The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1256-23
S.M. o/b/o H.M.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE
TOWNSHIP OF MONROE IN THE
COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX, ROBERT
GOODALL, ANTHONY GAMBINO
and DANIEL LEE,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
J.H., S.H., and A.H.,
Defendants.
________________________________
Argued October 8, 2025 – Decided May 18, 2026
Before Judges Smith and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Middlesex County, Docket No.
L-2756-17.
William Bloom argued the cause for appellants
(Methfessel & Werbel, attorneys; William Bloom, on
the briefs).
R. Armen McOmber argued the cause for respondent
(McOmber McOmber & Luber, PC, attorneys; R.
Armen McOmber, of counsel and on the brief; Austin
B. Tobin, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Monroe Township Board of Education ("Board") appeals
from an August 11, 2023, order denying its motion for a new trial. The
underlying dispute involved allegations that plaintiff H.M., 1 a student in the
Board's district, was subjected to harassment based on his sexual orientation
by another student, J.H., that escalated into a physical altercation in a school
locker room. Following a lengthy charge conference, the trial judge crafted a
single jury question to allow the jury to consider the plaintiff's claim under the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination ("NJLAD"), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and awarded damages. The
trial court denied defendant's request for a new trial. We affirm.
1
We use initials to protect plaintiff's and minors' privacy. See R. 1:38-
3(a)(2).
A-1256-23
2
I.
Plaintiff sued the Board, Robert Goodall, Anthony Gambino, and Daniel
Lee ("Board defendants"), J.H. (a fellow student) and his mother S.H. 2
Plaintiff asserted causes of action against the Board defendants for hostile
classroom environment and retaliation in violation of the NJLAD, negligence,
negligent supervision, negligent training, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Plaintiff's claims against J.H. and S.H. included assault,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dispositive motion
practice in February 2021 reduced the number of claims presented at trial to:
hostile classroom environment; gender/sexual orientation discrimination; and
negligence allegations. Trial began in May 2021.
The evidence revealed that plaintiff and J.H. attended Monroe Township
schools together from sixth through tenth grade. H.M. encountered repeated
harassment from J.H., beginning in middle school, such as physical
intimidation, derogatory slurs including being called "gay" and "f****t," and
isolated incidents of assault. H.M. complained frequently to the school's staff.
His mother corroborated his testimony, stating that he spoke to her on several
2
At the time the complaint was filed, plaintiff H.M. and defendant J.H. were
minor children. By the time of trial in May 2023, both plaintiff and defendant
were adults.
A-1256-23
3
occasions about J.H.'s harassment throughout middle school. She testified that
she addressed J.H.'s harassment of her son to his math teacher during parent -
teacher conferences, and in response, the teacher acknowledged the school was
aware of the harassment because it often occurred during class. The school
never tried to remediate the situation.
The harassment persisted into high school. In tenth grade, both students
were enrolled in driver's education and gym classes. J.H.'s harassment
escalated. He threw objects at plaintiff, verbally abused him, and physically
assaulted him. J.H. and his friends would bar plaintiff from entering class,
saying "gay people aren't allowed in the classroom."
A physical altercation between plaintiff and J.H. occurred in the gym
locker room in November 2015. At that time, J.H. directed homophobic
epithets at plaintiff and plaintiff's friend. Conflicting testimony was presented
as to the circumstances and precipitating actions. However, the exchange was
captured on cell phone video and was shown to the jury at trial.
The video begins with plaintiff on his knees smiling at J.H., offering oral
sex to him and asking him to expose his penis. In response, J.H. repeatedly
asked plaintiff to stop, becoming more visibly agitated, and warning that if
plaintiff continued, J.H. would hit him. Plaintiff repeated his statements as
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J.H. came closer to him. J.H. then punched plaintiff several times in the face.
Other students separated the two. However, after J.H. was pulled to the other
side of the room, plaintiff stood up and moved towards J.H. to re-engage in the
altercation. The recording shows J.H. punching plaintiff who subsequently fell
over a bench onto the ground. Notably, no teaching staff were present in the
locker room during the incident.
