Baldwin v. Baldwin

[Cite as Baldwin v. Baldwin, 2026-Ohio-1852.]

Released 5/11/26

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

VINTON COUNTY

BRIDGET BALDWIN, :

:

Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 25CA705

:

v. :

: DECISION AND JUDGMENT

JEREMIAH BALDWIN, : ENTRY

:

Defendant-Appellant. :

_____________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Jeremiah Baldwin, Columbus, Ohio, appellant pro se.

William L. Archer, Jr., Vinton County Prosecuting Attorney and Amanda K.

Miller, Assistant Vinton County Prosecuting Attorney, McArthur, Ohio, for

appellee South Central Ohio Job and Family Services and Bridget Baldwin.

_____________________________________________________________

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} Jeremiah Baldwin, “appellant,” appeals the Entry of Dismissal

entered April 24, 2025 in the Vinton County Court of Common Pleas. The

trial court’s entry dismissed various pending motions relating to appellant’s

obligations for child support arrearages. Appellant has raised seven

assignments of error challenging the dismissal. However, based upon our

review, all are without merit. Accordingly, all assignments of error are

overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 2

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶2} Appellant and Bridget Baldwin, “Bridget,” were married in

1998. Bridget filed a complaint for divorce, through counsel, against

appellant on May 11, 2001. Appellant was unrepresented until September

14, 2001 when Attorney Trecia Kimes-Brown filed a notice of appearance.

Two minor children were born during the marriage, N.B. in 1999, and A.B.

in 2000.

{¶3} The parties’ Agreed Judgment Entry Decree of Divorce was

entered on May 16, 2002. Bridget was ordered to be the residential parent

and legal custodian of the minor children. Appellant had rights of visitation.

Appellant was also ordered to pay child support in the amount of $683.51

per month. In the years since, the parties have returned to court on various

motions, including contempt. On June 27, 2019, the trial court entered a

Termination Order of judicial child support.

{¶4} On or after October 7, 2024, appellant filed the following

pleadings: Petition for Case Review; Motion for Administrative Review;

Motion for Discovery; and Motion for Injunctive Relief. On November 26,

2024, the trial court scheduled a hearing for January 21, 2025. The trial

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 3

court also filed a journal entry indicating that appellant’s pleadings

contained “flaws” and advised appellant to retain legal counsel.

{¶5} Appellant did not retain counsel and appeared at the January 21,

2025 hearing by Zoom. The hearing was conducted by Judge Laina

Fetherolf- Rogers. Attorney Amanda K. Miller appeared on behalf of the

Vinton County Prosecuting Attorney’s office for South Central Ohio Child

Support Enforcement Agency, “CSEA.” We set forth the pertinent portions

of the January 21, 2025 hearing transcript as follows:1

Court: Baldwin v. Baldwin. [W]e’re set today on the motions

that you filed. I’m going to need you to tell me what it is

you’re asking the Court for this morning, and then we’ll

discuss it.

Appellant: [T]he only thing I’m asking for I don’t fully—still fully

know, but I believe that the Court- - that the whole case

is discharged, and the Court basically has no control over

whatsoever. I was—I filed the motions to make sure of

that. And then get–an entry to that effect so that I can

file an appeal to that effect…([indiscernible- poor

audio/simultaneous speech] back to that. I didn’t think

you would have it. Yes, I was just looking for an entry to

verify that the Court no longer has jurisdiction over the

case.

Court: The Court does have jurisdiction over your case. It’s my

understanding there’s still money owed in the child

support case.

Appellant: Okay. See, that’s what I saw, and- and the lawyer’s been

1

The dialogue set forth has been “cleaned up” of “uh” and “um.” Some capitalization and punctuation

have been altered.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 4

talking to her and telling her that it was. So, that’s like,

that’s what I saw. Because it’s- - because it hadn’t been

fully discharged because of the arrears, and that part of it

should still…be considered at the Court.

