who also came to speak with the Defendant in Ms. Carlin’s office. Ms.
Carlin testified that the Defendant always stated that she acted to save the kitten’s life.
1
The indictment also charged the Defendant with one count of delivery of a schedule II controlled
substance and the unlicensed practice or attempted practice of veterinary medicine; however, both of these
charges were dismissed by the State prior to trial.
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Dr. Megan Anderson testified that she was a veterinarian and had worked as the
NHA’s medical director for six years. She testified that she was working on May 10, 2022,
when the Defendant brought the kitten to the NHA for care and described the kitten’s
condition, accompanied by photos and a video of the kitten while at the NHA. She testified
that she visually assessed the kitten before going to Ms. Carlin’s office to speak with the
Defendant, while another staff doctor continued to assess the kitten. Dr. Anderson
described the kitten as approximately eight weeks old and in a very debilitated condition.
She stated that the kitten barely opened his eyes, had very shallow breathing, and had a
medical sock net over the back half of his body when he arrived. Dr. Anderson also
described how the kitten’s temperature, pulse, respiration, and anal tone were assessed and
how the observations indicated the kitten’s ability to feel pain. She described the kitten as
“not really responsive to stimuli, potentially very close to losing consciousness, [and] not
responsive at all.” She also stated that the kitten was severely dehydrated. Dr. Anderson
later confirmed that the kitten had also suffered some spinal trauma and that the kitten
might have been anemic or did not have a good blood volume. Dr. Anderson stated that
she understood the Defendant had described the kitten as stable, but she opined that
“[n]othing about the pet on presentation even remotely suggest[ed the] patient was stable.”
Dr. Anderson testified that she could not say if the kitten was paralyzed without more
information because an animal can have motor deficiencies that make it appear to be
paralyzed while still feeling “deep pain.”
Dr. Anderson testified that the kitten meowed when she removed the sock net. She
stated that she then began to remove the tape, which removed some of the kitten’s fur and
made the kitten meow. Dr. Anderson opined that this was an indicator of pain, so she
paused the tape removal to administer some “heavy duty pain medications” for the kitten.
The removal of the sock net revealed a “very chronically exposed bone” with jagged edges,
and the exposed bone was longer than the skin. Dr. Anderson described the bone marrow
as discolored and the fur and tissue as dried out and plastered to the apparently devitalized
bone. She described a tendon that was exposed and “hanging out,” as well as an exposed
muscle. Dr. Anderson could not be sure when the kitten’s injuries had occurred, as the only
information available to her was the date the Defendant’s neighbor brought her the injured
kitten. However, Dr. Anderson testified that it could take up to several days for an infection
to occur and that amputating the kitten’s leg would not result in the infection going away.
She stated that, depending on how old the wound was, a good possibility existed that the
infection would spread to the bloodstream. She opined that antibiotics would have been
necessary and the first step in treatment, rather than amputation.
Dr. Anderson stated that the kitten should have been stabilized initially with fluids
and that a complete baseline diagnostic assessment should have been performed, including
X-rays and wound care. She opined that if the kitten had been brought to the clinic first it
would have taken approximately a week to determine if surgery was an appropriate option.
-3-
She further opined that the kitten would have felt pain during the amputation without
proper medications and anesthesia. She testified that pain in animals presents in different
ways. She stated that the pain medication used by the Defendant was not a “heavy duty”
pain medication and was not adequate pain control for such an amputation. She also stated
that the kitten’s fur had not been properly removed, the wound was not properly sealed,
and the bone was left exposed under the bandage after the amputation. She opined that
these actions would have left the kitten more prone to infection.
Dr. Anderson stated that the Defendant had various care options for the kitten,
including a general veterinary practice in normal office hours or emergency veterinary
clinics open twenty-four hours a day. She stated that despite the Defendant’s lack of
financial means, no veterinarian would allow an animal to suffer and, at a minimum, would
have helped to alleviate any suffering. She described the Defendant’s treatment of the
kitten as “heartbreaking.” Dr. Anderson testified that the kitten passed away within several
hours of arriving at the NHA clinic.
