Bobby Joe Patrick v. State of Tennessee

05/15/2026

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

March 10, 2026 Session

BOBBY JOE PATRICK v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Grundy County

No. 5445 Bradley Sherman, Judge

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No. M2025-01058-CCA-R3-PC

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A Grundy County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bobby Joe Patrick, of two counts of rape

of a child, and the trial court ordered an effective sentence of sixty-seven years in the

Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the

trial court’s judgments. State v. Patrick, M2019-02026-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 2102914,

at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 25, 2021), perm. app. denied. (Tenn. Feb. 10, 2022). The

Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of

counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner

maintains that he is entitled to post-conviction relief due to the ineffective assistance of

counsel and cumulative error. Following our review of the record, we affirm the post-

conviction court’s judgment.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, P.J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE R.

MCMULLEN and MATTHEW J. WILSON, JJ., joined.

W. Alan Rose and Corey A. Spearman, Tullahoma, Tennessee, for the appellant, Bobby

Joe Patrick.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney

General; Courtney Lynch, District Attorney General; and Taffy Wilson and Thomas

McEntyre, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Facts

At trial, a Grundy County jury convicted the Petitioner of two counts of rape of a

child, and the trial court ordered an effective sixty-seven-year sentence. This court

affirmed the convictions and sentences on appeal. Patrick, 2021 WL 2102914, at *1. The

evidence at trial showed that the victim disclosed sexual abuse following a school

presentation on child sexual and physical abuse. The Petitioner lived with the victim and

her mother at the time, and the victim’s mother worked nights. During a forensic interview,

the victim reported that while her mother was at work at night, the Defendant would get in

bed with the victim and touch her.

The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition alleging that he had received

the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial based upon his attorney’s (“Counsel”) failure

to object to Rule 404(b) evidence admitted at trial. The Petitioner filed two amendments

to his petition, but his ineffective assistance claim remained the same – Counsel failed to

object to 404(b) evidence admitted at trial. The post-conviction court held a hearing where

it admitted a video recording of Counsel’s January 3, 2025 sworn deposition.1

Counsel explained that, initially, the trial court appointed John Stewart to represent

the Petitioner; however, Mr. Stewart withdrew from the case due to a change in

employment. The trial court then appointed the Public Defender’s Office, and he was

assigned the case. Counsel represented the Petitioner up to and through the trial. He was

occasionally assisted by his superior, then-District Public Defender, Jeff Harmon. At the

time his office was appointed, certain pretrial motions had been filed, and the discovery

process was underway. Counsel obtained the Petitioner’s file from prior counsel.

Counsel sought to protect the Petitioner’s legal interests by working for a favorable

plea, because in his experience child rape charges were challenging cases that were “tough

to try”, and “high stakes affairs.” The State and Counsel reached a tentative resolution, but

the proposed plea was rejected by the trial judge.

Counsel recognized the potentially detrimental effect of prior bad act evidence and

sought to prevent or mitigate those negative effects through motions in limine addressing

Rule 404(b) evidence and pretrial hearings. These included a hearing on the admissibility

of the Child Advocacy Center’s forensic interview with the minor victim. Counsel filed

motions, had numerous discussions with the Court and with the prosecutor, and cited case

law to address certain issues and to preserve other issues in anticipation of trial and an

appeal.

Counsel interviewed witnesses and worked with the Petitioner and his mother,

Connie Hampton, to prepare for trial. While Counsel believed the Petitioner had “some

cognitive impairment,” the Petitioner had been evaluated and deemed competent to stand

1

According to the post-conviction court’s order, Counsel developed “serious health problems”

during the post-conviction proceedings that prevented him from attending the hearing. The recording was

entered without objection.

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trial, to assist counsel in the preparation of his defense, and to participate in a meaningful

way. Counsel recalled that, while the Petitioner sometimes had trouble communicating

effectively, the Petitioner was able to understand the discussions he had with Counsel and

was likewise “able to comprehend the advice.”

