Opinion

Klein

Court: United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Michigan
Filed: May 15, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 40.6%

court found that debtor fraudulently obtained a loan from his mother-in-law by intentionally failing to disclose his deteriorating relationship with his wife

How later courts described this case

court found that debtor fraudulently obtained a loan from his mother-in-law by intentionally failing to disclose his deteriorating relationship with his wife
plaintiff relying on defendant’s honesty does not satisfy the reasonable reliance standard under §523(a)(2)(A)
the failure to disclose a material fact can form the basis of either a material misrepresentation or false pretense
the degree of care necessary to show reliance is that degree of care which would be exercised in an average business transaction by parties under similar circumstances

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN

SOUTHERN DIVISION-FLINT

In re:

Case No. 25-30026-jda

RONALD NEWMAN, Hon. Joel D. Applebaum

Chapter 7

Debtor.

___________________________________/

WILLIAM KLEIN,

Plaintiff,

v. Adv. Pro. 25-3036

RONALD NEWMAN,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

OPINION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF

This matter is before the Court on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by

defendant Ronald Newman (“Defendant” or “Newman”). For the reasons explained

below, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED as to Count I

(breach of contract) and Count III (violation of the Michigan Vehicle Service and

Repair Act “MVSRA”) of the complaint filed by plaintiff William Klein (“Plaintiff”

or “Klein”). This Court GRANTS summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff on Count

II (conversion under § 523(a)(6)) and Count IV (fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A)) of his

complaint. The Court will hold a telephonic pretrial conference on June 17, 2026 at

11:00 a.m. EDT to discuss next steps and to schedule a trial on the sole issue of non-

dischargeable damages.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff purchased a 1999 International 4700 truck to earn income by hauling

vehicles and campers across the country. The truck, however, was designated a farm

grade vehicle and, therefore, needed various upgrades to pass a State of Michigan

Department of Transportation (“DOT”) road-worthiness inspection before Plaintiff

could use it on State highways.

Sometime prior to July 13, 2022, Plaintiff performed an online search for a

mechanic to perform these necessary upgrades. Plaintiff’s search led him to

Defendant and, on July 13, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant began texting each other

about the job. (Dkt. 21, text messages). During these communications, they agreed

that Defendant would obtain the necessary parts and make the upgrades for $3,600.

Defendant assured Plaintiff that he could get the truck ready to pass a DOT

inspection and that he could complete the work in about one week. (Dkt. 21, text

messages, p. 18). Plaintiff and Defendant did not have a formal written contract.

Rather, contractual terms were embedded in a lengthy series of text messages

between Plaintiff and Defendant and Plaintiff and Elisabeth Spencer of LRS Truck

Restoration, a company allegedly owned by Newman. Defendant has not argued

that an enforceable contract was not created, but only that the contract was not

breached by Defendant or, if it was breached, that such breaches do not render

Plaintiff’s claims non-dischargeable.

Before delivering his truck to Defendant, Plaintiff had ATS Fleet Service, a

truck service company unrelated to either Plaintiff or Defendant, to perform a DOT

inspection. On July 19, 2022, ATS Fleet Service provided Plaintiff with its service

report listing the necessary repairs required to pass inspection. Specifically, the

service report stated:

Performed federal annual DOT inspection and truck failed. Made list

of needed repairs and recommendations for customer. Check and

recharge A/C system. Found no leaks with vacuum. Charge A/C with

dye. System will need ran and please inform us of any noticed leaks

and exposed dye. Found button to turn on compressor is not working

correctly. Set up tuner and send files out to pathhungry per customer

request. Received files and followed procedures to tune the PCM. Put

250 HP tune in it and drove. Runs good.

(Dkt. 22, Ex. 4).1

On or about August 8, 2022, Defendant and Plaintiff first met in Farwell,

Michigan. Defendant arrived at this meeting driving a large service mechanic’s

truck for Flory Line Construction. According to Plaintiff, Defendant claimed that

he owned the truck, that he leased it to Flory Line Construction, and that he worked

1 All spelling, grammar, and punctuation in all quotations are as they appear in the

original.

for them as a subcontracted mechanic.2 Defendant also claimed to be trying to build

up his business, LRS Truck Restoration, located at 10637 S. Lewis Road, Clio,

Michigan. The Lewis Road address housed many vehicles which Defendant claimed

were all or mostly owned by him and which were either going to be fixed and sold

or dismantled and used for parts.

On October 9, 2022, Plaintiff dropped off his truck at the Lewis Road property

where Defendant was to provide the parts and perform the necessary upgrades.

On October 13, 2022, Elisabeth Spencer, an agent and director of LRS Truck

Restoration, text messaged Plaintiff to confirm the work to be performed. (Dkt. 23,

Ex. 6, p.1). In this text stream, Spencer asked Plaintiff for a copy of whatever

proposal Defendant had provided to Plaintiff. Plaintiff responded that Defendant

did not provide him with a written proposal, stating:

Don’t think it was a text. Just in conversation. Was swap rear end with

air, new gear and compressor. Also, extra fuel tank. I supplied the leaf

springs bushings, shocks and have pads for front. Said since I am

giving him calipers and brake parts for the rear end he is keeping, he

will supply new one he is putting in or at least pass his DOT inspection.

Quoted $3600 for that work. . . Only other thing was he was trying to

find different rims.

2 Although Defendant denied this allegation (Dkt. 7, ¶ 43), for the reasons set forth

in endnote 1, the Court finds that Defendant is not a credible or reliable source of

information.

(Dkt. 23, Ex. 6 p. 1). Spencer then responded, “Okay. I’ll go over it and have Ron

get a hold of you tomorrow to make sure we have what was discussed correct . . . .”

Id.

Based on Defendant’s assurances that he could complete the job in about one

week, Plaintiff entered a “lease to own” trailer agreement so that he could begin

hauling freight as soon as the necessary upgrades were completed.