Dr. Anderson stated that the Defendant’s description of the kitten as “doing great”
and not complaining much did not represent the condition of the “very obtunded animal”
that was “barely responsive” upon arrival at the NHA. She opined that nothing in the initial
assessment even remotely suggested the kitten was stable. Dr. Anderson testified that,
based upon the assessment of the kitten and the postmortem X-rays, “[i]n a case such as
this, humane euthanasia absolutely would have been an acceptable treatment and approved
treatment for this pet.”
Dr. Anderson also stated that the “owner surrender contract” completed for the NHA
contained written statements made by the Defendant. Dr. Anderson read a portion of the
statement into the record, stating:
We have already made this kitten a part of our family. We love him
and would like to keep him as such. We have taken care of this stray kitten
with injuries. Something to me by -- oh, maybe brought to me by neighbor
for help. Will I be maintaining kitten?
And then it said: I would like to be first right -- first refusal of this
kitten when he is ready to go home.
On cross-examination, Dr. Anderson discussed the compassionate care offered at
emergency veterinary clinics, including antibiotics, pain medications, and fluids, to help
animals until they receive other veterinary care. She also agreed that the kitten’s X-rays
showed that he suffered some damage to the cranial area. She agreed the kitten had suffered
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significant trauma and injuries, but she testified that antibiotics should have been the first
step in treating the kitten’s injuries. On redirect examination, Dr. Anderson testified that
despite the Defendant’s statements that she did not want the kitten to die, the Defendant
“failed to see the magnitude of the inappropriate acts and horrific acts, quite frankly, that
she had done to this cat.”
The State rested. Following an unsuccessful motion for judgment of acquittal, the
Defendant elected to testify.
The Defendant testified that on May 8, 2022, at approximately 5:00 p.m., a young
boy, who was one of the Defendant’s neighbors, found an injured kitten, which he brought
to the Defendant’s home to seek assistance for the kitten’s injuries. The Defendant
admitted she was not experienced or knowledgeable in veterinary medicine, but that she
had been a nurse for twenty-six years and wanted to help the kitten. The Defendant visually
inspected the kitten, whom she observed had a back leg that was mangled and broken in
several places and had several tears. The Defendant stated that the kitten looked to be in
great distress and pain, appeared limp, and was “crying nonstop.” The kitten did not move
or meow much. The Defendant testified that she attempted to call various veterinary offices
but that no one answered because it was Sunday. She testified that she called two or three
emergency care veterinary clinics but that she did not have the money to pay for care at
those facilities. The Defendant stated that she wanted to help the kitten and did not want
it to be euthanized. She was concerned that, due to the severity of the kitten’s injuries, he
would be euthanized because she could not afford expensive veterinary care. Thus, she
chose not to take the kitten to an emergency care veterinary clinic.
The Defendant testified that she also feared the kitten would develop an infection in
his leg wound. She stated that following her evaluation of the kitten, she believed the kitten
was likely paralyzed in both his back legs and his tail. The Defendant researched the injury
online and decided to amputate a portion of the kitten’s leg using medical supplies she had
in her home. She denied having watched a video of how to amputate the leg. She hydrated
the kitten with a saline syringe. She used pain medication she still possessed from another
cat’s prior surgery a year or two previously, but she was concerned about overdosing the
kitten; she stated she gave one dose prior to the amputation and two more doses after. She
used garden shears or branch cutters to amputate the kitten’s leg at approximately 10:30
p.m. She discussed how she attempted to sterilize the instruments by cleaning them with
bleach and then boiling them. She also used yarn to make a tourniquet. She testified she
did not use anesthesia. The Defendant stated that she applied pressure for fifteen minutes
to ensure that the bleeding had stopped, she cleaned the wound, and she placed a pressure
bandage on the wound. The Defendant then put a medical sock over both the kitten’s legs
and tail as a bandage. The Defendant stated that the kitten’s condition had improved after
the amputation; he appeared more alert and cried less. She stated that when he was placed
in a blanket, he would move “down a little bit with his front paws and his upper body, [and]
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he would pull himself back up so that he was back up here because he liked being
underneath and around the neck area.” She also stated that the kitten drank a little water,
as well as a broth-and-water mixture, but did not urinate or have a bowel movement after
the amputation. The Defendant admitted she did not obtain antibiotics for the kitten or take
the kitten for treatment or care on Monday, May 9. She did not remove the bandage before
taking the kitten to the NHA.
