The opinion
[Cite as In re A.K., 2026-Ohio-1778.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE A.K., ET AL. :
Minor Children : No. 115840
[Appeal by A.V., Mother] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 14, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Juvenile Division
Case Nos. AD-23-909971 and AD-23-909972
Appearances:
Brian A. Smith Law Firm, LLC and Brian A. Smith, for
appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:
Appellant-mother A.V. (“Mother”) appeals from the juvenile court’s
judgment granting permanent custody of her minor children, A.K., and S.A., to
appellee, Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or
“the agency”). Mother raises the following assignment of error for review:
The trial court’s rulings in case numbers AD-23-909971 and AD-23-
909972 granting appellee’s motion to modify temporary custody to
permanent custody, were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
After careful review of the record and relevant case law, we affirm the
juvenile court’s judgment.
I. Procedural and Factual History
A.V. is the biological mother of both A.K. (d.o.b. 04/18/2020) and
S.A. (d.o.b. 08/02/2023). D.K. is the alleged biological father of A.K.; however,
paternity has not been established. Sh.A. is the biological father of S.A.1
On August 30, 2023, CCDCFS filed a complaint for temporary
custody of both children, alleging that S.A. was abused as defined in R.C. 2151.031,
and that both children were neglected and dependent as defined in R.C. 2151.03 and
2151.04. The complaint relied on the following particulars:
1. Mother has a substance abuse problem that interferes with her
ability to provide appropriate care for her children. Mother tested
positive for fentanyl and cocaine during the second and third trimester
of her pregnancy.
2. S.A. has been hospitalized and treated for withdrawal symptoms
following his birth.
3. Mother lacks the decision making and parenting skills to provide
appropriate care for the children.
4. Mother has an older child who is no longer in her custody due in part
to Mother’s substance abuse issues. See case no. AD-18-906953.
5. Mother has a criminal conviction for possession of drugs.
1The children’s fathers are not parties to this appeal; therefore, our analysis will
primarily focus on the circumstances relating to Mother.
6. Alleged father of A.K., [D.K.], has failed to establish paternity,
support, visit, or communicate with the child on a consistent basis.
7. Alleged father of S.A., [Sh.A.], has yet to establish paternity.
8. Alleged father of S.A., [Sh.A.], is a registered sex offender and was
convicted of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, promoting
prostitution and notice of change of address.
Following a hearing, the children were committed to the emergency temporary care
of the agency on August 31, 2023.
On November 13, 2023, a hearing on CCDCFS’s complaint for
temporary custody was held before a magistrate. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the magistrate found the allegations of an amended complaint were proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Accordingly, S.A. was adjudicated abused, neglected and
dependent. A.K. was adjudicated neglected and dependent. Both children were
placed in the temporary custody of the agency. On December 8, 2023, the trial court
adopted the magistrate’s decision. The trial court subsequently approved a case plan
that was developed and implemented to promote the permanency plan of
reunification.
On August 20, 2024, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary
custody to permanent custody pursuant to R.C. 2151.413. The motion was supported
by the affidavit of CCDCFS social worker, Deshawn Jones (“Jones”), who alleged, in
pertinent part:
5. A case plan was filed with the Juvenile Court and approved which
requires that mother engage in substance abuse treatment services;
6. Mother has failed to consistently engage in substance abuse
treatment services. Her most recent screen in March of 2024 was
positive for fentanyl, cocaine, and marijuana. She has declined all
subsequent requests to screen and does not have a documented
sobriety date;
7. Mother has another child who was adjudicated abused due in part
to Mother’s substance abuse. That child is now in the legal custody of
a relative. See Case No. AD-18-906958;
8. Mother is currently incarcerated in the Cuyahoga County jail due to
a violation of probation related to her conviction of drug possession.
See Cuyahoga County C.P. No. 23-CR-6796671 [sic].
Following several continuances, the matter proceeded to a trial on
September 25, 2025. On behalf of the agency, DeLayna Campbell (“Campbell”),
testified that she is employed as a child protective specialist with CCDCFS and was
the first extended service worker assigned to the children’s case. Campbell outlined
the procedural history of the case and explained the circumstances that caused the
children to be removed from Mother’s care, including Mother’s history of drug abuse
and past interactions with the agency.