Court: That’s correct.

Appellant: Okay. So, they- - I’m requesting then in my motion the

other day I’m—trying to request, so yesterday I

[indiscernible - - poor audio]. I get confused easily when

- - I’m nervous. I’m requesting an administrative review.

Court: Have you filed - -

Appellant: - - for a possible modification is possible.

Court: Are you asking for the amount - - the total amount to be

reviewed, or the payment to be reviewed?

Appellant: The - - I guess both.

Court: So, what I can tell you is, we can’t change the total

amount due now because this is an arrearage only case.

If you wanted a modification about the amount of child

support you owed, you would have needed to do that

back when that was determined when your children were

still minors, and that - -was due and owing as a current

payment. Does that make sense?

Appellant: Yes…So I thought that as well. So - -

The Court: As far as the arrearage payment, we could discuss that.

How much are you currently asked to pay?

Appellant: To be honest, I have no idea. [Indiscernible- poor audio]

I think it’s the original order. I believe it was 400 and 30

some a month with a protected order of 50.

Ms. Miller: It’s $441.48 is his current monthly amount owed…

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 5

The Court: Okay. Per the agency, it’s $441.48 and that’s on

arrearages?

Appellant: Okay. That sounds right.

Ms. Miller: Arrearages.

Court: Okay. How much arrearage is owed?

Appellant: $29,593.38.

Court: So, probably the amount is so high, Mr. Baldwin,

because you have such an enormous arrearage.

Appellant: Yes. Yes. I’m- - grossly aware of that.

Court: You’re probably also aware that they could have filed for

felony non-support on you at some point in time for this.

Appellant: Yes. And I’m kind of, sort of wondering why they didn’t.

Court: That would have been a decision for whatever prosecutor

was in place at the time.

Appellant: Okay.

The Court: I don’t have an answer for that…different counties. I’ve

worked in several different counties, and they all have

different philosophical viewpoints about whether or not

it’s worth their time to file for felony non-support is what

I can tell you. Based on what the Court can do as - - as a

disciplinary action for felony non-support. So, is there an

amount that you believe you could pay each month?

Appellant: At this moment, no. I’m - - I don’t have any money at

all. I’m completely desolate. Can’t even work. I don’t

have my driver’s license.

Court: You could work without a driver’s license. People do

that all the time.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 6

Appellant: Now with my disabilities I can’t. No one will hire me

because it’s [indiscernible- poor audio].

Court: Have you been determined to be disabled by either the

VA or through the federal government such that you

receive disability?

Appellant: No.

Court: Do you have a med - -

Appellant: Only through a neurologist.

Court: Do you have a medical statement from that neurologist

that you could provide to the agency showing that you’re

unable to work?

Appellant: Yes, I should be able to.

Court: And I believe they have a form for that they would ask

you to have that neurologist fill out and submit it back to

them.

Appellant: Okay.

Court: Correct?

Ms. Miller: If he can work.

Court: So, the caseworker can mail that out to you. Is this a

good address that you provided to the Court?

Appellant: Yes….

The Court: They will send that form out to you and you need to have

your doctor fill it out. I’m going to set this case out for a

couple of months, and we’ll find out. If that has not been

done, we could perhaps discuss modifying the monthly

amount, but ultimately, if you don’t have a medical

statement that you’re disabled, I’m going to anticipate

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 7

that you need to figure out a way to get a job and pay this

back support. These children are now adults, and it

appears that they were primarily financially support by

their other parent pretty much their entire lives here. So,

if you are medically unable to work, provide

documentation of that, and we’ll go from there. If you

are not, then at that time you’re likely to continue to have

to pay these arrearages. Is that clear?

Appellant: Yes.

Court: Alright. I will have them send that form to you and you’ll

get a notice of a future hearing in the mail. Okay?

Appellant: Okay.

Court: Alright. Have a good rest of your day, Mr. Baldwin.

