The opinion
[Cite as State v. Holman, 2026-Ohio-1793.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250254
TRIAL NO. 24/CRB/16180
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
JUDGMENT ENTRY
TYIWON HOLMAN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
This cause was heard upon the appeal, the record, and the briefs.
For the reasons set forth in the Opinion filed this date, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Further, the court holds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal,
allows no penalty, and orders that costs be taxed under App.R. 24.
The court further orders that (1) a copy of this Judgment with a copy of the
Opinion attached constitutes the mandate, and (2) the mandate be sent to the trial
court for execution under App.R. 27.
To the clerk:
Enter upon the journal of the court on 5/15/2026 per order of the court.
By:_______________________
Administrative Judge
[Cite as State v. Holman, 2026-Ohio-1793.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-250254
TRIAL NO. 24/CRB/16180
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
vs. :
OPINION
TYIWON HOLMAN, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: May 15, 2026
Emily Smart Woerner, City Solicitor, Susan Zurface, Chief Prosecuting Attorney, and
Victoria Gooder, Senior Assistant City Solicitor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Christine Y. Jones,
Assistant Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
BOCK, Judge.
{¶1} A jury found defendant-appellant Tyiwon Holman guilty of sexual
imposition after the State presented evidence that Holman, while holding his erect
penis in his hand, pressed himself against his coworker H.H.’s lower back and
buttocks. For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Holman’s five assignments of error
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural History
A. Procedural history
{¶2} The State charged Holman with one count of sexual imposition in
violation of R.C. 2907.06, a third-degree misdemeanor.
{¶3} During jury selection, Holman moved for a new venire because he
asserted the State improperly described the case to the jury. Next, Holman alleged that
the State struck a juror based on race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986). The trial court denied Holman’s requests.
{¶4} The jury found Holman guilty. The trial court sentenced Holman to jail
time and informed him of his obligation to register as a Tier I sex offender. The trial
court denied Holman’s request for a stay pending appeal.
B. Facts
1. The State accused Holman of inappropriately touching H.H.
{¶5} H.H., during a shift at a restaurant, helped train Holman, a new hire.
Alone in the back of the restaurant, H.H. explained to Holman tasks he was expected
to accomplish and then began her own work.
{¶6} Later, Holman told H.H. that he could not locate a container in the walk-
in freezer, so H.H. went into the freezer with Holman and pointed it out. H.H. thought
it was strange that Holman could not find the container because “they are huge gallon-
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sized containers and they are right there.” Uncomfortable being alone in the freezer
with Holman, H.H. left and returned to her work at a prep table in the kitchen.
{¶7} H.H. testified that Holman “came up behind me and he pushed himself
into me. At that point, I felt something hard on my butt and I wasn’t sure what it was.
I assumed it was either his hand or his penis.” H.H. turned to face Holman, who said
either “my bad,” or “I am sorry.” Holman walked away.
{¶8} Though she initially wondered if the encounter was accidental, she soon
suspected that Holman’s “actions were intended and they were intended with harm.”
H.H. told her sister (a coworker) and the restaurant’s shift leader about Holman’s
conduct. The shift leader reviewed security footage and then called the store manager,
who also reviewed the footage. The store manager recorded the footage with his cell
phone “so that we had the video saved.”
{¶9} After H.H. became more upset, her mother came to the restaurant,
spoke with the manager, and watched the footage. Her mother took H.H. home.
{¶10} The store manager pulled Holman aside and asked him how “the day
was going and . . . if he felt like anything weird happened that day.” Holman responded
that the day was normal. But Holman later told the store manager that “there might
have been some accidental bumping in the kitchen.”
{¶11} Over Holman’s objection, the trial court admitted the store manager’s
cell phone recording of the restaurant’s security video and allowed the State to play it
for the jury.
2. Holman admitted to police he inappropriately touched H.H.
{¶12} After H.H. filed a police report, law enforcement officers, including
Officer Meece, interviewed Holman. The interview was recorded and played at trial.
Holman said he stopped working at the restaurant because he “got accused of touching
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
someone.” Holman initially claimed he accidentally walked into H.H. Eventually, he
admitted he was holding his penis under his pants when he touched H.H.’s buttocks
with his hand.