During the pendency of this case, a case plan for reunification was
developed, and amended as appropriate, to assist Mother in addressing the agency’s
ongoing concerns. In pertinent part, the case plan required Mother to (1)
successfully complete an inpatient drug treatment program, submit to scheduled
and random urine screens as requested and sign a release of information as
requested; and (2) provide the agency with a copy of her mental-health evaluation,
sign a release of information as requested, engage in any recommended services and
follow through with any recommended appointments or medications.
Substance-abuse objectives were included in the case plan because
Mother (1) “has a history of drug abuse” (2) “tested positive for cocaine and fentanyl
in her third trimester” and (3) S.A. tested positive for methadone at the time of birth.
(R. 111.) In addition, S.A. was born while Mother was incarcerated for a drug-related
conviction. As a condition of her release from jail, Mother was ordered to
successfully complete an inpatient program at the Hitchcock Center for Women (Tr.
21, Nov. 13, 2023.)
Campbell testified that Mother completed substance-abuse services
through Hitchcock in February 2024. However, Mother subsequently relapsed and
tested positive for cocaine and fentanyl from a hair sample submitted in March
2024. (R. 148.) Mother was then referred to Signature Health where she was
diagnosed with “opiate use disorder, severe” and “cocaine use disorder, severe.” (Tr.
19, 69.) Following a substance-abuse assessment in February 2024, it was
recommended that Mother complete an intensive outpatient treatment program
through Signature Health. Specifically, it was recommended that Mother
participate in a program that met three hours per day, three times per week, for a
12-week period. According to Campbell, Mother only attended one treatment
session through Signature Health before disengaging from the provider. Megan
Branstein (“Branstein”), a substance abuse counselor employed by Signature
Health, confirmed that Mother did not consistently attend scheduled appointments,
did not complete required drug screens and did not successfully complete the
recommended outpatient program. Branstein stated that the provider’s relationship
with Mother was minimal and consisted of “one group session” and “a few phone
calls.” (Tr. 68.)
After Mother ended her services through Signature Health, she
notified the agency that she intended to start services through OhioGuidestone.
Campbell confirmed that Mother was able to enroll herself into an outpatient
program at OhioGuidestone and began the services approximately two months
before the permanent custody trial. However, when Campbell spoke with
representatives from OhioGuidestone, she learned that Mother only attended one
virtual treatment session. And, during that session, Mother did not turn on her
camera and logged off approximately 20 minutes into the session. Thus,
OhioGuidestone “did not consider that a completion of the session.” (Tr. 21.) For
this reason, Campbell testified that, as of the date of trial, there was no verifiable
evidence to suggest Mother has completed the recommended outpatient services.
Campbell further testified that Mother’s last drug screen for the agency occurred in
May 2024. Thereafter, Mother did not submit to any of the agency’s requested drug
screens between February 2025 and September 2025. Nor did Mother provide the
agency with any records indicating that she completed a drug screen at an
independent location.
Mental-health objectives were included in the case plan because
Mother “is diagnosed with anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder.” (R. 111.) Mother was referred for mental-
health services through Signature Health and completed an initial intake evaluation.
Mother’s medical records indicate that she participated in mental-health sessions at
Signature Health but attended only five of the 22 scheduled appointments.
(CCDCFS exhibit No. 10.) Mother later notified the agency that she intended to
continue her mental-health services through OhioGuidestone. While at
OhioGuidestone, Mother was diagnosed with significant mental-health disorders
that required continuing mental-health counseling and medication management.
The records indicate, however, that Mother’s engagement with OhioGuidestone was
sparse. Specifically, Campbell testified that Mother’s attendance at a therapeutic
appointment on July 20, 2025, was OhioGuidestone’s “first encounter with the
client in about a year.” (Tr. 28; CCDCFS exhibit No. 11.) Mother attended no other
appointments prior to trial. (Id.) Given Mother’s inconsistent participation in
recommended services, Campbell stated that Mother had not complied with the
mental-health objectives of her case plan.
