Grossman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 25-CV-20455-MOORE/Elfenbein

LORIN GROSSMAN,

Plaintiff,

v.

B&J SERVICES OF MIAMI, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

_________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO DETERMINE AND AWARD ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Plaintiff Lorin Grossman’s Motion to Determine and

Award Attorney’s Fees and Costs (the “Motion”), ECF No. [29]. The Honorable K. Michael

Moore referred the Motion to me “to take all necessary and proper action as required by law and/or

to issue a Report and Recommendation regarding Plaintiff’s Motion to Determine and Award

Attorney’s Fees and Costs.” See ECF No. [25]. For the reasons explained below, I respectfully

RECOMMEND that the Motion, ECF No. [29], be GRANTED.

I. INTRODUCTION

This case arises out of Defendants’ discriminatory refusal to show or lease a residential

dwelling to Plaintiff Lorin Grossman based on her disability. Plaintiff, who uses a wheelchair and

has no use of her legs, sought to view and rent a property located at 315 NW 59th Street, Miami,

Florida (the “Property”) that Defendant B&J Services of Miami, LLC (“B&J Services”) advertised

on Facebook Marketplace in January 2024. See ECF No. [1] ¶¶9, 16, 18. On January 19, 2024,

Plaintiff contacted Defendant Carla Rodas (“Rodas”), B&J Services’ leasing agent, expressed

interest in renting the Property, and disclosed that she used a wheelchair. Id. at ¶¶18–19. Upon

learning of Plaintiff’s disability, Rodas stated that the Property’s stone pathway was not suitable

for wheelchairs and — at or around the time of that exchange — cancelled Plaintiff’s scheduled

showing for January 20, 2024, representing that the current residents would be moving out that

day. Id. at ¶19. On January 22, 2024, Rodas texted Plaintiff that the Property had already been

rented to someone else and reiterated in writing: “As I explained to you, the entrance to the

apartment is made of stone and is not suitable for wheelchairs.” Id. at ¶20. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendants’ representation that the Property could not be toured on January 20 was false — tours

were in fact given to able-bodied prospective tenants that day — and that Defendants entered into

a lease with a third party on that date, the very day Plaintiff was supposed to tour. Id. at ¶¶21–22.

Plaintiff thereafter filed this action asserting eleven counts against Defendants under the

Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)–(d) and (f)(1), and the Florida Fair Housing Act,

Fla. Stat. § 760.23(1)–(4), (7)–(8), all premised on disability-based discrimination in connection

with the rental of the Property. See generally ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff served Rodas with the

Complaint on February 5, 2025, and served B&J Services via substitute service on March 6, 2025.

See ECF Nos. [7], [14], and [16]. Neither Defendant responded. The Clerk of Court entered

default against Rodas on March 4, 2025 and against B&J Services on April 1, 2025. See ECF Nos.

[9] and [21]. On April 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of Final Default Judgment,

seeking $134,000.00 in damages and requesting the Court reserve jurisdiction to award reasonable

attorney’s fees and costs. See ECF No. [24] at 10.

The undersigned thereafter issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the

Court enter final default judgment in Plaintiff’s favor on Counts III through XI of the Complaint,

award $100,000.00 in punitive damages and $32,200.00 in actual damages, and reserve jurisdiction

to determine and award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. See ECF No. [27] at 20–21. On

February 9, 2026, Judge Moore adopted the Report and Recommendation in full, entered final

default judgment against Defendants on Counts III through XI, and directed Plaintiff to file a

supplemental affidavit on the amount of attorney’s fees and costs, including all necessary

information to support a lodestar analysis with supporting timesheets. See ECF No. [28] at 10–

11. Having prevailed on default judgment, Plaintiff now seeks to recover the attorney’s fees and

costs she incurred in connection with this action. See generally ECF No. [29].

Plaintiff, through her counsel Nolan Klein, Esq. of the Law Offices of Nolan Klein, P.A.,

filed the Motion, requesting $20,735.00 in attorney’s fees and $533.16 in costs, for a combined

total of $21,268.16. See ECF No. [29] at 2–3; ECF No. [29-1] at 8. Plaintiff supports the relief

requested in the Motion with Mr. Klein’s sworn affidavit and detailed timesheets reflecting 37.7

hours of attorney time at a rate of $550 per hour. See ECF No. [29-1] at 1–8. Defendants have

not responded to the Motion and the time to do so has long expired. The Motion is now ripe for

review.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Attorney’s Fees Under the Fair Housing Act

Plaintiff seeks attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) and Florida

Statute § 760.35(4). Section 3613(c)(2) provides that “[i]n a civil action under subsection (a), the

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.”

