Downingtown Area SD v. Chester Cnty Bd of Assmt.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

DOWNINGTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT : No. 45 MAP 2024

:

: Appeal from the Order of the

v. : Commonwealth Court at No. 92

: CD 2022 dated October 6, 2023,

: Reversing the Order of the

CHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF : Chester County Court of Common

ASSESSMENT APPEALS : Pleas, Civil Division, at No. 2019-

TAX PARCEL NO.: 33-5-43.3 : 11728-AB dated January 18, 2022

:

: ARGUED: September 11, 2025

APPEAL OF: DOWNINGTOWN AREA :

SCHOOL DISTRICT :

DOWNINGTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT : No. 46 MAP 2024

:

: Appeal from the Order of the

v. : Commonwealth Court at No. 93

: CD 2022 dated October 6, 2023,

: Reversing the Order of the

CHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF : Chester County Court of Common

ASSESSMENT APPEALS : Pleas, Civil Division, at No. 2019-

TAX PARCEL NO.: 33-5-43.2 : 11727-AB dated January 18, 2022

:

: ARGUED: September 11, 2025

APPEAL OF: DOWNINGTOWN AREA :

SCHOOL DISTRICT :

DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE DECIDED: May 19, 2026

The Majority’s opinion runs counter to the bedrock principles of uniformity and

undermines this Court’s precedent. Accordingly, I dissent. 1

1 I also join Justice Dougherty’s dissenting opinion in full.

The Uniformity Clause provides that “[a]ll taxes shall be uniform, upon the same

class of subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be

levied and collected under general laws.” PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. In Valley Forge Tower

Apartments v. Upper Merion School District, 163 A.3d 962 (Pa. 2017), we held that,

pursuant to the Uniformity Clause, a school district’s policy of selectively reassessing

commercial properties violated the Pennsylvania Constitution, reaffirming that “all

property must be taxed uniformly ... throughout the taxing jurisdiction.” Id. at 977, 980.

Thus, such reassessment policies must not be directed by “the type of property in

question or the residency status of its owner.” Id. at 979. We explained that taxing

entities’ objectives should not be limited solely to generating necessary revenues; they

must also ensure that taxes are imposed equitably. Id. Accordingly, we reasoned that

“[w]here there is a conflict between maximizing revenue and ensuring that the taxing

system is implemented in a non-discriminatory way, the Uniformity Clause requires that

the latter goal be given primacy.” Id. at 980. However, the Majority has instead decided

to invert that principle, setting revenue maximization above the mandates of our

Constitution.

We recognized in Valley Forge that taxing entities must use and acquire public

funds wisely to “obtain[] needed revenues” to support important objectives; however, we

stressed that “[t]he government must be concerned with ensuring a rough equalization of

tax burdens under a structure in which taxes are imposed, adjusted, and collected

equitably.” Id. at 979. This means that while taxation may not always be perfectly

equitable across all subclasses of realty, the policies of a taxing entity must be to

effectuate as equitable a system of taxation as possible. See Clifton v. Allegheny Cnty.,

969 A.2d 1197, 1212 (Pa. 2009) (“Taxation, however, is not a matter of exact science;

hence absolute equality and perfect uniformity are not required to satisfy the constitutional

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 2

uniformity requirement. Some practical inequalities are obviously anticipated, and so long

as the taxing scheme does not impose substantially unequal tax burdens, rough

uniformity with a limited amount of variation is permitted.”) (citations omitted). Thus, we

recognized that the “two objectives do not necessarily conflict.” Valley Forge, 163 A.3d

at 980. That is not to say that the conflict does not exist—our rationale clearly states

otherwise—but rather that in practice the conflict will arise. When this conflict between

inequitable taxation and revenue generation goes too far, the resolution is clear—we

follow our Constitution. In other words, when business decisions to maximize revenue

are given more weight than the goals of the Uniformity Clause, a taxing policy is patently

unconstitutional. Id. at 980. Unfortunately, ignoring our stated prioritization, the Majority’s

takeaway from Valley Forge is simply that “maximizing revenue and ensuring non-

discriminatory implementation of the taxing system do not necessarily conflict[.]” Majority

Op. at 10 n.11. Thus, the Majority is of the mind that there is no conflict between these

two goals. Its rationale supports the notion that so long as a taxing entity is seeking to

maximize revenue, however they do so is effectively irrelevant.

