State v. Brown

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State v. Brown

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. JAMES BROWN

(SC 20964)

Mullins, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Ecker,

Alexander, Dannehy and Bright, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted of murder in connection with the shooting death of the victim,

the defendant appealed to this court. The shooting had occurred amid a

fight between two rival groups with which the defendant and the victim,

respectively, were affiliated. At trial, the clerk of the court informed the

court that one of the jurors, Juror 7, had expressed concerns for her safety

stemming from certain interactions with a trial attendee. After discussing

the incident with counsel and canvassing both Juror 7, who denied having or

expressing any such safety concerns, and the clerk, the court excused Juror

7 from the jury. The court then canvassed the remaining jurors. One of the

remaining jurors, Juror 1, indicated that he had overheard Juror 7 raise safety

concerns and that two other jurors, Jurors 3 and 6, had also overheard those

concerns, but all of the other remaining jurors denied having or overhearing

any conversations regarding concerns about the trial. Thereafter, defense

counsel moved for a mistrial, contending that the canvass process itself made

it impossible for the remaining jurors to be fair and impartial and that Jurors

1, 3 and 6 also should have been excused. The trial court denied that motion.

On appeal, the defendant claimed, inter alia, that the trial court had abused

its discretion when it declined to declare a mistrial. Held:

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s

motion for a mistrial and excusing only Juror 7 from the jury.

The defendant was not entitled to a presumption, pursuant to Remmer v.

United States (347 U.S. 227), that the allegedly improper interaction involv-

ing Juror 7 was prejudicial.

That presumption of prejudice applies only when some external interference

with the jury’s deliberative process via private communication, contact, or

tampering with jurors relates directly to the matter being tried.

In the present case, the defense failed to demonstrate that the allegedly

improper juror contact pertained directly to the merits of the matter rather

than to the trial more topically.

The only inference of interference or tampering that the defense adduced

was that Juror 7 believed that one or more trial attendees watched her walk

to her car, before or after one of those attendees commented on her coat,

Juror 7 later denied ever having or expressing any concerns about her safety

when canvassed by the court, Juror 1 was the only juror who testified that

Juror 7 had expressed such a concern, the trial court made no finding that

threatening or intimidating conduct had occurred, and Juror 7 was excused

because of her own conduct rather than because of any efforts at intimidation.

State v. Brown

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to declare a mis-

trial, as the court, in canvassing all of the jurors, effectively ascertained the

nature and import of any potential juror bias, each juror was unequivocal

about his or her ability to be fair and impartial, no other juror stated that

he or she had safety concerns, and the court was able to observe the jurors’

answers to its questions and to assess their demeanor.

With respect to the defendant’s claim that the trial court should have excused

Jurors 3 and 6, it was speculative for the defendant to claim that those jurors

had safety concerns despite their unequivocal testimony to the contrary,

and, even if there were nonspeculative reasons to believe that Jurors 3 and

6 harbored safety concerns, the trial court had the unique opportunity to

observe those jurors and to make credibility determinations, which it did

through a meticulous and exhaustive canvassing process.

With respect to the defendant’s claim that the trial court should have excused

Juror 1 insofar as his statements that he did “[n]ot yet” have safety concerns

and that nothing made him concerned “so far” were equivocal, those state-

ments could reasonably be understood to communicate that, at the time of

questioning, Juror 1 did not have any safety concerns, and there was noth-

ing in the record to indicate that Juror 1 anticipated any such concerns in

the future.

To the extent that the defendant contended that Juror 1 subjectively believed

that the trial court cajoled him into disavowing his safety concerns, that

argument was speculative and without merit.

The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the prosecutor’s question-

ing of two witnesses, H and R, constituted prosecutorial impropriety that

deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.

No impropriety occurred when the prosecutor attempted to refresh H’s

recollection with his disavowed sworn statement to the police and asked H

whether he had authored a sentence containing “word on the street” hear-

say indicating that the defendant was the person who had shot the victim.

The prosecutor’s ostensible purpose in asking about the hearsay was not

to use it as substantive evidence but to lay a foundation for treating H as a

hostile witness and to provide a basis for admitting H’s prior sworn state-

ment, and, when the trial court ordered the prosecutor not to refer to that

hearsay again, he complied with that order.

The prosecutor did not improperly appeal to the jurors’ emotions, passions,

or prejudices when he asked R about the circumstances surrounding his

arrest pursuant to a capias warrant.

Given that R had disavowed a prior sworn statement to the police in which

he stated that he had witnessed the shooting of the victim, the prosecu-

tor’s questioning was permissible to discredit R’s lack of recollection and

to impeach R as someone who had changed his story to spread the word that

he was not a snitch.

State v. Brown

Moreover, defense counsel’s extensive cross-examination of R about the

circumstances of his arrest suggested that defense counsel did not believe

that the prosecutor’s line of questioning was improper.

Argued February 2—officially released May 19, 2026

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crime of murder, brought to the Superior Court in

the judicial district of Hartford and tried to the jury

before Droney, J.; verdict and judgment of guilty, from

which the defendant appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Denis J. O’Malley III, assistant public defender, for

the appellant (defendant).

Nathan J. Buchok, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom were John F. Fahey, state’s attorney, and, on the

brief, Sharmese L. Walcott, state’s attorney, and Robin

D. Krawczyk, former senior assistant state’s attorney,

for the appellee (state).

