Jewel School Dist. v. KC

No. 429 May 20, 2026 657

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

JEWELL SCHOOL DISTRICT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Kacey KC,

Oregon State Forester;

Mike Wilson, State Forest Division Chief;

and Department of Forestry,

Defendants-Respondents.

Clatsop County Circuit Court

24CV13514; A186539

Beau V. Peterson, Judge.

Argued and submitted March 18, 2026.

John A. DiLorenzo, Jr., argued the cause for appellant.

Also on the briefs was Davis Wright Tremaine LLP.

Carson L. Whitehead, Assistant Attorney General,

argued the case for respondents. Also on the brief were Dan

Rayfield, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Deputy

Attorney General.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Jacquot, Judge, and

Kistler, Senior Judge.

TOOKEY, P. J.

Reversed and remanded.

658 Jewel School Dist. v. KC

TOOKEY, P. J.

In this case concerning land designated as “state for-

ests” under ORS 530.010, plaintiff, Jewell School District, a

public school district located in Clatsop County, asserts that

defendants, the Oregon Department of Forestry, the Oregon

State Forester, and the State Forest Division Chief, have

failed to comply with the Northwest Oregon State Forests

Management Plan (the 2010 NWFMP). Specifically, plain-

tiff contends that defendants have failed to comply with one

of the “Asset Management Guidelines” in the 2010 NWFMP,

by failing to “[m]aintain a budgeting and financial manage-

ment system that assures that revenues derived from these

state forest lands are sufficient to cover the department’s

costs of implementing th[e] plan.”

Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and accom-

panying injunctive relief, and the trial court dismissed plain-

tiff’s complaint for lack of standing, determining that “the

relief that this court could order would not necessarily pro-

vide real relief from the alleged injury.” The trial court also

denied plaintiff’s motion to amend its complaint as futile.

On appeal, plaintiff raises two assignments of

error. First, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred when

it dismissed plaintiff’s complaint. Second, plaintiff contends

that the trial court erred when it denied plaintiff’s motion

to file an amended complaint. We agree with plaintiff that

the trial court erred when it dismissed plaintiff’s complaint.

That conclusion obviates the need to consider plaintiff’s sec-

ond assignment of error. We reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Historical Backdrop

“Oregon counties and the state have a long history

of cooperation in the management of Oregon’s forestlands.”

County of Linn v. State, 319 Or App 288, 292, 510 P3d 962,

rev den, 370 Or 214 (2022). Under the pertinent statutory

scheme, ORS 530.010 to 530.181, Oregon counties are autho-

rized “to convey land to the Board [of Forestry], and such

land is then designated as state forest.” County of Linn, 319

Or App at 292 (citing ORS 530.010); see also Tillamook Co.

Cite as 349 Or App 657 (2026) 659

v. State Board of Forestry, 302 Or 404, 407-09, 730 P2d 1214

(1986) (describing the statutory scheme). After such trans-

fer, “the state bears certain management responsibilities

for that land, and the state and the county that conveyed

the land to the state divide revenues derived from that land

under a statutory distribution formula.” County of Linn, 319

Or App at 293; see also ORS 530.050 (setting forth man-

agement responsibilities of the State Forester); ORS 530.110

(setting forth distribution formula for revenue derived from

state forest land acquired from counties).

Under the statutory distribution formula, revenue

generated from management of the state forests is split

between the county within which the revenue was generated

and the state. ORS 530.110. The parties agree that, at least

as a general matter, ultimately, the state retains a total of

36.25 percent of the revenue, and the remainder—63.75 per-

cent of the revenue—is paid to the county. See ORS 530.110.

Of the 63.75 percent that is paid to the county, 25 percent

is “credited and paid into the county school fund,” not less

than 10 percent goes to “the county general fund,” and the

remainder is “prorated and apportioned to the various tax-

ing districts in which the lands [that generated the revenue]

are situated.” ORS 530.115.

The “statutory plan” described above “contemplates

consensual dealings between the counties and the state

(through the Board of Forestry), dealings that would cre-

ate enforceable rights insofar as the state’s management of

formerly county owned forest land is concerned.” Tillamook

County, 302 Or at 416. We have recognized that counties

that have transferred land to the state under the statutory

plan “have a protected, recognizable interest—be it one that

arises from contract, trust, or otherwise—which entitles

them to a percentage of revenue as set forth in” that statu-

tory scheme. County of Linn, 319 Or App at 304.