42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2). Florida Statute § 760.35(4) likewise authorizes an award of “reasonable

attorney fees and costs” “[i]f the court finds that a discriminatory housing practice has occurred.”

Fla. Stat. § 760.35(4). Because the Florida Fair Housing Act “is patterned after the [Fair Housing

Act] and courts have recognized that it is to be construed consistently with federal law,” Noah v.

Assor, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (quotation marks omitted), the Court applies

federal case law to the fee analysis under both provisions. See Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights

Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 765 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The FHA and the Florida Fair Housing

Act are substantively identical, and therefore the same legal analysis applies to each.”).

A party “prevails” for purposes of these fee-shifting provisions when the court has awarded

“some relief” on the merits. Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home,

Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603 (2001)). Once entitlement to

fees under the Fair Housing Act is established, the Court determines the amount of the reasonable

fee award using the lodestar method, as discussed below.

B. Lodestar Method

To calculate attorney’s fee awards, courts generally use the “lodestar” method. See

Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988); Inj.

Treatment Ctr. Of Ft. Myers, Inc. v. Starr Indem. & Liability Co., No. 21-CV-80156, 2022 WL

17325834, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2022). “The most useful starting point for determining the

amount of a reasonable fee” using the lodestar method “is the number of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. This calculation provides an

objective basis on which to make an initial estimate of the value of a lawyer’s services.” See

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427

(11th Cir. 1999) (noting that the lodestar is “properly calculated by multiplying the number of

hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate” (quoting Blum v.

Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984))). “[T]here is a ‘strong presumption’ that the lodestar is the

reasonable sum the attorneys deserve.” See Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th

Cir. 2008) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546,

565–66 (1986)).

“The first step in the computation of the lodestar is determining the reasonable hourly rate.”

Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 1994). “A reasonable hourly rate is the

prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of

reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Id. (quoting Norman, 836 F.2d at

1299). “The general rule is that the relevant market for purposes of determining the reasonable

hourly rate for an attorney’s services is the place where the case is filed.” Barnes, 168 F.3d at 437.

“The party seeking attorney’s fees bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the

requested rate is in line with prevailing market rates.” Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781 (citation and

quotation marks omitted). Of course, the court “is itself an expert on the question and may consider

its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an

independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.”1 Id. (quotation

marks omitted).

To aid in determining what reasonable hourly rate applies in each case, the Eleventh Circuit

has approved of courts considering “the twelve factors discussed in Johnson v. Georgia Highway

Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974).” Id. at 781 n.6; see also Norman, 836 F.2d

at 1299. “The twelve factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of

the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of

1 Indeed, where “there is a lack of documentation or testimonial support the court may make the award on

its own experience. Where documentation is inadequate, the district court is not relieved of its obligation

to award a reasonable fee, but the district court traditionally has had the power to make such an award

without the need of further pleadings or an evidentiary hearing. Likewise, no additional evidentiary hearing

or pleadings are required where fee counsel fails to provide evidence on some factor which it contends the

court ought to take into account. It is perfectly proper to award attorney’s fees based solely on affidavits

in the record.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303 (footnote and citations omitted).

employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the

fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the

amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the

attorneys; (10) the ‘undesirability’ of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional

relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3.

“The next step in the computation of the lodestar is the ascertainment of reasonable hours.”

Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301. “Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to

exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary, just as a

lawyer in private practice ethically is obligated to exclude such hours from his fee submission.”

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. “In other words, the Supreme Court requires fee applicants to exercise

‘billing judgment.’” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437). “This must

necessarily mean that the hours excluded are those that would be unreasonable to bill to a client

and therefore to one’s adversary irrespective of the skill, reputation or experience of counsel. If it

were otherwise, an inexperienced or unskillful attorney would face a double penalty. First, his

hourly rate would be lowered and second, his time reduced.” Id. (emphasis and citation omitted).