In addition to other fact and expert witnesses, plaintiff called Edward
Dragan, Ed.D., who opined on applicable standards of care in school settings.
Dr. Dragan concluded that deficiencies in the Board's response constituted a
"major breach" of its professional duty. Dr. Dragan further emphasized the
school's awareness of J.H.'s problematic history, as corroborated by evidence
of disciplinary infractions dating back several years, including bullying, bias
incidents, and sexual harassment. School principal Robert Goodall testified
that he was not informed of J.H.'s disciplinary background.
After each party rested, the trial judge convened a charge conference that
was held over two days in May 2023. Plaintiff submitted a proposed charge
fashioned from the New Jersey Model Civil Jury charges, including the
NJLAD-based claims, the negligence causes of action, and the customary
instructions regarding damages, the burden of proof and, the roles of the judge
A-1256-23
5
and jurors. Defendants initially objected to the jury charge but, according to
plaintiff, later withdrew the objection in writing. 3
Plaintiff prepared a draft jury verdict form that, in addition to
negligence-based claims, included a specific section asking the jury to
consider the following three questions about plaintiff's NJLAD claims:
1. Do you find that [plaintiff] was subjected to
discrimination and harassment at the Monroe
Township High School?
....
2. Do you find that [plaintiff] suffered emotional
distress as a result of the discrimination and
harassment?
....
3. What amount of money do you find [plaintiff] is
entitled to for emotional distress as a result of
the discrimination and harassment?
....
Defendants objected to these questions and alternatively requested these
seven be presented to the jury:
1. Has [p]laintiff proved that the claimed harassment
against him by [J.H.] actually occurred?
....
3
The record before us does not include that correspondence.
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2. Has [p]laintiff proved that the harassment occurred
because of perceived sexual orientation?
....
3. Has [p]laintiff proved that [ ] defendant Monroe
Township Board of Education knew or should have
known of the harassment and failed to take
effective remedial measures to stop it?
....
4. Has [p]laintiff proved that defendant Monroe
Township Board of Education was negligent by
failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the
harassment from occurring?
....
5. Has defendant Monroe Township Board of
Education proved that it exercised reasonable care
to prevent harassment in school by having in place
appropriate policies and complaint mechanisms and
that [p]laintiff negligently failed to take advantage
of such policies and complaint mechanisms
provided by defendant?
....
6. Has [p]laintiff proved that the harassment was
severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable
person believe that the conditions of his schooling
were altered and that the school environment was
hostile?
....
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7. What amount of money would fairly and
reasonably [compensate] [p]laintiff for pain,
suffering, disability, impairment, and loss of
enjoyment of life due to the harassment[?]
Defendants contend that a more robust set of interrogatories was
necessary to break down the elements of the NJLAD and the prongs of
defendants' affirmative defenses. After considering both submissions, and
over the defendants' objection, the trial judge reduced the NJLAD issue to a
single question:
1. Do you find [plaintiff H.M.] has proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the Monroe
Township Board of Education defendants subjected
[H.M.] to discrimination and harassment while a
student at the Monroe Township High School?
The verdict sheet was presented to the jury along with a fifty-three-page
jury charge.
The jury deliberated for seventy-five minutes and returned a unanimous
verdict for plaintiff, and awarded $500,000 in compensatory damages.
The Board moved for a new trial, arguing the jury verdict sheet
regarding the NJLAD claim was deficient and misleading and the jury verdict
was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion,
stating:
A-1256-23
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[T]he law is clear, that a [c]ourt's oral instruction is
sufficient to convey an understanding of the elements.
Here the jury charge -- here, the [c]ourt charged the
jury in the applicable law, and even provided them
with a copy of the jury charge, to reference while
completing the verdict sheet.
Therefore, the jury was not confused and mislead
about the elements of the claim they considered [on
the verdict] before it was even presented to the jury.
Therefore, the request for a new trial on a deficient
verdict sheet is denied.