As noted, plaintiff is a school district located in

Clatsop County. Clatsop County is one of the Oregon coun-

ties that transferred forest land to the state pursuant to

the statutory scheme described above, and it receives reve-

nue from the state’s management of that forest land. And a

660 Jewel School Dist. v. KC

portion of that revenue is transferred to plaintiff pursuant

to ORS 530.115.

B. The 2010 NWFMP

In 2010, the Department of Forestry prepared the

2010 NWFMP, which the Board of Forestry adopted as an

administrative rule. OAR 629-035-0105(1)(a). As will be

explained, the 2010 NWFMP presupposes that compliance

with the 2010 NWFMP will financially benefit local taxing

districts, such as plaintiff. Given the centrality of the 2010

NWFMP to our analysis, we summarize its provisions below.

According to the “preface” in the 2010 NWFMP, it is

a “visionary plan” aimed toward creating a forest that “pro-

duces sustainable and predictable forest products that gen-

erate jobs and revenues for the benefit of the state, counties,

and local taxing districts.” (Emphases added.) The preface

further states that, among other goals, the 2010 NWFMP

aims to “assure sustainable timber and revenue for the ben-

efit of the Forest Trust Land Counties [e.g., Clatsop County],

and will also provide for the sustainable forest ecosystems

and healthy watersheds that are important to Oregonians.”

The first chapter of the 2010 NWFMP, among

other things, sets forth its “purpose and scope.” That chap-

ter explains that the “key set of management strategies”

in the 2010 NWFMP aim to, among other things, “concur-

rently achieve more desirable fish and wildlife habitats and

improved forest biological diversity[,] and to produce reve-

nue through harvesting of forest products.”

The second chapter of the 2010 NWFMP—concern-

ing “planning and resources”—recognizes that “timber on

the northwest Oregon state forests is an asset to the coun-

ties, local taxing districts, and the Common School Fund.”

(Emphasis added.)

The third chapter of the 2010 NWFMP presents “the

guiding principles, forest vision, and resource management

goals” of the 2010 NWFMP. Among the “guiding principles”

is that the 2010 NWFMP will “acknowledge the protected

and recognizable interest of the counties from which most of

the Board of Forestry Lands were originally derived.”

Cite as 349 Or App 657 (2026) 661

The fourth chapter of the 2010 NWFMP “presents

the resource management strategies, which are the heart

of the plan.” Those strategies aim to, among other things,

produce “a high level of sustainable timber and revenue.”

Particularly relevant in this case is the fifth chap-

ter of the 2010 NWFMP, titled “Implementation,” which

“describes guidance and standards for processes and activ-

ities that will be undertaken to implement the strategies

described in th[e] forest management plan.” And specifi-

cally, a section in that chapter titled “Asset Management

Guidelines,” which recognizes that the “northwest Oregon

state forests are a tangible asset of the people of Oregon,

and of the counties and local taxing districts where the for-

ests are located,” as they provide “both an ecological and

economic foundation for local communities and the north-

western Oregon region.”1 (Emphasis added.) It also high-

lights that “[m]aintaining and/or enhancing the value of the

assets described in this plan is fundamental to maintaining

the ability of these forest lands to provide for sustainable

timber.”

That section of chapter five—i.e., “Asset Management

Guidelines”—contains a bulleted list of “Guidelines for

Asset Management,” and provides that implementation of

the 2010 NWFMP “will be consistent” with the Guidelines

for Asset Management “in order to assure that the asset

value of these forests is maintained or enhanced through

plan implementation.” Among those Guidelines for Asset

Management is a bullet point—which, as explained below,

the complaint alleges defendants are not in compliance

with—that reads:

“Maintain a budgeting and financial management system

that assures that revenues derived from these state for-

est lands are sufficient to cover the department’s costs of

implementing this plan.”2

1

Assets are defined in the 2010 NWFMP “as the tangible resources and

infrastructure on state forest lands,” including “lands,” “forest products,” and

“fish and wildlife.”

2

We note that another Asset Management Guideline in the 2010 NWFMP

is a bullet point providing, “Implement timber accountability strategies and sys-

tems designed to assure that the state and other beneficiaries receive anticipated

revenue from the sale of timber and other products.” (Emphasis added.)