Appellant: Alright. Thank you.

{¶6} The matter was assigned another pretrial hearing date of April 7,

2025. On February 10, 2025, appellant filed a Motion for Temporary

Driving Privileges. However, the April 7, 2025 hearing did not proceed.

{¶7} On April 24, 2025, the trial court filed the appealed-from Entry

of Dismissal. The entry stated as follows:

At the January 21, 2025 pretrial, the Court

explained to Mr. Baldwin that the amount owed could not

be modified retroactively. Further, Mr. Baldwin argued

that he could not work due to medical reasons. He was

advised to submit documentation of his medical issues to

the agency. No documentation was submitted. At the

April 7, 2025 pretrial, he advised court staff although he is

not represented, he is working with an attorney who

advised him he did not need to submit anything as there

were no contempt actions pending.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 8

Mr. Baldwin seems to be under the

misapprehension that he does not need to support his

motions, but instead the agency needs to send him

information beyond his significant arrearages to justify the

suspension of his license as authorized by Ohio law. The

Court advised him of what information he needed to

submit to consider returning his license, and he declined.

Therefore, his pending motions are dismissed without

prejudice.

{¶8} This timely appeal followed.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. JUDGE FETHEROLF-ROGERS FAILED TO

DISMISS HERSELF UNDER CONFLICT OF

INTEREST.

II. THE COMMON PLEAS COURT ERRED IN

DISMISSING THE CASE WITHOUT HEARING

ARGUMENTS.

III. THE COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE

VINTON COUNTY PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE

TO REPRESENT THE PLAINTIFFS.

IV. THE COURT ABUSED ITS POWER BY

CONDUCTING ARGUMENTS FOR THE

PLAINTIFFS AND USING THREATS TO

ADVANCE A DISCOVERY FOR CSEA.

V. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT

CONDUCT THE PRE-TRIAL HEARING

SCHEDULED ON APRIL 7, 2025.

VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN USING

HEARSAY IN ITS DECISIONS.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 9

VII. THE COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING

SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR THE

APPELLANT WHEN THE PLAINTIFFS DID

APPEAR OR GIVE CAUSE.

Assignment of Error One - Alleged Conflict of

Interest/Failure to Recuse

{¶9} Appellant asserts that Judge Fetherolf-Rogers has a long-term

personal and professional relationship with appellant’s prior legal counsel,

Attorney Trecia Kimes-Brown. Appellant argues that Attorney Kimes-

Brown was also the attorney for CSEA of Vinton County during the

“modification that resulted in the arrears the appellant is attempting to

dispute.” Appellant cites Rule 2.4(B). Under the Ohio Code of Judicial

Conduct, Rule 2.4(B), External Influences on Judicial Conduct, “[a] judge

shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or

relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.”

{¶10} We begin by noting that R.C. 2701.03 establishes procedures

for filing an affidavit of disqualification against a common pleas judge. See

In re Criminal Charges Against Groves, 2018-Ohio-1406, at ¶ 18 (4th Dist.).

R.C. 2701.03(A) provides:

If a judge of the court of common pleas allegedly is

interested in a proceeding pending before the court,

allegedly is related to or has a bias or prejudice for or

against a party to a proceeding pending before the court or

a party's counsel, or allegedly otherwise is disqualified to

preside in a proceeding pending before the court, any party

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 10

to the proceeding or the party's counsel may file an

affidavit of disqualification with the clerk of the supreme

court in accordance with division (B) of this section. See

State v. Dean, 2015-Ohio-4347, ¶ 222.