{¶13} After Holman said he was attracted to H.H., officers asked Holman if it
“was a self-gratification moment.” Holman asked what gratification meant and the
officers explained that it meant “satisfying, getting off.” After continued questioning,
Holman explained that he touched H.H. because, “I think it was me, it was me, uh,
that gratification thing that you had said.”
II. Analysis
{¶14} On appeal, Holman challenges his conviction in five assignments of
error. He asserts the trial court erred by (1) denying his request for a new venire, (2)
overruling his Batson challenge, (3) excluding evidence of his past sexual abuse and a
law enforcement officer’s personal knowledge involving male sexual assault victims,
(4) admitting the cell phone recording of the security footage, and (5) convicting
Holman despite it being contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
A. Assignment of Error 1: Request for new venire
{¶15} Holman argues that the trial court erred in overruling his request for a
new venire. He asserts that the State improperly provided an introduction of the case
without consulting the trial court or defense counsel in violation of Crim.R. 24(A).
1. Standard of review
{¶16} A party seeking a new venire—also known as a jury panel—bears the
burden to demonstrate “either that the jurors were unlawfully impaneled or that the
jurors could not be fair and impartial.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 150. Trial
courts enjoy wide discretion over voir dire (jury selection), such as its scope, manner,
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
and “whether to grant a party’s motion for a new venire.” State v. Worley, 2021-Ohio-
2207, ¶ 90.
{¶17} A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily,
or unconscionably in deciding a matter about which it has discretionary authority.
Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 34. No court has discretion to make an error
of law. Id. at ¶ 38.
2. The State summarized the case during voir dire
{¶18} During the State’s examination of the jury panel, it summarized the
case: Holman had been charged with one count of sexual imposition; sexual
imposition meant a person having sexual contact with another person while either
knowing the contact is offensive or being reckless about if it was offensive; and sexual
contact included touching a person’s buttocks.
{¶19} Next, the State provided undisputed facts: H.H. and Holman had never
met before they became coworkers at a restaurant and the “allegation involves the
defendant holding his penis through his pants, and putting it against the victim’s butt
or buttocks.”
{¶20} The State asked if any potential jurors were uncomfortable serving on
the jury, if they disagreed that sexual contact meant touching someone in defined
areas, and if anyone had been, or knew someone who had been, the victim of unwanted
sexual contact. A potential juror responded that his “wife was molested when she was
young.” Another explained that his mother “had a similar situation that you just
mentioned.” A final prospective juror revealed that he believed he was presently under
investigation for some form of sexual misconduct.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶21} Before voir dire had concluded, Holman objected to the State’s
explanation of the case, arguing it was improper under Crim.R. 24(A), and requested
a new venire. The trial court denied Holman’s request.
3. Ohio permits parties in a criminal trial to examine juror bias
{¶22} Holman asserts that the State violated Crim.R. 24(A) when it provided
a description of the facts of the case without having consulted with the trial court.
{¶23} Under Crim.R. 24(A), trial courts may help potential jurors understand
“the nature of the case” by providing “a brief introduction to the case” after consulting
the parties. Crim.R. 24(B) requires all prospective jurors to, under oath, be examined.
While trial courts may examine the jurors, both the State and the defense may
supplement that examination. Likewise, R.C. 2945.27 requires trial courts to “examine
prospective jurors under oath” and to allow the State and the defendant the
opportunity to reasonably examine prospective jurors.
{¶24} Holman argues that Crim.R. 24(A) limits Crim.R. 24(B) by restricting a
party from describing a case’s facts unless the trial court first provides a Crim.R. 24(A)
introduction in consultation with the parties. We disagree.
{¶25} First, nothing in Crim.R. 24 suggests such a limitation. Crim.R. 24(A)
uses permissive language—it says the court “may” introduce the case. As such, this rule
means the trial court has discretion to provide or not provide an introduction. On the
other hand, both Crim.R. 24(B) and R.C. 2945.27 require the trial court to allow the
State and defense “the opportunity to conduct reasonable voir dire.”