Opinion

McDONALD, J. The defendant, James Brown, appeals

from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury

trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-

54a (a) and 53a-8. In this direct appeal, the defendant

claims that, following a juror’s expression of safety

concerns that were overheard by at least one other juror

and communicated to court staff, the court abused its

discretion by excusing only the complaining juror and

denying defense counsel’s motion for a mistrial. The

defendant also claims that the prosecutor deprived him

of his due process right to a fair trial by committing two

instances of prosecutorial impropriety while question-

ing witnesses. We disagree and affirm the judgment of

conviction.

This murder trial arose from a cold case investiga-

tion into the killing of the victim, Kennith Sullivan, in

Hartford on June 26, 2008. The jury reasonably could

have found the following facts. Members of two rival

State v. Brown

groups living in Hartford—respectively named “Money

Green Bedroc” and “Sandz-Bridge”—attended a concert

at the XL Center (formerly the Hartford Civic Center).

The defendant was associated with Money Green Bedroc

and the victim with Sandz-Bridge. Inside the concert

venue, the groups engaged in a fight that spilled outside

of the arena. Once outside, the defendant and two other

individuals from Money Green Bedroc retrieved firearms

from a nearby vehicle. As the victim and other Sandz-

Bridge members walked away from the scene, the victim

saw the defendant approaching, stepped into the street,

and said, “let’s fight.” The defendant then shot at the

victim multiple times, striking him with what would

prove to be a fatal gunshot to the stomach. The victim’s

associates placed him in the backseat of a car—but, after

driving approximately one block, they removed him and

left him in the street.

A crowd gathered in the street around the victim,

with police officers and federal agents arriving shortly

thereafter. The individuals at the scene fought with law

enforcement and were generally uncooperative with

attempts to gather information about the shooting. One

member of the crowd stated: “We know who shot . . .

my boy. Don’t worry, we’re going to get him.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Once removed from the scene,

the victim was transported to a hospital, where he died

from the gunshot wound to his stomach. Following these

events, members of Sandz-Bridge shot at individuals in

Money Green Bedroc’s neighborhood.

This 2008 cold case began to redevelop as eyewitnesses

gave sworn statements to the police between 2013 and

2015. Edward Rosado, a friend of the victim, recounted

his eyewitness account of the defendant’s shooting the

victim from a vantage point of about twenty feet. Iran

Harris, a member of Sandz-Bridge, stated that the defen-

dant spat at him during the concert and that he was one

of the people walking with the victim when the shooting

occurred. Harris also identified the defendant in a pho-

tographic array as someone with whom he had fought

State v. Brown

at the concert. Harris did not identify the defendant

as the person who shot the victim. However, two other

individuals, one from Money Green Bedroc and one from

Sandz-Bridge, provided sworn statements indicating that

the defendant had shot the victim. In his statement, the

Money Green Bedroc member recalled that the defendant

had often “bragged” about killing the victim and that he

had claimed the killing as his own “work . . . .” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) The Sandz-Bridge member

stated that he was “positive” that the defendant was the

person who shot the victim.

In light of these statements, the state charged the

defendant with murder. Following trial, a jury found

the defendant guilty, and the trial court sentenced him

to a total effective sentence of forty years of imprison-

ment. The defendant now appeals directly to this court.

See General Statutes § 51-199 (b) (3). Additional facts

and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

I

We first address the defendant’s claim that the trial

court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel’s

motion for a mistrial after a juror reported safety con-

cerns arising from interactions with trial attendees,

which were overheard by at least one other juror. The

defendant first argues that the reported interactions

triggered a presumption of prejudice pursuant to Rem-

mer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S. Ct. 450, 98 L.

Ed. 654 (1954), and that, because the state failed to rebut

this presumption, a new trial is required. The defendant

further argues that, even without the Remmer presump-

tion, the trial court’s failure to declare a mistrial was an

abuse of its discretion because “the jury had been tainted

by the excused juror’s fear for her safety,” and, thus, “the

fairness of the trial was irreparably damaged.” The state

responds that the Remmer presumption of prejudice does

not apply in this case because the excused juror’s safety

concerns did not relate to the merits of the trial. The

state further contends that the court did not abuse its

discretion because it canvassed each juror on the record

State v. Brown

to assess whether each juror could serve impartially and

drew “demeanor-based credibility determinations” from

these canvasses that supported its decision neither to

declare a mistrial nor to excuse any additional juror.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of this claim. On March 10,

2023, the fifth day of evidence, the trial court relayed

to counsel an incident concerning Juror 7:1 “[T]he clerk

informed me that . . . Juror 7 had taken her aside and

had . . . a conversation . . . separate from other jurors.

However, the other jurors were in the vicinity. . . . Juror

7 stated to the effect that, when she goes to the car at

the end of the day, she noted that people from the [court-

room’s public] gallery were near the juror parking lot. . . .

The clerk of the court has now told me . . . that Juror 7

feels uncomfortable coming into the courtroom if the

defendant is present. So, what I’m going to do is make

a record of the concerns that were reported to me and

then take up what should be done next. It was the report

of the clerk of the court . . . that the individuals that

[Juror 7] saw did not say anything to her and have been

respectful to her, but she did note their presence, and . . .

she felt they watched her and other jurors. She asked

the clerk about the verdict process and [whether the

jurors] would have to give the verdict in open court. The

clerk indicated, yes. She asked if she could leave directly

after [the jury returned its verdict]. She did indicate in

her comments that her concerns apply no matter what

the verdict was, not guilty or guilty. . . . She has now

indicated to the clerk of the court that she does not even

feel comfortable coming into court if the defendant is

present or there are people in the gallery, based on safety

concerns. So, with that, I am obligated to hold a hearing

on the record, which I am doing now. I’d like to hear from

counsel if they have any position with respect to how the

court should proceed.”