{¶11} Further, Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(C) provides:

“The chief justice of the supreme court or any judge of that court designated

by him shall pass upon the disqualification of any judge of the courts of

appeals or courts of common pleas or division thereof.” This provision vests

exclusive authority in the chief justice or her designee to pass on

disqualification matters. Dean, supra, at ¶ 223. See Beer v. Griffith, 54

Ohio St.2d 440, 441-442 (1978). The Supreme Court has repeatedly held

that a defendant who could have raised a judicial bias claim in a timely

affidavit of disqualification under R.C. 2701.03 to the Chief Justice, but

failed to do so, is “ ‘ “foreclosed from bringing such a complaint,” ’ ” on

appeal. Dean, supra, at ¶ 223, quoting State v. Osie, 2014-Ohio-2966, ¶ 65,

quoting State v. Moore, 93 Ohio St.3d 649, 650 (2001). See Groves, at ¶ 21.

{¶12} While a reviewing court must presume that the trial court

applied the law correctly, see State v. Combs, 180 Ohio St.3d 123, 125 and

State v. Jones, 2025-Ohio-4317, at ¶ 58 (4th Dist.), we also presume that

Judge Fetherolf-Rogers is familiar with the Ohio Rules of Professional

Conduct and complies with the rules. Here, Judge Fetherolf-Rogers

apparently found nothing in the alleged personal or professional relationship

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 11

with Attorney Kimes-Brown which would cause improper influence on her

judicial conduct or judgment and which would prevent her from presiding

over the underlying matter. Thus, we reasonably conclude that is why Judge

Featherolf-Rogers did not recuse herself.

{¶13} Moreover, appellant failed to bring his conflict of interest claim

in an affidavit for disqualification under R.C. 2701.03. Therefore, he is

“foreclosed from bringing it” on appeal. Having found no merit to

appellant's first assignment of error, it is hereby overruled.

{¶14} For ease of analysis and because the arguments are interrelated,

we will consider appellant’s second, fourth, and fifth assignments of error

jointly.

Assignment of Error Two - Dismissal without a Proper Hearing

Assignment of Error Four - Alleged Abuse of Power

Assignment of Error Five - Failure to Conduct April 7, 2025 Hearing

{¶15} Under the second assignment of error, Appellant’s first

argument is that the trial court’s November 26, 2024 entry scheduling a later

hearing provided that “verbal arguments would be heard.” Appellant directs

us to Civ.R. 7(B) and contends that the case was improperly dismissed.

Under the fifth assignment of error, again citing Civ.R. 7(B), appellant

argues that the trial court’s failure to conduct the April 7, 2025 hearing

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 12

deprived him of his ability to argue, to respond to any arguments of

Plaintiffs, and to file a motion for summary judgment.

{¶16} Under the second assignment of error, appellant also argues

that during the January 21, 2025 hearing, the trial court prevented him from

“presenting and defending his arguments.” Under the fourth assignment of

error, appellant contends that throughout the January hearing, Judge Rogers

“continuously” made statements and argued on behalf of the Plaintiffs and

“threatened” that appellant could be prosecuted for non-payment of arrears.

Further, appellant argues that Assistant Prosecutor Miller added to “the

underlying severity of further attempts at entering argument.”

{¶17} Civil Rule 7(B)(2), motions and pleadings, provides that “[t]o

expedite its business, the court may make provisions by rule or order not

inconsistent with these rules for the submission and determination of

motions without oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in

support and opposition.” (Emphasis added.). As set forth above in the

factual and procedural background, appellant was advised that he needed to

provide documentation of his medical condition. This documentation was

necessary to support his claim that he is unable to work and possibly be

granted a modification of his arrearage payments and reinstatement of

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 13

driving privileges. The trial court gave him over two months to do so.

Appellant failed to provide the requested information.

{¶18} The trial court explained its reasoning for the dismissal in the

April 24, 2025 entry. In our view, the trial court implicitly concluded that

without the supporting documentation, appellant’s verbal arguments would

be without merit, fruitless, and a waste of judicial resources. It is well-

established that a trial court has “inherent authority to control its own docket

and manage the cases before it.” Teays Valley Local School District Board

of Education v. Struckman, 2023-Ohio-244, at ¶ 48 (4th Dist.)(internal

citations omitted).