The defense rested. At the conclusion of the bench trial, the parties made closing
arguments, during which the trial court asked whether the phrase “no justifiable purpose,”
as contained in the statute, created an objective or subjective standard. The State argued
that the standard was an objective standard based upon reasonableness and not based upon
what a defendant thinks in his or her mind. The State further argued that the evidence was
sufficient because it demonstrated that the kitten suffered for two days with little pain
medication after the Defendant cut off part of his leg with branch clippers. The State argued
that the kitten suffered and that his pain was evident from his behaviors as testified to at
trial. The State argued that the Defendant had three choices: “She could do nothing, she
could take it and get some help, or she could do something that did nothing but exacerbate
the pain.” The State argued that the Defendant chose option three because of her own
views against euthanasia rather than what would have been best for the kitten.
The Defendant argued that the trial court could not confuse a justifiable purpose
with the method employed.2 When the trial court asked the Defendant what proof there
was to support justification, defense counsel responded that the open and exposed nature
of the kitten’s wound was more likely to be susceptible to infection and that the Defendant
had, “right or wrong,” attempted to remove any infection. The Defendant asserted that
despite the evidence of the potential of suffering and the injuries involved, as well as the
kitten’s meowing when the bandage was removed, there was no evidence to contradict that
she did not believe the animal to be in pain. As to the issue of the standard to be applied
to a “justifiable purpose,” the Defendant focused her argument on the distinction between
the method used and the purpose.
Following the conclusion of closing arguments, the trial court noted that the facts
were largely undisputed and then discussed the evidence presented. Then, the trial court
made the following findings:
T e ee a f ec e a a a ea e e f e ffe e a ed a
e fiab e e e a a e
ae e e ca e e ca a b a a f dea dea a
c a a a e a ca e e ca ac a a a Te C de A
a S
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In the [c]ourt’s view, the [D]efendant’s actions on May the 8th
amounted to mutilation of a helpless animal and torture, which is defined as
an act causing unreasonable physical pain and suffering. . . . The only issue
is whether the [D]efendant acted with justifiable purpose.
The statute, as I indicated during arguments, does not define
justifiable purpose. But in common parlance, justifiable purpose is a reason
that can be defended as being just, right, or warranted.
The [c]ourt is also guided by a quotation from American
Jurisprudence 2d on animals, which is a compilation of cases from across the
country, which states that: In the context of animal cruelty statutes[,] an act
is consider[ed] justifiable where its purpose or object is reasonable and
adequate and the pain and suffering caused is not disproportionate to the end
sought to be attained.
That definition and explanation of that term sort of rings true and
correct to the [c]ourt. And that guides the [c]ourt today.
In the [c]ourt’s view, there was no reasonable justification for the
[D]efendant’s actions in this case.
This animal suffered extreme and prolonged pain. The [D]efendant’s
actions were – in no way, shape or form amounted to any proper emergency
care. The [D]efendant was . . . not qualified to perform any veterinary
procedure, let alone the removal of a limb.
The pain and mutilation suffered by the animal in this situation was
so disproportionate to any asserted reason as to shock the conscience.
For all of these reasons, the [c]ourt finds that the State has carried its
burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that the [D]efendant is guilty
of aggravated cruelty to animals.
