Downingtown Area SD v. Chester Cnty Bd of Assmt.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

DOWNINGTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT : No. 45 MAP 2024

:

: Appeal from the Order of the

v. : Commonwealth Court at No. 92

: CD 2022 dated October 6, 2023,

: Reversing the Order of the

CHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF : Chester County Court of Common

ASSESSMENT APPEALS : Pleas, Civil Division, at No. 2019-

TAX PARCEL NO.: 33-5-43.3 : 11728-AB dated January 18, 2022

:

: ARGUED: September 11, 2025

APPEAL OF: DOWNINGTOWN AREA :

SCHOOL DISTRICT :

DOWNINGTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT : No. 46 MAP 2024

:

: Appeal from the Order of the

v. : Commonwealth Court at No. 93

: CD 2022 dated October 6, 2023,

: Reversing the Order of the

CHESTER COUNTY BOARD OF : Chester County Court of Common

ASSESSMENT APPEALS : Pleas, Civil Division, at No. 2019-

TAX PARCEL NO.: 33-5-43.2 : 11727-AB dated January 18, 2022

:

: ARGUED: September 11, 2025

APPEAL OF: DOWNINGTOWN AREA :

SCHOOL DISTRICT :

DISSENTING OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY DECIDED: May 19, 2026

The text of the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution plainly reflects

its animating principles: “All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects,

within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected

under general laws.” PA. CONST. art. 8, §1. By adopting the Uniformity Clause, the people

of this Commonwealth “placed the seal of their approval upon a system of taxation which

has for its corner stone uniformity in the valuation, levy, and collection of all taxes.”

Delaware, L. & W. R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 73 A. 429, 430 (Pa. 1909). Thus, “[i]t is the

duty of the courts in dealing with this subject to enforce as nearly as may be” not only

“equality of burden[,]” but also “uniformity of method in determining what share of the

burden each taxable subject must bear.” Id. (emphasis added).

Because the majority approves a method for taxing districts to choose which

property assessments to appeal pursuant to their authority under Section 8855 of the

Consolidated County Assessment Law, 1 which method applies only to a small subset of

properties — those that will make the most money for the taxing district — I respectfully

dissent. Specifically, I conclude the majority opinion is contrary to our Uniformity Clause

jurisprudence in three main respects: (1) by holding monetary thresholds constitutional;

(2) by holding the Downingtown Area School District’s (School District) method for

selecting properties among those meeting the threshold was constitutional, and relatedly,

that “tax-liability deficit” is a valid metric for identifying the most non-uniform assessments;

and (3) by asserting “[t]he Uniformity Clause focuses on purposeful differential treatment,

not differential impact.” Majority Opinion at 30 (emphasis in original). I address each of

those holdings in turn. 2

1 “A taxing district shall have the right to appeal any assessment within its jurisdiction in

the same manner, subject to the same procedure and with like effect as if the appeal were

taken by a taxable person with respect to the assessment, and, in addition, may take an

appeal from any decision of the board or court of common pleas as though it had been a

party to the proceedings before the board or court even though it was not a party in fact.

A taxing district authority may intervene in any appeal by a taxable person under section

8854 (relating to appeals to court) as a matter of right.” 53 Pa.C.S. §8855.

2I note up front that this dissenting opinion overlaps to some extent with Justice

Donohue’s dissenting opinion, which I join in full.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 2

I. Monetary Thresholds

I begin with the undisputed premise that the Uniformity Clause’s requirements

apply to taxing districts’ policies for choosing which assessments to appeal. Most

relevantly, in Valley Forge Towers Apartments N, LP v. Upper Merion Area School

District, we struck down a policy where the school district concentrated on appealing

commercial properties only. See 163 A.3d 962 (Pa. 2017). In doing so, we distilled two

principles from our prior case law: “First, all property in a taxing district is a single class,

and, as a consequence, the Uniformity Clause does not permit the government, including

taxing authorities, to treat different property sub-classifications in a disparate manner.”

Id. at 975, citing Clifton v. Allegheny Cty., 969 A.2d 1197, 1212 (Pa. 2009), and

Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review of Allegheny

Cty., 652 A.2d 1306, 1314 (Pa. 1995) (“all real estate is a constitutionally designated class

entitled to uniform treatment and the ratio of assessed value to market value adopted by

the taxing authority must be applied equally and uniformly to all real estate within the

taxing authority’s jurisdiction”). “Second, this prohibition applies to any intentional or

systematic enforcement of the tax laws, and is not limited solely to wrongful conduct.” Id.,

citing Downingtown Area Sch. Dist. v. Chester Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 913 A.2d

194, 201 n.10 (Pa. 2006) (explaining “similarly situated taxpayers should not be

deliberately treated differently by taxing authorities[,]” and “the term ‘deliberate’ does not

exclusively connote wrongful conduct, but also includes any intentional or systematic

method of enforcement of the tax laws”).

In line with those precepts, we rejected the school district’s argument that a

conventional rational-basis standard applied. See id. at 977. Although the General

Assembly has “power to classify, even in matters of taxation, so that a taxpayer generally

must demonstrate that the classification ‘is unreasonable and not rationally related to any

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 3

legitimate state purpose[,]’” we explained that “property taxes are ‘different’ because ‘real

property is the classification.’” Id., quoting Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1211-12 (emphasis in

original). Thus, “all real estate in a taxing district is constitutionally entitled to uniform

treatment.” Id., citing Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1212 (“this Court has consistently interpreted

the uniformity requirement of the Pennsylvania Constitution as requiring all real estate to

be treated as a single class entitled to uniform treatment”). With that legal background,

we held “it follows that a taxing authority is not permitted to implement a program of only

appealing the assessments of one sub-classification of properties, where that sub-

classification is drawn according to property type — that is, its use as commercial,

apartment complex, single-family residential, industrial, or the like.” Id. at 978.