On February 17, 2023, four months after Plaintiff left his truck in the care of

Defendant and after many inquiries about the status of his truck, Plaintiff sent the

Defendant the following text:

I am giving it until Friday next week to be done, by done I mean rear

end install with dump value and gage in cab, driveshaft installed,

battery box and everything else buttoned up and DOT passable and

inspected like you told me repeatedly you would do. I will finish

cutting down frame and have a licensed mechanic finish everything else

that you told me you would do all along. With that I will pay the agreed

amount, but if it isn’t done then we have two choices.

1. You buy the truck as is for the $16,000 I paid for it and we call it

done, or

2. I report you and your business and you personally to the state and

we end up in court. I really do not want to do either of those, but

can not wait for you any longer. You call me and start screaming

and yelling again and we jump straight to number 1 or 2. So unless

you can be reasonable and rational when we talk, do not call thinking

you are going to yell again.

(Dkt. 21, text messages, p. 79).

Defendant responded:

I just read ur text. I get hold of u tomorrow after after I get back from

Martin got truck on side of road need to get back here I’ll give u a plan

over the phone. And if ur don’t want to do that then ur more then

welcome to try a law due. But number 1 is not gonna happen that truck

ain’t worth more then 3 or 4 grand total. If u paid that no wonder ur

broke. I won’t even consider that at all. Have good evening shouldn’t

be no later than 1 or 2. That give u time to set up a recording of the

conversation. But I’m not agreeing to that so it won’t be legal so don’t

try it. I m very well at knowing with what is legal. Have good evening.

(Dkt. 21, text messages, p. 80). The text messages between the parties continued

with the Plaintiff wanting to pick up the truck in the condition in which he left it and

with the Defendant warning Plaintiff not to come onto his property. Plaintiff then

stated:

You have until Sunday to finish the truck and I will still pay, but not

paying before its done. I can even take the driveshaft and get it done

so you don’t have to pay for it and I can have it done in about 48 hours.

(Id., at p. 85). Many of the pages of text messages show a frustrated Plaintiff trying

to get Defendant to either complete the job or return the truck, (Id. at pp. 85-97),

neither of which occurred.

Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant with the State

of Michigan, Business Compliance and Regulation Division, seeking its help to get

his truck back. Plaintiff’s complaint stated:

guy appeared professional, but has a person that isnt qualified working

on my truck and the job I was told would take 4 to 5 days to complete

has been almost 4 months. he has refused to ever give me an invoice

about work to perform or price in writing. now he refuses to finish the

work, but is telling me if I want my truck back I have to pay more than

the original agreement or I wont get my truck back. Ron who claims he

can have anyone he wants to work on my truck as long as he checks it

later. he now will not guarantee any work and scream at me that he

doesnt care what the rules are from the state because he can do what he

wants and at one point threatened to delete my truck so I cant drive it if

I dont pay and cant have the truck until I do.

(Dkt. 19, Ex. 1).

In a text message sent shortly after Plaintiff filed his complaint with the State,

Defendant menacingly wrote, “U had the option, U never will make it as a truck

drive or owner. Watch.” (Dkt. 21, Ex. 3, text messages, p. 114).

On March 23, 2023, the State of Michigan, Business Compliance and

Regulation Division issued a Temporary Order to Cease and Desist (the “Cease and

Desist Order”) to LRS Truck Restoration, LLC ordering it to stop operating a vehicle

repair facility. The Cease and Desist Order further stated, in part, that:

• on February 28, 2023, a State Investigator had arrived at the Lewis

Road address and interviewed Jeffrey Brady, an unlicensed mechanic

who worked for LRS;

• Brady told the State Investigator that he and Ronald Newman had been

working on a truck for Klein;

• on March 2, 2023, the State Investigator spoke with Newman by

telephone and confirmed that Newman was performing major

automotive repairs for Bill Klein, that Newman is not a state certified

mechanic and that neither Newman nor LRS is licensed.

(Dkt. 19, documents related to State investigation).

A copy of the Cease and Desist Order, along with the State Investigator’s business

card, was posted at the Lewis Road address on March 28, 2023. On March 30, 2023,

Defendant called the State Investigator with questions about the Order. (Dkt. 19, Ex.

1, Investigator’s Notes).

The State Investigator wrote up a narrative of his findings which states, in

part:

. . . Bill [Klein] stated that he located Ron [Newman] on-line and met

Ron who was driving a large truck. Bill stated the truck made it look

like Ron was legit. Bill took his vehicle to Ron and dropped it off. I

have been to the property which does not contain any type of signage

indicating that there is a business at the location going by the name of

LRS Truck Restoration. . . Bill stated he has asked Ron about his license

after dropping off the truck and the fact that Ron has a guy by the name

of Jeff working on his truck. Ron told Bill that he can have anyone

complete the repairs as long as Ron inspects the repair once completed.

Bill stated he talked with Jeff who told Bill that he really doesn’t know

what he is doing when it comes to the repair of the truck. . . Jeff is not

a certified mechanic. . . Bill stated had he known that the repair facility

was not properly licensed he would not have taken his truck there. . .

Ron is not a certified mechanic, and the company does not hold a valid

repair facility license. . .

I did make contact with Ronald Newman by phone. . . Ron stated that

Bill made contact with him wanting Ron to perform repairs on his

international truck. . . Ron said he has called Bill and told him that he

needs to pay for the repairs before Ron will finish the repair. . . I asked

Ron if he is a state certified mechanic and he stated he is not. . . Ron

tried to tell me that he was not completing repairs for the public. I again

told Ron that he is completing repairs for Bill on a truck that Ron does

not own, and he is charging Bill for the repairs. Ron tried to tell me

that he is only charging Bill for parts and that Bill is installing the parts

not him and Jeff . . .

On 02/28/2023 I did arrive at the location of Bill’s truck. When I

arrived, I made contact with Jeffrey Brady. . . Jeff said that Ron sold

Bill the parts to make the system full air ride and Jeff and Ron have

been installing them. I asked Jeff if Bill performed any of the repairs.