Defense counsel agreed that the trial court should

examine Juror 7 “on the record [and] under oath to see

1

The jurors are referred to by their numbers or their first initials to

protect their privacy interests. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 341 Conn.

387, 406 n.13, 267 A.3d 81 (2021).

State v. Brown

exactly what she has to say.” He contended, however,

that “it would be a safe bet that [Juror 7] expressed her

concerns to the [other jurors], whether it be spoken or

unspoken,” noting that he was “of the belief [that] she’s

already poisoned” the other jurors. The court concluded

that it did not “have any choice but to ask Juror 7 to

come in.”

At first, Juror 7 refused to enter the courtroom. The

prosecutor suggested that, if Juror 7 would not testify

about her safety concerns, the trial court should canvass

every juror to “[ask] if [Juror 7’s] concerns had been

shared with any of them, and, even if they say ‘no,’ do

they have any concerns about their ability to sit for the

rest of the trial and [to] be fair and impartial?” Defense

counsel objected, arguing that he did not want “this

poisoned pill to be hinted at” by canvassing the rest of

the jurors. He preferred that the court “order [Juror 7]

to sit in that chair and [to] testify.” The court concluded

that, no matter the course of action, it would excuse Juror

7: “If she cannot come into the courtroom to answer my

questions to decide whether there is an issue, that, in and

of itself, shows that there is an issue, and she cannot sit

[to] be a fair and impartial juror.”

Before deciding whether to canvass the remaining

jurors, the trial court ordered Juror 7 to enter the court-

room and to testify about her safety concerns. Juror 7’s

testimony was inconsistent with her concerns as reported

by court staff. She testified that she had only asked court

staff “a question about the process of the jury, like how

things go.” She also testified that she had not expressed

any concerns to other jurors and that she and the other

jurors had questions only about the logistics of jury

service. After the court held a sidebar, it asked Juror 7

about her safety concerns directly. She denied having

the concerns that had been reported by court staff. Pre-

sented with this denial, the court held another sidebar,

after which it asked: “[W]ere you concerned [at] any time

about coming into the courtroom because there would

be people here in the gallery, and the defendant would

be present?” Juror 7 answered: “I don’t want people

State v. Brown

thinking that I’m thinking there’s concerns because

there’s not. . . . In fact, everybody that we’ve . . . come

in contact with outside has been very nice and courteous.

Hold[ing] doors open.” The court then dismissed Juror 7

and instructed the clerk to testify so that there would be

a record of Juror 7’s original concerns. The clerk testi-

fied consistently with what the court had reported to the

parties—specifically, that Juror 7 saw trial attendees

watching her walk to her car.

After hearing the contradictory testimony of the clerk

and Juror 7, the trial court excused Juror 7 from the

jury. In response, defense counsel first stated that a full

jury canvass was necessary to protect his client’s right to

an impartial jury, before arguing that a canvass would

be futile because the jury was already “poisoned” and

that any canvass in fact would further poison the jury.

Specifically, defense counsel contended that Juror 7

feared the defendant’s “side” of the courtroom “because

of skin color” and that she may have “[let] on any . . .

of her prejudices to the other jurors,” as well as “her

concerns for safety.” For those reasons, counsel moved

for a mistrial.

The trial court decided that it was “obligated” to can-

vass the remaining jurors “[i]n order to rule on defense

counsel’s motion for a mistrial . . . .” After a recess, the

prosecutor and defense counsel each submitted proposed

questions to the court for use in the canvass. The court

then presented its final canvass questions to the parties.

These questions included whether a given juror “ha[d]

any conversations or overhear[d] any conversations with

any juror about concerns about the trial, issues related

to it or delivering a verdict”; whether the juror could be

“fair and impartial”; and possible follow-up questions,

depending on the juror’s answers. Presented with this

planned line of questioning, defense counsel objected,

arguing that the court should explicitly ask the jurors

whether they had any safety concerns. The court acknowl-

edged defense counsel’s objection but explained: “I don’t

want to mention the word ‘safety.’ I don’t want to give

it undue influence, as if it were to come from me that

State v. Brown

it’s something [the jurors] should be concerned about.

However, I understand defense’s position, and it’s noted

for the record. If they do raise an issue and say ‘yes,’ if

they talk about safety, I’ll inquire further, as necessary.”

With this understanding, the trial court conducted

its canvass of the remaining jurors individually, follow-

ing the same line of questioning that the court had just

presented to both parties. The court began with Juror 1:

“Q. First, did you have any conversations or overhear

any conversations with any juror about concerns about

the trial, issues related to it or delivering a verdict?

“A. So, I overheard one of the jurors, I think last week,

or maybe the first of this week, [saying] that one of the

spectators talked to her on her way out of the courtroom

two days in a row and commented about her coat, and she

wasn’t sure whether she should be nervous about that or

not. That’s all I heard. I did comment to her that, if she

was concerned, she should talk to the clerk.

“Q. Do you know which juror [said] that to you?

“A. [L].

“Q. Okay. Juror 7?

“A. I don’t know her number.

“Q. And are you aware of anyone else overhearing that?

“A. Yes.

“Q. And who else do you think overheard that?