According to the Majority, there is no indication that the School District “was

motivated to appeal the subject property because of its type, usage, or where its new

owner lived; rather, it was a transparent attempt to obtain more tax money by

conforming the property’s assessment to the [common-level ratio (‘CLR’)].” Majority Op.

at 21 (emphasis added). While the Majority may be correct that this is the practical

“purpose of Section 8855[,]” 2 id., the “statutory right to appeal assessments … alone

2 Section 8855 provides:

A taxing district shall have the right to appeal any assessment

within its jurisdiction in the same manner, subject to the same

procedure and with like effect as if the appeal were taken by

a taxable person with respect to the assessment, and, in

addition, may take an appeal from any decision of the board

(continued…)

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 3

cannot justify action which the Uniformity Clause prohibits.” Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at

978. Thus, a tax policy cannot solely be intended for the purpose of maximizing revenue

regardless of the consequences. If that were the case, then this Court would never have

found any taxing policy in violation of the Uniformity Clause. But the Majority has seen fit

to approve any taxing scheme if the taxing entity seeks to maximize revenue and does

not publicize its intention to only seek reassessment of those properties that will provide

the government with the most money.

In discussing the methodology of the School District’s consultant, the Majority

endorses the practice of “maximiz[ing] the return” so long as the properties selected for

reassessment are those “expected to yield the greatest collective return to the school

district.” Majority Op. at 23. The simplest way to do this, of course, would be to only

reassess those properties of the highest value. It comes as no surprise that commercial,

industrial, and apartment complex properties are all higher value properties compared to

single-family residential properties. 3 Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 966 (noting that

commercial property values are “generally higher than those of single-family homes”).

The Majority recognizes precisely this fact. See Majority Op. at 27. In explaining why

only commercial properties have been reassessed under the School District’s policy, the

Majority notes that this is “due to the value of such properties,” but “[i]f market forces

change so that single-family residences rise in value compared to commercial properties,

or court of common pleas as though it had been a party to the

proceedings before the board or court even though it was not

a party in fact. A taxing district authority may intervene in any

appeal by a taxable person under section 8854 (relating to

appeals to court) as a matter of right.

53 Pa.C.S. § 8855.

3 For ease of reference, I shall hereinafter refer to commercial, industrial, and apartment

complex properties collectively as “commercial properties.”

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 4

it is expected that more residential properties will be appealed at that juncture[.]” Id. at

26-27. The likelihood of the market value of the typical single-family residence increasing

to a valuation comparable to that of commercial properties is effectively non-existent.

Thus, under the Majority’s revenue maximization justification, single-family residences

could never be reassessed, and this would satisfy the Majority’s understanding of the

Uniformity Clause. 4

4 The Majority explains that by relying on monetary thresholds—both in this case and in

GM Berkshire Hills v. Berks County Board of Assessment Appeals, 290 A.3d 238 (Pa.

2023)—taxing entities have identified single-family residential properties. Majority Op. at

31 n.32. To the Majority, this puts its holding with respect to revenue maximization and

monetary thresholds on safe ground. While I am of the position that significantly fewer

single-family residences will be capable of generating sufficient revenue to meet the

instant monetary threshold if they are even reviewed, this is not my principal concern with

the Majority’s holding. First and foremost, for the reasons set forth in Justice Dougherty’s

dissenting opinion, I agree that the School District’s monetary threshold is

unconstitutional. Dissenting Op. at 3-11 (Dougherty, J., dissenting). It could “easily serve

as [a] method[] of circumventing our holdings, in cases such as Clifton and Valley Forge

Towers, as [it] could be set at amounts that would largely target only certain

neighborhoods” or subclasses of property. G.M. Berkshire, 290 A.3d 238, 253 n.5 (Pa.

2023) (Donohue, J., Opinion in Support of Reversal). Even if “one residence is appealed”

in a given tax year, that will not necessarily square a taxing policy with the Uniformity

Clause. Majority Op. at 31 n.32. When the methodology is unconstitutional, the result is

irrelevant.

My principal concern is the Majority’s holding that tax policy decisions can be driven solely

by the government’s desire to maximize revenue. This renders monetary thresholds

completely irrelevant. See infra pp. 6-7. By setting revenue maximization as the goal, all

that matters is the actual value of the properties themselves, not whether it can reach a

fictitious monetary threshold. Because the value of commercial properties are generally

much higher than the average single-family residence, the Majority’s methodology

ensures that single-family residential properties will never be selected for reassessment.

We see this borne out in the instant case. Despite single-family residences comprising

84.2% of all properties in the jurisdiction, see infra p. 7 & note 5—and, as the Majority

highlights, there may have at least “thirty single-family residences that met the $10,000

threshold,” Majority Op. at 31 n.32—no such properties were appealed. That is because

when the policy is revenue maximization, the government is bound to select the highest

value properties.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 5

The Majority fully acknowledges that the School District’s policy resulted in zero

appeals of residential properties in the relevant tax year. Id. at 27 (observing that no

residential properties were appealed in the “tax year 2020”). Under this same policy, in

fact, we only have a reference to a single other instance of a residential property being

reassessed “a number of years ago.” N.T., 6/2/2021, at 18. That appeal was notable to

the president of the School District’s board at the time, as it “surprised” her that a

residential property could generate $10,000 more in revenue. See id. at 20 (“[F]rom my

perspective, I was surprised the house could generate that much more in revenue.”). The

Majority has no problem with this result because, in its view, the result of a policy is

irrelevant to the Uniformity Clause. All that matters is that a taxing entity does not publicly

state its policy to subject a subclass of property to differential treatment. Majority Op. at

29 (“The Uniformity Clause focuses on purposeful differential treatment, not differential

impact.”) (emphasis in original).