Jeff said that Bill never helped it has been just him and Ron. Jeff stated

Ron told Bill un [sic] front the cost and now that they are almost done

Bill does not have the money and wants to make payments for the

repairs. Jeff stated he knows that Ron and Bill have been arguing over

the payment. Jeff stated that the truck just needs a drive shaft and it

will be done. . .

(Dkt. 19, Ex. 1, Investigation Findings).3

The State Investigator also produced a list of Defendant’s violations of the

applicable State regulations, including:

Violation: F15-257.1307(d)

Description: Failed to reveal a material fact to a customer

Note: Ronald Newman failed to reveal to Bill Klein that the

facility and himself were not properly licensed

(Dkt. 19, Ex. 1, Violations).4

3 Although the State Investigator’s narrative in the report is not dated, the Report

indicates “Report Generated Date: 26-March-2025.”

4 Although the State Investigator referenced MCL 257.1307(d) as the statute

violated, it is unclear whether the basis is MVSRA 25.1307(d) or (e) or both.

MVSRA 257.1307 states, in relevant part:

257.1307 Prohibited conduct. Sec.1.

On June 26, 2023, Plaintiff, still not in possession of his truck, filed a

complaint for breach of contract against Defendant in Tuscola County Circuit Court,

seeking damages in the amount of $167,826.31 because of Defendant’s failure to

complete the upgrades in a timely manner. (Dkt. No. 17, Ex. E, Brief, p. 3).5

On June 10, 2024, Defendant filed his amended answer to the state court

complaint, asserting that Plaintiff failed to pay for parts he installed.

The case was scheduled for trial to begin on January 9, 2025. On January 8,

2025, Defendant filed his bankruptcy petition and, as a result, the state court action

was stayed.

A motor vehicle repair facility that is subject to this act, or a person that

is an owner or operator of a motor vehicle repair facility that is subject

to this act, shall not, directly or through an agent or employee, do any

of the following:

* * *

(d) Make, either written or orally, an untrue or misleading

statement of a material fact to a customer.

(e) Fail to reveal a material fact to a customer that the customer

could not reasonably know if that omission tends to mislead or

deceive the customer.

5 This amount includes the lost value of the truck ($13,500.00), the parts purchased

for the truck ($400), insurance premiums paid ($1,500.00), lease payments for the

trailer ($10,867.95), lost income ($135,471.00), and the increase in the cost to obtain

a Class A commercial driver’s license ($4,600.00).

On May 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed his pro se adversary complaint seeking to

determine that his claim against Defendant is non-dischargeable. The complaint

contains four counts: Count I - Breach of Contract; Count II - Conversion; Count III

- Violation of the MVSRA (MCL 257.1301); and Count IV - Fraud under

§523(a)(2)(A). The factual basis underlying the complaint is that Plaintiff’s injuries

were caused because Defendant held himself out to be a licensed mechanic when he

was not, did not complete the agreed-upon repairs, damaged Plaintiff’s truck, refused

to relinquish possession of the truck, and improperly removed truck components

belonging to Plaintiff for Defendant’s personal use.

On June 30, 2025, Defendant filed his answer to the complaint. Defendant

states that he did not release the truck because Plaintiff failed to pay him for the

parts.

After recovering his truck from Defendant in September 2025, Plaintiff had

the truck towed to ATS Fleet Service to assess its condition and the cost to repair. 6

On September 23, 2025, ATS Fleet Service issued its report with the following

notes:

Inspect truck that was towed into shop. Found coolant was empty.

Appears to be leaking from radiator. Radiator and CAC looked

damaged and in poor condition. Missing fuel filter. Multiple broken and

6 While it is unclear when Klein recovered his truck, Klein likely had his truck

towed directly from Newman’s location to ATS Fleet sometime before ATS Fleet

issued its second evaluation of the truck on September 23, 2025.

missing manifold bolts. Missing D/S fuel cell and batteries along with

battery tray. Several wiring connections are unplugged and harness

plugs are unpinned. Has fuel in P/S tank but has sediment in bottom of

tank. Air compressor not hooked up and no air tank on truck. Unable to

source wiring schematic to determine how to plug wiring back into

harness plugs. Each wire would need figured and OHMED to source.

Unable to complete any repairs due to condition of truck nor are we

able to source schematics needed. Our opinion is the repairs needed

would far supersede the value of truck.

(Dkt. 22, Ex. 4). Attached to this inspection report is a partially illegible handwritten

list of repairs needed:

1. Drive axle brakes and rotors. Probably will need brake calipers

2. Wire not secured on frame, steer axle spring [can’t read handwriting]

and [??], steer axle shocks

3. Tire rods and tube

4. No reflective tape of on top of cab

5. No reflective tape on back of [??]/mud flaps

6. Mud flaps not secured properly

Id.

On November 25, 2025, Defendant filed his Motion for Summary Judgment

arguing that Plaintiff cannot establish the required elements under §§ 523(a)(2) and

(a)(6) (Counts II and IV) and that Counts I and III (breach of contract and violation

of the MVSRA) do not support a finding of non-dischargeability as a matter of law.

Defendant attached the following exhibits to his Motion:

Exhibit A: Klein’s State Court Complaint for breach of Contract dated June

26, 2023;

Exhibit B: Newman’s Amended Answer dated June 10, 2024;

Exhibit C: State Investigator findings, report generated on March 26, 2025;

Exhibit D: Klein’s State Court Motion to Strike Newman’s Answer and

Brief filed November 17, 2023; and

Exhibit E: Klein’s State Court Brief with attached text messages between

Klein and Newman from July 13, 2022 to April 12, 2023.