-7-
Following a sentencing hearing on April 24, 2024, the trial court sentenced the
defendant to two years of supervised probation, and on May 1, 2024, the trial court entered
an order of deferral placing the Defendant on judicial diversion. The Defendant was also
ordered to undergo a psychological evaluation and counseling. The Defendant was not
required to surrender the two dogs she already owned, but she was prohibited from
possessing or owning any additional companion animals during her two-year probationary
term. The defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial on May 15, 2024. Following a
hearing on October 30, 2024, the trial court denied the Defendant’s motion for a new trial
on January 16, 2025. This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court misconstrued the “no justifiable
purpose” language in the statute by interpreting the phrase as applying an objective
standard. The Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish her
conviction for aggravated cruelty to animals, arguing that the State failed to prove that she
acted “with no justifiable purpose.” The State argues that the trial court properly
interpreted the statute and that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. We
examine these issues below.
A. “WITH NO JUSTIFIABLE PURPOSE”
The Defendant asserts that the trial court misinterpreted the phrase “justifiable
purpose” within the aggravated cruelty to animals statute by applying an objective standard
or “reasonable procedure” test. The Defendant argues that the statutory language requires
the fact finder to look at her actual purpose and goal in her actions, rather than at the actions
themselves, to determine whether she acted with a justifiable purpose. The State argues
that the trial court appropriately applied an objective standard. At the time of the offense,
and as charged in the indictment, aggravated cruelty to animals was defined in relevant part
as occurring when “[a] person . . . , with no justifiable purpose, . . . intentionally or
knowingly . . . [k]ills, maims, tortures, . . . mutilates, . . . or otherwise causes serious
physical injury, a substantial risk of death, or death to a companion animal or intentionally
causes serious physical injury to a companion animal.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-212(a)(1)
(Supp 2021).
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This issue is one of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo without a
presumption of correctness. Falls v. Goins, 673 S.W.3d 173, 179 (Tenn. 2023); State v.
Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. 2010). In interpreting statutes, the judiciary’s
foremost consideration is to give effect to the General Assembly’s legislative intent without
either restricting or expanding the statute beyond its intended scope. Owens v. State, 908
S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995). In doing so, we presume that the General Assembly “knows
the law and makes new laws accordingly.” Johnson v. Hopkins, 432 S.W.3d 840, 848
(Tenn. 2013). Our goal in determining “what a statute means” requires us to determine
“how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text
at the time it was issued.” State v. Deberry, 651 S.W.3d 918, 924 (Tenn. 2022) (first quoting
Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tenn. 2008); and then
quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
33 (2012)).
When a statute’s meaning is unclear or ambiguous, “we rely upon well-established
canons of statutory construction.” State v. Sherman, 266 S.W.3d 395, 401 (Tenn. 2008).
The principle of statutory interpretation expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or “the
expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others,” is helpful in our present analysis.
Richards v. Vanderbilt Univ. Med. Ctr., 706 S.W.3d 319, 324 (Tenn. 2025). We may also
“look to authoritative dictionaries published around the time of a statute’s enactment.”
Deberry, 651 S.W.3d at 925 (citing State v. Edmondson, 231 S.W.3d 925, 928 & n.3 (Tenn.
2007)). In interpreting unclear or ambiguous statutes, “[w]e consider the whole text of a
statute and interpret each word so that no part will be inoperative, superfluous, void[,] or
insignificant” in an effort to give full effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Deberry,
651 S.W.3d at 925 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bailey v. Blount Cnty. Bd.
of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216, 228 (Tenn. 2010)). “Statutes in pari matera—those relating to
the same subject or having a common purpose—are to be construed together.” Owens v.
State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926 (Tenn. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Wilson
v. Johnson County, 879 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tenn.1994)).
Our analysis first requires us to determine the ordinary and natural meaning of the
phrase “justifiable purpose” as contained in Code section 39-14-212(a)(1). The phrase is
not defined in the statute. Although we have previously been called upon to determine the
General Assembly’s intent in relation to other aspects of this statute, the issue of
determining the General Assembly’s intent regarding “justifiable purpose” is one of first
impression. See State v. Mainer, 678 S.W.3d 717, 723-25 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2023)
(interpreting the meaning of “companion animal” as used in Code section 39-14-212(a)
(2018)); State v. Barnett, No. M2009-00756-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 3822880, at *12-13
(Tenn. Crim. App. May 20, 2010) (interpreting the meaning of “depraved and sadistic” as
used in Code section 39-14-212(b)(1) (2006)), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 23, 2010).