Again, based on its view that maximization of revenue is a singularly appropriate

tax policy justification, the Majority explains that

[a] neutral, systematic treatment of all properties might affect

different properties differently due to their economic value,

which varies as the economy and markets fluctuate. To

violate the Uniformity Clause, the classification would have to

be drawn in a way that indicates the members of one class

will be treated differently regardless of such changes, which

did not occur here.

Id. In other words, single-family residential properties have less market value compared

to commercial properties and thus, until that changes, only commercial properties will be

reassessed under the School District’s policy. Short of the entire collapse of all elements

of the commercial realty sectors, it is hard to imagine when, if ever, the market will

fluctuate in such a manner that the average single-family residence will be able to

generate revenue comparable to that of commercial properties. However, because the

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 6

Majority finds the School District’s policy to be “facially neutral,” id. at 25, the effect or

intention behind the School District’s policy can be completely ignored.

Coupled with its flawed conclusion that tax equalization is not to be prioritized over

maximizing revenue, the Majority proclaims, for the first time in this Court’s history, that

the use of monetary threshold tax policies is lawful. It is this policy that the Majority finds

to be “facially neutral” for purposes of the instant matter; or rather, it finds that such a

policy does not violate the Uniformity Clause “without more[.]” Majority Op. at 10. I can

only assume that the “more” the Majority is referring to is an express policy to subject only

one subclass of realty to a monetary threshold. Otherwise, it would seem that it has

justified the use of any monetary threshold, regardless of the amount. Even here, where

single-family residences make up 84.2% of all properties in the jurisdiction, 5 the Majority

finds no problem where none of those properties are subject to appeal. N.T., 11/17/2021,

at 77. This blessing results from the Majority’s position that the maximization of revenue

is an acceptable selection criterion without regard to the constitutional mandate to

prioritize equalization of tax burdens among all classes of real property. However, in

endorsing this maximization of revenue rationale, the Majority renders monetary

thresholds entirely irrelevant. If all that matters is the maximization of revenue, then what

purpose does a monetary threshold serve? Under the Majority’s rationale, regardless of

the chosen threshold, the same properties will be selected for appeal—those that

generate the most revenue. Under this framework, monetary thresholds merely serve as

a guise for policies seeking to appeal only those properties with the highest value.

It is axiomatic that the values of commercial properties are “generally higher than

those of single-family homes, and hence, raising their assessments would result in a

5 Apartment, commercial, and industrial buildings make up 3.2% of all properties in the

School District, and yet these properties comprise 100% of the School District’s 2019

appeals. N.T., 11/17/2021, at 78.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 7

greater tax-revenue increase[.]” Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 966. To the Majority, so long

as a taxing entity seeks to maximize revenue under the guise of a monetary threshold,

the government can put into place a taxing scheme that results exclusively in appeals of

commercial properties. The Majority has manufactured a loophole to uniformity. It

endorses a method of taxation that will result in the appeal of only commercial properties

so long as the government does not publicize its intent to do so. That is precisely what

happened here. We cannot blind ourselves to the reality of a taxing scheme that

exclusively targets commercial properties for assessment appeals.

The School District is doing indirectly what it cannot do directly, i.e., selectively

appealing commercial properties. Even if the School District had good intentions and

sought to be fiscally responsible, “any intentional or systematic enforcement of the laws”

that “treats commercial properties differently from other types of parcels” is

unconstitutional. Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 975. The $10,000 threshold which was driven

by the goal to maximize revenue caused the School District’s third-party consultant to

focus almost exclusively on commercial properties. Here, the consultant limited his

review of single-family residential properties to only those that were 3,500 square feet or

more, which eliminated an unknown—though likely considerable—number of such

properties for consideration. N.T., 11/17/2021, at 27. This was all in an effort to maximize

revenue, the “hard and fast rule,” the Majority is so quick to endorse. Accordingly, the

School District’s consultant was effectively required to treat commercial properties as the

only targets for appeal. This policy clearly results in decisions that discriminate against

one subclass of property, and thus, it is in violation of the Uniformity Clause.

Based on the above, I conclude that the School District’s policy violates the

Uniformity Clause. Accordingly, I dissent.

Chief Justice Todd and Justice Dougerty join this dissenting opinion.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 8