Barnes

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

Jaiden Barnes, Case No. 3:26-cv-15

Plaintiff,

v. ORDER

Wal-Mart Transportation, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

The parties’ joint motion for stipulated protective order is denied without prejudice. (Doc.

No. 15). Specifically, I reject, in part, Sections 8 and 12, (see Doc. No. 15-1 at 7-10), because they

contain provisions I conclude to be at odds with the Local Rules of the Northern District of Ohio,

my Standing Order regarding discovery disputes, and Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of

Michigan, 825 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 2016).

First, as restated in this case’s Case Management Order, I maintain the following Standing

Order regarding discovery disputes:

No motion relating to discovery may be filed without leave of court. If counsel

cannot resolve a discovery dispute despite their good faith efforts, they should email

me a joint letter (Helmick_Chambers@ohnd.uscourts.gov) summarizing the nature

of the dispute and their efforts to resolve it. After I review the joint submission, my

chambers will contact counsel regarding next steps toward resolution.

(Doc. No. 12 at 2). This accords with this District’s Local Rule 37.1, which generally disfavors

additional legal memoranda and sets forth informal procedures for handling discovery disputes. I

consider a dispute over a confidentiality designation to be a “discovery dispute.” Because the

parties’ Section 12 proposal that “[i]n the event of disagreement, . . . the designating person or

entity shall file a motion pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 26(c)” conflicts with my Standing Order and

Local Rule 37.1, I reject it. (Doc. No. 15-1 at 10).

Second, Shane Group, Inc. distinguishes protective orders from orders to seal and stands for

the position that the court should not hastily protect documents from public disclosure. 825 F.3d at

305-06. Through Section 8 of their proposed stipulated protective order, (see Doc. No. 15-1 at 7-8),

the parties may inadvertently muddy the waters between protection during the discovery and

adjudication stages and set forth procedures I conclude to be at odds with the “‘strong presumption

in favor of openness’ as to court records.” Shane Grp., Inc., 825 F.3d at 305 (quoting Brown &

Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983)).

For example, in the last paragraph of Section 8, the parties propose a procedure that would

effectively turn the presumption of openness on its head by inviting parties and “potentially-

prejudiced” nonparties alike to object to public disclosure of not just documents that are designated

as confidential under the protective order, but of any document counsel subjectively “believes may

warrant sealing.”1 (Id. at 8). The parties offer no authority to suggest such a prophylactic measure to

public disclosure and related motion practice is appropriate. Additionally, because counsel must

adhere to the Local Rules of this District, my Standing Orders, and Sixth Circuit precedent including

1 Through the first paragraph of Section 8, the parties propose a separate procedure to be followed

when a party seeks to file materials designated as confidential under the protective order. (Doc. No.

15-1 at 7-8). The existence of this alternate proposed procedure not only suggests that the alternate

procedure in the last paragraph applies to documents outside the scope of the protective order, but

also is itself at odds with Shane Group, Inc. Under this procedure, a party seeking to file “any

confidential information subject to protection under this Order” could “fil[e] a redacted document

with the consent of the party who designated the document as confidential” rather than “seeking

permission to file the document under seal by filing a motion for leave to file under seal.” (Id.). But

as the parties recognize in the second paragraph of Section 8, “[r]egardless of whether the parties

agree, it remains the Court’s independent obligation to determine whether a seal is appropriate for

any given document or portion thereof.” (Id. at 8) (emphasis added). If I allowed the filing party and

the producing entity to determine what portions of a document to redact, I would effectively allow

them to agree to seal portions of the document. I cannot abdicate my obligations in such a manner.

See Shane Group, Inc., 825 F.3d at 306 (“[A] court’s obligation to explain the basis for sealing court

records is independent of whether anyone objects to it.”).

Shane Group, Inc., I conclude the remainder of Section 8 serves little purpose and may cause

unnecessary confusion. Accordingly, I reject it.

For the foregoing reasons, I deny the parties’ joint motion for protective order without

prejudice. (Doc. No. 15).

So Ordered.

s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick

United States District Judge