{¶26} Second, although Crim.R. 24(A) limits when the trial court may
introduce the case—only when it consults with both parties—the rule does not place
the same limitation on the parties.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶27} Third, parties may explain circumstances of the offense to determine if
prospective jurors have knowledge of the offense or have biases that might impact
their fitness to serve on the jury. See State v. Tyler, 50 Ohio St.3d 24, 32 (1990),
quoting Kane v. State, 3 Ohio Law Abs. 246, 246-247 (7th Dist. 1924) (“In the
examination of prospective jurors the state has a right to state the nature of an alleged
offense and who was claimed to be connected therewith in order to ascertain whether
the jurors knew or had read about the occurrence.’’); see also State v. Burns, 2024-
Ohio-1669, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.) (parties may provide some case information to examine
potential jurors’ biases); State v. Jackson, 2005-Ohio-5981, ¶ 52 (“While it is improper
for counsel to seek a commitment from prospective jurors on whether they would find
specific evidence mitigating, counsel should be permitted to present uncontested facts
to the venire directed at revealing prospective jurors’ biases.” (Citations omitted.)).
4. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
The State’s presentation of the facts included only undisputed facts: H.H. and
Holman, who were coworkers at a restaurant, had never met before the day of the
offense. Moreover, the State described facts to which Holman had admitted to police
as an allegation: “the allegation involves the defendant holding his penis through his
pants, and putting it against the victim’s butt or buttocks.” It also accurately stated
elements of sexual imposition and defined sexual contact, but only after telling the jury
that the judge would provide the law.
{¶28} Nothing in the State’s summary of the case strayed beyond uncontested
allegations or accurate descriptions of relevant statutory language. Significantly,
Holman admitted to police that he held his erect penis in his hand under his apron
and pressed against H.H.’s buttocks, and, on appeal, Holman’s manifest-weight
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
challenge is limited to contesting whether he engaged in that sexual contact for the
purpose of sexual gratification.
{¶29} Finally, just after the State summarized the case, it asked prospective
jurors if they would feel uncomfortable sitting on a case involving those allegations.
This demonstrates that the State’s presentation was “arguably made for the
permissible purpose of revealing potential juror bias.” See Burns, 2024-Ohio-1669, at
¶ 17 (10th Dist.).
{¶30} We overrule Holman’s first assignment of error.
B. Assignment of Error 2: Batson challenge
{¶31} Holman argues that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson
challenge to the State’s exercising a preemptory strike of a prospective juror because
the State improperly struck the juror based on his race and the State’s proffered race-
neutral explanation was belied by the record. But because the State’s alternate race-
neutral explanation for striking the prospective juror supported the trial court’s
decision, we affirm.
1. Batson prohibits striking potential jurors based on race
{¶32} The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution prohibits the State from engaging in “[p]urposeful racial
discrimination in selection of the venire.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 86. Accordingly, the
State may not use peremptory challenges to exclude a prospective juror based on that
person’s race. Id. at 89.
{¶33} The Batson Court established a burden-shifting framework for
analyzing a defendant’s challenge to the State’s use of a peremptory strike based on
racial discrimination. Id. at 93-94. First, the defendant must establish “a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the totality of the relevant facts
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Id. To do so, the defendant must
show that the defendant is a member “of a cognizable racial group” and the State
exercised peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors from the same race as the
defendant. Id. at 96. If the defendant succeeds in doing so, the burden shifts to the
State to demonstrate that it exercised its peremptory challenge using a “permissible
racially neutral selection criteria and procedure[]” that is “related to the particular case
to be tried.” Id. at 94, 98. The trial court must consider the circumstances of the case
and determine if the State engaged in purposeful discrimination. State v. Herring,
2002-Ohio-796, ¶ 63.
{¶34} Under Batson, “[t]he second step . . . does not demand an explanation
that is persuasive, or even plausible.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-768 (1995).
Rather, the court’s consideration is limited to “‘the facial validity of the prosecutor’s
explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor’s
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.’” Id., quoting Hernandez
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
{¶35} If the State offers a race-neutral justification, the court must move to
Batson’s final step and determine if the defendant “proved purposeful racial
discrimination.” Purkett at 758. Defendants may present evidence to show racial
discrimination, such as (1) data and statistics about the “prosecutor’s use of
peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors as compared to white prospective
jurors” in the case; (2) the State’s disparate questioning and investigation of
prospective jurors by race; (3) a comparison of which prospective jurors the State kept
and struck; (4) “a prosecutor’s misrepresentations of the record when defending the
strikes,” and (5) the State’s historical use of peremptory strikes in prior cases. Flowers
v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. 284, 301-302 (2019). “The ultimate inquiry is whether the
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
State was ‘motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.’” Id. at 303, quoting
Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 488, 513 (2016).
