Ronald Young v. Eric Keyes

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 24-2763

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Ronald Edward Young

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Eric Keyes, acting in his individual capacity as a Williston police officer; Nick

Rintamaki, acting in his individual capacity as a Williston police officer

Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of North Dakota - Western

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Submitted: October 22, 2025

Filed: May 19, 2026

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Before SMITH, KELLY, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

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SMITH, Circuit Judge.

Williston Police Officer Eric Keyes saw Ronald Young make an illegal turn

and pulled him over. Officer Keyes questioned Young and had him exit his vehicle.

After Officer Keyes administered a series of field-sobriety tests, Young and Officer

Keyes began arguing. Eventually, Officer Keyes, with the assistance of Officer Nick

Rintamaki, took Young to the ground and handcuffed him. Young was injured in the

struggle. He subsequently sued Officers Keyes and Rintamaki for excessive force.

The district court granted the officers’ motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified

immunity. Young now appeals. We reverse and remand.

I. Background

At approximately 10:00 p.m. on December 31, 2019, New Year’s Eve, Officer

Keyes witnessed a vehicle making an illegal left turn and initiated a traffic stop.

During his conversation 1 with the driver, Young, Officer Keyes “observed indicia

of alcohol intoxication” and conducted field-sobriety tests. R. Doc. 1, at ¶ 10. The

officers conducted two tests. However, during the second, Young ceased complying

with Officer Keyes’s directions. After Officers Keyes and Rintamaki completed the

two tests, Officer Keyes requested another screening test using an alcohol sensor.

Young declined to answer whether he would agree to the test and instead continued

asking questions. Officer Keyes then told Young, “I am done arguing with you.” R.

Doc. 17, at 3 (quoting R. Doc. 10-2, at 16:27). Young responded, “no,” while

stepping toward Officer Keyes. Id. (quoting R. Doc. 10-2, at 16:27).

Young’s complaint describes the next series of events as follows:

12) Without warning, Keyes forcefully grabbed Young’s arm.

13) After Keyes grabbed Young’s arm, he then commanded Young

to put his hands behind his back.

14) Rintamaki grabbed Young from the other side.

15) Both officers threw Young to the ground. Because the officers

held Young’s arms, Young was unable to protect himself from injury

as he was thrown to the ground.

16) Young repeatedly asked officers what they were doing to him.

1

The district court relied on dash-camera and body-camera footage, finding

that they were “embraced by the pleadings.” R. Doc. 17, at 2 (citing Ching v. City of

Minneapolis, 73 F.4th 617, 621 (8th Cir. 2023)). The parties do not object to the use

of the videos or their authenticity.

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17) Young tried to prevent injury to himself during the encounter,

but officers controlled him and prevented him from doing so.

18) The officers put their weight on Young’s back once he was on

the ground. Officers continued to control and put Young’s arms into a

painful position.

R. Doc. 1, at ¶¶ 12–18. The video footage does not contradict Young’s allegations.

The dash-camera footage is unclear as to whether Young attempted to pull his arms

away after the two officers grabbed him prior to the three of them ending up on the

ground. The body-camera footage recorded the officers telling Young to “stop

resisting.” R. Doc. 10-2, at 16:38. In addition, they directed him to put his hands

behind his back.

Young alleges that Officers Keyes and Rintamaki used excessive force in

violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Young’s complaint alleges that the force

used by the officers broke his glasses, caused lacerations to his face and chin, and

led to mental trauma and emotional harm. The officers moved to dismiss the

complaint on grounds of qualified immunity. The district court granted the officers’

motion. The district court held that the officers’ use of force was de minimis 2 and,

alternatively, that the force was objectively reasonable. Young now appeals.

II. Discussion

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Waters v. Madson, 921

F.3d 725, 734 (8th Cir. 2019). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, we may consider

matters “embraced by the complaint,” such as video evidence, where no party

challenges the contents’ authenticity. Zean v. Fairview Health Servs., 858 F.3d 520,

2

At oral argument, the government conceded that it did not “know that the

force here actually was de minimis when a suspect is grabbed and then taken to the

ground.” Oral Arg. at 12:07. The government further stated “Assuming the facts in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff . . . I don’t think that would be de minimis

force . . ..” Id. at 12:15. We agree with the parties and find that the district court erred

in finding the force de minimis.

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526 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Enervations, Inc. v. Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co., 380 F.3d

1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 2004)). We “accept[] as true all factual allegations in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party” unless “they are blatantly contradicted by

video evidence.” Waters, 921 F.3d at 734 (citation modified). To hold that the video

evidence “blatantly contradict[s]” the alleged facts, it must conclusively disprove

plaintiff’s account of the events. Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2014)

(holding that the video evidence did not blatantly contradict plaintiff’s account of

the events where it did not conclusively disprove the plaintiff’s account).