The “district court is charged with deducting for redundant hours. Redundant hours

generally occur where more than one attorney represents a client. There is nothing inherently

unreasonable about a client having multiple attorneys, and they may all be compensated if they are

not unreasonably doing the same work and are being compensated for the distinct contribution of

each lawyer.” Id. at 1301–02. The “district court must deduct time spent on discrete and

unsuccessful claims.” Id. at 1302. “When a district court finds the number of hours claimed is

unreasonably high, the court has two choices: it may conduct an hour-by-hour analysis or it may

reduce the requested hours with an across-the-board cut.” Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350; see also

Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436–37 (“There is no precise rule or formula for making these determinations.

The district court may attempt to identify specific hours that should be eliminated, or it may simply

reduce the award to account for the limited success.”).

As noted above, the “product” of the reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours

reasonably expended on the litigation “is the lodestar.” See Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350. After

determining the lodestar amount, courts can “adjust the fee upward or downward, including [by

considering] the important factor of the results obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (quotation

marks omitted). “If the result was excellent, then the court should compensate for all hours

reasonably expended.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. “If the result was partial or limited success,

then the lodestar must be reduced to an amount that is not excessive.” Id.; see also Bivins, 548

F.3d at 1350–51 (“When the number of compensable hours and the hourly rate are reasonable, a

downward adjustment to the lodestar is merited only if the prevailing party was partially successful

in its efforts.”). “A reduction is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in

comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. “Where all

theories derive from a common core of operative facts, the focus should be on the significance of

overall results as a function of total reasonable hours. It is improper to make the reduction based

on a simple ratio of successful issues to issues raised.” Id. (citation omitted).

“[T]he determination of fees should not result in a second major litigation.” Fox v. Vice,

563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). “The essential goal in shifting fees (to either

party) is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing perfection. So trial courts may take into

account their overall sense of a suit, and may use estimates in calculating and allocating an

attorney’s time.” Id. Whatever the court decides, it must “provide a concise but clear explanation

of its reasons for the fee award. When an adjustment is requested on the basis of either the

exceptional or limited nature of the relief obtained by the plaintiff, the district court should make

clear that it has considered the relationship between the amount of the fee awarded and the results

obtained.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Entitlement to Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiff is a prevailing party. On February 9, 2026, Judge Moore entered final default

judgment in Plaintiff’s favor and against Defendants on Counts III through XI, awarding

$132,200.00 in compensatory and punitive damages. See ECF No. [28] at 10–11. That judgment

awards “some relief” on the merits sufficient to confer prevailing-party status. See Bhogaita, 765

F.3d at 1291. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to a reasonable award of attorney’s fees and costs

under 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) and Florida Statute § 760.35(4).

B. Lodestar Calculation

The Court next turns to determine the reasonable amount of recoverable attorney’s fees

and to do so, it must calculate the reasonable hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably

expended on the litigation. See Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350. Starting first with determining the

reasonable hourly rate, Plaintiff’s counsel, Nolan Klein, Esq., requests $550 per hour. See ECF

No. [29] at 2; ECF No. [29-1] at 1. Mr. Klein has been a member of the Florida Bar since 2003

and has practiced in the Southern District of Florida since 2004, giving him more than twenty years

of federal court experience. See ECF No. [29-1] at 1. He has represented clients in hundreds of

disability rights matters on both the plaintiff and defense sides and has handled nearly one thousand

cases in federal court. Id. He serves as a faculty member for Lawline, has taught continuing legal

education courses on disability law approved for credit by multiple state bar associations and taken

by thousands of attorneys nationwide, and has appeared as a legal analyst on national news

programs in connection with his disability law practice. Id.

In further support of the requested rate, counsel cites Chavez v. The Fifth Labor, LLC, No.

22-CV-01055, 2023 WL 3647912, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2023), in which the district court

determined that a rate of $500 per hour was reasonable for Mr. Klein’s work on a comparable

disability civil rights matter. See ECF No. [29] at 3. Since that decision nearly three years ago,

Mr. Klein has continued to expand his federal court practice across multiple jurisdictions. See

ECF No. [29-1] at 1. The Court’s own familiarity with prevailing market rates in this District

further confirms that a rate of $550 per hour is reasonable for an attorney of Mr. Klein’s experience

and specialization in federal disability and fair housing law. See Loranger, 10 F.3d at 781.