{¶36} As the party challenging the strike, the defendant maintains the burden
of persuasion. Id. An appellate court defers to the trial court’s finding of no
discriminatory intent because the determination largely involves the evaluation of
credibility. State v. Wright, 2017-Ohio-1568, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.). The trial court’s finding
will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous. Herring at ¶ 68.
2. The State questioned Juror C about an old conviction
{¶37} Holman’s Batson challenge involves the State’s exercising a peremptory
challenge to Juror C, who had been retired for 15 years from the Cincinnati Fire
Department. Throughout his 35-year career, Juror C interacted with police officers in
a mutually beneficial working relationship.
{¶38} When the State asked Juror C about a prior conviction for “malicious
entry,” he explained that the State had prosecuted him 52 years ago for the offense.
Juror C was “at the wrong place at the wrong time. . . I went with a person to – basically
as his support . . . And it kind of went out of – I never entered.” He clarified that
although he did not enter the home, he put himself in a bad position and “you have to
know the definition of the law.”
{¶39} The State pressed Juror C about whether he felt he was treated unfairly
when he was prosecuted and whether the experience would make him believe that the
State was treating Holman unfairly. Multiple times, Juror C denied that his conviction
would cause him to disfavor the State. He said that the officers involved in his
prosecution were “really more than fair . . . Because I was someplace I shouldn’t have
been.” Further, Juror C pointed out that the conviction was 52 years ago and after his
conviction, during his career as a firefighter, he worked “hand in hand with the police.”
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
3. The State exercised a preemptory challenge to strike Juror C
{¶40} After the State sought to use a peremptory strike to remove Juror C,
Holman raised a Batson challenge. The trial court asked the State for a race-neutral
reason for the strike. The State explained that it sought to strike Juror C because of
“the police contact with him” and that Juror C “had said something along the lines of
I felt unfairly prosecuted at that time.” The State was concerned he would “put himself
in the shoes of the defendant and say he is being unfairly prosecuted.”
{¶41} Holman responded that the State’s explanation was pretextual because
Juror C’s prosecution occurred more than 50 years ago, he had stated that he felt fairly
treated during that prosecution, and he had subsequently worked as a firefighter
alongside police officers for 35 years. The State again asserted that Juror C had
reported feeling unfairly prosecuted. The trial court dismissed Juror C without making
any findings.
4. Batson analysis
{¶42} Holman has the initial burden of making a prima facia showing of
discrimination. The trial court appears to have found that he did so, as it asked the
State to explain its use of the peremptory challenge based on a reason “other than
race.” Accordingly, we move to Batson’s second step. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359
(After the State offers a race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge and the
trial court rules in the State’s favor, “whether the defendant had made a prima facie
showing becomes moot.”).
{¶43} The State, under Batson’s second step, provided two reasons for striking
Juror C: (1) his police contact and prosecution, and (2) his statements showing he felt
he had been treated unfairly during his prosecution, which could lead Juror C to
believe that Holman was being prosecuted unfairly. Although the State’s second
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
proffered justification directly contradicted what Juror C said during voir dire, on its
face, these were race-neutral justifications.
{¶44} Holman argued that the State’s proffered reason for striking Juror C—
“He had said something along the lines of I felt unfairly prosecuted at that time”—is
contradicted by the record. He is correct. The State concedes that the prosecutor
inaccurately described Juror C’s responses as the record shows Juror C did not say he
felt unfairly prosecuted.
{¶45} But the State’s erroneous representation of the record was not the only
justification for its preemptory challenge. The other justification was Juror C’s prior
“police contact.” We have held that a prospective juror’s prior criminal prosecution
may serve as a valid race-neutral reason to strike a juror. State v. King, 2007-Ohio-
4879, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.) (20-year-old conviction provided race-neutral reason to strike
juror); see State v. Santiago, 2003-Ohio-2877, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.) (25-year-old criminal-
trespass conviction). The State’s lengthy examination of Juror C about his prosecution
cuts against a finding that its explanation was pretextual. See Flowers, 588 U.S. at 312,
quoting Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 246 (2005), quoting Ex parte Travis, 776
So.2d 874, 881 (Ala. 2000) (“[T]he State’s failure to engage in any meaningful voir
dire examination on a subject the State alleges it is concerned about is evidence
suggesting that the explanation is a sham and a pretext for discrimination.”).