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As asserted by the State, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “justifiable” as “[l]egally
or morally acceptable for one or more good reasons; excusable; defensible.” Justifiable,
Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Black’s defines “purpose” as “[a]n objective,
goal, or end.” Purpose, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). The Defendant asserts
that “justifiable” is defined as “having a good reason, or capable of being justified,” and
that “purpose” relates to the Defendant’s “intended goal or objective in acting.” However,
the Defendant cites to no authority for either definition. The term justifiable is used to
modify the term “purpose” within the statute. Therefore, the plain meaning of the phrase
“justifiable purpose” entails having a reasonable, excusable, or defensible objective, goal,
or end.
Additionally, although “justifiable” is not defined in the aggravated cruelty to
animals statute, the General Assembly has addressed justification in the general criminal
statutes by providing that “[i]t is a defense to prosecution that the conduct of the person is
justified under this part.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-11-601. Within the same part of the Code,
the specific defense of “necessity” provides a definition of justification. While necessity
is not raised as a defense here, the language of this statute is instructive:
[C]onduct is justified if:
(1) The person reasonably believes the conduct is immediately
necessary to avoid imminent harm; and
(2) The desirability and urgency of avoiding the harm clearly
outweigh the harm sought to be prevented by the law proscribing the conduct,
according to ordinary standards of reasonableness.
Id. § 39-11-609 (emphasis added). This, too, supports the trial court’s application of an
objective, rather than a subjective, standard in interpreting the meaning of “justifiable
purpose.”
Beyond consideration of the plain meaning of the terms, “[i]n construing statutes,
Tennessee law provides that courts are to avoid a construction that leads to absurd results.”
State v. Curry, 705 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tenn. 2025) (quoting Tennessean v. Metro. Gov't of
Nashville, 485 S.W.3d 857, 872 (Tenn. 2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
State v. Emerson, No. W2024-00968-CCA-R3-CD, 2025 WL 2985714, at *8-10 (Tenn.
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Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2025), no perm. app. filed. The Defendant asserts that “[t]he context
here is a criminal prohibition meant to target malicious or sadistic acts of animal abuse”
and that “any sincere, humane purpose on the part of the Defendant should suffice” to
establish the justifiable purpose language of the statute, regardless of how flawed the
methods used to achieve the goal. Although the aggravated cruelty to animals statute
previously defined “aggravated cruelty” as “conduct which is done or carried out in a
depraved and sadistic manner and which tortures or maims an animal,” the terms “depraved
and sadistic” were removed from the statute prior to the offense in this case. 2002 Tenn.
Laws Pub. Ch. 858 (S.B. 1810) (effective July 1, 2021). The current statute does not
require the prohibited behavior to be committed in a “depraved and sadistic” manner.
Inasmuch as the Defendant argues that the statutory language should be interpreted in that
context, her argument is unavailing because the General Assembly has clearly indicated its
intent to remove those considerations from the calculus by removing those terms from the
statute.
In addition, relying solely on a defendant’s subjective statement to determine
whether a justifiable purpose exists, as suggested by the Defendant, could lead to absurd
results by allowing a defendant to create a justifiable purpose where one may not exist.
Applying an objective or reasonable standard, however, requires the finder of fact to
consider the Defendant’s asserted subjective purpose in light of the context, circumstances,
and outcome of the conduct. This objective standard, combined with the subjective
purpose asserted by a defendant, allows the trier of fact to consider all the evidence, which
is more in line with the plain and natural meaning of the phrase.
Finally, a review of the case law analyzing the sufficiency of the convicting evidence
as it relates to a defendant’s acting with a justifiable purpose, supports our conclusion that
the General Assembly intended to create an objective, rather than a subjective, standard.