{¶19} Appellate courts review “a trial court's orders regarding docket

and case management for an abuse of discretion.” See Teays Valley, supra,

at ¶ 46. Given appellant’s failure to provide supporting documentation for

his medical condition, it is reasonable to conclude that appellant would not

be making arguments relevant to the claim. It is also reasonable to conclude

that, in light of the non-produced supporting documentation, the assistant

prosecutor, on behalf of CSEA, would not need to appear or respond.

{¶20} It is axiomatic that the credibility of witnesses is determined by

the trier of fact. See State v. Meeks, 2015-Ohio-1527, at ¶ 78 (4th Dist.),

citing State v. Yarbrough, 2002-Ohio-2126, at ¶ 79. We defer to the trial

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 14

court’s credibility determinations because the trial court is in the best

position to view a witness or party’s demeanor, voice inflections, and body

language. See A.V. v. McNichols, 2019-Ohio-2180, at ¶ 23 (4th Dist.). In

our view, the trial court reasonably determined that appellant would simply

use the April hearing to ask for additional time to obtain the documentation

and, possibly, improperly delay the proceedings. Based upon our review, we

cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in resolving appellant’s

pending motions by the April 24, 2025 entry of dismissal, as argued within

assignments of error two and five.

{¶21} Appellant also claims that the trial judge abused her power and

prevented him from presenting and defending his arguments, threatened him,

and allowed the prosecutor to speak on behalf of plaintiffs. We must point

out that our review is restrained by a cold record. We cannot, as an appellate

court reviewing a transcribed record, which has been set forth above,

conclude that the trial court cut him off, threatened him, or otherwise

squelched his ability to present evidence.

{¶22} Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court did not exhibit

an abuse of power and did not abuse its discretion by dismissing the case via

judgment entry. Thus, we find the second, fourth, and fifth assignments of

error are without merit. Accordingly, all are overruled.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 15

Assignment of Error Three - Alleged Improper Legal Representation

{¶23} Appellant next argues that the Vinton County Prosecutor’s

Office does not have jurisdiction to represent CSEA or plaintiffs in civil

matters. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear and

decided a particular case on its merits. See State v. Mitchell, 2021-Ohio-

4386, at ¶ 10 (4th Dist.) (Citations omitted). Personal jurisdiction refers to

the court’s power to render a valid judgment against a particular individual.

See Francis v. Contractor Services, Inc., 2025-Ohio- 5873, at ¶ 46 (4th

Dist.); State v. Henderson, 2020-Ohio-4784, at ¶ 36.

{¶24} Appellant contends that the court erred when it allowed

Assistant Prosecutor Miller to represent the plaintiffs in the motions hearing.

We interpret appellant’s assignment of error as arguing that the Vinton

County Prosecutor’s Office did not have authority to represent CSEA or

Bridget. Black’s Law Dictionary, Abridged Sixth Edition, defines

“authority,” in part, as “Permission…Right to implement and enforce laws;

to exact obedience.” Appellant’s argument is without merit.

{¶25} The Ohio General Assembly created the office of child support

in the department of job and family services and required each county to

have a child support enforcement agency. See R.C. 3125.01, et seq.; R.C.

3125.10; Lyons v. Lyons, 2009-Ohio-6868, at fn3 (3d Dist.); Seelbaugh v,

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 16

Common Pleas Court of Montgomery County, 2024-Ohio-5705, at ¶ 15 (2d

Dist.).2 The state programs were “to be designed ‘for the purpose of

enforcing the support obligation owed by absent parents to their children.’ ”

Cuyahoga Cty. Support Enforcement Agency v. Lozada, 102 Ohio App.3d

442, 446, quoting 42 U.S.C. 651. CSEA has the ability to appear as a party

before the courts to ensure that both a child's interests are protected, as well

as the pecuniary interest of the state. See e.g., Delaware County Child

Support Enforcement Agency v. Kise, 2021-Ohio-915, at ¶ 22 (5th Dist.);

Saari v. Lorain Cty. Child Support Enf't Agency, 2011-Ohio-2198, ¶ 7 (9th

Dist.), citing Cuyahoga Cty. supra.