Stable and appropriate housing also remained a concern for the
agency. Campbell testified that Mother claimed to have housing through the EDEN
housing program. However, as of trial, Mother had not provided the agency with a
copy of her lease or other documentation from EDEN. Campbell testified that she
attempted to discuss Mother’s housing situation with representatives of EDEN
before trial but was unable to “verify [Mother]’s current housing” situation. (Tr. 29.)
Under cross-examination, Campbell did concede that she previously visited
Mother’s residence and that it was a suitable home. Nevertheless, Campbell opined
that, as of the date of trial, she could not confirm the terms of the lease agreement
or whether Mother was legally residing in the home. Campbell further stated that
Mother is not currently employed and has not presented the agency with
documentation to suggest otherwise.
With respect to visitation, Campbell testified that Mother has
exercised her right to visitation during the pendency of this case. Initially, Mother
participated in supervised overnight visits with the children while she was residing
at Hitchcock. Thereafter, the court permitted Mother to participate in unsupervised
visits with the children over the agency’s objection. However, these visits were
terminated after Mother was incarcerated in late 2024. Upon her release in
February 2025, Mother began weekly supervised visits with the children. Campbell
testified that Mother’s visits with the children were appropriate and that there is an
observable, loving bond between Mother and the children.
The last visit with the children, prior to trial, occurred on August 7,
2025. Campbell testified that the agency attempted to facilitate a visit on August 14,
2025. Mother, however, failed to respond. Mother notified the agency that she was
unable to participate in the August 14, 2025 visit because her phone had been stolen.
CCDCFS later learned, however, that Mother had been arrested and incarcerated on
a new charge of receiving stolen property. (CCDCFS exhibit No. 7.)
Regarding the children’s biological fathers, Campbell testified that
S.A.’s father, Sh.A., was incarcerated following a probation violation. The agency
had ongoing concerns with Sh.A.’s ability to receive custody of the child due to his
criminal history, including a prior case involving sexual crimes with minors. With
respect to A.K., Campbell testified that the alleged father, D.K., did not establish
paternity or engage with the agency during the pendency of this matter. Campbell
further testified that the agency attempted to identify suitable relatives for
placement prior to trial. Their efforts, ultimately, proved unsuccessful.
Finally, Campbell provided extensive testimony concerning the
children’s current placement. The children are currently placed in separate foster
homes because their respective caregivers are unable to take both children. A.K. was
originally placed with her maternal grandfather. She was subsequently moved to
the residence of her maternal cousin at the request of the maternal grandfather. A.K.
has “adjusted well” to her current placement and appears to be “well bonded” with
her caregivers. (Tr. 37.) S.A. has been placed with a fictive kin since he came into
the agency’s custody. Campbell testified that S.A. is “very well bonded” and
“emotionally attached” to his caregivers. (Tr. 38.) A.K. and S.A. are also bonded
with each other and their respective caregivers “have the understanding and the
willingness to continue visitation between the two of them outside of visitation, as
well.” (Tr. 39-40.)
Based on the foregoing, Campbell opined that Mother had not
remedied the conditions leading to the children’s removal and, therefore, was
unable to provide the children with a safe, stable and permanent home. Accordingly.
Campbell believed that the children were still in need of a legally secure permanent
placement.
At the conclusion of trial, the court heard from the child’s guardian
ad litem (the “GAL”). Consistent with the recommendations of the agency’s
employees, the GAL recommended that permanent custody be granted in favor of
CCDCFS. The GAL summarized her position as follows:
Your Honor, I still continue to recommend permanent custody for
these children. They are thriving in their current placements.
Unfortunately, love isn’t enough in this case. There’s no doubt in my
mind that mother loves her children and that her children love her.
Unfortunately, my recommendation and opinion is they need a sober
caregiver in order to consistently provide for their needs. And that just
hasn’t happened in time.
I know mother has expressed repeatedly a desire to get sober, but we
need action steps and we didn’t get that in this case.
(Tr. 76-77.)