On January 7, 2026, Plaintiff filed his response and brief in opposition to

Defendant’s Motion. (Dkt. 18). Along with his response brief, Plaintiff filed the

following exhibits:

Exhibit 1: Cease and Desist Order and related documents (Dkt. 19);

Exhibit 2: portions of the MVSRA and the Motor Vehicle Code (Dkt. 20);

Exhibit 3: 123 pages of text messages between Klein and Newman from

July 13, 2022 to April 12, 2023 (Dkt. 21);

Exhibit 4: truck and parts related documents including loan and purchase

documents, documents relating to obtaining a commercial

driver’s license, and a list of repairs needed as of July 19, 2022

and a list of repairs needed as of September 23, 2025 (Dkt. 22);

Exhibit 5: copy of the state court complaint and answer (Dkt. 23);

Exhibit 6: text messages with Elisabeth Spencer from October 13, 2022 to

March 15, 2023 (Dkt. 23);

Exhibit 7: documents related to the lawsuit filed against William Klein for

his failure to repay the loan he took out to pay for the trailer (Dkt.

23);

Exhibit 8: state court pleadings for action filed by Klein against Newman

(Dkt. 23);

Exhibit 9: pictures showing damage to the truck including pictures of the

condition of the truck prior to leaving it in Defendant’s care (Dkt.

24, Ex 9, pp. 1-3) and after Plaintiff recovered the truck from

Defendant: missing wheels and tires (Id. at p. 4), missing bolts

(Id. at p. 5), a missing headlight (Id. at p. 6), a bent frame (Id. at

p. 7), missing batteries, steps, battery box, power invertor,

driveshaft, rear axle, stereo, amplifier, speakers (Id. at p. 8), and

a missing stereo system (Id. at p. 9).

Exhibit 10: (A) transcript of 341 hearing dated March 3, 2025; (B) Continued

341 hearing held March 17, 2025; and (C) conversation between

Newman and Klein on January 23, 2023 (Dkt. 24); and

Exhibit 11: Klein’s summary of text messages regarding delays in repairs and

supporting documents (Dkt. 25). 7

Following oral argument held on March 18, 2026, the Court took the matter

under advisement, and allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs. (Dkt. Nos.

32 and 34).

II. JURISDICTION

Bankruptcy courts have jurisdiction over all cases under Title 11 and all core

proceedings arising under Title 11 or arising in a case under Title 11. See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1334 and 157. Core proceedings include proceedings to determine

7 The proof of service attached to Plaintiff’s response and brief in opposition to

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 18) states that service of these

exhibits was made on Defendant’s counsel, along with an audio recording. The

Court cannot tell if this audio recording is different from the transcript filed as part

of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 10. (Dkt. 24).

dischargeability. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). The parties have also expressly

consented to the entry of final orders and judgment by this Court. (Dkt. 12).

III. APPLICABLE LAW

A. Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7056 (Rule 56 applies in adversary

proceedings). The central inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one

party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 251-52 (1986). After adequate time for discovery and upon motion, Rule 56(c)

mandates summary judgment against a party who fails to establish the existence of

an element essential to that party's case and on which that party bears the burden of

proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The movant has an initial burden of showing "the absence of a genuine issue

of material fact." Id. at 323. Once the movant meets this burden, the non-movant

must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).

To demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact in dispute, the non-movant must

present sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably find for the non-

movant; a "scintilla of evidence" is insufficient. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.

The Court must believe the non-movant's evidence and draw "all justifiable

inferences" in the non-movant's favor. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255.

Even if a party does not move for summary judgment, “[a] court may enter

summary judgment sua sponte in favor of a nonmoving party so long as the losing

party was on notice to present all desired evidence on the matter at issue.” In re Stat

Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., No. 23-31085-JDA, 2025 WL 2404270, at *4 (Bankr.

E.D. Mich., August 19, 2025); See also, QSI Holdings, Inc. v. Alford, 382 B.R. 731,

736 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007), citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326

(1986) and Salehpour v. Univ. of Tennessee, 159 F.3d 199, 204 (6th Cir.1998). Here,

Defendant had ample opportunity to present his evidence concerning Plaintiff’s

complaint. Defendant’s supplemental brief acknowledges that “this is not a case in

which additional factual development could alter that analysis.” (Dkt. 32, p. 7).

IV. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff seeks to hold non-dischargeable four claims against Defendant:

Count I (Breach of Contract); Count II (Conversion); Count III (Violation of the

MVSRA – MCL 257.1301); and Count IV (Fraud under § 523(a)(2)). Because

breach of contract claims and claims under the MVSRA are not claims which meet

any of the statutory criteria required to support a finding of non-dischargeability

under § 523(a), these claims are dischargeable as a matter of law. Accordingly,

summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendant on Counts I and III of Plaintiff’s

complaint. The two remaining counts -- Count II (Conversion) and Count IV (Fraud

under § 523(a)(2)(A)) -- allege claims that may be non-dischargeable and are

discussed below.

A. Standards for the Non-Dischargeability of a Debt under 11 U.S.C. §

523(a)

Relief under the Bankruptcy Code was designed to provide "honest but

unfortunate debtors” with a fresh start by granting a discharge of their debts. Local

Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). Notwithstanding the general

availability of the discharge, § 523 of the Bankruptcy Code specifically enumerates

certain debts that are not discharged in bankruptcy for various public policy reasons

such as those debts resulting from intentional wrongdoing. The Bankruptcy Code

recognizes that society's interest in excepting such debts from discharge outweighs

a debtor's need for a fresh economic start. Exceptions to discharge are to be strictly

construed against the creditor and in favor of the debtor. Tweedie v. Hermoyian (In

re Hermoyian), 466 B.R. 348, 359 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2012).

In this case, Plaintiff seeks to have his claim against Defendant deemed non-

dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)(fraud in the inducement) and § 523(a)(6)(willful

and malicious injury). Specifically, Plaintiff seeks non-dischargeability under

§523(a)(2)(A) on the grounds that Defendant obtained possession of his truck by

misrepresenting his status as a licensed mechanic, resulting in damage to his truck.

In addition, Plaintiff seeks to hold his claims non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6)

on the grounds that Defendant acted willfully and maliciously by rendering

Plaintiff’s truck inoperable and by converting truck parts belonging to Plaintiff to

Defendant’s personal use.