“A. [Juror 6]. [Juror 3]. I’m not sure if there were

any others.

“Q. Okay. Did hearing that impact your ability to be a

fair and impartial juror in this case?

“A. No.

“Q. Do you have any safety concerns yourself?

“A. Not yet.

State v. Brown

“Q. And what do you mean by ‘not yet’?

“A. Nothing. I haven’t seen anything that makes me

concerned so far.

“Q. Do you have any concerns delivering your verdict,

whether it’s not guilty or guilty?

“A. No.

“Q. Do you believe that you can still keep an open mind

and decide the issues in this case based only on the evi-

dence presented here in court?

“A. Yes.

“Q. Is there anything at all, including this discussion,

that would affect your ability to be a fair and impartial

juror in this case and to follow my instructions?

“A. No.”

Based on those answers, defense counsel asked that

Juror 1 be excused, arguing that his answer of “not yet”

to the trial court’s question about safety concerns and

his “vivid recollection” of overhearing Juror 7’s concerns

demonstrated that he, too, must have concerns.

The trial court reserved decision on defense counsel’s

request and proceeded to canvass the remaining jurors.

They all indicated that they did not “have any conversa-

tions or overhear any conversations with any juror about

concerns about the trial, issues related to it or delivering

a verdict.” Each juror also indicated that there was not

“anything at all, including this discussion, that would

affect [the juror’s] ability to be a fair and impartial juror

and [to] follow the court’s instructions.” Jurors 3 and 6,

whom Juror 1 identified as having overheard Juror 7’s

safety concerns, both answered that they had not over-

heard any other juror’s concerns, that they could serve

fairly and impartially as jurors, and that they had no

safety concerns of their own. The court indicated that it

asked about the safety concerns of only these two jurors

because “the door was opened by Juror 1 on the issue . . . .”

State v. Brown

After the trial court’s canvass of the jury, defense

counsel renewed his motion for a mistrial, which is the

basis for the defendant’s claim on appeal. Defense counsel

argued that “the [canvass] process itself” made it impos-

sible for the remaining jurors to be fair and impartial,

and that Jurors 1, 3, and 6 should have been excused on

the ground that they may have overheard Juror 7’s con-

cerns. The trial court denied defense counsel’s motion,

explaining: “The court is satisfied that the approach that

it has taken today is the appropriate approach . . . . By

inquiring of each juror, I was able to perceive not only

their answers to my questions, but their demeanor. . . .

I am assured by Juror 7’s excus[al] from the jury that

this jury remains fair and impartial. . . . With regard

to [Jurors] 1, 3, and 6, I specifically inquired of those

individuals concerning safety concerns only because they

were the only individuals with any testimony concerning

any substantive answers other than ‘no’ to the questions

that I asked. And I’m assured by their answers that they

remain fair and impartial. Based on those observations

and their answers to my questions, which I do credit the

truthfulness of, the motion for a mistrial is denied, but

defense’s record is preserved for appeal, if appropriate.”

Having recounted the extensive record developed by

the trial court and by the parties, we turn to the appli-

cable standard of review. “In our review of the denial of

a motion for mistrial, we have recognized the broad dis-

cretion that is vested in the trial court to decide whether

an occurrence at trial has so prejudiced a party that he

or she can no longer receive a fair trial. The decision of

the trial court is therefore reversible on appeal only if

there has been an abuse of discretion. . . .

“Potential juror bias is considered akin to other mis-

conduct that similarly might affect a juror’s impartial-

ity, thus potentially violating a core requirement of the

right to trial by jury guaranteed by the constitution of

Connecticut, article first, § 8, and by the sixth amend-

ment to the United States constitution. . . . Judicial

inquiry into jury tampering is governed by the same

State v. Brown

standards as other possible instances of jury bias. . . .

Thus, [w]ith respect to allegations that a juror poten-

tially may be biased, [e]ven where a juror has formed

some preconceived opinion as to the guilt of an accused,

a juror is sufficiently impartial if he or she can set aside

that opinion and render a verdict based on evidence in

the case. . . . Only where a juror has indicated a refusal

to consider testimony and displayed evidence of a closed

mind concerning [the] defendant’s innocence can it be

said that [the court] abused its discretion in refusing

to [remove] a juror [from the panel]. . . . It is enough

if a juror is able to set aside any preconceived notions

and decide the case on the evidence presented and the

instructions given by the court. . . . While we recognize

that a juror’s assurances that he or she is equal to the

task are not dispositive of the rights of an accused . . . we

are aware of the broad discretion of a trial judge which

includes his determination of the credibility to be given

a juror’s statement in this context. . . .

“The trial court’s assessment of the juror’s assur-

ances, while entitled to deference, must be realistic and

informed by inquiries adequate in the context of the case

to ascertain the nature and import of any potential juror

bias. . . . The inquiry need not, however, be lengthy, so

long as the questions, viewed in the context of the juror’s

answers, are adequate for the trial court to determine

that the juror can indeed serve fairly and impartially. . . .

The nature and quality of the juror’s assurances [are] of

paramount importance; the juror must be unequivocal

about his or her ability to be fair and impartial.” (Cita-

tions omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Berrios, 320 Conn. 265, 274–76, 129 A.3d 696 (2016).

In Remmer v. United States, supra, 347 U.S. 229, the

United States Supreme Court held that certain forms of

jury tampering or interference create a presumption of

prejudice and require a new trial unless the state rebuts

this presumption. See State v. Berrios, supra, 320 Conn.