Qualified immunity protects government officials from liability unless their

actions violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Kohorst v. Smith, 968 F.3d 871, 876 (8th

Cir. 2020) (quoting McGuire v. Cooper, 952 F.3d 918, 922 (8th Cir. 2020)). We

consider a “two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out

a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly

established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Brown v. City of

Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 496 (8th Cir. 2009). A “clearly established” right

“must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he

is doing violates that right.” Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002, 1008 (8th

Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). “Existing

law need not be directly on point to clearly establish a right, but it must put the

question beyond debate.” Kohorst, 968 F.3d at 876.

“When evaluating a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under § 1983,

we consider ‘whether the amount of force used was objectively reasonable under the

particular circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Michael v. Trevena, 899 F.3d 528, 532 (8th

Cir. 2018)). “We evaluate the reasonableness of the force used from the perspective

of a reasonable officer on the scene,” without the benefit of hindsight. Id. “The

reasonableness inquiry, however, is an objective one: the question is whether the

officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances

confronting them.” Brown, 574 F.3d at 496 (citation modified). This evaluation

entails carefully considering the particular facts and circumstances, including: “[1]

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the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat

to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest

or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Michael, 899 F.3d at 532 (quoting Graham

v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).

First, we consider the severity of the crime at issue—driving while

intoxicated. “We have previously cognized the severity of the suspected crime at

issue—driving while intoxicated—and the immediate threat that impaired drivers

pose to the safety of officers and others.” Schoettle v. Jefferson Cnty., 788 F.3d 855,

860 (8th Cir. 2015). But this severity is particularly threatening when the arrestee is

“in command of a running vehicle.” Id. (quoting Janis v. Biesheuvel, 428 F.3d 795,

800 (8th Cir. 2005)). At the time of the relevant interaction, Young was no longer in

command of a running vehicle. Additionally, driving under the influence is a

misdemeanor in North Dakota. N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 39-08-01.

Next, we turn to whether Young posed an “immediate threat” to the officers’

safety. The undisputed facts do not show that Young posed an immediate threat to

the officers. As the conversation progressed, the environment became more “tense

[and] uncertain,” yet it remained nonthreatening. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. But

being argumentative does not alone permit the use of force. See, e.g., Shannon v.

Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 865 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Although [the suspect] greeted [the

officer] in a disrespectful, even churlish manner, that alone did not make [the

officer’s] use of force acceptable under extant law.”); Bauer v. Norris, 713 F.2d 408,

412 (8th Cir. 1983) (“The use of any force by officers simply because a suspect is

argumentative, contentious, or vituperative is not to be condoned.” (citation

modified)).

The complaint’s fact allegations, when construed in favor of Young, are

inconclusive as to whether Young posed an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers. The video evidence also fails to conclusively demonstrate that Young posed

a threat. See, e.g., Raines v. Counseling Assocs., Inc., 883 F.3d 1071, 1075 (8th Cir.

2018), as corrected (Mar. 6, 2018) (finding that the video evidence did not

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conclusively support the officers’ argument and foreclose the arrestee’s argument

where the court found the evidence inconclusive on the matter). The only potential

threat that Young himself posed arose when he responded to Officer Keyes by saying

“no” and stepping towards him. Young’s step and single word do not establish an

imminent threat.

The officers argue that the circumstances of the stop and Young’s general

behavior further contributed to the threat that Young posed. We disagree. The stop’s

occurrence late on New Year’s Eve on the side of a busy highway does not establish

that the “suspect pose[d] an immediate threat to the safety of the officers.” Michael,

899 F.3d at 532. Further, the video does not conclusively support the officers’

arguments that Young moved “around on the side of the roadway in an erratic

manner” and “reached into his coat,” Appellee’s Br. at 20, nor do such actions rise

to the level of posing an immediate threat in a winter environment in North Dakota.

Finally, we look to the third factor—whether Young actively resisted arrest or

attempted to evade arrest by flight. Consistently, we have held that a resisting

arrestee may require more force. See, e.g., Wertish v. Krueger, 433 F.3d 1062, 1066–

67 (8th Cir. 2006) (“When a suspect is passively resistant, somewhat more force

may reasonably be required.”); Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 650 (8th Cir. 2012)

(finding the use of force reasonable where arrestee resisted and officers had to

respond “with an amount of force that was reasonable to effect the arrest”).