{¶46} While some facts support Holman’s assertion that the State’s proffered
reason for striking Juror C was pretextual, we hold that Holman did not demonstrate
that the trial court clearly erred. “Comparing prospective jurors who were struck and
not struck can be an important step in determining whether a Batson violation
occurred.” Flowers at 311. Here, other than the State’s concession that the prosecutor
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
misrepresented the record, we lack evidence that the State engaged in racial
discrimination.
{¶47} We overrule Holman’s second assignment of error.
C. Assignment of Error 3: Exclusion of Holman’s past sexual abuse
{¶48} Holman next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
excluding evidence involving his sexual-assault history and evidence about male
sexual-assault victims generally. He asserts that this evidence was relevant to disprove
the “sexual contact” element of sexual imposition.
1. Limits on a defendant’s right to present a defense
{¶49} This court reviews a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence
at trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fritsch, 2023-Ohio-2676, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.).
{¶50} The United States Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the
“‘meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
683, 690 (1986), quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984). A
defendant’s right to present a complete defense includes the “right to offer the
testimony of witnesses and to present the defendant’s version of the facts.” State v.
Jones, 2020-Ohio-281, ¶ 47 (1st Dist.), rev’d on other grounds, 2021-Ohio-3311, ¶ 28.
But that right is limited because defendants lack a right to present evidence that is
inadmissible under the rules of evidence. Id.
{¶51} Under Evid.R. 402, “relevant evidence is admissible” and irrelevant
evidence is inadmissible. Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Evid.R. 401.
Relevancy is a low bar, reflecting a policy preference in favor of admitting evidence so
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
factfinders may weigh it as they deem appropriate. State v. Patterson, 2018-Ohio-
3348, ¶ 21 (1st Dist.).
{¶52} Yet, Evid.R. 403(A) limits the breadth of Evid.R. 402. Trial courts must
exclude relevant evidence when “its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
Evid.R. 403(A). Evidence is unfairly prejudicial where it “‘might result in an improper
basis for a jury decision’” by “‘arous[ing] the jury’s emotional sympathies, evok[ing] a
sense of horror, or appeal[ing] to an instinct to punish.’” State v. Mincey, 2023-Ohio-
472, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Crotts, 2004-Ohio-6550, ¶ 24.
2. The excluded testimony
{¶53} In cross-examining Officer Meece, Holman asked about Meece’s
experience interviewing male sexual-assault victims and asked if “a male . . . can have
an erection without contact and be necessarily pleasurable?” The State objected,
arguing that the question was irrelevant, Meece was not an expert qualified to testify
about male anatomy, and Evid.R. 403 precluded this evidence. Holman responded
that the line of questioning was relevant to the sexual-gratification element of the
sexual-imposition charge because it would show that although Holman admitted to
having an erection when he pressed against H.H., this could happen without
experiencing sexual gratification. He emphasized that his question was specific to
Meece’s own knowledge based on his experience with male sexual-assault victims. The
court sustained the State’s objection.
{¶54} Later, Meece described the portion of his interview with Holman in
which they viewed video footage showing Holman pressing against H.H. Meece asked
Holman what he had been thinking. Holman replied that “he’d been having some
thoughts.” The State objected to questions eliciting the content of those thoughts. It
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
argued that Holman was attempting to introduce evidence of his own sexual abuse,
which was inadmissible under Evid.R. 401, 402, and 403. Holman asserted the
evidence was relevant to his mental state. The trial court sustained the State’s
objection, noting “no case law in Ohio that says [being a victim of sexual assault] is a
defense to a charge of sexual imposition . . . This is merely to invoke sympathy.”
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
{¶55} The State charged Holman with sexual imposition, which required the
State to prove Holman had “sexual contact” with H.H. R.C. 2907.06(A). “Sexual
contact” means touching “an erogenous zone of another, including . . . [the] buttock[s]
. . . for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B).