278–79. The Remmer presumption applies “to external

State v. Brown

interference with the jury’s deliberative process via

private communication, contact, or tampering with

jurors that relates directly to the matter being tried.”

(Footnote omitted.) Id., 292. “In determining whether

the presumption is triggered, we refer back to the factors

the Supreme Court deemed important . . . . Those factors

are: any private communication; any private contact;

any tampering; directly or indirectly with a juror during

trial; about the matter before the jury. . . . Put differ-

ently, the improper contact must pertain directly to the

merits of the matter, rather than merely relate to the trial

more topically.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Id., 292 n.25. “We emphasize, however,

that the burden remains on the defendant to show prima

facie entitlement to the Remmer presumption; evidence,

rather than speculation, is required to shift the burden

of proof to the state.” Id., 293.

We first address the defendant’s argument that he is

entitled to a presumption of prejudice under Remmer

and Berrios. The defendant argues that, due to Juror

7’s alleged safety concerns “arising from the ominous

interactions [with] the trial attendee” as she walked to

her car, as well as “the knock-on effect that interaction

and the fear it inspired had on (at least) Jurors [1, 3, and

6], [and] the likelihood that other jurors observed some

of the same behaviors or forces,” he is entitled to the

Remmer presumption of prejudice. We are not persuaded.

A threshold requirement for invoking the Remmer

presumption of prejudice is that “the improper [juror]

contact . . . pertain directly to the merits of the matter,

rather than merely relate to the trial more topically.”

State v. Berrios, supra, 320 Conn. 292 n.25. Here, the

defendant has made no such showing. Indeed, the only

inference of interference or tampering that the defendant

unearthed in the trial court’s exhaustive review of this

issue was a juror who felt that one or more trial attend-

ees watched her walk to her car, before or after one of

these attendees commented on her coat. We observe that

Juror 7 denied ever having or expressing any concerns

State v. Brown

about her safety, Juror 1 was the only juror who testi-

fied that Juror 7 had expressed such a concern, the trial

court made no finding that threatening or intimidating

conduct had occurred, and Juror 7 was excused because of

her own conduct rather than because of any such efforts

at intimidation. For these reasons, the defendant has

not “show[n] prima facie entitlement to the Remmer

presumption . . . .” Id., 293.

Having declined to apply the Remmer presumption, we

now consider the defendant’s claim that the trial court

abused its discretion by not granting defense counsel’s

motion for a mistrial and by not excusing Jurors 1, 3,

and 6. We first address the defendant’s argument that

the trial court erred in declining to grant the motion

for a mistrial and hold that the court did not abuse its

discretion by denying that motion. Indeed, having repro-

duced the record development efforts of the trial court

at great length in this opinion, we conclude that it care-

fully considered the gravity of the defendant’s claim

and that it proceeded with great care. At the outset, the

trial court sought to make an accurate record of Juror

7’s initial interactions with court staff and the nature

of her safety concerns. It then accommodated defense

counsel’s request to “order [Juror 7] to sit in that chair

and [to] testify,” which revealed that Juror 7 was not

forthcoming in open court about her safety concerns.

The court then excused Juror 7 and sought defense coun-

sel’s input on the canvass questions. After completing

the full jury canvass, the trial court observed that it

was satisfied that, during the canvass, it “was able to

perceive not only [the jurors’] answers to [its] questions,

but their demeanor.” No other jurors stated that they

had safety concerns. We conclude that the trial court’s

inquiry was “realistic and informed by inquiries adequate

in the context of the case to ascertain the nature and

import of any potential juror bias” and that each juror

was “unequivocal about his or her ability to be fair and

impartial.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Berrios, supra, 320 Conn. 275–76.

State v. Brown

We next address the defendant’s argument that the

trial court abused its discretion by declining, at a mini-

mum, to excuse Jurors 1, 3, and 6. Regarding Jurors 3

and 6, it is speculative for the defendant to claim that

those jurors had safety concerns despite their unequivo-

cal testimony to the contrary. Once Juror 1 testified that

Jurors 3 and 6 had overheard Juror 7’s safety concerns,

the court balanced the need to sufficiently canvass Jurors

3 and 6 against the risk of creating new safety concerns

through its questioning. In response to the court’s ques-

tions, Jurors 3 and 6 unequivocally stated that they did

not overhear other jurors’ concerns, that they could be

fair and impartial, and that they had no safety concerns

of their own. That is, despite Juror 1’s testimony, the

canvasses of Jurors 3 and 6 revealed no hint of concern.

Even if there were a nonspeculative reason to think that

Jurors 3 and 6 lied under oath and did, indeed, harbor

safety concerns, the trial court, which had the unique

opportunity to observe the two jurors and to make cred-

ibility determinations, did not abuse its discretion in

resolving this issue through a meticulous and exhaustive

canvassing process.