At this stage in the proceedings, the pleadings do not conclusively support the

conclusion that Young resisted arrest. Looking at the allegations in the complaint,

Young does not allege or imply that he resisted at all. Turning next to the video

evidence, it does not blatantly contradict Young’s allegations, nor does it

conclusively support the officers’ argument that Young resisted. First, the video does

not show Young resisting the officers prior to Officer Keyes grabbing Young and

then saying to “put your hands behind your back” after he already had hold of

Young’s hands. R. Doc. 10-2, at 16:30. Second, while the dash-camera footage

indicates that Young potentially attempted to pull his arm away, it is not conclusive

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that this constituted resistance. Third, the officer’s yelling of “stop resisting” may

imply that Young could have been resisting, but the video fails to provide a clear

view of Young’s actions. Id. at 16:38. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, we take

as true the facts alleged in the complaint where the facts are not blatantly

contradicted by video evidence. See Waters, 921 F.3d at 734. We hold that the video

evidence is inconclusive as to whether Young resisted arrest and does not blatantly

contradict Young’s allegations within his complaint.

Young had a clearly established right to be free from excessive force as a

misdemeanant. Here, there is no conclusive evidence that Young posed a threat to

officers or resisted arrest to contradict the complaint allegations. We have long held

that “[f]orce is least justified against nonviolent misdemeanants who do not flee or

actively resist arrest and pose little or no threat to the security of the officers or the

public.” Brown v. City of Golden Valley, 574 F.3d 491, 499 (8th Cir. 2009); see also

Montoya v. City of Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867, 873 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding it was

unlawful to “throw to the ground a nonviolent, suspected misdemeanant who was

not threatening anyone, was not actively resisting arrest, and was not attempting to

flee”). While this analysis may be different had the officers given a command that

Young failed to comply with prior to initiating force, those are not the facts here.

See, e.g., Kelsay v. Ernst, 933 F.3d 975, 980 (8th Cir. 2019) (holding the officer was

protected by qualified immunity when executing a takedown after the officer had

given a command and the arrestee did not comply).

Taking Young’s allegations as true, except where conclusively contradicted

by video evidence, we conclude that Officers Keyes and Rintamaki cannot show that

they did not violate Young’s clearly established rights at this stage of the

proceedings.

III. Conclusion

For the forgoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s dismissal and remand

for further proceedings.

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Grasz, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

This appeal presents two issues — whether we may consider the body and

dash camera footage Officers Keyes and Rintamaki filed along with their motion to

dismiss and, if so, whether the footage blatantly contradicts the allegations in

Young’s Complaint. I join the majority’s opinion on the first issue and write

separately to explain why in more detail. But I am convinced the footage blatantly

contradicts Young’s allegations and shows that Keyes’s and Rintamaki’s use of

force was objectively reasonable, so I dissent from the majority’s analysis of the

second issue and would affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case with

prejudice.

Taking the two issues in turn, this case is before us on Young’s appeal from

the district court’s order granting Keyes and Rintamaki’s motion to dismiss, which

they filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A defendant is entitled

to have the complaint against him dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it “fail[s]

to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When we evaluate a 12(b)(6)

motion, the plaintiff gets certain procedural breaks. For instance, we ordinarily

consider only “the facts alleged in the complaint.” Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185,

187 (8th Cir. 1986). And we assume those facts “are true” and draw “all reasonable

inferences” from them in the plaintiff’s favor. Fla. State Bd. of Admin. v. Green

Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645, 660 (8th Cir. 2001). This makes sense. The plaintiff

has “not had a full opportunity to conduct discovery” or to “uncover facts that

support his or her claim” at the pleading stage. Ashley v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 408

F.3d 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2005).

Over the years, we have recognized several deviations from this framework.

For example, courts may now consider “matters incorporated by reference or integral

to the claim, items subject to judicial notice, matters of public record, orders, items

appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint” when

ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion. Miller v. Redwood Toxicology Lab’y, Inc., 688 F.3d

928, 931 n.3 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting 5B Wright & Miller, Federal Practice &

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Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)). This is because, as we have explained, these

materials, and others, are “necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Porous Media

Corp. v. Pall Corp., 186 F.3d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Piper Jaffray Cos.

v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 967 F. Supp. 1148, 1152 (D. Minn. 1997)).

More recently, we broadly stated that “[v]ideos of an incident are necessarily

embraced by the pleadings.” Ching ex rel. Jordan v. City of Minneapolis, 73 F.4th

617, 620–21 (8th Cir. 2023) (citing LeMay v. Mays, 18 F.4th 283, 289 (8th Cir. 2021)

(Grasz, J.)). But to support this proposition, Ching cited only LeMay, a case I

authored. And LeMay does not say that courts can always consider video evidence

when ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion. Rather, it concluded that the officer was not

entitled to qualified immunity even considering the videos, since they did not

definitively show he had acted reasonably. 18 F.4th at 289–90.