On the issue of miscarriage of justice, . . . [t]he [c]ourt
finds that a miscarriage of justice did not occur here,
as there was ample basis upon which the jury could
rule in plaintiff's favor. [Defendants] argue[] that
plaintiff's testimony was not credible. However,
plaintiff's testimony was not the only factor presented
and considered by the jury. And even if it was, jury
verdicts can be based on the testimony of a single
witness. The jury heard testimony from the plaintiff,
teachers, administrators from the high school, and
experts. They reviewed [J.H.'s] disciplinary record,
that show[ed] a history of aggressive behavior, reports
from [plaintiff's expert], and watched a video of the
physical altercation that took place between the
students.
....
Since defendant[s] never actually put on their own
case, the jury only had plaintiff's testimony, with
nothing to refute it, other than defendant[s]' attempt to
challenge [ ] plaintiff's truthfulness. The jury still
must have determined that plaintiff was credible.
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In November 2023, the trial court entered a total judgment of
$1,397,487.60, representing the jury award and attorney fees.
Defendants appeal the denial of its new trial motion, asserting that the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because the jury verdict
sheet was so deficient as to produce an unjust result.
II.
Rule 4:49-1 directs the court "shall grant [a] motion [for a new trial] if,
having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the
credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was
a miscarriage of justice under the law." The standard of review on appeal from
a decision on a motion for a new trial is the "same governing the trial judge -
whether there was a miscarriage of justice under the law." Risko v. Thompson
Muller Auto. Grp., Inc., 206 N.J. 506, 522 (2011); see also Hayes v.
Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 386 (2018); R. 2:10-1. "[A] 'miscarriage of justice'
can arise when there is a 'manifest lack of inherently credible evidence to
support the finding,' when there has been an 'obvious overlooking or under -
valuation of crucial evidence,' or when the case culminates in a 'clearly unjust
result.'" Hayes, 231 N.J. at 386 (quoting Risko, 206 N.J. at 521-22). A motion
for a new trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and jury verdicts
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are entitled to considerable deference. Id. at 385; Lindenmuth v. Holden, 296
N.J. Super. 42, 48 (App. Div. 1996). As such, we must not only consider
whether the trial judge misapplied discretion, but also scrutinize the record to
ascertain whether a "miscarriage of justice" occurred. Pressler & Verniero,
Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey, cmt. 4 on R. 2:10-1
(2026).
It is axiomatic that jury verdicts should be set aside in favor of a new
trial sparingly and only in cases of clear injustice. Dutton v. Rando, 458 N.J.
Super. 213, 223-24 (App. Div. 2019). A jury's verdict, including an award of
damages, is "cloaked with a 'presumption of correctness.'" Cuevas v.
Wentworth Grp., 226 N.J. 480, 501 (2016) (quoting Baxter v. Fairmont Food
Co., 74 N.J. 588, 598 (1977)).
The purpose of a verdict sheet and jury interrogatories, is "'to require the
jury to specifically consider the essential issues of the case, to clarify the
court's charge to the jury, and to clarify the meaning of the verdict and permit
error to be localized.'" Ponzo v. Pelle, 166 N.J. 481, 490-91 (2001) (quoting
Wenner v. McEldowney & Co., 102 N.J. Super. 13, 19 (App. Div. 1968)).
They should be tailored to avoid confusion on the part of the jury. Id. at 492.
"'The framing of [jury] questions in clear and understandable language cannot
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be overemphasized.'" Id. at 491 (alteration in the original) (quoting Benson v.
Brown, 276 N.J. Super. 553, 565 (App. Div. 1994)). Errors in interrogatories
given to the jury are not grounds for reversal unless they were "misleading,
confusing, or ambiguous." Id. at 490 (quoting Sons of Thunder v. Borden,
Inc., 148 N.J. 396, 418 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]n
reviewing an interrogatory for reversible error, we . . . consider it in the
context of the charge as a whole [because a]n accurate and thorough jury
charge often can cure the potential for confusion that may be present in an
interrogatory." Id. at 491.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to a new trial because the trial
judge's use of a single, generalized interrogatory contained on the jury verdict
sheet to consider defendant's liability under the NJLAD was improper and
produced an unjust result. We disagree and conclude the trial judge's jury
charge was sufficient to provide the jury with a sufficient understanding of the
applicable law and each element plaintiff was required to prove and the verdict
sheet properly articulated the proper legal standard to be assessed and
permitted the jury to decide the issue accordingly.