1. Non-Dischargeability of Debt Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)

Section 523(a)(2)(A) excepts from discharge any debt “for money, property,

[or] services . . . to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or

actual fraud. . . “ The purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) is to prevent debtors from

retaining the benefits of property obtained through fraud. XL/Datacomp, Inc. v.

Wilson (In re Omegas Group, Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443, 1451 (6th Cir. 1994). To prevail

on a claim under this section, a plaintiff must show that:

(1)[T]he debtor obtained money, property or services through a

material misrepresentation that at the time the debtor knew was false or

that he made with reckless disregard for the truth; (2) the debtor

intended to deceive; (3) the creditor justifiably relied on the false

representation; and (4) its reliance was the proximate cause of loss.

Accord, Rembert v. AT&T Universal Card Services, Inc. (In re Rembert), 141 F.3d

277, 280 (6th Cir. 1998). See also, Digital Commerce Ltd. v. Sullivan (In re

Sullivan), 305 B.R. 809, 823 (W.D. Mich. 2004). A “false pretense” involves an

implied misrepresentation or conduct intended to create or foster a false impression.

False pretense, in turn, has been defined to include a “mute charade,” where the

debtor's conduct is designed to convey an impression without oral representation. A

“false representation,” on the other hand, is an expressed misrepresentation. In re

Rapp, 375 B.R. 421, 433 (2007) citing James v. McCoy (In re McCoy), 114 B.R.

489, 498 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (citations omitted). With respect to § 523(a)(2),

the creditor must prove each element by a preponderance of the evidence. Rembert,

141 F.3d at 281.

a. Defendant Obtained Money, Property or Services

Through a Material Misrepresentation that at the Time

the Debtor Knew Was False or That He Made With

Reckless Disregard for the Truth.

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant held himself out as a certified,

licensed mechanic and, based on that misrepresentation, Plaintiff entrusted his

vehicle to him to perform the necessary upgrades and repairs. Instead, Defendant

removed parts belonging to Plaintiff from Plaintiff’s truck. And while Plaintiff

admits that Defendant did not expressly tell him that he was a certified mechanic

before entering into the contract, Plaintiff argues that Defendant intentionally

fostered that misimpression, relying on the following:

(1) From July 13, 2022 to October 9, 2022, Plaintiff and Defendant

exchanged numerous text messages regarding Defendant providing

parts and upgrades to Plaintiff’s truck. (Dkt. 21, text messages, pp.

1-25);

(2) Defendant assured Plaintiff he could complete the work in a week

or so. (Dkt. 21, text messages, pp. 18, 48, 114);

(3) Plaintiff raised the necessity of passing a DOT inspection multiple

times in the text messages before Plaintiff dropped off his truck with

Defendant. (Dkt. 21, text messages, pp. 5, 20);

(4) Defendant stated that he could get the truck ready for a DOT

inspection;

(5) When Plaintiff first met Defendant, Defendant was driving a large

service mechanic’s truck for Flory Line Construction. Defendant

claimed that he owned the truck, that he leased it to Flory Line

Construction, and that he worked for them as a subcontracted

mechanic;

(6) Defendant told Plaintiff that he was building up his mechanic’s

business, LRS Truck Restoration;

(7) Defendant told Plaintiff that the many vehicles housed at the Lewis

Road location were (mostly) his and he was going to fix, sell, or use

them for parts;

(8) On October 13, 2022, Elisabeth Spencer, the agent and director of

LRS Truck Restoration, messaged Plaintiff to confirm the scope of

the work to be performed. (Dkt. 23, Ex. 6, p.1);

(9) Defendant continued his charade after the contract was made by

telling Plaintiff that he was a certified mechanic during a

conversation on January 23, 2023. (Dkt. 24, Exhibit 10C, p. 1); and

(10) Plaintiff believed Defendant was a licensed mechanic when he

reported his problems with the State of Michigan, Business and

Regulation Division, prior to learning that Defendant was not

licensed.

Numerous courts have held that a debt incurred after a contractor expressly

misrepresents that he or she has the requisite license is non-dischargeable under

§523(a)(2)(A). See, e.g., Bottari v. Baiata (In re Baiata), 12, B.R. 813, 819-820

(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981)(“[t]he incidence of license conveys to lay persons a concept

of authority and standards of workmanship impacting on reliance”); Sinha v. Clark

(In re Clark), 330 B.R. 702, 707–708 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2005)(contractor's false

representation to creditor that he was licensed and insured was sufficient for

purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A)); McCain v. Fuselier (In re Fuselier), 211 B.R.

540, 545 (Bankr.W.D.La.1997) (finding that the debtor knowingly misrepresented

to creditors that he had a general contractor's license and holding that the debt at

issue was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(2)(A)); Vaks v. Grenier (In re Grenier),

2009 WL 763352 at *19 (Bankr. D. Mass. March 19, 2009)(same).

Similarly, courts have also held that a failure to disclose not being licensed is

a misrepresentation sufficient to support a finding of non-dischargeability under

§523(a)(2)(A) when the facts support that a debtor is intentionally misleading

someone for his or her personal gain. Peterson v. Bozzano (In re Bozzano), 173 B.R.

990, 994 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Cohen v. de la

Cruz, 523 U.S. 213 (1998)(court found that debt was non-dischargeable because

“debtor intentionally created and fostered a false impression regarding his

qualifications” even though debtor never affirmatively stated he was a licensed

general contractor and creditors never asked him if he had a license).

Moreover, “[B]ankruptcy courts have overwhelming held that a debtor’s

silence regarding a material fact can constitute a false representation actionable

under section 523(a)(2)(A).” In re Van Horn, 823 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1987)

abrogated on other grounds by Grogan v. Garner, 111 S.Ct. 654 (1991)(court found

that debtor fraudulently obtained a loan from his mother-in-law by intentionally

failing to disclose his deteriorating relationship with his wife); Hermoyian, 466 B.R.

at 377 (the failure to disclose a material fact can form the basis of either a material

misrepresentation or false pretense); Semaan v. Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 951 F.2d

718, 728 (6th Cir.1991) (“That such deception takes the form of an intentional

nondisclosure of a material fact or an implied representation makes no difference.”);

Brann v. Oxford (In re Oxford), 440 B.R. 772, 777 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.2010)(a debtor's

silence may “create a false impression which would be actionable under §

523(a)(2)(A)....”).