In Valley Forge, we also rejected an argument forwarded by amici that the

appellants’ pleadings “were insufficient in that all assessment appeals reduce the

[coefficient of dispersion 3] and, in that sense, enhance uniformity.” Id. at 979. We

explained that “argument overlooks that the Uniformity Clause can be independently

harmed by a systematic course of disparate treatment relative to a particular sub-

classification of property.” Id. We elaborated that “[a]lthough the aim of every such

appeal is to conform the property’s assessment with the [common level ratio (CLR) 4], the

members of the sub-class are aware that they alone have been targeted for scrutiny solely

due to their membership in the sub-class; moreover, they alone must bear the costs of

defending against the appeal and of any follow-up litigation in court[.]” Id. Nor were we

swayed by the fact the school district’s method would result in a greater tax-revenue

3 The coefficient of dispersion is “the average variance from the common assessment

ratio in a district.” Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 976.

4 The CLR is the ratio of assessed value to current market value used generally in the

county, as calculated by the State Tax Equalization Board (STEB) based on arms-length

real estate sales (except for outliers). See Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 966 n.2.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 4

increase. See id. at 979-80 (“The government must be concerned with ensuring a rough

equalization of tax burdens under a structure in which taxes are imposed, adjusted, and

collected equitably. . . . Where there is a conflict between maximizing revenue and

ensuring that the taxing system is implemented in a non-discriminatory way, the

Uniformity Clause requires that the latter goal be given primacy.”).

Today, the majority holds the School District’s use of a monetary threshold (i.e., its

consideration of properties to appeal only if they would potentially result in total annual

additional tax revenue of $10,000) is permissible under the Uniformity Clause. It reasons

that “[w]here a taxing district’s policy along these lines does not create a prohibited

subclass of properties defined by an impermissible characteristic such as type, use,

neighborhood, or residency status of the owner, it tends to enhance uniformity by

selecting for appeal the properties whose assessments are the most nonuniform in terms

of their tax-liability deficit.” Majority Opinion at 9 (footnotes omitted). The majority

expands on its position, stating that “[b]ringing these assessments in line with the CLR

means the property’s assessment ratio is still less than about half of the other properties

in the county, but it is no longer an outlier. This, in turn, enhances fairness to the

remaining taxpayers who would otherwise need to pay more of the cost of government

than their proportionate share, as the taxing district would otherwise have to raise its

millage to meet budgetary needs.” Id. “Furthermore,” the majority believes, “a taxing

district’s use of a monetary threshold to ensure its efforts are not a net drain on the public

fisc reflects an effort by the district to handle public funds in a responsible and judicious

manner based on a cost-benefit analysis.” Id. at 9-10 (footnote omitted). It notes that in

Valley Forge, we left open the possibility that the Uniformity Clause might permit monetary

thresholds.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 5

Although I acknowledge our clarification in Valley Forge “that nothing in this opinion

should be construed as suggesting that the use of a monetary threshold . . . or some other

selection criteria would violate uniformity if it were implemented without regard to the type

of property in question or the residency status of its owner[,]” 163 A.3d at 979, I emphasize

this statement was mere dicta, clarifying the bounds of the case before us. See id. (“Such

methodologies are not presently before the Court.”). With the issue before us now, I

would hold that the School District’s monetary threshold cannot be squared with the other

principles announced in Valley Forge.

On its face, the School District’s monetary threshold creates (at least) two

subclasses of property: those whose reassessments would net an additional $10,000 of

tax revenue for the School District, and those whose reassessments would be less

valuable to the School District. To put it another way, the policy separates properties

based on the appreciation of their value, as demonstrated by Valbridge’s table below,

showing the threshold value increase needed for properties in each municipality to meet

the $10,000 threshold:

Ex. M-5 at 2 (unpaginated). 5 Thus, in West Bradford Township, for example, the

properties were split into two subclassifications: those that had risen at least $617,831 in

5 Valbridge was the third-party the School District used to identify properties to appeal.

When asked to explain the column for “Threshold Value Increase” in Exhibit M-5,

Valbridge employee Reaves Lukens testified, “[i]n order to generate $10,000 in additional

(continued…)

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 6

value, and those that had not. And under the School District’s policy, only those in the

former category were subject to the possibility of an assessment appeal. Not to mention,

of course, that these dollar amounts varied by municipality, creating subclassifications

within the subclassifications created by the $10,000 threshold. See N.T., 11/17/21, at 35

(Lukens affirming that “depending upon what township you’re in, the same property in

one township might trigger a reassessment while in another township it wouldn’t”). Thus,

only certain property owners are subject to the burdens associated with school district

assessment appeals, see Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 979, based on subclassifications

defined by their property’s value increase and municipality. 6 In fact, as pointed out by the

majority, “the evidence suggests over 100 properties out of the 28,000 situated within the

School District met the $10,000 threshold.” Majority Opinion at 15. That means that only

0.4% to 0.7% of the properties in the School District were even exposed to the possibility

of a Section 5588 assessment appeal. Cf. PA. CONST. art. 8, §1 (“All taxes . . . shall be

levied and collected under general laws”). 7

revenue . . .[,] the value pick up needs to be at or exceed that amount in that column.”

N.T., 11/17/21, at 35. Lukens did not explain why the “ratio” in the chart was set at

51.30%, but to be clear, the parties stipulated to CLRs for each of the relevant years:

49.3% for 2020, 47% for 2022, and 45% for 2022. See id. at 6.