On October 20, 2025, the juvenile court issued separate journal
entries granting the agency’s motion for permanent custody, thereby terminating
Mother’s parental rights. This timely appeal followed.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Manifest Weight of the Evidence
In the sole assignments of error in the respective cases, Mother argues
the juvenile court’s judgment granting permanent custody to CCDCFS is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Mother contends that the evidence presented at
trial demonstrated, contrary to the juvenile court’s findings, that “the children could
be placed with Mother within a reasonable time.” Mother further suggests that the
juvenile court’s best interests determination failed to adequately consider material
facts, including (1) her stable housing in the City of Lakewood, (2) her uncontested
bond with the children, (3) her history of appropriate visitation with the children,
(4) her continued engagement in substance-abuse counseling and (5) Campbell’s
“lack of definite knowledge of Mother’s case plan involvement and use of services.”
As always, we take our responsibility in reviewing cases involving the
termination of parental rights and the award of permanent custody very seriously.
A parent has a “‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody and management”
of his or her child, In re Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 156 (1990), quoting Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), and the right to raise one’s own child is “‘an
essential and basic civil right.’” In re N.B., 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67 (8th Dist.), quoting
In re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48 (1997). However, this right is not absolute. It is
“‘always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the polestar or
controlling principle to be observed.’” In re L.D., 2017-Ohio-1037, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.),
quoting In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio St.2d 100, 106 (1979).
Because the termination of parental rights is “‘the family law
equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case,’” it is “an alternative [of] last
resort.” In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, ¶ 66 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Hoffman, 2002-
Ohio-5368, ¶ 14; In re Gill, 2002-Ohio-3242, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.). It is, however,
“sanctioned when necessary for the welfare of a child.” In re M.S., 2015-Ohio-1028,
¶ 7 (8th Dist.), citing In re Wise, 96 Ohio App.3d 619, 624 (9th Dist. 1994). All
children have “‘the right, if possible, to parenting from either natural or adoptive
parents which provides support, care, discipline, protection and motivation.’” In re
J.B. at ¶ 66, quoting In re Hitchcock, 120 Ohio App.3d 88, 102 (8th Dist. 1996).
Where parental rights are terminated, the goal is to create “a more stable life” for
dependent children and to “facilitate adoption to foster permanency for children.”
In re N.B. at ¶ 67, citing In re Howard, 1986 Ohio App. LEXIS 7860, 5 (5th Dist.
Aug. 1, 1986).
1. Standard of Review
R.C. 2151.414 provides a two-prong analysis to be applied by a
juvenile court in adjudicating a motion for permanent custody. In re S.C., 2018-
Ohio-2523, ¶ 20 (8th Dist.), citing R.C. 2151.414(B). This first prong of this statute
authorizes the juvenile court to grant permanent custody of a child to the public
agency if, after a hearing, the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence,
that any of the following factors apply: (a) the child is not abandoned or orphaned
but the child cannot, or should not, be placed with either parent within a reasonable
time, (b) the child is abandoned, (c) the child is orphaned and there are no relatives
of the child who are able to take permanent custody, (d) the child has been in the
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private child
placing agencies for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month period or (e) the
child or another child in the custody of the parent or parents from whose custody
the child has been removed has been adjudicated an abused, neglected or dependent
child on three separate occasions by any court in this state or another state. R.C.
2151.414(B)(1)(a)-(e).
In accordance with the second prong of R.C. 2151.414, when any one
of the above factors exists, the juvenile court must then analyze whether, by clear
and convincing evidence, it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent
custody to the agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D). “‘Clear and convincing evidence
is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the
evidence,” but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable
doubt” in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a
firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.’” In re Z.C., 2023-
Ohio-4703, ¶ 7, quoting Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three
of the syllabus.
The Supreme Court of Ohio clarified the standard of review in
permanent custody cases, explaining that
[g]iven that R.C. 2151.414 requires that a juvenile court find by clear
and convincing evidence that the statutory requirements are met . . .
the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-
evidence standards of review are the proper appellate standards of
review of a juvenile court’s permanent-custody determination, as
appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that are
presented by the parties.
In re Z.C. at ¶ 11.
In reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we must
examine the record to determine whether the trier of facts had sufficient evidence
before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof. See id. at ¶ 12, citing Cross at 477.
“When reviewing for manifest weight, the appellate court must weigh the evidence
and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and
determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the finder of fact clearly
lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the judgment
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” Id. at ¶ 14, citing Eastley v. Volkman,
2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20.
With respect to Mother’s challenges to the weight of the evidence
supporting the juvenile court’s judgment in this case, the Ohio Supreme Court has
emphasized the importance of affording appropriate deference to the finder of fact,
stating:
“In weighing the evidence, the court of appeals must always be mindful
of the presumption in favor of the finder of fact.” [Eastley] at ¶ 21. “The
underlying rationale of giving deference to the findings of the trial court
rests with the knowledge that the trial judge is best able to view the
witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures and voice inflections,
and use these observations in weighing the credibility of the proffered
testimony.” Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80
(1984). “‘If the evidence is susceptible of more than one construction,
the reviewing court is bound to give it that interpretation which is
consistent with the verdict and judgment, most favorable to sustaining
the verdict and judgment.’” Id. at fn. 3, quoting 5 Ohio Jurisprudence
3d, Appellate Review, Section 603, at 191-192 (1978).
Id. at ¶ 14.
2. First Prong — R.C. 2151.414(B)
Regarding the first prong of the permanent-custody analysis, the
juvenile court found, pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), that the children could not
be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with
their parents.
When assessing whether a child cannot be placed with either of the
child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s
parents under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a), a juvenile court must consider the factors
outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E). In re A.V., 2014-Ohio-5348, ¶ 58 (8th Dist.). A
juvenile court is only required to find that one of these factors is met in order to
properly find that a child cannot or should not be placed with a parent. In re Ca.T.,
2020-Ohio-579, ¶ 27 (8th Dist.), citing In re V.C., 2015-Ohio-4991, ¶ 42 (8th Dist.).
In this case, the juvenile court found the children could not be placed
with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either
parent pursuant to the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), (9), (10), (13),
(15) and (16). These provisions provide as follows:
(1) Following the placement of the child outside the child’s home and
notwithstanding reasonable case planning and diligent efforts by the
agency to assist the parents to remedy the problems that initially
caused the child to be placed outside the home, the parent has failed
continuously and repeatedly to substantially remedy the conditions
causing the child to be placed outside the child’s home. In determining
whether the parents have substantially remedied those conditions, the
court shall consider parental utilization of medical, psychiatric,
psychological, and other social and rehabilitative services and material
resources that were made available to the parents for the purpose of
changing parental conduct to allow them to resume and maintain
parental duties.
(2) Chronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual
disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent
that is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate
permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated,
within one year after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division
(A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section
2151.353 of the Revised Code;
...
(9) The parent has placed the child at substantial risk of harm two or
more times due to alcohol or drug abuse and has rejected treatment two
or more times or refused to participate in further treatment two or
more times after a case plan issued pursuant to section 2151.412 of the
Revised Code requiring treatment of the parent was journalized as part
of a dispositional order issued with respect to the child or an order was
issued by any other court requiring treatment of the parent.
(10) The parent has abandoned the child.[2]
...
(13) The parent is repeatedly incarcerated, and the repeated
incarceration prevents the parent from providing care for the child.[3]
...
(15) The parent has committed abuse as described in section 2151.031
of the Revised Code against the child or caused or allowed the child to
suffer neglect as described in section 2151.03 of the Revised Code, and
the court determines that the seriousness, nature, or likelihood of
recurrence of the abuse or neglect makes the child’s placement with the
child’s parent a threat to the child’s safety.
...
(16) Any other factor the court considers relevant.
After careful consideration, we find the record supports the juvenile
court’s determination that A.K. and S.A. clearly and convincingly could not or should
not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time. In this case, the children
were removed from Mother’s care due to her prior history with CCDCFS and her
extensive history of substance-abuse and mental-health issues. As mentioned,
Mother was actively using drugs during her pregnancy and was incarcerated at the
2 This finding was only included in the judgment entry pertaining to A.K.
3 This finding was only included in the judgment entry pertaining to S.A. The child’s
biological father, Sh.A. was incarcerated at the time of trial.
time of S.A.’s birth. After the complaint for temporary custody was filed, CCDCFS
developed a case plan for reunification that was designed to address the agency’s
ongoing concerns with Mother’s ability to care for the children.