Similarly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in declining to excuse Juror 1. The defendant makes two

arguments regarding Juror 1. First, he argues that,

because Juror 1 answered “[n]ot yet” when asked if he

had safety concerns, and because he said that nothing

made him concerned “so far,” the trial court should have

considered these answers to be equivocal and should have

excused Juror 1. Specifically, the defendant contends

that these “equivocal answers communicated the trou-

bling message that Juror 1 at the very least anticipated

having reason to fear for his safety as a result of his jury

service.” We disagree. The court reasonably understood

these answers to communicate that, at the time of ques-

tioning, Juror 1 did not have any safety concerns, as

there is nothing in the record to indicate that Juror 1

“anticipated” any safety concerns in the future, and his

answers concerned only the present moment. Further-

more, Juror 1 unequivocally told the court that nothing

State v. Brown

that had happened, including the court’s questioning,

affected his ability to keep an open mind, to decide the

case solely on the basis of the evidence presented at trial,

to follow the court’s instructions, to be a fair and impar-

tial juror, or to deliver a verdict, regardless of whether

that verdict was guilty or not guilty. Overall, the record

reflects that the trial court undertook the necessary

inquiry and found no signs of equivocation.

Second, the defendant contends, without reference to

any record evidence, that Juror 1 subjectively believed

that the trial court cajoled him into disavowing his safety

concerns.2 For this reason, the defendant argues, the

court should have recognized Juror 1’s supposed per-

ception that he was under duress, interpreted Juror 1’s

unequivocal answers as, in fact, equivocal for this reason,

and excused Juror 1 for cause. This argument is specula-

tive and without merit. We conclude that the trial court

did not abuse its discretion in any of the proceedings or

rulings concerning the juror canvass.

II

We next address the defendant’s claim that the pros-

ecutor committed two instances of prosecutorial impro-

priety during the questioning of witnesses, such that

the state deprived the defendant of his constitutional

right to a fair trial. The defendant argues that, when

the prosecutor attempted to refresh Harris’ recollection

of his disavowed sworn statement to the police by read-

ing him each sentence of the statement at trial, it was

improper for the prosecutor to read a sentence containing

“word on the street” hearsay that the defendant shot the

victim. The state responds that asking Harris whether

2

Specifically, the defendant asserts: “The subsequent questions were

clearly understood by Juror 1 as an opportunity to clean up his honest

(but apparently ‘wrong,’ to the court) equivocal answers. . . . On the

third try, he finally gave what he perceived to be the answer the court

was looking for: an unequivocal ‘no’—not ‘[n]ot yet,’ not ‘nothing . . .

so far,’ his first two answers. That sequence of equivocations followed

by Juror 1’s apparent attempt to tell the court what he assumed it

wanted to hear cannot withstand the scrutiny this court must give

those responses.”

State v. Brown

he recalls this sentence from his prior sworn statement

cannot constitute prosecutorial impropriety because it

was a single question asked by counsel, there was no prior

order prohibiting reference to this hearsay statement,

and defense counsel did not contemporaneously object,

even though he must have known that Harris’ entire

prior sworn statement would be read aloud.

Separately, the defendant also argues that it was

improper for the prosecutor to impeach Rosado’s credibil-

ity at trial by recounting the circumstances of Rosado’s

arrest pursuant to a capias warrant.3 Relevant to this

argument is that Rosado told his associates to “pack

the courtroom” as he was being arrested. The defendant

contends that this statement, once read into the record,

served “the wholly improper purpose of inflaming the

emotions, prejudices, and fears of the jurors” given the

trial court’s recent resolution of possible juror safety

concerns. The state responds that the prosecutor had

a good faith basis to pursue a line of questioning that

would undermine Rosado’s credibility and that, after

defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s line of

questioning, counsel extensively cross-examined Rosado

on the same topic.

The following additional facts and procedural history

are relevant to our resolution of the defendant’s claim

regarding Harris. As previously discussed, Harris, a

member of Sandz-Bridge, provided a sworn statement

to the police that the defendant spat at him during the

concert and that he was walking with the victim after

the concert when the shooting occurred. When called to

testify as a witness for the state during trial on March

2, 2023, Harris disavowed this sworn statement but

acknowledged that it bore his signature. When the pros-

ecutor subsequently sought to treat Harris as a hostile

witness, defense counsel objected, arguing that there

3

“A capias is a vehicle to compel attendance at a judicial proceeding.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Myers v. Commissioner of Correc-

tion, 215 Conn. App. 592, 598 n.2, 284 A.3d 309 (2022), cert. denied,

346 Conn. 1021, 293 A.3d 897 (2023), and cert. denied sub nom. Myers

v. State, 346 Conn. 1021, 293 A.3d 897 (2023).

State v. Brown

was not an adequate foundation. The prosecutor then

indicated that he would lay a foundation by attempting

to refresh Harris’ recollection of his statement, “line by

line.” This questioning proceeded through each sentence

of Harris’ statement.

Once the prosecutor reached the sentence containing

the hearsay at issue, he attempted to refresh Harris’

recollection in the same manner as with the other sen-

tences in Harris’ prior sworn statement. The prosecutor,

referring to the defendant as “Decky” and to the victim

as “Kenny,” asked: “Do you recall saying, ‘I had heard

from people that word on the street was that Decky was

the guy who shot Kenny?’” Over no contemporaneous

objection by defense counsel, Harris responded that he

did not remember this sentence of his sworn statement,

just as he did not remember the other sentences.

After the prosecutor attempted to refresh Harris’ rec-

ollection of each remaining sentence of his sworn state-

ment, defense counsel asked the trial court to excuse the

jury and Harris. Once they left the courtroom, defense

counsel stated that, although he had not wanted to draw

the jury’s attention to the hearsay statement by con-

temporaneously objecting, he believed that the hearsay

statement was prejudicial to the defendant. He further

indicated that, if the prosecutor “continue[d] with this,”

he would “have to contemplate whether . . . to move for

a mistrial,” ultimately asking that both the prosecutor’s

question and Harris’ answer be stricken. The prosecu-

tor responded that defense counsel did not object to the

question when it was asked and that striking the ques-

tion and answer—after Harris denied remembering the

sentence—would risk the impression that the prosecutor

“made something up and put it in the statement.”