Although this is an issue of first impression, this court has nevertheless implicitly
concluded that a defendant’s actions were objectively performed without a justifiable
purpose in previous cases. See State v. Givens, No. W2023-00633-CCA-R3-CD, 2024 WL
1507609, at *12 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 8, 2024) (affirming a defendant’s conviction of
aggravated cruelty to animals where the proof established that the defendant intentionally
lit a house on fire, trapping a dog therein and causing it to subsequently die of smoke
inhalation, with the admitted purpose of destroying evidence and creating a diversion for
his escape from law enforcement), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 17, 2024); Mainer, 678
S.W.3d at 726 (affirming a defendant’s conviction of aggravated cruelty to animals where
the proof established that the defendant’s torture of a caged cat by shooting it five times
with an airsoft rife was without justifiable purpose despite the defendant’s testimony that
he acted due to the cat’s dangerous demeanor and that he was unable to safely release it
without killing it); State v. Curll, No. M2017-00090-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 3146336, at
*8 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 26, 2018) (affirming a defendant’s conviction of aggravated
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cruelty to animals where the proof established that the defendant intentionally deprived a
dog of food and water despite his testimony that he “verbally made it real clear that [he
was] no longer holding responsibility for th[e] dog” and in light of his refusal to take the
dog to “the pound”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 10, 2018); State v. Stewart, No. W2013-
02562-CCA-R3-CD, 2015 WL 3509397, at *13 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 4, 2015) (affirming
a defendant’s convictions of aggravated cruelty to animals where the proof established that
the defendant inflicted excessive cruelty in euthanizing dogs via strangulation was
unnecessary, “as the testimony showed that the [d]efendant could have utilized the squeeze
gate to contain the dogs and to provide the euthanasia technician with an opportunity to
administer a sedative”), no perm. app. filed; Barnett, 2010 WL 38228800, at *14 (affirming
a defendant’s conviction of aggravated cruelty to animals where the proof established that
the defendant filed a dog’s teeth down and beat him “like he meant to hurt him” until the
dog lost consciousness in an effort to “discipline” the dog and as a means of “preventing
further damage to his property”). Thus, our previous statutory analyses also support the
trial court’s utilization of an objective standard in this case.
Therefore, we conclude that the plain meaning of the phrase “justifiable purpose”
used in the statute means a reasonable, excusable, or defensible objective, goal, or end
based upon what a reasonable person would do or perceive under the circumstances known
to the person at the time of their actions. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in applying
an objective standard in interpreting the statute. The Defendant is not entitled to relief.
B. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In a related claim, the Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of what she asserts
is uncontroverted evidence establishing her justifiable purpose of preventing the kitten
from developing an infection and from dying. The Defendant conceded in the trial court
that the method she chose was not the “right” procedure according to veterinary practice.
She argues, however, that this has no effect on whether her purpose to prevent an infection
or death was a justifiable purpose. The State argues that the Defendant could have taken
the kitten to any emergency care animal clinic to alleviate the kitten's pain, but instead she
chose to act in a way that did not relieve the kitten’s pain and, in fact, “exacerbated” it.
“Findings of guilt in criminal actions . . . shall be set aside if the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). The standard of appellate review on a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (citations
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omitted) (emphasis in original); see also State v. Williams, 558 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tenn.
2018). Additionally, Rule 13(e) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure states,
“Findings of guilt in criminal actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.” The verdict of a trial judge in a bench trial is entitled to the same weight
on appeal as a jury verdict. See State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1999).
A conviction “removes the presumption of innocence with which a defendant is
initially cloaked and replaces it with one of guilt, so that on appeal a convicted defendant
has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient.” State v. Tuggle, 639
S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); see also State v. Thomas, 687 S.W.3d 223, 249 (Tenn. 2024)
(citing State v. Carruthers, 35 S.W.3d 516, 557-58 (Tenn. 2000)). “On appeal, the State is
entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable and legitimate
inferences which may be drawn therefrom.” State v. Wilson, 211 S.W.3d 714, 718 (Tenn.