6 The majority disposes of the Taxpayer’s argument that the varying millage rates among

the different municipalities in the School District caused disparities in application of the

monetary threshold by reasoning “the existence of these different millage rates is a

function of local law as enacted in different municipalities . . . and it would be a strained

reading of the Uniformity Clause to conclude it permits the use of a monetary threshold

only where, by happenstance, the cumulative millage rate is identical for all properties

within the school district’s boundaries.” Majority Opinion at 12 (reciting precept we are

only concerned with “rough” uniformity). This reasoning presupposes the validity of

monetary thresholds, but in my view, the varying millage rates within a taxing district are

yet another reason monetary thresholds contradict uniformity in the first place.

7 On this point, the majority observes that more than sixteen properties satisfied the

threshold, and it rejects the Commonwealth Court’s purported disapproval of the policy

because the School District “did not appeal all properties with a projected tax-liability

deficiency of at least $10,000.” Majority Opinion at 14. According to the majority, “[s]uch

(continued…)

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 7

Where our law is explicit that “real property is the classification” and “that all real

estate in a taxing district is constitutionally entitled to uniform treatment[,]” I cannot make

sense of the majority’s conclusion that the School District’s monetary threshold complies

with the Uniformity Clause. Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 977, quoting Clifton, 969 A.2d at

1212 (emphasis in original). No sincere argument exists that the School District’s policy

does not create subclassifications. It appears, however, the majority simply does not

believe they are “prohibited subclass[es] of properties defined by an impermissible

characteristic such as type, use, neighborhood, or residency status of the owner[.]”

Majority Opinion at 9 (emphasis added). However, the majority does not provide a reason

for its implicit holding that some subclasses of real property are acceptable

notwithstanding our wealth of case law to the contrary. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 163 A.3d

at 977; Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1212 (“[T]his Court has consistently interpreted the uniformity

requirement of the Pennsylvania Constitution as requiring all real estate to be treated as

a single class entitled to uniform treatment”); id. at 1213 (“judicial review of uniformity

challenges to a statutory scheme of property taxation often needs only to focus on . . .

a rule is impractical and finds no support in the Uniformity Clause’s text or history.”

Majority Opinion at 16. In my view, the relevant sentence from the Commonwealth

Court’s opinion — “the School District’s decision to undertake a piecemeal

implementation of this [monetary threshold] policy, deliberately leaving many other

underassessed properties alone, has created disparate treatment that is anathema to the

Uniformity Clause” — is being taken out of context. Downingtown Area Sch. Dist. v.

Chester Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 303 A.3d 1104, 1114 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2023).

Where the Commonwealth Court reasoned the School District implemented its policy in

an arbitrary fashion, I do not read this portion of its opinion as suggesting the School

District had to appeal all properties meeting the threshold. Instead, it appears the

Commonwealth Court believed that where the School District knew other properties met

the monetary threshold, it needed to apply its policy in some principled, non-arbitrary

manner. In the very next sentence, the Commonwealth Court concluded: “This random

application of a monetary threshold created a lack of uniformity in violation of the

Pennsylvania Constitution.” Id. (emphasis added). Regardless, I would leave this issue

for another day, as I would not foreclose the possibility that 53 Pa.C.S. §8855 is itself

unconstitutional precisely because it allows interested taxing authorities like school

districts to selectively appeal only certain assessments.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 8

whether the statute results in a ‘classification’ — because in the property taxation context,

any disparity in tax liability, beyond the expected practical inequities, most likely

constitutes a violation of the Uniformity Clause”) (emphasis added); Downingtown Area

Sch. Dist., 913 A.2d at 201 n.9 (contrasting the Pennsylvania Constitution with the federal

charter by explaining “the United States Constitution does not require equalization across

all potential sub-classifications of real property”) (emphasis added); Westinghouse,

652 A.2d at 1314 (“all real estate is a constitutionally designated class entitled to uniform

treatment”); Deitch Co. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals & Review of Allegheny Cty.,

209 A.2d 397, 402 (Pa. 1965) (“the uniformity requirement of the Constitution of

Pennsylvania has been construed to require that all real estate is a class which is entitled

to uniform treatment”); McKnight Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Bd. of Prop. Assessment, Appeals

& Review of Allegheny Cty., 209 A.2d 389, 392 (Pa. 1965) (“it is clear that all real estate

is the class entitled to uniform treatment”) (emphasis in original). To be sure, we have

never created an exception to that rule for real estate that has risen substantially in fair

market value, just because such an exception would financially benefit taxing authorities

who could recover greater tax revenues by targeting those properties. 8

8 Respectfully, the majority engrafts a strawman argument onto my reasoning, claiming I

define the subclass “simply as those parcels the School District chooses to appeal[.]”

Majority Opinion at 22 n.25. To be clear, that is not the classification created by the

monetary threshold; the subclassification I discuss is properties meeting the monetary

threshold based on their increase in fair market value. And I repeat that “I would leave

this issue [regarding the constitutionality of Section 8855] for another day[.]” Supra at 7-

8 n.7. Indeed, the subclassification articulated by the majority would not be a relevant

subclassification for purposes of a Uniformity Clause analysis — “those parcels the

School District chooses to appeal” would be the result of the School District’s exercise of

its Section 8855 authority, while here, the Uniformity Clause is concerned with the School

District’s use of subclassifications when deciding which properties to appeal. Regardless,

by redefining the “subclassification” in the broadest terms, the majority manufactures a

“tension whereby taxes inevitably become non-uniform as time goes on, but any attempt

to correct the same via Section 8855 cannot help but ‘treat’ some properties differently by

correcting their assessments and bringing them into line with the CLR.” Majority Opinion

(continued…)