{¶56} Holman argues that evidence involving male victims of sexual abuse
generally and his own sexual abuse was relevant to “show that a male victim of sexual
assault could experience an erection without finding the contact to be sexually
gratifying.” He argues that this evidence would permit the jury to infer that, although
he had an erection when he pressed himself against H.H.’s buttocks, he did not
experience sexual gratification.
{¶57} But the State was not required to prove that Holman experienced sexual
gratification to establish the sexual-contact element. The statute only requires proof
that the contact was “for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.”
R.C. 2907.01(B). A person’s purpose for acting is distinct from the result of that act.
{¶58} Any probative value of testimony about Meece’s general knowledge of
male sexual-assault victims and Holman’s past sexual abuse would have been
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by excluding this evidence under Evid.R. 403(A).
{¶59} We overrule Holman’s third assignment of error.
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D. Assignment of Error 4: Best-Evidence Rule
{¶60} Holman argues that the trial court erred in admitting a cell phone
recording of the restaurant security footage in violation of the “best evidence rule.”
1. The best-evidence rule
{¶61} Under Evid.R. 1002, the “original” of a writing, recording, or
photograph should be admitted to prove the contents of that writing, recording, or
photograph. “Photograph” includes a video recording. Evid.R. 1001(2).
{¶62} Evid.R. 1003 provides an exception to the best-evidence rule and
permits the admission of a duplicate in place of “an original unless (1) a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it
would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.” Evid.R. 1003.
{¶63} An “original” of a photograph “includes the negative or any print
therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any printout or other
output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately.” Evid.R. 1001(3). And
“[a] ‘duplicate’ is a counterpart produced . . . by means of photography, including
enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, . . . or by
other equivalent techniques which accurately reproduce the original.” Evid.R. 1001(4).
{¶64} The party challenging the admission of a duplicate bears the burden of
establishing that it should be excluded. State v. Tibbetts, 92 Ohio St.3d 146, 160
(2001). We review the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Id.
{¶65} Ohio courts have held that video recordings of security footage are
admissible as duplicates. See State v. Ollison, 2016-Ohio-8269, ¶ 52-54 (10th Dist.)
(collecting cases) (duplicate recording of original security footage was admissible
where witness who recorded the duplicate testified the duplicate was the same as the
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original she viewed and witness had no control over skips occurring in the original that
were captured in the duplicate).
{¶66} Moreover, recordings depicting portions of a video are admissible as
duplicates where the full video would not have revealed anything conflicting with
witness testimony or the duplicate. State v. Biswa, 2022-Ohio-3156, ¶ 33-36, 41 (2d
Dist.) (finding no plain error in admission of shorter duplicate); see State v. Taylor,
2012-Ohio-5421, ¶ 32 (8th Dist.) (acknowledging defendant’s concession that a
duplicate capturing a portion of the original video was admissible as a duplicate).
2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion
{¶67} Holman first argues that the duplicate should not have been admitted
because H.H. testified about events at the restaurant beyond what the recording
showed—that she and Holman had been together in the walk-in freezer.
{¶68} H.H. testified that after Holman could not find a container, she went
into the walk-in freezer with him to show him where it was. She thought it was “weird”
that he could not find it because it was conspicuous. Further, she felt uneasy being
alone with Holman in the freezer because he was someone she “didn’t know.”
{¶69} The only portions of this testimony with verifiable facts, rather than
H.H.’s feelings, were the conspicuous placement of the containers and the fact that no
one else was in the freezer. But this testimony did not involve any allegation that
Holman acted inappropriately toward H.H. So, assuming without deciding that the
trial court should have required the State to show the entire video, the truncated
version did not prejudice Holman.
{¶70} Next, Holman argues that the duplicate was altered and therefore
inadmissible because it depicted the events in the restaurant at double-speed, which
he argues “undoubtably affects the interpretation of the evidence.” But Holman has
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
not established that the original differs from the duplicate because there is no evidence
of the original’s playback speed. The store manager, the shift leader, and H.H.’s
mother viewed the original security footage, and all three testified that the duplicate
accurately depicted the original security footage.
{¶71} Moreover, even if evidence established that the duplicate had been
altered, Holman cannot show prejudice. Had the video been slowed to its claimed
original speed, a viewer would perceive the contact between Holman and H.H. to last
longer, which could cause a viewer to be more likely to interpret the contact as
intentional.