The applicable Johnson factors further confirm the reasonableness of the rate. This

litigation presented multi-count claims under parallel federal and state fair housing statutes

requiring specialized knowledge of disability discrimination law. See ECF No. [1] at ¶20; ECF

No. [27] at 12–13; Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–19 (identifying as relevant factors the novelty and

difficulty of the questions presented, the skill requisite to perform the legal service, and the

experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys). Plaintiff obtained an excellent result: a

$132,200.00 judgment on nine of eleven counts, including a $100,000.00 punitive damages award

to deter willful disability discrimination. See ECF No. [28] at ¶¶3–4; Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717–

19 (identifying the amount involved and results obtained as relevant factors). On balance, the

Johnson factors are consistent with the rate requested, which the Court finds reasonable.

Turning next to the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, Plaintiff’s

counsel requests fees for 37.7 hours billed solely by Mr. Klein between January 15, 2025 and

December 30, 2025. See ECF No. [29-1] at 3–8. No paralegal or other non-attorney time is

included in the request. See ECF No. [29] at 2. The Court’s review of the billing entries reveals

that they are reasonable, appropriate, and sufficiently specific for the Court to determine the task

completed as compared to the amount of time spent on each individual task. The pre-filing and

immediate post-filing phase — encompassing initial client intake and review of the FCHR’s

reasonable cause findings, background research on Defendants through public dockets and Florida

state databases, and the drafting and filing of an eleven-count federal complaint — is well-

documented and reflects the demands of initiating disability discrimination litigation in federal

court. See ECF No. [29-1] at 3. The default judgment phase encompassed substantive legal

research across eleven statutory counts under both federal and Florida law, preparation of the

motion for default judgment and Plaintiff’s supporting sworn affidavit, and all related tasks. Id. at

5–7. The remaining time reflects periodic client communications, case monitoring, and

preparation of the instant fee application. Id. at 7–8. As Mr. Klein is the sole timekeeper, there

is no issue of duplication of effort. See Norman, 836 F.2d at 1301–02. The Court identifies no

entries that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434.

Thus, the lodestar is $20,735.00 (37.7 hours at $550.00 per hour). See ECF No. [29-1] at

8. No adjustment to the lodestar is warranted. The Court entered final default judgment in

Plaintiff’s favor on nine of eleven counts and awarded the full punitive damages amount she

requested — an excellent result. “If the result was excellent, then the court should compensate for

all hours reasonably expended.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302. A downward adjustment “is merited

only if the prevailing party was partially successful in its efforts.” Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350–51.

No such limitation applies here. The Court accordingly awards Plaintiff her attorney’s fees in the

full lodestar amount.

C. Costs

Plaintiff seeks $533.16 in litigation costs, comprising: (1) a $405.00 filing fee; (2) a $60.00

service of process fee for Defendant Rodas; (3) a $60.00 service of process fee for Defendant B&J

Services; and (4) $8.16 in certified mail costs incurred in connection with the substitute service

proceedings. See ECF No. [29-1] at 8. Filing fees and service of process costs are recoverable

under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(1) and the Fair Housing Act’s costs provision. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2);

Fla. Stat. § 760.35(4); 28 C.F.R. § 0.114. The certified mail expense was a necessary component

of completing substitute service on the corporate Defendant and is likewise recoverable. All

requested costs are approved.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, I respectfully RECOMMEND that the Motion, ECF No.

[29], be GRANTED and that Plaintiff be AWARDED $21,268.16 in attorney’s fees and costs

($20,735.00 in attorney’s fees and $533.16 in costs) against Defendants jointly and severally.

Pursuant to Local Magistrate Rule 4(b), the parties have fourteen (14) days from the date

of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation within which to file written

objections, if any, with the Honorable K. Michael Moore, United States District Judge. Failure to

timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de novo determination by the District Judge of

an issue covered in the Report and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to

factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report except upon grounds of plain error if

necessary in the interest of justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140,

149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

CASE NO. 25-CV-20455-MOORE/Elfenbein

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Florida on, April 21, 2026.

A a

MARTY FULGHUEIRA ELFENBEIN

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ce: All Counsel of Record

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