Counsel involved the Petitioner’s mother, Connie Hampton, in their many

discussions and enlisted her help in ensuring the Petitioner fully understood the

discussions. When speaking with the Petitioner, Counsel took things slowly and addressed

his advice directly to the Petitioner in a measured, purposeful way. He made sure to make

eye contact with the Petitioner to gauge his focus and understanding.

Counsel testified that the Petitioner’s family had transportation challenges

throughout his representation, so Counsel often went to the Petitioner’s family home to

meet with him. This gave Counsel the opportunity to get to know the Petitioner and his

extended family.

At trial, Counsel was cognizant of the sensitive nature of child rape cases and the

need for a skillful and gentle approach with the minor victim and the jury. Counsel chose

to refrain from incessantly objecting to matters that did not “prove anything about child

rape” to avoid emphasizing negative evidence with the jury.

Just before trial, Counsel learned that the victim had allegedly made statements to

her half-sister, H.P.,2 amounting to a recantation. Counsel investigated and explored this

alleged recantation. Counsel acknowledged that the victim’s alleged recantation was not

recorded, but rather H.P. was recorded telling the Public Defender’s investigator that the

victim had recanted. Counsel was familiar with the victim’s half-sister, and based upon

the timing of her recantation claim, he believed H.P.’s statements to the investigator were

coached. He explained that the issue of recantation had not come up in any of the numerous

prior meetings with the Petitioner’s family. Additionally, the family removed H.P. to Ohio

before the trial, apparently to avoid having her testify and cause a rift in the family.

Counsel provided further insight into his choice to avoid repeated objections at trial.

He explained that, as a general practice he did not “repeatedly object” to evidence already

deemed admissible by the trial court. He believed doing so would emphasize and draw the

jury’s attention to negative evidence. Counsel said that he was mindful not to come “across

as an ogre to the jury,” particularly with respect to a minor victim. Counsel also explained

that his decision to limit objections was a tactical decision. Some of the prejudicial or

negative information admitted at trial, such as allegations of abuse or threats, allowed

2

It is the policy of this court to refer to minors by their initials.

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Counsel to argue that the victim had a retaliatory motive to fabricate the rape allegations

against the Petitioner.

Counsel consulted with then-Public Defender, Jeff Harmon, on issues in the case

and Mr. Harmon assisted Counsel with work on the Petitioner’s defense.

At the post-conviction hearing, Jeff Harmon testified that he was the Public

Defender at the time of the Petitioner’s trial and that Counsel, an Assistant Public Defender,

represented the Petitioner at trial and through the direct appeal. Mr. Harmon reviewed the

file maintained by the Public Defender’s Office and did not notice anything “out of the

ordinary” with respect to Counsel’s representation of the Petitioner.

Mr. Harmon stated that Counsel sat as “first chair” and asked him to assist at trial

as “second chair.” Mr. Harmon identified a motion for individual sequestered voir dire.

He explained that he generally filed such a motion in cases involving child sex abuse. Mr.

Harmon confirmed that his office also filed a 404(b) challenge to the admissibility of the

recording of the Children’s Advocacy Center forensic interview of the victim. This motion

was handled by Counsel, who notified Mr. Harmon of the outcome of the motion – the trial

court had ruled the recording was admissible along with some other threats the Petitioner

made. Mr. Harmon recalled the defense filing and arguing various motions. He identified

several motions in limine seeking to preclude certain evidence. The trial court, however,

ruled that the evidence was admissible.

Mr. Harmon explained that, as a matter of strategy, the defense team did not object

at trial to 404(b) material. He believed there was a possibility of “making things worse”

by objecting after the trial court had ruled the evidence admissible. He explained that in

child sex abuse cases, juries often want to know why a child would make the allegations if

they were not true. In this case, some of the evidence the State sought to introduce was

that the Petitioner had whipped the child, made threats, and pulled a gun on the victim’s

mother. This provided the defense with an argument that the victim made the false

allegations as retribution for these acts.

The Petitioner testified that he could not read or write, so when the charges were

reviewed with him, he did not “really ever understand” the charges he was facing. He

recalled that he met with Counsel two or three times and that Counsel never explained the

State’s evidence against him. The Petitioner could not recall whether he ever told Counsel

that he could not read or write.