Upon review, we find the record reflects that Mother failed to
complete significant portions of her case plan and, therefore, failed to substantially
remedy the conditions that caused the children to be removed from her home.
Regarding her substance-abuse issues, Mother was diagnosed with severe opiate
and cocaine disorders. In February 2024, Mother successfully completed a court-
ordered substance-abuse program through Hitchcock and was progressing in her
case plan. From that point on, however, Mother relapsed and failed to consistently
comply with the requests of the agency or the recommendations of the referred
substance-abuse providers. Campbell testified, for example, that Mother only
participated in one session of an outpatient program through Signature Health.
Thereafter, Mother enrolled in drug treatment services through OhioGuidestone.
Again, however, Mother only attended one virtual session of the outpatient program
at OhioGuidestone and logged off of the appointment before it was completed.
Campbell testified that Mother had not successfully completed any recommended
substance-abuse services by the time of trial. Campbell further stated that Mother
had a history of noncompliance with requested drug screens. Mother’s last drug
screen for the agency was completed in May 2024. Mother did not submit to any of
the requested drug screens between February 2025 and the date of trial. (Tr. 21-22.)
Thus, Mother’s date of sobriety, if any, was not established by a verifiable source.
The agency also had ongoing concerns with Mother’s ability to
provide the children with a permanent home based on her failure to adequately
address the mental-health issues that have contributed to her drug use and pattern
of relapses. Although Mother completed a mental-health assessment, the medical
records introduced at trial demonstrate that Mother’s participation and attendance
at scheduled appointments has been erratic. Specifically, Mother only attended five
of the 22 mental-health appointments scheduled through Signature Health.
Mother’s attendance at mental-health appointments scheduled through
OhioGuidestone was equally scarce. Accordingly, Campbell testified that Mother
had not complied with the mental-health objectives of her case plan.
Finally, the record shows that Mother failed to provide the agency
with documented evidence of secure, permanent housing. Although Campbell
confirmed that she had previously visited Mother’s current residence, the agency
could not confirm whether Mother was enrolled in a housing program through
EDEN. Thus, the agency had no knowledge of the terms of Mother’s housing or even
if she was legally residing in the home. This factor was significant to the agency
because Mother had no verifiable employment.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we are unable to conclude that
the juvenile court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (E) were against the
manifest weight of the evidence. The juvenile court was presented with all relevant
information at trial and was in the best position to assess the credibility of
Campbell’s testimony and weigh the evidence going to each statutory factor. Here,
the evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the alleged fathers of the children
had no involvement or interaction with the children during the pendency of this
case. The evidence also highlighted Mother’s failure, or unwillingness, to address
the agency’s concerns with respect to her ability to adequately care for the young
children within a reasonable period of time. Significantly, Mother has no
established sobriety date and has failed to take the necessary steps to permanently
resolve her chemical dependency. In addition, Mother has not meaningfully
engaged with her mental-health treatment and continued to engage in troubling
conduct during the pendency of this case that led to additional criminal charges, her
incarceration in unrelated cases and prolonged absences from the children.
Accordingly, we find clear and convincing evidence supported the juvenile court’s
conclusion that the children could not, or should not, be placed with either parent
within a reasonable time pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).
3. Second Prong: Best Interest of the Child
Having determined that competent and credible evidence supports
the juvenile court’s finding that the child could not or should not be returned to
either parent within a reasonable time, we now turn to the second prong of our
analysis, which requires the court to determine, by clear and convincing evidence,
whether it is in the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody to the
agency pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(D).