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 9

Nor does the majority explain what makes increase in fair market value a

permissible characteristic, while type, use, neighborhood, and residency status are

“impermissible[.]” Majority Opinion at 9. Indeed, in Clifton (discussed in more detail infra),

we expressly rejected classifications based on distinctions in the appreciation or

depreciation of property values. There, we explained that even if classifications were

permissible in the property-taxation context, the taxing authority (Allegheny County in that

case) “d[id] not base its supposed classification on any legitimate distinction” where it

“permit[ted] the inevitable vicissitudes of the real estate market to define the

‘classification’ at issue, and then attempt[ed] an after-the-fact explanation why such non-

uniform treatment [wa]s allowable.” Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1229. We further explained the

county’s justifications of promoting stability and predictability “cannot justify a taxing

scheme that routinely taxes property owners with declining or stagnant property values

at a higher rate of assessed-to-actual value than property owners with stable or

at 22 n.25. And because “[t]he constitutional text focuses on taxes being uniform,” the

majority posits, “[t]his requires us to resolve the aforementioned tension in favor of

uniformity of tax rate over uniformity of obligation to defend against an assessment

appeal.” Id. (emphasis in original). But our Constitution does not speak in terms of tax

rates only: “All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the

territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under

general laws.” PA. CONST. art. 8, §1 (emphasis added). Indeed, for well over a century,

we have interpreted this language as imposing a “duty [upon] the courts in dealing with

this subject to enforce as nearly as may be equality of burden and uniformity of method

in determining what share of the burden each taxable subject must bear.” Delaware,

L. & W. R., 73 A. at 430 (emphasis added). The majority’s suggestion that the Uniformity

Clause is concerned with tax rates at the expense of assessment methodologies implicitly

overrules this “corner stone” of our law requiring “uniformity in the valuation, levy, and

collection of all taxes.” Id.; see also Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 978 (“systematic disparate

enforcement of the tax laws based on property sub-classification, even absent wrongful

conduct, is constitutionally precluded”); id. at 979 (“The government must be concerned

with ensuring a rough equalization of tax burdens under a structure in which taxes are

imposed, adjusted, and collected equitably.”). Of course, “when taxes become

nonuniform due to market forces,” the government has a duty to take corrective action.

Majority Opinion at 22 n.25. But that cannot mean that taxing authorities are allowed to

commit other violations of the Uniformity Clause to do so.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 10

appreciating property values.” Id. (additionally reasoning the classification was not

rationally related to the purported governmental interest). If “property owners with

declining or stagnant property values” is an impermissible classification, id., then so too

is its inverse: “property owners with rising property values.” In sum, no distinction could

legitimately support any subclass of real property, where our case law forbids such

subclassification across the board. But even if classifications were permitted in this

context (they’re not), classification based on changes in market value is, to use the

majority’s term, “prohibited.” Majority Opinion at 9. 9 I would therefore hold the School

District’s monetary threshold unconstitutional.

II. Unconstitutional Application of the School District’s Policy

Even assuming, arguendo, that monetary thresholds can comply with the

Uniformity Clause, the School District’s application of its policy was still unconstitutional

here, where it did not meaningfully apply the threshold at all. 10 Instead, it simply selected

the properties with the greatest value increases by dollar amount (because those would

lead to the greatest return). See Dissenting Opinion at 7 (Donohue, J.) (“Under this

framework, monetary thresholds merely serve as a guise for policies seeking to appeal

9 Plus, as Justice Donohue aptly observed in her Opinion in Support of Reversal in GM

Berkshire Hills LLC v. Berks County Board of Assessment, “[s]uch [monetary] thresholds

could easily serve as methods of circumventing our holdings in cases such as Clifton and

Valley Forge Towers, as they could be set at amounts that would largely target only

certain neighborhoods (i.e., those known to contain more expensive homes), property

uses (large apartment buildings vs. small single-family homes), or types (commercial vs.

residential).” 290 A.3d 238, 253 n.5 (Pa. 2023) (Donohue, J., OISR) (“Under both Clifton

and Valley Forge Towers, such pretextual thresholds would run afoul of the Uniformity

Clause, regardless of whether they were intentionally created.”).

10 In fact, it is questionable whether the majority even needed to decide whether monetary

thresholds are constitutional, given that the Commonwealth Court did not base its holding

on the validity of the monetary threshold and the threshold was not dispositive to the

selection of properties to appeal in any event. See In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905, 909 (Pa.

1996) (“courts should avoid constitutional issues when the issue at hand may be decided

upon other grounds”).

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 11

only those properties with the highest value.”). Any justification for a monetary threshold

based on the School District’s need to ensure its ability to recoup the costs of the appeal

does not apply when selecting among properties above that threshold. And here, the

only selection criterion for properties above the threshold, which the majority blesses, was

simply to “maximize the return” for the School District. Majority Opinion at 25. Under that

criterion, the threshold becomes irrelevant — the threshold could have been $100 (a

facially neutral threshold that could easily apply to all types of property), yet the same

properties would have been selected. But in my view, selecting properties for more

burdensome tax treatment based purely on maximizing return to the taxing authority is

anathema to the Uniformity Clause. See Delaware L. & W. R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 73

A. at 430 (“It is the duty of the courts . . . to enforce as nearly as may be equality of burden

and uniformity of method in determining what share of the burden each taxable subject

must bear.”) (emphasis added).

Even if we chose to read Valley Forge narrowly as allowing some subclassification

of real property when deciding which assessments to appeal, a subclassification based

on increased actual value, by dollar amount, is intolerable under our Uniformity Clause

jurisprudence. As explained above, in Clifton we disapproved of Allegheny County’s use

of “inevitable vicissitudes of the real estate market to define the ‘classification’ at issue[.]”

Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1229. Likewise, in other taxation contexts, we do not allow taxing

authorities to discriminate based on monetary value. Indeed, only ten years ago, we

decided Mount Airy #1, LLC v. Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, which involved a

tax imposed by the General Assembly in the Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and

Gaming Act. See 154 A.3d 268 (Pa. 2016). The statute required, inter alia, that casinos

located outside of Philadelphia pay a municipal local share assessment of either 2% of

their Gross Terminal Revenue (GTR) — i.e., amounts received by slot machines minus

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 12

amounts paid out to players — or a lump sum of $10 million, whichever was greater. See

id. at 271. This meant that those casinos that earned GTRs at or below $500 million

always paid $10 million dollars, while those that earned GTRs above $500 million always

paid above $10 million. See id. We held the General Assembly’s revenue-based

classification violated uniformity.

In doing so, we explained:

When the validity of a tax classification is challenged, the relevant inquiry is

whether the classification is based upon some legitimate distinction

between the classes that provides a non-arbitrary, reasonable, and just

basis for the disparate treatment. We must decide whether there exists

“some concrete justification” for treating the relevant group of taxpayers as

members of distinguishable classes subject to different tax burdens. Absent

such a justified distinction between the classes, the imposition of

substantially unequal tax burdens upon similarly situated persons violates

the Uniformity Clause.

Id. at 274 (citations omitted, emphasis added).

Relying on multiple of this Court’s precedents, we explained “[t]he basic principle

that ‘[t]he money value of any given kind of property . . . can never be made a legal

basis of subdivision or classification for the purpose of imposing unequal burdens on

[similarly situated] classes,’ . . . has endured through the years.” Id. at 275 (emphasis

added), quoting In re Cope’s Estate, 43 A. 79, 81-82 (Pa. 1899); also citing Amidon v.

Kane, 279 A.2d 53 (Pa. 1971) (tax purporting to apply flat rate to income, as established

by federal standards and with federal exemptions, violated uniformity); Saulsbury v.

Bethlehem Steel Co., 196 A.2d 664 (Pa. 1964) (striking down ordinance imposing tax on

individuals engaged in an occupation with gross earnings of $600 or more); Kelley v.

Kalodner, 181 A. 598 (Pa. 1935) (graduated income tax violates uniformity).

In line with those cases, we concluded “the General Assembly essentially created

a variable-rate tax, fashioning one rate for non-Philadelphia casinos with GTR below $500

million, and another for non-Philadelphia casinos with GTR greater than $500 million.” Id.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 13

at 276. We held “[o]ur case law teaches that such quantitative distinctions lack uniformity

because any ‘classification that is based solely on a difference in quantity of

precisely the same kind of property is necessarily unjust, arbitrary, and illegal.’”

Id., quoting Cope’s Estate, 43 A. at 81 (emphasis added). Further, we were not swayed

by the Department of Revenue’s rationale that the tax scheme was rational because it

would provide a significant source of new revenue. See id. at 278. “This is beside the

point[,]” we concluded. Id. “Were we to hold that the legislature’s mere desire to increase

tax revenue empowers it to impose non-uniform taxes, we would nullify the Uniformity

Clause.” Id.

Here, where the subclassification for selection of properties to appeal is based on

the amount a property has appreciated in actual value, I do not see how the School

District’s methodology can comply with these precedents. I recognize that Mt. Airy #1

involved a rate challenge rather than a challenge to assessment appeal methodology, but

I see no reason why its rule would not apply in equal force here, especially where our law

imposes more stringent rules about classifications in the real property context. See

Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1212 (“Property taxation[ ] is different.”). In either context, the

Uniformity Clause does not allow taxing authorities to discriminate against property

owners based on the value of their property when imposing burdens.

In the same vein, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s assertion that tax-

liability deficit is an acceptable metric for identifying the most nonuniform properties in a

district. As defined by the majority, “[a] property’s ‘tax-liability deficit’ is the difference

between the property’s current tax liability and what that liability would be if the property’s

assessment ratio — that is, the ratio of the property’s assessed value to its fair market

value, see Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 966 n.1 — were to be conformed to the CLR.”

Majority Opinion at 8 n.8. But uniformity is about everyone paying their “fair share of the

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 14

cost of government.” Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 979. It is for that reason that we require

tax liability to be proportionate to value. See id. at 973 (“it [is] an established feature of

Pennsylvania uniformity jurisprudence that ‘all real estate is a constitutionally designated

class entitled to uniform treatment and the ratio of assessed value to market value

adopted by the taxing authority must be applied equally and uniformly to all real estate

within the taxing authority’s jurisdiction’”) (emphasis added), quoting Westinghouse, 652

A.2d at 1314; Downingtown Area Sch. Dist., 913 A.2d at 199 (“a taxpayer is entitled to

relief under the Uniformity Clause where his property is assessed at a higher percentage

of fair market value than other properties throughout the taxing district”) (emphasis

added); Appeal of F.W. Woolworth Co., 235 A.2d 793, 795 (Pa. 1967) (“uniformity has as

its heart the equalization of the ratio among [a]ll properties in the district”) (emphasis

added); Commonwealth ex rel. Dep’t of Justice v. A. Overholt & Co., 200 A. 849, 853 (Pa.

1938) (“when taxes are levied upon property there must be an apportionment with

reference to a uniform standard, or they degenerate into mere arbitrary exactions”)

(emphasis added), quoting Cooley, 2 Constitutional Limitations at 1040 (8th Ed.); Del., L.