The Petitioner testified that Counsel was too ill during his representation to “truly

fight[]” for the Petitioner. The Petitioner maintained his innocence and affirmed his desire

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for the judgments to be vacated. He said that he disciplined his children by “whipping”

them with an open hand.

On cross-examination, the Petitioner agreed that he was present in the courtroom

during all the hearings related to his case. He also confirmed that he testified at trial that

he did not threaten the victim and did not beat the victim. The Petitioner agreed that

Counsel met with the Petitioner’s mother “multiple times” about the case and that his

mother would speak with the Petitioner about those conversations. The Petitioner agreed

that “if [Counsel] felt like [his] mother could communicate with [the Petitioner] better, that

is what [Counsel] did.” Upon further questioning by the post-conviction court, the

Petitioner stated that he lived with his mother before the trial. He could not explain why

Counsel met with the Petitioner’s mother or where he was at the time of those meetings.

Connie Hampton, the Petitioner’s mother, testified that the Petitioner was a

concerned and involved father. She was surprised by the allegations the victim made

against the Petitioner. Ms. Hampton confirmed that the Petitioner lived with her and

testified that she never witnessed any physical or sexual abuse of the children.

Ms. Hampton confirmed that the Petitioner could not read or write. The Petitioner

appeared to her to understand what he was charged with, he just could not understand why

he was charged with those offenses. Ms. Hampton stated that the Petitioner appeared

confused about his case and “didn’t know that much about it.” Ms. Hampton recalled that

Counsel did not meet with the Petitioner much due to Counsel’s health problems. Ms.

Hampton said that there “wasn’t too much communication,” but noted that Counsel came

to her house and met with her and the Petitioner “a couple of times.” She also recalled

speaking with Counsel over the phone about the Petitioner’s case. Although there was

never a spoken agreement, it just happened that Counsel communicated with Ms. Hampton,

and Ms. Hampton conveyed the information to the Petitioner.

Ms. Hampton testified that she had obtained her GED but did not attend college.

When asked if she felt she could explain the case to the Petitioner, she responded that there

“wasn’t all that much” to tell the Petitioner. She recalled that she did not get any paperwork

until “[c]lose to the end.” The documents she received were complicated and she had to

review them carefully. Ms. Hampton explained that the Petitioner was “a little concerned”

because it seemed that Counsel did not follow up on some issues or concerns.

Ms. Hampton recalled that Counsel conveyed several offers to the Petitioner. The

Petitioner finally agreed to one offer to plead guilty on the gun charge only. Counsel and

the Petitioner shook hands, and then Counsel left. Later, Counsel called Ms. Hampton and

told her that the trial court would not accept any offer that did not result in the Petitioner

being placed on the sex offender registry.

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On cross-examination, Ms. Hampton testified that she “frequently handled things

for [the Petitioner]” because he could not read or write. She agreed that it was possible

that Counsel allowed Ms. Hampton to explain the legal issues in a way the Petitioner could

understand. Upon further questioning by the post-conviction court, Ms. Hampton

estimated that Counsel met with them six or seven times.

Susan Stephens was a close friend of the victim’s mother. During the trial, the

victim’s mother and the victim lived with her. Ms. Stephens stated that the victim did not

speak with her about the trial but that the victim recanted some of her allegations to Ms.

Stephens’s brother-in-law.

Devin Coppinger, another close friend of the victim’s mother, testified that the

victim disclosed that she had lied or exaggerated the truth when she testified. The victim

made this disclosure while she was crying hysterically and visibly upset. The victim told

Ms. Coppinger that she was upset because she had “made a mistake” and sought advice

about the “situation.” Ms. Coppinger never told anyone about this incident. She explained

that she did not because the victim asked her not to tell anyone.

H.P., the victim’s half-sister, testified that the victim was truthful sometimes, but

not always. To H.P., it appeared that the victim was less concerned about lying if it

benefited her but that she was less comfortable with lying if it did not benefit her.