In our precedent predating Ching, we repeatedly held that evidence is only

embraced by a pleading when no party questions its authenticity. See, e.g., Ashanti

v. City of Golden Valley, 666 F.3d 1148, 1151 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Documents

necessarily embraced by the pleadings include ‘documents whose contents are

alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not

physically attached to the pleading.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Kushner v. Beverly

Enters., 317 F.3d 820, 831 (8th Cir. 2003))). So I agree with the majority, ante, at 3,

video evidence of an incident, just like other evidence, is only “necessarily embraced

by the pleading” when neither party questions its authenticity. 3 See Ashanti, 666

F.3d at 1151.

I note that after Ching, several district courts dispensed with our earlier

precedent in favor of universally considering video evidence at the pleading stage.

They were wrong to do so. Ching did not — and could not — overrule our prior

3

A petition for certiorari asking the Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split

regarding “[w]hether a district court may, or must, consider objective video evidence

at the motion-to-dismiss stage” is currently pending. Petition for Writ of Certiorari

at i, Zook v. Fuqua ex rel. Roybal, No. 25-1108 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2026).

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precedent. See Smith v. United States, 63 F.4th 677, 678 (8th Cir. 2023) (“Only the

en banc court (or the Supreme Court) can overrule a prior panel’s controlling

decision.”). And practically, adhering to our earlier rule is more important today

than ever, given the increasing prevalence of artificial intelligence. Seeing no longer

means believing.

Turning to the second issue, I agree with the majority that Young’s Complaint,

standing alone, states an excessive force claim. Ante, at 5–6. So Keyes and

Rintamaki are only entitled to qualified immunity if the body and dash camera

footage “blatantly contradicts” Young’s allegations and shows that their use of force

was objectively reasonable. Boude v. City of Raymore, 855 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir.

2017) (cleaned up); see also Ehlers v. City of Rapid City, 846 F.3d 1002, 1011 (8th

Cir. 2017) (“To determine whether a particular use of force was excessive, the court

considers whether it was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, relying on

the perspective of a reasonable officer present at the scene rather than the 20/20

vision of hindsight.” (cleaned up)). In my view, the videos do just that.

For instance, in his Complaint, Young alleges that Keyes pulled him over after

seeing him make an illegal turn; that Keyes and Rintamaki then administered a series

of field sobriety tests after observing “indicia of alcohol intoxication”; and that

“[a]fter the tests were completed,” Keyes and Rintamaki “grabbed” his arms and

threw him to the ground “[w]ithout warning.”

The videos, on the other hand, show that while Young was generally calm,

cool, and cooperative while Keyes administered an eye test and the walk-and-turn

test, he became exasperated around fifteen minutes into the stop, as Keyes tried to

explain a “screening test” that he had planned to conduct next. Young began arguing

with Keyes, telling the officers that they needed to “chill the f**k out” and

demanding they explain whether he had passed the prior tests. Keyes eventually

said, “Ronald, I’m done arguing with you” and moved to grab Young’s arm. Young

shouted “no,” abruptly stepped toward Keyes, and raised his right arm toward Keyes.

Keyes then seized Young’s right arm and told him to “put [his] hands behind his

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back.” At the same time, Rintamaki tried to seize Young’s left arm. But Young

struggled. As a result, the officers employed a takedown and were eventually able

to handcuff Young.

I recognize that granting qualified immunity at the pleading stage based on

video evidence is a high hurdle, since the video must conclusively disprove the

plaintiff’s allegations. See Edwards v. Byrd, 750 F.3d 728, 733 (8th Cir. 2014). In

my view, however, the footage in this case meets this test because it blatantly

contradicts Young’s allegations that Keyes and Rintamaki seized him and threw him

to the ground without reason. The footage shows that Young became aggravated

and belligerent as the officers prolonged the traffic stop and that when they

ultimately told him to put his hands behind his back and tried to seize his arms to

arrest him, he resisted by pulling his arms away. As I see it, when Young refused to

give the officers his arms, they were “entitled to use the force necessary to effect an

arrest,” since he “at least appear[ed] to be resisting.” Kohorst v. Smith, 968 F.3d

871, 876 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Ehlers, 846 F.3d at 1011). And the takedown they

used was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. See Ehlers, 846 F.3d at

1011.

I acknowledge that the officers bear some responsibility for this unfortunate

situation, since they subjected Young to successive and prolonged sobriety tests,

even as he became increasingly (and obviously) agitated. They had ample reason to

arrest Young much earlier in the stop, while he calmy cooperated. But this does not

change the result. So I would affirm the district court’s order dismissing this case

with prejudice because Keyes and Rintamaki are entitled to qualified immunity.4

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4

Lastly, I agree with the majority that takedowns are more than de minimis

force. Ante, at 3 n.2; see also Mitchell v. Kirchmeier, 28 F.4th 888, 898 (8th Cir.

2022) (recognizing takedowns are more than de minimis force) (first citing Montoya

v. City of Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867, 870, 872–73 (8th Cir. 2012); and then citing

Shannon v. Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 858, 863–64 (8th Cir. 2010)).

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