The prosecutor suggested to the trial court that,

because he would eventually offer Harris’ entire dis-

avowed sworn statement as substantive evidence pursu-

ant to State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753, 513 A.2d 86,

cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d

598 (1986), the court could give a limiting instruction

State v. Brown

regarding the hearsay sentence or redact it from the

Whelan statement once the statement was admitted into

evidence. The court asked defense counsel how he would

prefer to proceed, and counsel indicated that the best

approach would be to remind the jury that questions by

counsel are not evidence. The court instructed the jury

accordingly.

At the beginning of the next day of trial, the trial court

ordered that, if a similar situation arose concerning

hearsay statements in a prior sworn statement that the

prosecutor planned to admit under Whelan, the pros-

ecutor may not refer to those hearsay statements. The

prosecutor did not violate this order and did not refer

to Harris’ “word on the street” hearsay sentence again.

Ultimately, when the court admitted Harris’ prior sworn

statement as substantive evidence under Whelan, the

state redacted the hearsay sentence at issue.

We begin with the applicable standard of review. “[A]

claim of prosecutorial impropriety, even in the absence of

an objection, has constitutional implications and requires

a due process analysis under State v. Williams, 204 Conn.

523, 535–40, 529 A.2d 653 (1987). . . . In analyzing

claims of prosecutorial impropriety, we engage in a two

step process. . . . First, we must determine whether any

impropriety in fact occurred; second, we must examine

whether that impropriety, or the cumulative effect of

multiple improprieties, deprived the defendant of his due

process right to a fair trial.” (Citation omitted; footnote

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Sullivan, 351 Conn. 798, 809–10, 334 A.3d 446 (2025).

Prosecutorial improprieties may occur during the exami-

nation of any witness. See, e.g., State v. Warholic, 278

Conn. 354, 380, 897 A.2d 569 (2006). They “may be so

clearly inflammatory as to be incapable of correction

by action of the court. . . . In such instances there is a

reasonable possibility that the improprieties . . . either

contributed to the jury’s verdict of guilty or, negatively,

foreclosed the jury from ever considering the possibility

of acquittal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

State v. Brown

“[W]e note that the defendant’s failure to object at

trial to each of the occurrences that he now raises as

instances of prosecutorial impropriety, though relevant

to our inquiry, is not fatal to review of his claims. . . . This

does not mean, however, that the absence of an objection

at trial does not play a significant role in the determina-

tion of whether the challenged statements were, in fact,

improper. . . . To the contrary, we continue to adhere to

the well established maxim that defense counsel’s failure

to object to the prosecutor’s argument when it was made

suggests that defense counsel did not believe that it was

[improper] in light of the record of the case at the time.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Taft, 306

Conn. 749, 762, 51 A.3d 988 (2012).

To resolve the defendant’s claim that it was improper

for the prosecutor to ask a question of Harris that con-

tained a hearsay statement from Harris’ prior sworn

statement, “we must [first] determine whether any

impropriety in fact occurred . . . .” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Sullivan, supra, 351 Conn. 810.

In contending that this question of Harris constituted

prosecutorial impropriety, the defendant primarily anal-

ogizes this case to State v. McLaren, 127 Conn. App. 70,

15 A.3d 183 (2011). McLaren is, however, distinguish-

able from the present case. In McLaren, the Appellate

Court concluded that prosecutorial impropriety occurred

when the prosecutor, during both cross-examination and

rebuttal closing argument, referred to an inculpatory

out-of-court statement that the trial court previously had

excluded from evidence, even by reference, by granting a

motion in limine. See id., 80–82. The prosecutor’s viola-

tion of the trial court’s order was, for that reason alone,

prosecutorial impropriety. See id., 81. The Appellate

Court in McLaren also held that “[i]t was improper for

the prosecutor to ask about a specific inculpatory com-

ment found in the police report and again refer to that

comment during closing rebuttal argument because the

police report was not in evidence, it was never offered as

an exhibit, [the declarant] did not testify, and there was

State v. Brown

nothing in the record that substantiated the content of

[the declarant’s] statement.” Id., 82.

Here, the prosecutor violated no order of the trial court

by asking Harris whether he authored the hearsay sen-

tence in his prior sworn statement, and the prosecutor did

not attempt to use the hearsay sentence as substantive

evidence. The ostensible purpose for asking Harris about

the hearsay sentence was to lay a foundation for treat-

ing Harris as a hostile witness and to provide a basis for

admitting Harris’ prior sworn statement under Whelan.

Once the trial court ordered the prosecutor not to refer to

the hearsay sentence again, he complied with this order,

neither using the statement as substantive evidence nor

referring to it at any point in time thereafter. See, e.g.,

State v. Garcia, 7 Conn. App. 367, 374, 509 A.2d 31

(1986) (“[t]here were no attempts by the prosecutor to

‘hammer’ home his point to the jury, nor did he make

repeated efforts to introduce inadmissible evidence”).