{¶72} Holman has the burden of showing that under “the circumstances it
would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.” Evid.R. 1003. He has
not done so here, so we overrule his fourth assignment of error.
E. Assignment of Error 5: Manifest weight of the evidence
{¶73} Holman asserts that his conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence because the State failed to credibly establish that he made contact with H.H.
for the purpose of sexual gratification.
1. Manifest-weight review
{¶74} A manifest-weight-of-the-evidence challenge asserts that the State
failed to meet its burden of persuasion at trial. State v. Sawyer, 2025-Ohio-5834, ¶ 28
(1st Dist.). A manifest-weight review requires us to view the entire record, weigh the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider witness credibility, and determine if
evidentiary conflicts demonstrate that the factfinder “clearly lost its way and created
such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment must be reversed and a new
trial ordered.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 14.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
{¶75} Under R.C. 2907.06(A), the State had to prove that Holman purposely
had sexual contact with H.H., knowing that such contact would offend H.H. On appeal,
Holman disputes only whether his conduct constituted sexual contact, which, relevant
here, means touching another person’s buttocks “for the purpose of sexually arousing
or gratifying either person.” R.C. 2907.01(B).
{¶76} Sexual arousal or gratification are not defined by statute, but this court
has explained that the phrase encompasses “any touching of the specified areas that a
reasonable person would perceive as sexually stimulating or gratifying.” State v.
Hodgkin, 2019-Ohio-1686, ¶ 10 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Mack, 2006-Ohio-6284,
¶ 9 (1st Dist.). A defendant’s purpose in having contact with the victim—for sexual
arousal or some other purpose—is a question of fact the factfinder resolves by
considering the type of contact, the nature of the contact, and the circumstances
surrounding the contact. State v. Alanani, 2024-Ohio-5660, ¶ 17 (1st Dist.). While the
act of touching, alone, is insufficient to establish sexual gratification, it can be
considered “‘strong evidence of intent.’” Id., quoting Mack at ¶ 9.
2. The jury did not lose its way
{¶77} Holman argues that the State failed to credibly prove sexual contact
because the evidence did not establish that he made contact with H.H. for the purpose
of sexually arousing or gratifying himself.
{¶78} First, Holman asserts that his admission during the police interview—
that he touched H.H. for “that gratification thing that you had said”—was clearly
Holman parroting back words the officers had said to him. Holman asked what
“gratification” meant and an officer responded, “satisfying” or “getting off.” While
Holman’s response referred to what the officer had explained to him, the officer
defined “gratification” in simple, understandable terms that Holman appeared to
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
understand. That an officer defined “gratification” in those terms does not suggest that
Holman did not understand what it meant.
{¶79} Next, Holman argues that the security footage failed to support his
conviction because it showed only brief contact with H.H., his hands were “covering
his genitals” under his pants and an apron, and rather than making sexually suggestive
comments, he apologized after the contact.
{¶80} Holman admitted to holding his erect penis in his hand and pressing
that hand against H.H.’s buttocks. This admission constitutes credible evidence
supporting the conviction. Simply because the contact was brief does not make the
contact’s purpose for something other than sexual arousal or gratification. See State
v. Ruschak, 2025-Ohio-2303, ¶ 15 (11th Dist.). This is particularly true where there
was no obvious reason for Holman to have made the contact as he could have easily
avoided all contact with H.H. See State v. Rasheed, 2023-Ohio-906, ¶ 29 (1st Dist.)
(“The video shows Rasheed pressing his pelvic area against G.G.’s backside three
different times. His thin stature, when compared to the space where G.G. was standing
as he passed her, shows that he had ample room to avoid touching her.”); compare
Alanani, 2024-Ohio-5660, at ¶ 6-7, 18 (1st Dist.) (holding that grabbing witness’s
genitalia was not for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal where
circumstances showed that defendant grabbed the witness to threaten or intimidate
him). And Holman’s apology to H.H. after the contact is not enough to show that he
made contact with her for a purpose other than sexual gratification or arousal.
{¶81} The jury did not lose its way or create a manifest miscarriage of justice.
We overrule Holman’s fifth assignment of error.
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OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
III. Conclusion
{¶82} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule Holman’s assignments of error
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Judgment affirmed.
ZAYAS, P.J., and CROUSE, J., concur.
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