With respect to this misrepresentation, the evidence clearly demonstrates that

Defendant intentionally fostered the impression that he was a licensed mechanic.

Defendant was driving a service mechanic’s truck for another company when he met

Plaintiff and indicated that it was his truck, and he was a sub-contracted mechanic

for that company. Defendant stated he had the ability to bring Plaintiff’s truck up to

the standard where it would pass a DOT inspection. He told Plaintiff that he owned

a repair shop and that he could complete the repairs in a very short period of time.

Had Plaintiff known Defendant was not a certified mechanic, Plaintiff asserts that

would have never entered a business relationship with Defendant. Defendant never

corrected this misimpression and, indeed, subsequently confirmed it, and Plaintiff

believed that Defendant was licensed even when he filed his complaint with the

licensing board. Further, it is illegal for an unlicensed mechanic to accept payment

for his services, See Mich. Comp. Laws 257.1301 et. seq., and Defendant

unambiguously and repeatedly demanded payment from Plaintiff. This evidence

supports a finding that Defendant participated in a “mute charade” leading Plaintiff

into entering a business relationship with Defendant which, in turn, led to Defendant

removing Plaintiff-owned parts from Plaintiff’s truck.

Defendant denies that he misled Plaintiff into believing that he was a licensed

mechanic. First, Defendant states that he and Plaintiff had an informal repair

agreement and that Defendant did not make any representations, express or

otherwise, as to his licensure. Plaintiff disputes this, as discussed above.

Second, Defendant claims that Plaintiff knew that Defendant was not licensed,

citing multiple text messages where Plaintiff states that he knows Defendant is not

a licensed mechanic. This Court finds this argument disingenuous because the text

messages relied on by Defendant were sent only after Plaintiff discovered that

Defendant was not licensed and contradicted by Defendant’s later statement. (Dkt.

24, Ex. 10C).

Third, Defendant claims that no such representation as to licensure was

necessary because the vehicle is a farm truck, and as such, can legally be repaired

by a non-licensed mechanic citing MCL 257.216(d) (classifying farm vehicles

separately from other motor vehicles), MCL 257.33 (defining vehicles covered by

the Motor Vehicle Act), and MCL 257.1302(m) (limiting “repair facility”

registration to vehicles required to be registered for highway use). The Court does

not find this argument persuasive because the evidence clearly shows that Plaintiff’s

purpose for hiring Defendant was to make his truck road ready for hauling cargo.

(Dkt. 21, text messages, pp. 5, 42, 48, 69, 70, 90). In summary, regardless of whether

the truck was dropped off with a farm plate, Defendant was well-aware that the

purpose of the upgrades was to make the truck safe for use on the roadways. For this

reason, this Court finds that to lawfully repair or upgrade Plaintiff’s truck, Defendant

was required to be a licensed mechanic.

b. Defendant Intended to Deceive Plaintiff

The second prong under Rembert requires a plaintiff prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the defendant intended to deceive the plaintiff.

Under this prong, the inquiry is whether lies and falsehoods were made to a creditor

with the intention that the lies or falsehoods be considered true. In re Childers, 651

B.R. 699, 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2023) citing In re Somogye, No. 18-3037, 2020

WL 1519315 at *12 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, March 30, 2020)(“The element of intent to

deceive is the heart of the § 523(a)(2)(A) exception to discharge .... [T]he chaff of

breach of contract and negligent performance is separated from the wheat of fraud

by whether the speaker intended to deceive the listener.”).

“A broken promise alone will not establish the existence of any intent to

deceive.” Childers, 651 B.R. at 726-727 citing In re Hunter, 535 B.R. 203, 213

(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2015) and Strominger v. Giquinto (In re Giquinto), 388 B.R. 152,

166 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008)(“It is a matter of well-entrenched jurisprudence that a

contractor's failure to perform as promised, standing alone, gives rise to a case for

breach of contract, not actionable fraud, misrepresentation or false pretenses under

§ 523(a)(2)(A).”). Intent to deceive is, instead, measured by a subjective standard

and must be determined by the totality of the circumstances. Childers, 651 B.R. at

727 citing Rembert, 141 F.3d at 281; see also, In re Somogye, 2020 WL 1519315 at

*13 (“A finding of fraudulent intent may be made on the basis of circumstantial

evidence or from the debtor's ‘course of conduct,’ as direct proof of intent will rarely

be available.” (citing Hamo v. Wilson (In re Hamo), 233 B.R. 718, 724 (B.A.P. 6th

Cir. 1999)). In close cases, where there is a possibility of honest intent, the question

of nondischargeability must be resolved in favor of the debtor.” Childers, 651 B.R.

at 227 citing In re Mann, 646 B.R. at 456; ITT Fin. Servs. v. Szczepanski (In re

Szczepanski), 139 B.R. 842, 844 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991).

Here, the totality of the circumstances supports a finding that Defendant

intended to deceive Plaintiff. Defendant told Plaintiff that he worked as a

subcontracted mechanic for Flory Line Construction and that he owned the service

vehicle he was driving when he met with Plaintiff. He further stated that he owned

LRS Truck Restoration, something that was confirmed by Spencer, and he told

Plaintiff that he was working on the vehicles on his lot. The State, apparently

believing that Defendant misled Plaintiff as to his status as a licensed mechanic,

cited Defendant with a violation for failing to reveal a material fact to a customer:

“Ronald Newman failed to reveal to Bill Klein that the facility and himself were not

properly licensed.” (Dkt. 19, Ex. 1, Violations). Defendant continued his charade

after Plaintiff hired him for the job by expressly telling Plaintiff that he was a

certified mechanic. (Dkt. 24, Ex. 10C).