2007) (citing State v. Hall, 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999)). “We do not reweigh the
evidence, because questions regarding witness credibility, the weight to be given the
evidence, and factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the . . . trier of fact.”
State v. Curry, 705 S.W.3d 176, 183 (Tenn. 2025) (citations omitted). The same standard
of review applies “whether the conviction is predicated on direct or circumstantial
evidence, or a combination of both.” Williams, 558 S.W.3d at 638 (first citing State v.
Dorantes, 331 S.W.3d 370, 379 (Tenn. 2011), and then citing State v. Brown, 551 S.W.2d
329, 331 (Tenn. 1977)).
As previously stated, aggravated cruelty to animals was defined in relevant part at
the time of the offense as occurring when “[a] person . . . , with no justifiable purpose, . . .
intentionally or knowingly . . . [k]ills, maims, tortures, . . . mutilates, . . . or otherwise
causes serious physical injury, a substantial risk of death, or death to a companion animal
or intentionally causes serious physical injury to a companion animal.” Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 39-14-212(a)(1) (Supp 2021). “‘Companion animal’ means any non-livestock animal as
defined in § 39-14-201(3),” id. § 39-14-212(b)(2) (2018), and there is no dispute that the
kitten in this case qualified as a companion animal. See Mainer, 678 S.W.3d at 725
(concluding that cats are companion animals for purposes of Code section 39-14-212(a)).
Our Code also defines “torture” in relevant part as “every act, omission, or neglect whereby
unreasonable physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted . . . .” Tenn. Code
Ann. § 39-14-201(4).
The Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the elements
of the offense, except as it relates to the statutory exception where the acts were done with
a “justifiable purpose.” She argues that to uphold the conviction would be to criminalize
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a “well-meaning rescue attempt,” which “the statute simply does not support,” in that her
desire to help the kitten exempted her from liability for aggravated cruelty to animals
because it was a “justifiable purpose.” The State argues that the purpose was not justifiable
because the Defendant caused needless pain and suffering to the kitten, and that the
Defendant’s actions were disproportionate to her asserted purpose.
In her brief, the Defendant concedes that the evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution “shows a defendant who intentionally caused serious injury to
an animal.” However, she asserts that she sought “professional help the next morning when
it became available, which is utterly inconsistent with any malicious or ill-intended
purpose.” However, the evidence is uncontroverted that the kitten came into the
Defendant’s care on Sunday at approximately 5:00 p.m., and she amputated the kitten’s leg
at approximately 10:30 p.m. that same evening. The Defendant sought no medical
assistance or care on Monday and did not seek care until 3:00 p.m. on Tuesday afternoon.
This evidence belies the Defendant’s claim that she acted with a justifiable purpose. In
fact, the evidence established that the Defendant knowingly and intentionally delayed
seeking care after such an admittedly ill-advised choice exposed the kitten to even greater
risks of infection and pain. The Defendant admittedly performed the amputation without
proper pain medication or anesthesia. She admittedly limited the pain medication she
provided to the kitten because she was unsure of the required dosage. The Defendant, who
had medical knowledge from her profession as a nurse, did not pursue the less drastic, less
painful path of obtaining antibiotics to help prevent infection, as veterinary practices would
have suggested. It is further clear from the evidence that the Defendant made the choice
without reasonable regard to the additional pain, injury, or risk of death this could cause
the kitten. She chose the option for additional pain to the kitten because she did not want
the animal euthanized or to have to pay for proper medical care. While she contends that
this choice was made to help the kitten, she completely disregarded the consideration that
euthanasia was potentially the better option and intentionally performed an unorthodox
amputation of the kitten’s leg without proper procedures, medications, or follow-up. While
she claimed to have stabilized the kitten, she left the bone exposed and did not check the
wound from Sunday evening until she handed the kitten over to NHA on Tuesday
afternoon.
The record clearly supports the trial court’s finding of guilt. The Defendant is not
entitled to relief on this issue.
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III. CONCLUSION
Following our review of the record and based upon the foregoing analysis, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
s/ Steven W. Sword
STEVEN W. SWORD, JUDGE
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