Accordingly, under the circumstances of this case, we

find no prosecutorial impropriety with respect to this

single question.4

4

Although the alleged impropriety was indeed a single question—as

the state’s counsel stressed at oral argument—this fact does not auto-

matically render the prosecutor’s conduct proper. “As this court has

often emphasized, a prosecutor is not only an officer of the court, like

every attorney, but is also a high public officer, representing the people

of the [s]tate, who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for

the innocent. . . . A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of

justice and not simply that of an advocate.” (Citations omitted; empha-

sis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sullivan,

supra, 351 Conn. 811. It may be true that the prosecutor read Harris’

prior sworn statement aloud for the sake of laying a foundation to

treat Harris as a hostile witness, but there was no need to read every

single sentence of Harris’ statement in the presence of the jury. Just

as the prosecutor argued that defense counsel must have known that

the hearsay sentence would be read into the record as part of reading

Harris’ entire prior sworn statement, so, too, must the prosecutor have

known his own line of questioning. The “word on the street” hearsay

contained in the prosecutor’s question, suggesting that it was common

knowledge within the community that the defendant shot the victim,

relates to the ultimate issue of guilt in the defendant’s murder trial.

In this specific case, the prosecutor’s conduct in asking this question

State v. Brown

We now turn to the defendant’s claim of prosecuto-

rial impropriety concerning Rosado’s testimony. The

following additional facts and procedural history are

relevant to this separate, alleged instance of prosecutorial

impropriety that occurred later in the defendant’s trial.

Rosado was an eyewitness who provided a sworn state-

ment to the police that he witnessed the fatal shooting at

issue in this case. Rosado was subpoenaed to testify at the

defendant’s trial but failed to comply with the subpoena.

He was thereafter arrested on a capias warrant to compel

his appearance. Rosado testified on March 10, 2023,

following the trial court’s jury canvass. During direct

examination, the prosecutor asked: “Yesterday, when

you were taken into custody by some of the officers and

inspectors . . . why were you yelling to the group to ‘pack

the courtroom?’” Rosado denied making this statement,

although he acknowledged that he was arrested in the

presence of his friends. After Rosado denied that any of

his “Sandz friends” were present in the courtroom, the

prosecutor asked him whether “[a]nybody that you would

call ‘your boys’ [is] in the courtroom?” Rosado answered:

“Yeah. Some of them [are] here.” The prosecutor also

asked Rosado what “signal” he “flashed” to the gallery

when he took the stand. Rosado responded that he was

greeting his mother. Defense counsel did not object to

any of these questions.

On cross-examination, defense counsel also asked

Rosado about the circumstances of his capias arrest.

Rosado told the jury that, during his arrest, “about

fifteen officers” blocked his car, drew their guns, pulled

him out of his car, put him in handcuffs, and “threw”

him into a police cruiser. Later during cross-examination,

defense counsel asked Rosado if he would be surprised

to learn that police reports describing his capias arrest

did not mention that any guns were drawn. After some

clarification of the question, Rosado responded: “Oh.

Nah. They put what they want to put [i]n them reports.”

may not have been improper, but it is still too close a call from a high

public officer for us to endorse.

State v. Brown

On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked Rosado

whether he had previously told the police that he carries

a gun because he is a witness in this case. Rosado denied

that he had told the police that he carries a gun or that

he was worried about being a “snitch” but admitted that

he had told the police that he would not testify.

We evaluate the defendant’s claim regarding Rosado

pursuant to the same legal standard governing prosecuto-

rial impropriety that we previously set forth. Addition-

ally, relevant to this issue, “[i]t is well established that a

prosecutor should not appeal to the emotions, passions

and prejudices of the jurors. . . . [S]uch appeals should

be avoided because they have the effect of diverting the

[jurors’] attention from their duty to decide the case on

the evidence. . . . When the prosecutor appeals to emo-

tions, he invites the jury to decide the case, not according

to a rational appraisal of the evidence, but on the basis of

powerful and irrelevant factors [that] are likely to skew

that appraisal. . . . It must be acknowledged that the line

between comments that risk invoking the passions and

prejudices of the jurors and those that are permissible

rhetorical flourishes is not always easy to draw. The more

closely the comments are connected to relevant facts

disclosed by the evidence, however, the more likely they

will be deemed permissible. . . . By contrast, statements

that have no reasonable connection to evidence offered

or issues presented in a case are more likely to be deemed

improper.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) State v. Sullivan, supra, 351 Conn. 812.

The defendant argues that the prosecutor’s impeach-

ment of Rosado was for “the wholly improper purpose

of inflaming the emotions, prejudices, and fears of the

jurors.” We disagree. Given that Rosado disavowed his

prior sworn statement that he had witnessed the fatal

shooting, it was not improper to undermine his cur-

rent testimony by impeaching him as someone who had

changed his story to spread the word that he was not a

snitch. The prosecutor’s questions about Rosado’s non-

compliance with his trial subpoena, Rosado’s statement

State v. Brown

to investigators that he carried a gun because he was

labeled a “snitch” for giving his prior sworn statement,

Rosado’s telling his associates to “pack the courtroom,”

and Rosado’s potentially signaling to people he knows

in the courtroom are all lines of questioning that were

permissible to discredit Rosado’s lack of recollection.

Further, defense counsel questioned Rosado about the

circumstances of his arrest at least as extensively as

the prosecutor did. Defense counsel’s own elicitation of

Rosado’s testimony “suggests that defense counsel did

not believe that it was [improper] in light of the record

of the case at the time.” (Internal quotation marks omit-

ted.) State v. Taft, supra, 306 Conn. 762. Accordingly,

we conclude that there was no prosecutorial impropriety

in this case.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

State v. Brown

State v. Brown