& W. R. Co.’s Tax Assessment, 73 A. at 430 (Uniformity Clause requires that “[t]he large

property owner and the small holder pay upon the same ratio”) (emphasis added). In this

context, we have no reason to apply a blunt dollar-amount metric like tax-liability deficit

to measure uniformity (or lack thereof) rather than a metric that accounts for one’s

proportionate share.

If we use tax-liability deficit as the measuring stick for lack of uniformity, higher

value properties are more likely to be considered more nonuniform just because they

have a higher tax liability to begin with. For example, imagine a single-family home that

is assessed at only 25% of its fair market value (using round numbers, imagine it is

assessed at $100,000 but its actual value is $400,000), versus an apartment complex

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 15

that is assessed at 40% of its fair market value (imagine it is assessed at $4 million but

its actual value is $10 million). If the CLR were 50% (assuming the CLR applies rather

than the established predetermined ratio), the home would be underassessed by

$100,000 ($400,000 multiplied by 50%, minus $100,000), and the apartment complex

would be underassessed by $1 million ($10 million times 50%, minus $4 million). The

apartment complex is paying closer to its proportional share, but if tax-liability deficit is

the metric used to select properties to appeal, it will be chosen over the single-family

home every time. 11 The majority opines that “[i]f market forces change so that single-

family residences rise in value compared to commercial properties, it is expected that

more residential properties will be appealed at that juncture.” Majority Opinion at 28. But

the majority does not show its math. I question the likelihood that if an average single-

family home one day meets the $10,000 threshold, it would be selected for appeal where

many commercial properties would almost certainly have a higher tax-liability deficit, even

if they did not “rise in value compared to” single-family residences, as the Majority

11 In GM Berkshire Hills LLC v. Berks County Board of Assessment, I emphasized that

“[t]his Court has recognized that ‘the CLR is not indicative of uniformity.’” 290 A.3d 238,

258 (Dougherty, J., OISR). I repeat my point from that case — that “the process of

choosing targeted properties for appeal precisely because their difference in actual to

assessed value is huge can be characterized as self-serving as easily as it can be seen

as promoting uniformity[,]” id. at 258 n.1 — but I add that even if we use the CLR as a

tool to make properties’ assessments more uniform, the method accepted by the majority

in this case does not further that goal. Cf. Majority Opinion at 9 (“Bringing these

assessments in line with the CLR means the property’s assessment ratio is still less than

about half of the other properties in the county, but it is no longer an outlier.”). As

explained above, the CLR is the county-wide ratio of assessed value to current market

value set by STEB. As demonstrated, tax-liability deficit does not necessarily identify

outliers for purposes of the CLR, because a high-value property could have a high tax-

liability deficit while still being assessed at a percentage of its fair market value that is

relatively close the CLR. Regardless, we rejected a similar argument in Valley Forge that

all assessment appeals necessarily promote uniformity, explaining such an “argument

overlooks that the Uniformity Clause can be independently harmed by a systematic

course of disparate treatment relative to a particular sub-classification of property.” 163

A.3d at 979.

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speculates might occur someday. Id.; accord Dissenting Opinion (Donohue, J.) at 6

(“Short of the entire collapse of all elements of the commercial realty sectors, it is hard to

imagine when, if ever, the market will fluctuate in such a manner that the average single-

family residence will be able to generate revenue comparable to that of commercial

properties.”). 12

12 We recognized this reality in Valley Forge when we explained why Keystone, the

consultant in that case, concentrated solely on commercial properties: “They did so

because these properties’ values were generally higher than those of single-family

homes, and hence, raising their assessments would result in a greater tax-revenue

increase than doing the same with under-assessed single-family homes, including those

which were under-assessed by a greater percentage.” Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 966

(emphasis added). And even beyond this case, our courts have seen the same pattern

arise in other taxing districts that have implemented similar policies. See, e.g.,

Phoenixville Area Sch. Dist. v. Shi, 2025 WL 2739043, at *8 (Pa. Cmwlth. Sept. 26, 2025)

(“That many of the appealed properties are commercial properties located in the

Phoenixville Borough business district, [is] simply because those properties satisfied the

Policy’s objective financial criteria.”); Coatesville Area School Dist. v. Chester Cty. Bd. of

Assessment Appeals, 323 A.3d 61, 82 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024) (reasoning school district “was

open to appealing a residential property tax assessment; it simply had not identified one

yet that met the [$10,000] threshold”); Kennett Consol. Sch. Dist. v. Chester Cty. Bd. of

Assessment Appeals, 228 A.3d 29, 39 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (“[T]he facially neutral action

employed by District is not sufficient to result in a violation of the Uniformity Clause. . . .

The mere fact that all appealed properties were commercial does not per se create a

violation of the Uniformity Clause.”); Punxsutawney Area Sch. Dist. v. Broadwing Timber,

LLC, 2019 WL 5561413, at *9 (Pa. Cmwlth. Oct. 29, 2019) (“[T]hat the District’s practice

thus far has resulted in appeals of commercial or commercially-used properties is not

determinative where that practice is implemented or carried out without regard to the type

or ownership of a property. . . . So far, no sale of residential properties has resulted in a

high enough realty transfer tax to warrant review, and Broadwing has not presented

evidence to the contrary. That is not to say that none will in the future[.]”) (emphasis in

original); E. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Meadow Lake Plaza, LLC, 2019 WL 5250831,

at *6 (Pa. Cmwlth. Oct. 17, 2019) (“We conclude that the $10,000 threshold is reasonable

and does not violate the uniformity requirement of the Pennsylvania Constitution, despite

the fact that in this particular instance, only commercial properties in the School District

met that threshold.”); In re Springfield Sch. Dist., 101 A.3d 835, 849 (Pa. 2014) (“The fact

that the $500,000 threshold would mostly subject commercial properties to assessment

appeals does not warrant a different conclusion.”). It is not a fluke that these policies

result in the disproportionate appeals of commercial/non-residential properties. I question

how long our courts can, with a straight face, say that maybe someday these policies will

apply equally to single-family homes.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 17

Additionally, nothing in the School District’s policy requires that the other properties

in the district must be appealed before the subject properties can be re-appealed.

Theoretically, only high-value properties could be subject to appeals year after year, even

if their fair market value increases at a slower rate than their neighbors. 13 While this

system keeps select, high-value properties assessed based on their actual value, it

improperly leaves the majority of other properties in the School District under-assessed

in perpetuity. See, e.g., Narehood v. Pearson, 96 A.2d 895, 899 (Pa. 1953) (“the

intentional, systematic undervaluation by state officials of taxable property of the same

class belonging to other owners contravenes the constitutional right of one taxed upon

the full value of his property”) (citation omitted). Thus, I would hold the School District’s

application of its policy violated the Uniformity Clause, and I disagree with the majority’s

holding that tax-liability deficit is an appropriate metric for lack of uniformity.

III. Differential Treatment Versus Differential Effect

The majority acknowledges our precedents “establish that the Uniformity Clause

prohibits intentional or systematic differential treatment of subclasses of property, whether

the governmental conduct is ‘wrongful’ or not.” Majority Opinion at 30. “But[,]” it

continues, “that does not mean the Uniformity Clause imports the concept of ‘disparate

impact’ wholesale from civil rights law and applies it the same way.” Id., citing

Punxsutawney, 2019 WL 5561413, at *5. Instead, according to the majority:

13 For further illustration, the parties stipulated the two parcels owned by Marchwood

Apartments Owners LLC (Taxpayer) had the following fair market values for the relevant

years: for the 6.1 acre parcel, $11,035,500 as of January 1, 2020, and $11,445,000 as of

January 1, 2021, and January 1, 2022; and for the 37.5 acre parcel, $67,789,500 as of

January 1, 2020, and $70,305,000 as of January 1, 2021, and January 1, 2022. N.T.,

11/17/21, at 5-6. In 2019, the smaller parcel was assessed at $4,586,112 and the larger

parcel was assessed at $28,171,897. See Ex. M-21 at 3 (unpaginated). By contrast, in

Tax Year 2020, only 6 out of the 23,591 single-family homes in the School District were

assessed to be at least $1 million (or fewer than .03% of single-family homes). See

Angelides Report at 7.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 18

The Uniformity Clause focuses on purposeful differential treatment, not

differential impact. A neutral, systematic treatment of all properties might

affect different properties differently due to their economic value, which

varies as the economy and markets fluctuate. To violate the Uniformity

Clause, the classification would have to be drawn in a way that indicates

the members of one class will be treated differently regardless of such

changes, which did not occur here.

Id. at 30-31 (emphasis in original).

Although I do not contend the “Uniformity Clause imports the concept of ‘disparate

impact’ wholesale from civil rights law[,]” id. at 30, I disagree with the majority insofar as

it suggests that differential impact is irrelevant or that the policy would have to be drawn

to facially discriminate against members of a subclass in order for the Uniformity Clause

to kick in. In my view, such a holding is irreconcilable with our holding in Clifton.

In that case, taxpayers challenged Allegheny County’s base year method 14 for

property valuation, where after a series of litigation, assessments for 2006 and

subsequent years were to be based on properties’ values from a 2002 base year.

Although we held the base year method was not facially unconstitutional, we held its

application in Allegheny County led to a lack of uniformity. See Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1221-

22. In doing so, we explained that typically, a taxpayer bringing a uniformity challenge

“must demonstrate that: (1) the enactment results in some form of classification; and (2)

such classification is unreasonable and not rationally related to any legitimate state

purpose.” Id. at 1211. We also explained that “when a method or formula for computing

a tax will, in its operation or effect, produce arbitrary, unjust, or unreasonably

14 “Under a base year system of valuation, a county performs a countywide reassessment

of all real property in the base year, and then uses each property’s base year assessment

as that property’s basis for taxation in the base year, as well as its basis (i.e., assessed

value) in subsequent years. . . . In the base year, a property’s assessed value may be

100% of its actual value, and thus, assessments of all real estate in the county are based

on actual, fair market value for the base year. Each year thereafter, however, a given

property’s market value may change, but its assessment ordinarily remains static, fixed

at its base year level until the next countywide reassessment.” Clifton, 969 A.2d at 1203

(citations omitted).

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discriminatory results, the uniformity requirement is violated.” Id. (emphasis added). And

as noted above, we clarified that property taxation is different because “real property is

the classification[,]” meaning in property tax challenges, a court “often needs only to focus

on the first prong of the uniformity analysis — whether the statute results in a

‘classification’ — because in the property taxation context, any disparity in tax liability,

beyond the expected practical inequities, most likely constitutes a violation of the

Uniformity Clause.” Id. at 1212-13 (emphasis in original).

We held that the taxpayers failed to lodge a successful facial challenge, explaining

a base year system might not implicate the Uniformity Clause “if, for example, a county

conducted adequate periodic reassessments, or if it could be shown that property values

in a particular county remained relatively unchanged, or those values had virtually the

same rate of change.” Id. at 1224. But based on the evidence presented at trial, we held

that the indefinite base year assessment system used in Allegheny County “resulted in

significant disparities in the ratio of assessed value to current actual value[.]” Id. at 1222.