“In determining the best interest of a child, a juvenile court ‘may
apply one of two different tests.’” In re S.C., 2022-Ohio-356, ¶ 38 (10th Dist.),
quoting In re J.P., 2019-Ohio-1619, ¶ 39 (10th Dist.). “‘Under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1),
the juvenile court weighs multiple factors . . . to decide whether granting an agency
permanent custody of a child is in that child’s best interest.’” Id., quoting In re J.P.
at ¶ 39. “By contrast, ‘under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2), if the juvenile court makes [each
of] the four enumerated findings, permanent custody is per se in the child’s best
interest and the court “shall” commit the child to the permanent custody of the
agency.’” Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 39. “These two provisions ‘are alternative means
for reaching the best-interest determination.’” Id., quoting In re J.P. at ¶ 40.
In this case, the juvenile court applied R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) and found,
by clear and convincing evidence, “that a grant of permanent custody is in the best
interests of the [children].” R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) provides as follows:
If all of the following apply, permanent custody is in the best interest of
the child, and the court shall commit the child to the permanent
custody of a public children services agency or private child placing
agency:
(a) The court determines by clear and convincing evidence
that one or more of the factors in division (E) of this
section exist and the child cannot be placed with one of the
child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be
placed with either parent.
(b) The child has been in an agency’s custody for two years
or longer, and no longer qualifies for temporary custody
pursuant to division (D) of section 2151.415 of the Revised
Code.
(c) The child does not meet the requirements for a planned
permanent living arrangement pursuant to division (A)(5)
of section 2151.353 of the Revised Code.
(d) Prior to the dispositional hearing, no relative or other
interested person has filed, or has been identified in, a
motion for legal custody of the child.
If all the factors enumerated under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) are
applicable, permanent custody is per se in the child’s best interest and the juvenile
court must commit the child to the permanent custody of the agency. In re G.A.,
2020-Ohio-2949, ¶ 61 (8th Dist.), citing In re J.R., 2018-Ohio-1474, ¶ 41 (10th
Dist.).
Upon review, we find there is competent, credible evidence in the
record to support the juvenile court’s reliance on the factors set forth under R.C.
2151.414(D)(2) and its conclusion that permanent custody to the agency is in
children’s best interests. In this case, the children were removed from Mother’s care
in August 2023 and remained in the agency’s custody throughout the pendency of
these proceedings. Accordingly, as of the date of the permanent-custody trial, the
children had been in the agency’s custody for approximately 25 months and no
longer qualified for an extension of temporary custody. See R.C. 2151.415(D)(4)
(“[T]he court shall not order an existing temporary custody order to continue
beyond two years after the date on which the complaint was filed or the child was
first placed into shelter care, whichever date is earlier, regardless of whether any
extensions have been previously ordered pursuant to division (D) of this section.”).
Moreover, as previously discussed, the juvenile court’s findings under R.C.
2151.414(D)(2)(a) and (E) are supported by ample evidence in the record. Mother
has failed to successfully remedy the severe substance-abuse and mental-health
issues that have impaired her parenting in the past, and she continues to engage in
questionable conduct that has led to additional criminal charges and prevents her
from maintaining a safe and adequate home for the children. Finally, the young
children did not meet the requirements for a planned permanent-living
arrangement (to do so, a child must be at least 16 years old) and the agency was
unable to identify any relatives or other interested person who could take legal
custody of the children. R.C. 2151.353(A)(5).
Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that this is the exceptional case
where the juvenile court lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice in
evaluating the best-interest factors. The juvenile court was presented with all
relevant evidence relating to the R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) findings, including the
children’s custodial history and the significant issues Mother has yet to resolve.
Although “[f]amily unity and blood relationship are vital factors to carefully and
fully consider,” the “paramount consideration” is always the best interest of the
child. In re J.B., 2013-Ohio-1704, at ¶ 111. While Mother loves her children and has
visited with them regularly when not incarcerated, she has failed to demonstrate the
ability to provide the children with a safe and stable home despite having over two
years to do so.
Viewed collectively, the R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) findings mandated that
permanent custody is in the children’s best interests and that the court commit the
children to the permanent custody of the agency. Accordingly, we find the juvenile
court’s judgment granting the agency permanent custody and terminating Mother’s
parental rights is supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record and is
not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The sole assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
________________________
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., CONCUR