Another reliable indicator of fraudulent intent, particularly in situations

involving a debtor-contractor, is whether a debtor-contractor undertook any of the

steps necessary to perform as promised. Childers, 651 B.R. at 227; See also,

Siebanoller v. Rahrig (In re Rahrig), 373 B.R. 829, 834 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio

2007)(Speer, J.)(“Thus, as a general rule, this Court has observed that the greater the

extent of a debtor's performance, the less likely it will be that they possessed an

intent to defraud.”); Mack v. Mills (In re Mills), 345 B.R. 598, 605 (Bankr. N.D.

Ohio 2006). An inverse relationship is also applicable: an intent to deceive may be

found when a debtor takes no significant measures toward the performance of an

obligation; inferences of fraud are muted if the debtor undertakes significant steps

to perform as promised. Childers, 651 B.R. at 227, citing In re Rahrig, 373 B.R. at

834. Here, Defendant never came close to completing the repairs. To the contrary,

as evidenced by the ATS Fleet Service report provided after Plaintiff retrieved his

truck, the truck was in substantially worse shape than when it was first delivered to

Defendant.

c. Justifiable Reliance on the False Representation

Whether reliance is justified is judged on the circumstances of a particular

transaction and requires a creditor to use reasonable care to safeguard his investment.

In order to establish justifiable reliance:

[A] person is “required to use his senses and cannot recover if he blindly

relied upon a misrepresentation the falsity of which would be patent to

him if he utilized his opportunity to make a cursory examination or

investigation.”

Willens v. Bones (In re Bones), 395 B.R. 407, 431-32 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011),

quoting Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 70-71 (1995); Jennings v. Bodrick (In re

Bodrick), 509 B.R. 843, 855 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2014); In re Constantino, 72 B.R.

231 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987)(the degree of care necessary to show reliance is that

degree of care which would be exercised in an average business transaction by

parties under similar circumstances); Van Wert Nat’l Bank v. Druckemiller (In re

Druckemiller), 177 B.R. 859, 861 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1994)(plaintiff relying on

defendant’s honesty does not satisfy the reasonable reliance standard under

§523(a)(2)(A)).

In this case, Klein justifiably relied on his interactions with Newman as a basis

for Newman’s ability to complete the job. Newman answered questions confidently,

came to their meeting driving a service mechanic’s vehicle which he claimed he

owned, indicated that he was sub-contracting as mechanic for a local construction

company, and stated that he owned LRS Truck Restoration. Clearly, Newman

deliberately fostered the impression that he was qualified, able, and willing to

complete the necessary truck upgrades. Accordingly, Klein’s reliance was

justifiable.

d. Plaintiff’s Reliance on Defendant’s Assertion that he was a

Licensed Mechanic Was the Proximate Cause of his Loss.

The State requires a license to protect the public. Moreover, the threat of

losing one’s license provides a strong incentive for honesty in dealings with the

public. Plaintiff stated that he would have never hired Defendant had he known that

Defendant was not licensed because licensure implies a basic level of ability to

complete the job. The Court finds Plaintiff’s assertion credible and, accordingly,

finds that Defendant’s lack of licensure was the proximate cause of Plaintiff’s loss.

In summary, because Plaintiff has met all four requirements to establish that

his claim against Defendant is non-dischargeable, summary judgment is granted to

Plaintiff on his § 523(a)(2)(A) count.

B. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6): Nondischargeability Based On Willful and

Malicious Conduct

1. Sufficiency of the Pleadings

As a preliminary matter, this Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegation of

conversion is sufficient to serve as an allegation of non-dischargeability under

§523(a)(6). The rule regarding pleading requires only that the opposing party have

notice of the claims against him. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires

only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 540 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).8 The fundamental inquiry is

whether the opposing party was on notice of the claims alleged against him.

In this case, Defendant was well-aware that Plaintiff was seeking to have his

claims held non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) because of Defendant’s alleged

conversion of Plaintiff’s property. Any doubts regarding Defendant’s awareness is

dispelled by Defendant’s own Motion for Summary Judgment which responds

8This Court also notes that the standard of pleading for pro se litigants is lower than

the standard for those who are represented by counsel. In re Thompson, 668 B.R.156,

178 (6th Cir. BAP 2025)(“While pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed and

held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, pro se

plaintiffs must still satisfy basic pleading requirements.”)

directly to the conversion allegation and specifically addresses § 523(a)(6) in the

following paragraphs:

37. Section 523(a)(6) applies only where the debtor intended

the injury itself, not merely the act.

38. Defendant retrieved parts only after Plaintiff refused to pay

for them. Defendant acted with a claim of right and without

malice.

39. Commercially motivated conduct taken to recover unpaid-

for materials does not constitute willful or malicious injury

under Sixth Circuit authority.

40. Plaintiff has shown no evidence of intent to harm.

These allegations in Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment demonstrate that

Defendant understood that Plaintiff’s conversion claim was a non-dischargeability

claim under § 526(a)(6) notwithstanding that § 523(a)(6) was not specifically pled.

2. Willful or Malicious Injury Under § 523(a)(6)

Under § 523(a)(6), debts are excepted from discharge if the debt arises from

a “willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of

another entity.” 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). To prevail on a claim under this section, a

plaintiff must show that:

(1) the debtor's conduct was willful and malicious, (2) [the creditor]

suffered an invasion of [its] legal rights or to the legal rights to [its]

property, and (3) the invasion was caused by the debtor's conduct.

Morse v. Morse (In re Morse), 504 B.R. 462, 475-76 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.

2014)(citations omitted).