The victim testified that she was truthful in her interview at the Child Advocacy

Center. She denied that anyone told her what she should say during the interview. The

victim agreed that she was scared during the interview. The victim further agreed that she

stated some things differently in the Child Advocacy Center interview than she did in her

testimony at trial. She explained that it was because she was seven years old “when it

started.” She again denied that anyone – police, family, attorneys – pressured her into

saying something that was not true.

When asked if there was anything about her trial testimony that she would change,

she answered in the negative. She further denied having told anyone, post-trial, that her

trial testimony was not true. She denied recanting her testimony to Ms. Coppinger, stating

that she had never spoken with Ms. Coppinger about her trial testimony. On cross-

examination, the victim testified that she never told Willy Stephens that she was untruthful

during her trial testimony. The victim did not know why Ms. Stephens would testify that

the victim had recanted her testimony to her brother-in-law, Willy Stephens. As to why

Ms. Coppinger claimed the victim was recanting, the victim guessed that it was likely

because she shared a child with the Petitioner. She reiterated that she never told her sister

that her testimony was false.

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In a written order, the post-conviction court denied relief.

II. Analysis

The Petitioner asserts that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

He claims that Counsel failed to communicate with the Petitioner, failed to object to

prejudicial character evidence, and was significantly ill, undermining his ability to

adequately represent the Petitioner. Further, he argues that the cumulative effect of all

these errors warrants relief.

To obtain post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that his or her conviction or

sentence is void or voidable because of the abridgment of a constitutional right. T.C.A. §

40-30-103 (2018). The petitioner bears the burden of proving factual allegations in the

petition for post-conviction relief by clear and convincing evidence. T.C.A. § 40-30-110(f)

(2018). Upon review, this Court will not re-weigh or re-evaluate the evidence below; all

questions concerning the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given their

testimony, and the factual issues raised by the evidence are to be resolved by the trial judge,

not the appellate courts. Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Henley

v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578-79 (Tenn. 1997)). A post-conviction court’s factual findings

are subject to a de novo review by this Court; however, we must accord these factual

findings a presumption of correctness, which can be overcome only when a preponderance

of the evidence is contrary to the post-conviction court’s factual findings. Fields v. State,

40 S.W.3d 450, 456-57 (Tenn. 2001). A post-conviction court’s conclusions of law are

subject to a purely de novo review by this Court, with no presumption of correctness. Id.

at 457.

The right of a criminally accused to representation is guaranteed by both the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9, of the Tennessee

Constitution. State v. White, 114 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tenn. 2003); State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d

453, 461 (Tenn. 1999); Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). The following

two-prong test directs a court’s evaluation of a claim for ineffectiveness:

First, the [petitioner] must show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the [petitioner] by

the Sixth Amendment. Second, the [petitioner] must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s

errors were so serious as to deprive the [petitioner] of a fair trial, a trial whose

result is reliable. Unless a [petitioner] makes both showings, it cannot be

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said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the

adversary process that renders the result unreliable.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State v. Melson, 772

S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tenn. 1989).

In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court must determine

whether the advice given or services rendered by the attorney are within the range of

competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter, 523 S.W.2d at 936. To

prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, “a petitioner must show that

counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” House v.

State, 44 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tenn. 2001) (citing Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn.

1996)).

When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing court

should judge the attorney’s performance within the context of the case as a whole, taking

into account all relevant circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690; State v. Mitchell, 753

S.W.2d 148, 149 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). The reviewing court should avoid the

“distorting effects of hindsight” and “judge the reasonableness of counsel’s challenged

conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. In doing so, the reviewing court must be highly deferential

and “should indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide

range of reasonable professional assistance.” Burns, 6 S.W.3d at 462. Finally, we note

that a defendant in a criminal case is not entitled to perfect representation, only

constitutionally adequate representation. Denton v. State, 945 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1996). In other words, “in considering claims of ineffective assistance of

counsel, ‘we address not what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally

compelled.’” Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (quoting United States v. Cronic,

466 U.S. 648, 665 n.38 (1984)). Counsel should not be deemed to have been ineffective

merely because a different procedure or strategy might have produced a different result.

Williams v. State, 599 S.W.2d 276, 279-80 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). “‘The fact that a

particular strategy or tactic failed or hurt the defense, does not, standing alone, establish

unreasonable representation. However, deference to matters of strategy and tactical

choices applies only if the choices are informed ones based upon adequate preparation.’”

House, 44 S.W.3d at 515 (quoting Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 369).

If the petitioner shows that counsel’s representation fell below a reasonable

standard, then the petitioner must satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test by

demonstrating “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694; Nichols v. State, 90 S.W.3d 576, 587 (Tenn. 2002). This reasonable probability must

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be “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694;

Harris v. State, 875 S.W.2d 662, 665 (Tenn. 1994).

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The Petitioner asserts that Counsel failed to communicate effectively, failed to

object to improper Rule 404(b) evidence and that Counsel’s illness “prevented effective

representation.” The State notes that, of these three issues, the Petitioner only raised the

claim related to 404(b) evidence in his petition and at the hearing on the matter.

Consequently, the post-conviction court did not address any other issues.

As a general rule, this court will not address post-conviction issues that were not

raised in the petition or addressed in the trial court.” Brown v. State, 928 S.W.2d 453, 457

(Tenn. Crim. App. 1996); see T.C.A. § 40-30-106(g) (2018) (providing that “[a] ground

for relief is waived if the petitioner personally or through an attorney failed to present it for

determination in any proceeding before a court of competent jurisdiction in which the

ground could have been presented,” with limited exceptions). We agree with the State that

the only ineffective assistance of counsel issue presented in the petition is whether the

Petitioner’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of improper

404(b) evidence. Therefore, the Petitioner’s other issues on appeal are waived because

they were not raised in the petition for relief or ruled upon by the post-conviction court.

After the hearing, the post-conviction court issued an order denying relief. The post-

conviction court made the following findings as to credibility:

Assistant Public Defender, [Counsel] and then-Public Defender, Jeff

Harmon, are both capable, competent, experienced attorneys with years of

criminal defense practice under their respective belts. They have both

represented many criminally accused and justice-involved people,

participated in numerous hearings and trials and generally enjoyed positive

reputations in the legal community. As such, this Court finds them both to

be credible witnesses. The Court credits the testimony of both [Counsel]

and Harmon.

With respect to the admission of 404(b) evidence, the post-conviction court made

the following findings:

This Court cannot find from the proof that [Counsel] was deficient in his

representation of the Petitioner. On the contrary, he clearly worked on the

case, met with his client and his client’s close family, prepared for trial, and

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made strategic decisions for articulable reasons based on his knowledge of

Grundy County and, more particularly, Grundy County juries.

The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. Counsel

sought to preclude evidence of potential threats or acts of violence by the Petitioner, but

the trial court ruled the evidence admissible. As a matter of strategy, because there was a

minor victim involved in the case, Counsel was very aware of the perceptions of the jury.

The trial court had ruled the statements admissible; therefore, he elected not to emphasize

or draw more attention to the Petitioner’s acts. Furthermore, the defense sought to use the

evidence to provide the jury with a reason why the victim would have fabricated the

allegations. They posited that the victim made up the sex abuse allegations as retaliation

for the Defendant’s threats and physical abuse. The evidence supports that Counsel’s

choice was an informed one and based upon adequate preparation.

Accordingly, the Petitioner failed to establish deficient performance or prejudice by

clear and convincing evidence. He is not entitled to relief as to his issue.

B. Cumulative Error

The Petitioner contends that the cumulative effect of the errors in this case deprived

him of a fair trial. Having considered each of the Petitioner’s issues on appeal and

concluding that the trial court did not err, we need not consider the cumulative effect of the

alleged errors. State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 77 (Tenn. 2010) (“To warrant assessment

under the cumulative error doctrine, there must have been more than one actual error

committed.”).

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing reasoning and authorities, we affirm the judgment

of the post-conviction court.

__________S/ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER___________

ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, PRESIDING JUDGE

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