662 Jewel School Dist. v. KC

Further, under a heading reading “Summary

of Anticipated Outcomes from Implementing the Asset

Management Guidelines,” the 2010 NWFMP provides that

“[i]mplementation of the plan’s strategies is expected to

result in significant revenue to the state, counties, and local

taxing districts.”

C. Plaintiff’s Complaint

As noted, plaintiff is a public school district located

in Clatsop County. Plaintiff filed a complaint against defen-

dants, who it alleges “manage and administer [state for-

ests] located within Clatsop County, including the lands

from which [the school district] derives revenue.” The com-

plaint alleges a single cause of action for declaratory judg-

ment under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, ORS

28.020.

In particular, plaintiff alleges that Clatsop County

conveyed “substantial acres of Forest Trust Lands to the

State pursuant” to the statutory scheme described above,

and the 2010 NWFMP requires the State Forester to “[m]

aintain a budgeting and financial management system

that assures that revenues derived from these state forest

lands are sufficient to cover the department’s costs of imple-

menting th[e] plan.” The complaint further alleges that,

notwithstanding the requirements of the 2010 NWFMP,

the “policies implemented by Defendants fail to generate

sufficient revenue to comply with [that] mandate, resulting

in insufficient funding for Defendants’ management oper-

ations—and a proportionate decrease in funding for the

District.”

Indeed, plaintiff alleges in its complaint that it

has “received a substantial portion of its funding from the

revenues generated through Defendants’ management of

forestlands conveyed by Clatsop County to the State,” but

that “Defendants have pursued policies that fail to gen-

erate the level of revenue required under Defendants’

own rules—resulting in significant revenue shortfalls for

both Defendants and the [School] District.” (Emphasis in

original.)

Cite as 349 Or App 657 (2026) 663

In its prayer for relief, plaintiff’s complaint seeks (1)

a “declaration that Defendants’ policies are in contravention

of the requirements of the 2010 NWFMP by failing to gen-

erate sufficient revenue ‘to cover the department’s costs of

implementing’ the management plan and that Defendants

must either increase timber revenues or substantially

reduce their budgets,” and (2) an “injunction that requires

Defendants to comply with the declaratory relief.”

D. The Motion to Dismiss and the Trial Court’s Ruling

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under

ORCP 21 A(1)(a), asserting that plaintiff “lacks standing to

assert the claim for relief it asserts.” Defendants argued,

among other points, that plaintiff could not “demonstrate

that the relief it requests would have any impact on it at all”

because plaintiff did not “demand relief that would require

an increase in revenues to taxing districts in Clatsop County

or anywhere else” but instead “demands relief that would

allow either an increase in overall state forest revenue or a

decrease in the Department budget.” (Emphases in original.)

As defendants saw it, neither “option is likely to increase

revenues to Clatsop County and its taxing districts.”

The trial court agreed with defendants, reasoning

that “the relief that this court could order would not neces-

sarily provide real relief from the alleged injury” insofar as

the Department of Forestry could “reduce its costs substan-

tially, it could increase harvest levels in” areas other than

Clatsop County, “or do both,” and that “none of those actions

would result in an increase in the timber revenue received”

by plaintiff.

As the trial court saw it, “only if the [Department

of Forestry] was ordered to increase harvest levels equally

across its management area or specifically within the for-

est land that generates revenue for Plaintiff would the

relief requested have a real impact on the Plaintiff, and

those orders would clearly be outside the authority of this

court and are not the relief requested by Plaintiff in any

event.”

The trial court subsequently dismissed plaintiff’s

complaint, and plaintiff appeals the resulting judgment.

664 Jewel School Dist. v. KC

II. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Standing and Standard of Review

The term “standing,” as relevant here, “means the

right to obtain an adjudication.” Eckles v. State of Oregon,

306 Or 380, 383, 760 P2d 846 (1988), appeal dismissed, 490

US 1032, 109 S Ct 1928, 104 L Ed 2d 400 (1989) (discussing

ways the legal term “standing” is used). Whether a plaintiff

has standing “largely depends on the statute under which

the plaintiff seeks relief.” MT & M Gaming, Inc. v. City of

Portland, 360 Or 544, 553, 383 P3d 800 (2016).

As noted, in this case, plaintiff seeks relief under

the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. The relevant stat-

ute, ORS 28.020, provides:

“Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract

or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights,

status or other legal relations are affected by a constitu-

tion, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or

franchise may have determined any question of construc-

tion or validity arising under any such instrument, consti-

tution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or

franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other

legal relations thereunder.”