{¶26} CSEA is required to enforce child support orders in Vinton

County, Ohio, consistent with Title IV-D of the Social Security Act and state

law. CSEA is not only entitled to collect the support arrearages, but also

required by law to do so. Lyons, at ¶ 31; R.C. 3123.14. See also O.A.C.

5101:12-50-50 (amplifying the judicial enforcement procedures the CSEA

may take under R.C. 3123.14). Ohio’s statutes require support payments to

be forwarded to the appropriate CSEA by the parent/obligor whether or not a

child receives public assistance. See Weber v. Weber, 2000 WL 1682945

2

“The child support enforcement agency for a county is the local Title IV-D agency for the county and

shall operate a program for support enforcement in the county that complies with Title IV-D of the “Social

Security Act,” Seelbaugh, supra, citing 88 Stat. 2351 (1975), 42 U.S.C. 651, as amended, any rules

adopted pursuant to that title, and state law.” R.C. 3125.11.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 17

(4th Dist.), at *3. The CSEA in turn disburses the proper amount to the

parent/obligee. Id. The CSEA possess a legitimate government interest in

assuring that all parents/obligors satisfy all child support orders. Id.

(Citations omitted.)

{¶27} R.C. 309.09(A) provides that “[t]he prosecuting attorney shall

be the legal adviser of the board of county commissioners…” Thus, it is

obvious that the Vinton County Prosecuting Attorney’s office is entitled to

appear on behalf of CSEA and Vinton County’s Department of Job and

Family Services, county agencies operating under the auspices of the Vinton

County Board of Commissioners. Appellant’s third assignment of error is

overruled.

Assignment of Error Six - Improper Admission of Hearsay

{¶28} Appellant asserts that the trial court based its decision

dismissing his motions on improper hearsay information gathered by the

court’s staff. He argues this was demonstrated in the court’s entry of

dismissal when the court wrote: “At the April 7, 2025 pretrial, [appellant]

advised court staff although he is not represented, he is working with an

attorney who advised him he did not need to submit anything…” The CSEA

argues in its brief in response that appellant misunderstands the hearsay rule,

Evid.R. 802. We must agree.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 18

{¶ 29} “ ‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the

declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove

the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Evid. R. 801(C).

Generally, hearsay is not admissible. State v. Douglas, 2025-Ohio-2250, at

¶ 35 (4th Dist.). As the responsive brief points out, an evidentiary hearing

did not occur. Thus, we agree that the “hearsay rule” has no application to

appellant’s argument regarding the judge’s language in the dismissal entry.

{¶30} We are mindful that appellant was pro se below and is also pro

se on appeal. However, “[i]t is well-established that pro se litigants are held

to the same rules, procedures, and standards as litigants who are represented

by counsel.” Woods v. Best, 2025-Ohio-357, at ¶ 24 (4th Dist.) (Citations

omitted.) “Litigants who choose to proceed pro se are presumed to know the

law and correct procedure and are held to the same standards as other

litigants.” Matter of H.A.H., 2018-Ohio-3446, ¶ 18 (4th Dist.), citing

Capital One Bank v. Rodgers, 2010-Ohio-4421, ¶ 31 (5th Dist.). At least

one court has observed that bailiffs are conduits between attorneys and

judges and, in that capacity, bailiffs relay information to attorneys on any

number of issues. See First National Bank of S.W.Ohio v. Doellman, 2006-

Ohio-1663, at ¶ 16 (12th Dist.). Attorneys often rely upon the

representations of a bailiff. Id.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 19

{¶31} In the underlying proceedings, appellant functioned as his own

attorney. Throughout his brief, he has made sweeping accusations of the

court’s unfairness. Whether or not he spoke to a bailiff, the judge’s

secretary, or some other court personnel, appellant has directed us to no

authority to support his argument hereunder. Indeed, “it is our duty to

assume that such court acted in accordance with law unless the record shows

the contrary.” Marietta v. Verhovec, 2020-Ohio-7020, at ¶ 17 (4th Dist.)