We observed “[t]he disparity is most often to the disadvantage of owners of properties in

lower-value neighborhoods where property values often appreciate at a lower rate than

in higher-value neighborhoods, if they appreciate at all.” Id. We relied on “the

proportionality principle, which forms the basis of the uniformity requirement, [and]

requires that taxpayers pay no more or less than their proportionate share of the cost of

government.” Id. at 1224 (“To ensure proportionality, all property must be taxed uniformly,

with the same ratio of assessed value to actual value applied throughout the taxing

jurisdiction.”). We explained the evidence showed property values in Allegheny County

changed over time and at varying rates in different neighborhoods, so the frozen values

applied under the base year method resulted in disparities. See id. at 1225.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 20

In light of Clifton, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s assertion “[t]he

Uniformity Clause focuses on purposeful differential treatment, not differential impact.”

Majority Opinion at 30 (emphasis in original). Viewed through Clifton’s lens, although the

initial treatment of property owners in Allegheny County was not differential when the

county first established the 2002 base year (everyone was assessed at their 2002 fair

market value), the base year method violated uniformity because it had a differential

impact when property values changed at varying rates within the County and the base

values stayed the same. Likewise, Clifton disproves the majority’s assertion that “[a]

neutral, systematic treatment of all properties might affect different properties differently

due to their economic value, which varies as the economy and markets fluctuate[,]” but

“[t]o violate the Uniformity Clause, the classification would have to be drawn in a way that

indicates the members of one class will be treated differently regardless of such

changes[.]” Id. at 30-31. “[S]uch changes” in economic values are exactly what caused

the Uniformity Clause violation in Clifton, notwithstanding the facially neutral policy. See

also GM Berkshire, 290 A.3d at 250 (Mundy, J., OISA) (“If pronounced inequalities

become pervasive, relief compelling a countywide reassessment may be available.”);

Mount Airy #1, 154 A.3d at 277 (we may not “overlook the patently discriminatory effect

of a particular tax merely because the General Assembly employed a formula that, at first

blush, does not resemble a traditional variable-rate tax”); Beattie v. Allegheny Cty., 907

A.2d 519, 523-24 (Pa. 2006) (in case about administrative exhaustion, affirming

Commonwealth Court decision that if “a discriminatory effect [against lower value homes]

exists from the systematic application of the [c]ounty’s mass appraisal system, the

adequacy of the statutory remedy provided to taxpayers must be evaluated, for if it is

inadequate the trial court may be permitted to exercise its equity jurisdiction”).

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 21

In my view, even if the School District’s policy were facially neutral (it’s not,

because it differentiates between properties above and below the monetary threshold), it

clearly has an unequal effect on non-residential properties. Specifically, as of 2019, only

one residential property had been appealed under the School District’s policy, which had

been in effect since 2012. See Trial Court Opinion, 3/8/22, at 2. Moreover, of the sixteen

properties appealed for the tax years at issue in this case, none were residential. See

Ex. M-21 at 3 (unpaginated) (chart of final list of properties for appeal showing two were

apartment complexes, two were industrial, eleven were commercial, and one was

“Restaurants, Stores (retail)”). According to Taxpayers’ expert, Dr. Angelides, single-

family residences comprised 84.2% of all properties in the School District during Tax Year

2020 but 0% of the appeals, while commercial properties comprised only 2.9% of all

properties in the School District but 75% of appeals, apartments comprised only 0.2% of

all properties but 12.5% of appeals, and industrial properties comprised only 0.1% of all

properties but 12.5% of appeals. See Angelides Report at 5 (Table 1). 15 Thus, it is patent

from the record that although single-family homes comprise the vast majority of properties

in the School District, they are being appealed at a strikingly low rate compared to non-

residential properties.

But even if one does not believe Taxpayer built a sufficient record here to establish

the School District’s policy has a disparate effect on commercial and other non-residential

property types, we should not foreclose the possibility a taxpayer could prove a disparate

15 It appears Dr. Angelides counted the one property listed as “Restaurants, Stores

(retail)” in the School District’s final chart as a commercial property. I recognize the

School District rebutted portions of Dr. Angelides’s testimony that there were multiple

residential properties that met the $10,000 threshold based on the fact he overlooked that

certain properties were entitled to lower tax rates under the Clean and Green Program,

see 72 P.S. §§5490.1-5490.13, but it does not appear the School District challenged that

single family residences comprised the majority of properties in the district and that none

were chosen for assessment appeal in 2019.

[J-72A-2025 and J-72B-2025] [MO: Mundy, J.] - 22

effect in other cases using methods similar to those employed in Clifton, analyzing, for

example, the coefficient of dispersion and the price-related differential (which is an

accepted indicator of inequity between high-value properties and low value properties).

Certainly, as in Clifton, one could foresee how over time, the School District’s policy could

impact different neighborhoods differently, if values rise and fall at different rates within

the district (which difference could be further exacerbated by the different millage rates

among the different municipalities). Or, imagine if this policy continues for another

decade, and still the School District appeals only a nominal amount of single-family

residences. Unlike the majority, I would leave open the possibility that a differential

impact, proven by such means, violates the Uniformity Clause.

IV. Conclusion

For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent. Moreover, I take this

opportunity to reiterate the point I first made in GM Berkshire: “The underlying inequity

that arises by permitting clearly outdated, decades-old assessments to continue

indefinitely for most properties in a district, while identifying the greatest outliers from

those assessments to challenge, could be cured by more frequent county-wide

assessments of all properties in each taxing district.” 290 A.3d at 259-60 (Dougherty, J.,

OISR). This is an ongoing problem requiring a legislative fix. And although “I am

cognizant of the political unpopularity frequent and costly county-wide property

reassessments likely entail[,]” “the Uniformity Clause prohibits disparate treatment ‘in

order to avoid political accountability.’” Id., quoting Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 979.

Chief Justice Todd and Justice Donohue join this dissenting opinion.

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