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A.
A cause of action exists under the NJLAD "for student-on-student
harassment . . . if the school district's failure to reasonably address that
harassment has the effect of denying to that student any of a school's
'accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges.'" L.W. ex rel. L.G. v.
Toms River Reg'l Sch. Bd. of Educ., 189 N.J. 381, 402 (2007) (quoting
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(f)(1)). At the same time, however, "[a] school cannot be
expected to shelter students from all instances of peer harassment," such as
"isolated schoolyard insults or classroom taunts." Id. at 402, 406.
To state a claim under the NJLAD against a school:
an aggrieved student must allege [(1)] discriminatory
conduct that would not have occurred "but for" the
student's protected characteristic, [(2)] that a
reasonable student of the same age, maturity level, and
protected characteristic [(3)] would consider
sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to create an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive school environment,
and [(4)] that the school district failed to reasonably
address such conduct.
[Id. at 402-03.]
When developing this test, the L.W. Court decided not to adopt the U.S.
Supreme Court's "deliberate indifference" standard for Title IX claims from
Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 641 (1999). Instead, it used
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the Lehmann standard 4 to hold a school district is responsible for harassment if
it knew or should have known about it, but did not take reasonable steps to
stop it. L.W., 189 N.J. at 390.
B.
Although defendants did not ultimately object to the jury charges, they
did object to the jury questions presented to assess plaintiff's NJLAD claim.
Defendants argue the proffered questions prohibited the jury from considering
each specific element of the NJLAD claim. Additionally, defendants argue the
question was flawed because the trial judge did not follow Model Jury Charge
2.21. As a result, the verdict sheet asked only if defendant "subjected"
plaintiff to harassment, instead of breaking the claim into specific elements.
The trial judge overruled the objection and stated the single question would be
adequate because the jury would receive a printed copy of the jury charge.
Following our review of the record, we conclude the trial judge's jury
instruction was both thorough and accurate. The interrogatory presented to the
4
The Lehmann standard, established in Lehmann v. Toys R Us, Inc., 132 N.J.
587 (1993), is a four-prong test for hostile work environment sexual claims.
The court held that to state a claim for hostile work environment sexual
harassment, a plaintiff must allege: the complained-of conduct (1) would not
have occurred but for the employee's gender; and it was (2) severe or pervasive
enough to make a (3) reasonable woman believe that (4) the conditions of
employment are altered and the working environment is hostile or abusive .
Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 603-604.
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jury properly encapsulated the elements of NJLAD in order to permit the jury
to consider defendants' liability. It was not so misleading, confusing, nor
ambiguous that it was clearly capable of producing an unjust result to require a
new trial. R. 2:10-2.
In the instructions that accompanied the jury verdict sheet, the trial judge
clearly, meticulously, and explicitly explained to the jury that it was required
to find each element of plaintiff's NJLAD claim by a preponderance of the
evidence to vest liability on defendants. The judge also gave a detailed
explanation on each of the issues the jury had to decide in reaching the verdict
on the NJLAD claim. Notably, defense counsel provided his own explanation
on the applicable law and what it means in his closing statement with the
purpose of aiding the jury in its deliberations.
Defendants' claim that the jury instruction was vague or misleading is
belied by the record. The jury was encouraged to ask any questions that might
arise during deliberations. They did not, and unanimously returned a verdict in
plaintiff's favor. Additionally, following the announcement of the jury verdict,
the court polled the jury and every member agreed with the decision.
In sum, when considered with the jury charge and instructions as a
whole, the verdict sheet was not "clearly capable of producing an unjust
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result." Ponzo, 166 N.J. at 490; R. 2:10-2. As a result, the verdict sheet did
not constitute reversible nor plain error. Mogull v. CB Commercial Real
Estate Grp., Inc., 162 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2000). Therefore, defendants have not
established "clearly and convincingly . . . that there was a miscarriage of
justice under the law." R. 4:49-1(a).
To the extent we have not addressed any of defendants' remaining
arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merits to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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