(Citations omitted.) Furthermore, we are not required to construct

appellant’s arguments for him. See generally Citibank, N.A. v. Hines, 2019-

Ohio-464, at ¶ 111 (4th Dist.).

{¶32} Based on the foregoing, the sixth assignment of error is without

merit. It is hereby overruled.

Assignment of Error Seven - Summary Judgment

{¶33} Appellant argues that under Civ.R. 56, the trial court has the

ability to grant summary judgment when an opposing party does not answer

or give explanation. Here, he asserts that Bridget’s absence was

unexplained at both hearings. Appellant concludes that when the trial court

did not conduct hearings in which appellant was able to present arguments,

the trial court denied his ability to file for summary judgment based on

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 20

Bridget’s absence. Appellant misunderstands summary judgment motion

practice.

{¶34} In response, CSEA argues that summary judgment was

inapplicable and even if one had been filed, under appellant’s reasoning,

judgment to him would have been denied. Further, there was no reason for

Bridget to attend the January and April 2025 hearings as appellant’s

arrearages could not be reduced pursuant to statute. CSEA is correct.

{¶35} In Marietta v. Professional Service Industries, Inc., 2025-

Ohio-1530, at ¶ 15, we explained:

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the

following have been established: (1) that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3)

that reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion,

and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.

Barclay Petroleum, ¶ 16; Civ.R. 56(C); DIRECTV, Inc. v.

Levin, 2010-Ohio-6279, ¶ 15. In ruling on a motion for

summary judgment, the court must construe the record and

all inferences therefrom in the nonmoving party's favor.

Civ.R. 56(C). The party moving for summary judgment

bears the initial burden to demonstrate that no genuine

issues of material fact exist and that they are entitled to

judgment in their favor as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt,

75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996). To meet its burden,

the moving party must specifically refer to “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, written

admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written

stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action,” that

affirmatively demonstrate that the nonmoving party has no

evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. Civ.R.

56(C); Dresher at 293, 662 N.E.2d 264.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 21

In addition, failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment does not

automatically mean the movant prevails. See Marietta v. Verhovec, 2020-

Ohio-7029, at ¶ 30 (4th Dist.); Bennett v. Mechell, 2008-Ohio-1287, at ¶ 13

(4th Dist.) (as the burden is upon the moving party to establish the non-

existence of any material factual issues, the lack of a response by the

opposing party cannot, of itself, mandate the granting of summary

judgment); see Morris v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 45, 47 (1988).

{¶36} The underlying matter is not one which could be resolved in

summary judgment. Appellant is gravely mistaken if he somehow assumed

that since his children have reached majority, the law provides that the child

support arrearages would or could be waived due to Bridget’s failure to

attend the January and April 2025 hearings in this matter. See Geter v.

Geter, 2022-Ohio-2804, at ¶ 56 (2d Dist.) (The bill analysis for 2000 S.B.

180, concerning R.C. 3123.14, states that “[t]he act provides that the

termination of a court support order or an administrative child support order

does not abate the authority of a court or CSEA to…collect arrearages under

the terminated support order.”).

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 22

{¶37} For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s seventh assignment of

error is without merit and is also overruled.

{¶38} Having found no merit to any of appellant’s assignments of error, the

judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.

Vinton App. No. 25CA705 23

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be

assessed to appellant.

The Court finds there were no reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing

the Vinton County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into

execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to

Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Hess, J. and Wilkin, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

________________________

Jason P. Smith

Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 22, this document constitutes a final

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from

the date of filing with the clerk.