To establish standing under that statute, “a plain-

tiff must show that its claim meets three requirements.”

ACLU of Oregon v. City of Portland, 338 Or App 750, 768, 567

P3d 1067, rev allowed, 374 Or 372 (2025). First, “the plaintiff

must establish that the challenged law causes some injury to

or impact upon a legally recognized interest of the plaintiff’s,

beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or the

validity of the law.” MT & M Gaming, Inc., 360 Or at 554

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Second,

the plaintiff “must show that the claimed injury or impact

is real or probable, not hypothetical or speculative.” Id. at

555. And, third, the plaintiff “must show that a decision by

the court will in some sense rectify the injury, i.e., that it

will have a practical effect on the rights that the plaintiff is

seeking to vindicate.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

In considering those requirements, as we under-

stand it, “certainty” is not required. See League of Oregon

Cite as 349 Or App 657 (2026) 665

Cities v. State of Oregon, 334 Or 645, 649, 56 P3d 892 (2002)

(plaintiffs had standing to seek to “invalidate Ballot Measure

7 (2000),” although “the consequences that plaintiffs * * *

anticipate are not certain to result from the implementation

of Measure 7”). Moreover, at this stage of the proceeding, the

pleadings need only “bear the reasonable inference” that a

decision by the court will in some sense rectify the injury.

Hinkley v. Eugene Water & Electric Board, 189 Or App 181,

186-87, 74 P3d 1146 (2003) (the plaintiff’s allegations “suf-

ficient” where complaint alleged the defendant’s “failure to

follow the requirements of law in entering into * * * contracts

caused [the] defendant to incur[ ] higher costs of operations

contrary to its obligations to its ratepayers,” because those

allegations “bear the reasonable inference that the resultant

higher costs will be passed through to ratepayers, including

[the plaintiff]” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And,

in “reviewing the judgment of dismissal[,] we assume the

truth of all facts alleged in [plaintiff’s] complaint, drawing

all inferences in favor of plaintiff[ ].” Id. at 183.3

Further, we have said that, ultimately, “stand-

ing to challenge a statute under the Uniform Declaratory

Judgments Act extends to all who allege and demonstrate

a legally recognized interest affected by the statute or ordi-

nance.” Oregon Restaurant and Lodging Assn. v. City of

Bend, 313 Or App 772, 778, 497 P3d 306 (2021).

“Whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a declar-

atory judgment action is a legal question, which we review

for legal error.” Id. at 777.4

3

We note that, in the trial court, this case was decided on the pleadings,

without consideration of evidence outside the pleadings. See ORCP 21 A(2)(b)

(permitting trial court to consider evidence outside the pleadings on certain

motions). Had such evidence been submitted in the trial court and considered

by the trial court in ruling on defendants’ motion to dismiss, we would “assume

the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint to the extent that they are not con-

tradicted by additional facts in or outside of the record.” Nordbye v. BRCP/GM

Ellington, 271 Or App 168, 174, 349 P3d 639 (2015).

4

We apply the same standing analysis with regard to plaintiff’s request for

injunctive relief. That is because the Supreme Court “has long applied essentially

the same standing requirements that ordinarily apply in declaratory judgment

actions” to determine a party’s standing to obtain injunctive relief. Morgan v.

Sisters School District No. 6, 353 Or 189, 201, 301 P3d 419 (2013) (noting “the

same standing standards apply to plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunc-

tive relief”). Thus, our analysis in this opinion applies equally to plaintiff’s

request for a declaratory judgment and to plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.

666 Jewel School Dist. v. KC

B. The Parties’ Arguments

On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred

in ruling that it did not have standing, highlighting defi-

ciencies in the trial court’s reasoning as it relates to plain-

tiff’s standing. As to the first requirement of the standing

analysis, plaintiff asserts it has a “legally recognized inter-

est” as “the intended beneficiary of the statutory contract

between Clatsop County and the State pursuant to which

the [state forest lands] were established nearly a century

ago and under which the lands continue to be managed”

and a “legally recognized interest in the substantial reve-

nue it receives as a school district within Clatsop County.”

Additionally, plaintiff contends that it has a “legally rec-

ognized interest[ ] in the management of the Forest Trust

Land,” i.e., the land conveyed by Clatsop County to the state.

As to the second requirement, plaintiff argues that defen-

dants’ “failure to comply with the 2010 NWFMP constitutes

a concrete present injury to the School District’s interests”

because “it suffers a concrete injury when Defendants fail to

manage those [state forests] as required by law” regardless

“of whether that mismanagement causes a separate finan-

cial injury to the School District” and, in any event, defen-

dants’ “mismanagement has caused a substantial finan-

cial injury to the School District by reducing the revenue it

has received (and will continue to receive) from the lands.”

(Emphasis in original.) Finally, as to the third requirement,

plaintiff argues that declaring that defendants “must com-

ply with the 2010 NWFMP would directly redress the injury

to the School District’s interest in the management” of state

forests and that “increasing revenue across the lands man-

aged under the 2010 NWFMP to comply with [the particular

Asset Management Guideline at issue] would necessarily

generate additional revenue within Clatsop County.”

Defendants respond, regarding the first require-

ment of the standing analysis, that plaintiff “has not

demonstrated that it has a sufficient interest in the correct

management of state forest lands, in general, to support

standing” and “to the extent plaintiff has any interest at

all, that interest is limited to receipt of its statutory share

of revenue from Clatsop County’s distribution of state forest

Cite as 349 Or App 657 (2026) 667

revenues.” Regarding the second requirement, defendants

argue, among other points, that to “the extent plaintiff

contends it has suffered or will suffer financial injury, that

contention is speculative and hypothetical.” Regarding the

third requirement, defendants contend that because “coun-

ties and their taxing districts only receive revenues from

timber sales within county boundaries, an overall increase

in timber revenue may have no impact on the revenue to a

specific county or taxing district.” That is, even “if the court

ordered the relief plaintiff requested—an order to increase

revenue or reduc[e] costs—and the State Forest Division

increased revenues overall, that order may have no impact

at all on plaintiff.” Further, defendants contend that, if “the

Department were to decrease its management costs—which

is one of the possible options under the 2010 NWFMP, as

plaintiff alleged in its complaint—then it could comply with

the plan without any increase in revenues to plaintiff.”

Additionally, as an alternative basis to affirm,

defendants assert that “the trial court did not have sub-

ject matter jurisdiction to issue a declaration usurping the

Department’s or the Board’s discretion to manage the state

forests,” which is, in defendants’ view, what the relief sought

by plaintiff would do. That is, defendants argue, an “order

to defendants to change their management of state forest

lands in accordance with the court’s reading of the flexible

and adaptable 2010 NWFMP would usurp authority that

the legislature reserved for the Board and that the Board

has assumed in the structure and content of its rules.”

C. Analysis

Having considered the parties’ arguments, we con-

clude that the trial court erred and that plaintiff had stand-

ing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief.5

As an initial matter, and concerning the first

requirement, plaintiff has a financial interest in the rev-

enue generated by the management of the state forests

in Clatsop County, see Eckles, 306 Or at 385 (stating that

“[t]he interest perhaps most often recognized as sufficient

5

In reaching our conclusion, we express no opinion on whether the statu-

tory scheme concerning state forests created a “statutory contract” as plaintiff

argues, as reaching that issue is unnecessary to our analysis.

668 Jewel School Dist. v. KC

for standing under ORS 28.020 is a present or foreseeable

financial interest”), and given the provisions of the 2010

NWFMP, we think that plaintiff has a corollary financial

interest in defendants’ compliance with the 2010 NWFMP

that is beyond “an abstract interest in the correct applica-

tion” of the 2010 NWFMP, League of Oregon Cities, 334 Or

at 658 (noting that, to establish standing under ORS 28.020,

“this court has held that a plaintiff must show some injury

or other impact upon a legally recognized interest beyond an

abstract interest in the correct application or the validity of

a law”).

As noted, by its own terms, the 2010 NWFMP is

designed to, among other things, create a forest that “pro-

duces sustainable and predictable forest products that gen-

erate jobs and revenues for the benefit of the state, counties,

and local taxing districts.” (Emphases added.) And plaintiff

is a taxing district, which the terms of the 2010 NWFMP

are expressly designed to benefit. See MT & M Gaming, Inc.,

360 Or at 558 (explaining that, under Supreme Court prece-

dent, “a plaintiff whose interests do fall generally within the

intended objectives of the targeted statute has standing to

bring a declaratory judgment act with regard to the statute”

(emphasis in original)).

Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that, historically, it

has “received a substantial portion of its funding from the

revenues generated through Defendants’ management of

forestlands conveyed by Clatsop County to the State,” but

that “Defendants have pursued policies that fail to generate

the level of revenue required under Defendants’ own rules,”

because defendants have failed to comply with one of the

2010 NWFMP’s “Asset Management Guidelines.” (Emphasis

in original.) And, as noted, under a heading reading

“Summary of Anticipated Outcomes from Implementing the

Asset Management Guidelines,” the 2010 NWFMP expressly

provides that “[i]mplementation of the plan’s strategies is

expected to result in significant revenue to the state, coun-

ties, and local taxing districts” (emphasis added)—e.g., school

districts such as plaintiff. Further, the Asset Management

Guidelines in the 2010 NWFMP—one of which plaintiff con-

tends that defendants are not in compliance with—exist, at

Cite as 349 Or App 657 (2026) 669

least in part, to “assure that the asset value of these forests”

is “maintained or enhanced through plan implementation.”

Thus, we conclude that plaintiff has a financial

interest in the revenue generated by the management of

the state forests in Clatsop County, and because the 2010

NWFMP contemplates, among other points, that manage-

ment of state forests in accordance with the 2010 NWFMP

will provide “substantial revenue” to local taxing districts

such as plaintiff, and is designed to benefit, among others,

local taxing districts such as plaintiff, plaintiff has a corol-

lary financial interest in defendants’ implementation of the

terms of the 2010 NWFMP.

Concerning the second requirement—”whether

plaintiff[ has] shown that their injury or impact is real

or probable, and not hypothetical or speculative,” Oregon

Restaurant and Lodging Assn., 313 Or App at 778—as

noted, plaintiff has alleged that defendants’ “policies” have

“fail[ed] to generate sufficient revenue” to comply with the

2010 NWFMP, which has resulted in a “decrease in fund-

ing for the District.” That is sufficient to satisfy the second

requirement. See id. 778-79 (allegation by businesses “that

depend on patronage in Bend” that a “reduction in funds

for tourism promotion [in Bend] would have concrete and

plausible fiscal ramifications” sufficiently alleged an “injury

or impact [that] is real or probable, and not hypothetical

or speculative”). Particularly here, where, as discussed

above, the purpose of the Asset Management Guidelines is

to “assure that the asset value of [certain] forests,” includ-

ing forests in Clatsop County, the management of which

plaintiff derives revenue from, is “maintained or enhanced

through plan implementation.”

Regarding the third requirement—that a plaintiff

show “that a decision by the court will in some sense rec-

tify the injury, i.e., that it will have a practical effect on the

rights that the plaintiff is seeking to vindicate,” id. at 778

(internal quotation marks omitted)—we conclude that that

requirement, too, is satisfied.

As noted, the provision of the 2010 NWFMP plain-

tiff contends defendants have failed to comply with is that

670 Jewel School Dist. v. KC

they must “[m]aintain a budgeting and financial manage-

ment system that assures that revenues derived from these

state forest lands are sufficient to cover the department’s

costs of implementing this plan.” Plaintiff seeks a declara-

tion and injunction requiring defendants to “either increase

timber revenues or substantially reduce their budgets.”

The trial court determined that the third require-

ment was not satisfied because “the relief that this court

could order would not necessarily provide real relief from

the alleged injury,” insofar as the Department of Forestry

could “reduce its costs substantially, it could increase har-

vest levels in” areas other than Clatsop County, “or do both,”

and that “[n]one of those actions would result in an increase

in the timber revenue received” by the district.

The difficulty with the trial court’s reasoning is

twofold. First, we think that it is speculative, on this record,

that the Department of Forestry would “reduce costs sub-

stantially” or increase harvest levels in areas other than

Clatsop County to make up for any shortfall as the trial

court reasoned. And, as noted, as we understand it, the com-

plaint need not demonstrate with certainty that the relief

requested would rectify plaintiff’s injury, only that there

is a reasonable inference that it would. We think such an

inference can be drawn here, given the allegations in the

complaint described above.6

Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, the trial

court’s ruling misses the mark because it disregards the

nature and purpose of the 2010 NWFMP itself. As detailed

above, one purpose of the 2010 NWFMP is to manage a for-

est that “produces sustainable and predictable forest prod-

ucts that generate jobs and revenues for the benefit of the

state, counties, and local taxing districts.” It does so by

6

Further, we note that plaintiff asserts that Clatsop County is the county

with the “second highest * * * Land acreage managed under the 2010 NWFMP,”

and defendants do not contend that that is inaccurate.

In that regard, we also note that, as we understand the statutory distribu-

tion formula and plaintiff’s view of the Asset Management Guidelines, for every

$100 generated by the Department of Forestry from logging in Clatsop County

to “assure[ ] that revenues derived from these state forest lands are sufficient to

cover the department’s costs of implementing” the plan, the state would retain

approximately $36.25 while $63.75 would go to Clatsop County.

Cite as 349 Or App 657 (2026) 671

implementing “the plan’s strategies [which are] expected to

result in significant revenue to the state, counties, and local

taxing districts,” and the “Asset Management Guidelines”—

one of which plaintiff contends defendants are out of com-

pliance with—exist “in order to assure that the asset value

of these forests is maintained or enhanced through plan

implementation.”

Given that framework, which, as noted, presupposes

that compliance with the 2010 NWFMP generally (and the

Asset Management Guidelines specifically) will financially

benefit local taxing districts such as plaintiff, plaintiff’s

allegation that defendants have failed to comply with one of

the Asset Management Guidelines in the 2010 NWFMP, in

our view, alleges an injury to plaintiff’s financial interests

that could be remedied by requiring defendants to comply

with the 2010 NWFMP.

As for defendants’ alternative argument—i.e., that

“the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction

to issue a declaration usurping the Department’s or the

Board’s discretion to manage the state forests,” because it

would “interfere” with “the discretionary power vested in an

agency”—defendants rely principally on Ashland Drilling,

Inc. v. Jackson County, 168 Or App 624, 4 P3d 748, rev den,

331 Or 429 (2000).

In that case, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that

the Water Resources Commission had “failed to implement”

a certain “program by failing to undertake specific enforce-

ment and implementation actions.” Id. at 629. We explained

that “[c]ourts will not interfere by declaratory judgment or

injunctive relief with the discretionary power vested in an

agency, unless some compelling reasons exist.” Id. at 632.

We reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claim failed because the rel-

evant statute, ORS 537.780, provided only that, with regard

to the particular program, the “commission ‘may’ undertake

particular implementation and enforcement actions,” and

by seeking a declaration that it did, the plaintiffs sought to

have the court “override the legislature’s delegation of dis-

cretion to the commission by declaring that the commission

must undertake particular enforcement actions.” Id. (quot-

ing ORS 537.780 (emphases in Ashland Drilling)).

672 Jewel School Dist. v. KC

This case is different from Ashland Drilling. Here,

plaintiff does not seek a declaration that would “override”

an agency’s exercise of discretion, as the plaintiffs did in

Ashland Drilling, but instead seeks a declaration and injunc-

tion requiring defendants to comply with an administrative

rule. As noted, the 2010 NWFMP provides that implemen-

tation of the 2010 NWFMP “will be consistent” (not “may”

be consistent) with the Asset Management Guidelines. As

plaintiff does not seek a declaration or injunction dictating

how defendants exercise their discretion under the terms of

the 2010 NWFMP, Ashland Drilling is inapposite.7

In sum, having considered the parties’ arguments,

we conclude that the trial court erred when it concluded that

plaintiff lacks standing and dismissed plaintiff’s complaint.

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a financial interest in the

revenue generated by the management of the state forests

in Clatsop County, and given the provisions of the 2010

NWFMP, we think that it has a corollary financial inter-

est in defendants’ compliance with the 2010 NWFMP that

is beyond “an abstract interest in the correct application”

of the 2010 NWFMP. Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged

that the injury or impact is real or probable, and not hypo-

thetical or speculative, and that a decision by the court will

in some sense rectify the injury. Finally, the relief sought

by plaintiff will not interfere with the discretionary power

vested in an agency. Consequently, we reverse and remand.

Reversed and remanded.

7

Regarding plaintiff’s allegation that defendants are not in compliance with

the Asset Management Guideline related to maintaining budgeting and finan-

cial management systems as described above, we express no opinion on what in

particular that Asset Management Guideline requires defendants to do. That

issue has not been briefed and is not before us. That issue can be addressed in

connection with the merits of this proceeding.