The analysis under § 523(a)(6) is two pronged: the injury must be both willful

and malicious. Because the word “willful” modifies the word “injury”

“nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate

or intentional act that leads to injury.” Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61

(1998). A willful injury results when the debtor either desires to cause the

consequences of his act or “believes that the consequences are substantially certain

to result from it.” Markowitz v. Campbell (In re Markowitz), 190 F.3d 455, 464 (6th

Cir. 1999). As one bankruptcy court has explained,

“‘[t]o find that a debtor intended to cause the consequences of his act

or believed that the consequences were substantially certain to result

from his act, it is necessary to look into the debtor's mind,

subjectively.’” Gabel v. Olson (In re Olson), 355 B.R. 660, 665

(Bankr.E.D.Tenn.2006) (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Wood (In re Wood),

309 B.R. 745, 753 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2004)).

Proof of willful behavior must often be demonstrated through the

use of circumstantial evidence. See In re Jones, 276 B.R. at 802. The

bankruptcy court in In re Jones noted that “willful” behavior can “be

indirectly established by the creditor demonstrating the existence of

two facts: (1) the debtor knew of the creditor's … rights; and (2) the

debtor knew that his conduct would cause injury to those rights.” Id. As

another bankruptcy court in this Circuit recently observed, “[t]he

willfulness element is designed to separate negligent or inadvertent acts

from deliberate and intentional ones, and to ensure that the conduct in

question falls within the ambit of an intentional tort.” In re Wierenga,

431 B.R. 180, 185 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2010).

Morse v. Morse (In re Morse), 504 B.R. 462, 475-76 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.

2014)(emphasis added).

A person acts “maliciously” when that person acts “in conscious disregard of

his duties or without just cause or excuse.” Wheeler v. Laudani, 783 F.2d 610, 615

(6th Cir. 1986). “A ‘just cause’ is defined as a ‘legally sufficient reason’ and a ‘just

excuse’ is defined as a ‘reason that justifies an act or omission or [] relieves a person

of duty.” MarketGraphics Research Group, Inc. v. Berg (In re Berg), 953 F.3d 907,

915 (6th Cir. 2020)(quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)).

“Elaborating on the meaning of ‘conscious disregard,’ the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy

Appellate Panel has explained that ‘[t]here must be a consciousness of wrongdoing

.... It is this knowledge of wrongdoing, not the wrongfulness of the debtor's actions,

that is the key to malicious under § 523(a)(6).’” Buzzard v. Ratliff (In re Ratliff), 673

B.R. 719, 742 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2025)(citations omitted). Malice “does not require

ill-will or specific intent to do harm.” Wheeler, 783 F.2d at 615.

Conversion may give grounds for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(6) if the

conversion is both (1) willful and (2) malicious. Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293

U.S. 328 at 332 (1934); In re Hanif, 530 BR 655, 670 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2015);

Eberhardt v. Comerica Bank, 171 B.R. 239, 244 (E.D. Mich. 1994). “[N]ot every

tort judgment for conversion is exempt from discharge.” Geiger, 523 U.S. at 63–64.

A court has to consider the circumstances surrounding the conversion to determine

if it falls within the scope of this exception. Davis, 293 U.S. at 332. An innocent or

technical conversion, such as an unauthorized assumption of dominion, without

more will not fall within the purview of § 523(a)(6). Id.

Defendant moves for summary judgment under § 523(a)(6) claiming that the

underlying dispute between Plaintiff and Defendant is merely contractual and that

the evidence in no way demonstrates that Defendant willfully and maliciously

caused injury to Plaintiff’s property. Specifically, Defendant asserts that his conduct

was undertaken to recover parts and materials for which payment was not received,

and taking steps in furtherance of payment does not constitute willful or malicious

injury.

In stark contrast, however, Plaintiff argues that Defendant removed

components and parts belonging to Plaintiff from Plaintiff’s truck, retained them for

Defendant’s own use, and that he did so with malice. (Complaint, ¶¶ 23, 27).

Plaintiff produced evidence substantiating that Defendant acted with an actual intent

to cause harm. By way of example, Plaintiff points to Defendant’s threatening text

message (“U will never make it as a truck drive [sic] or owner. Watch.”) sent after

Plaintiff filed his complaint with the State and the fact that the truck, which was

operable when delivered to Defendant, was essentially destroyed when Plaintiff was

finally able to wrest control of it back from Defendant.

a. Evidence of the Condition of the Truck when Plaintiff Brought

it to Defendant

Prior to delivering his truck to Defendant, Plaintiff had ATS Fleet Service

perform a DOT inspection. On July 19, 2022, ATS Fleet Service provided Plaintiff

with a service report listing the repairs required to pass DOT inspection. Specifically,

the service report stated:

Performed federal annual DOT inspection and truck failed. Made list

of needed repairs and recommendations for customer. Check and

recharge A/C system. Found no leaks with vacuum. Charge A/C with

dye. System will need ran and please inform us of any noticed leaks

and exposed dye. Found button to turn on compressor is not working

correctly. Set up tuner and send files out to pathhungry per customer

request. Received files and followed procedures to tune the PCM. Put

250 HP tune in it and drove. Runs good.

(Dkt. 22, Ex. 4). Only after receipt of this report did Plaintiff drop his truck off at

Defendant’s facility.

b. Evidence of Scope of Repairs Plaintiff Hired Defendant to

Perform

After determining what upgrades were required to pass a DOT inspection,

Plaintiff hired Defendant to perform limited work on his truck. This work was

described in a text stream dated October 13, 2022 between Plaintiff and Elisabeth

Spencer, agent and director for LRS truck Restoration. In this text stream, Spencer

texted Plaintiff to get a copy of whatever proposal Defendant had presented to

Plaintiff. Plaintiff responded:

Don’t think it was a text. Just in conversation. Was swap rear end with

air, new gear and compressor. Also, extra fuel tank. I supplied the leaf

springs bushings, shocks and have pads for front. Said since I am

giving him calipers and brake parts for the rear end he is keeping, he

will supply new one he is putting in or at least pass his DOT inspection.

Quoted $3600 for that work. . . Only other thing was he was trying to

find different rims.

(Dkt. 23, Ex. 6 p. 1).

c. Evidence of Condition of Truck after Plaintiff Recovered his

Truck from Defendant

When Plaintiff finally recovered his truck, it was inoperable. Plaintiff then

had the truck towed back to ATS Fleet Service for a new inspection where ATS

determined that the truck was essentially totaled. The inspection notes, dated

September 23, 2025, state: