Opinion

State v. Walker

2026 Ohio 1767

Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
Filed: May 14, 2026
Status: Published
On the bench: Laster Mays
Cited by: 2 cases
Authority: More cited than 47.8%

The opinion

[Cite as State v. Walker, 2026-Ohio-1767.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :

No. 115280

v. :

ROBERT WALKER, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: May 14, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas

Case No. CR-24-694420-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting

Attorney, and Courtney Kirven, Assistant Prosecuting

Attorney, for appellee.

Joseph V. Pagano, for appellant.

ANITA LASTER MAYS, J.:

Defendant-appellant Robert Walker (“Walker”) appeals his

convictions and asks this court to vacate his convictions and remand to the trial

court for a new trial. We affirm.

Walker was charged with seven counts including having weapons

while under disability, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2923.13(A)(3);

carrying a concealed weapon, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of

R.C. 2923.12(A)(2); two counts of improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle,

fourth- and fifth-degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2923.16(B) and (D)(1);

obstructing official business, a second-degree misdemeanor, in violation of

R.C. 2921.31(A); and two counts of driving while under the influence of alcohol or

drugs, first-degree misdemeanors, in violation of R.C. 4511.19(A)(1)(A) and

(J)(VIII)(II). After a jury trial, Walker was found not guilty of obstructing official

business but guilty of all remaining counts. Walker was sentenced to 18 months of

community-control sanctions.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On January 8, 2025, prior to Walker’s trial, he filed a motion to

suppress arguing that there was no lawful cause to stop and detain him, impound

and search his vehicle, and arrest him without a warrant. The trial court held a

hearing on the motion on February 18, 2025. On March 10, 2025, the trial court

denied Walker’s motion to suppress. Journal Entry No. 193182367 (Mar. 10, 2025).

The matter proceeded to a jury trial.

At Walker’s trial, Officer Jearod Woods (“Ofc. Woods”), of the

Cleveland Police Department, testified that on August 24, 2024, he initiated a traffic

stop after observing Walker driving a vehicle with dark-window tint and failing to

yield to a traffic light. Tr. 194-195. As Ofc. Woods pursued Walker’s vehicle, Walker

made a U-turn, parked in a parking spot, and got out of his vehicle. Tr. 196. Ofc.

Woods turned his lights and sirens on his cruiser and parked. Walker then began

walking towards Ofc. Woods. Ofc. Woods instructed Walker to get out of the street,

and Walker eventually walked over to the grass area. Id.

During this traffic stop, Ofc. Woods determined that Walker failed to

comply with his commands, informing Walker not to approach the officers. Tr. 202.

During his testimony, Ofc. Woods was asked if he responded differently to Walker

because Walker exited his vehicle. Ofc. Woods stated, “Instead of a normal, hey, this

is the reason for the stop, you know, introducing ourselves, everything like that, then

we would go and detain him because technically at this point, he’s obstructing what

we’re trying to do.” Tr. 201. He continued, “Well, I was trying to tell him the reason

for the stop. I mean if he would still have been in the car it would have been just a

traffic violation.” Id. Ofc. Woods explained that Walker told him that he lived in the

apartments at the corner while flailing his arms. As a result of Walker’s

noncompliance, Ofc. Woods detained Walker and patted him down for any

weapons.

Next, according to his testimony, Ofc. Woods asked Walker if he had

anything in his car because Walker smelled like marijuana. At this point in the trial,

the video-surveillance footage of the arrest was observed, and Walker stated that the

officers could keep the gun and the weed if they wrote him a ticket. Tr. 204. The

officers searched Walker’s vehicle and found a loaded gun under the driver’s seat

and marijuana in the center console.

Walker explained to Ofc. Woods that his girlfriend bought him the

gun and that he had just been smoking marijuana. Tr. 209. After detaining Walker,

the officers took him to the hospital so a “chemical” test could be administered to

Walker. Id. Dr. Luigino Apollonio (“Dr. Apollonio”), the chief toxicologist at the

Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office, testified that he reviewed Walker’s

toxicology report, which demonstrated that Walker had marijuana and cocaine in

his system. Tr. 187.

At the end of the State’s case, the State sought to admit two prior

journal entries of Walker’s plea in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-14-590759-A, where

Walker pleaded guilty to drug possession. Tr. 243. The trial court asked if there

were any objections to the proposed exhibits. Walker’s counsel initially stated: “No,

Judge, it’s videos and that was shown, the gun and the report.” Tr. 244. After the

State described in detail what exhibits it was admitting, the trial court again asked

Walker’s counsel, “[I]s there an objection to any of the State’s proposed exhibits?”

Tr. 245. To which, Walker’s trial counsel replied, “No.” Id. The trial court

responded: “At this time all of the exhibits proposed by the State of Ohio will be

deemed admitted.” Id.

Once the exhibits were admitted, Walker moved for a Crim.R. 29

motion of acquittal. The State objected, stating:

Just based off the testimony and exhibits, the State does feel it’s met its

burden, provided enough evidence to get this to the trier of fact, to the

jury. First just briefly for the having weapons charge, we have a

stipulated to prior conviction for Mr. Walker, we’ve had testimony that

he had the firearm in his possession in his car. He was the sole driver,

it was under his seat. We also have several statements from him

indicating that possession that the jury can infer from where he stated

my weed and gun, he’s stating that he was attempting to protect

himself. Even though there are statements that his girlfriend

purchased the firearm, there is evidence that he was in possession of it

at that point.

We know it was readily at hand in regards to the carrying concealed

weapons. It was under his seat in his vehicle immediately within his

reach. In regards to improper handling charges, 3 and 4, we know Mr.

Walker was operating the car, that he brought it to a stop, he was the

driver. We know that that firearm was located in the vehicle.

We also heard testimony that he was under the influence while

operating that vehicle. That firearm, through observation from Officer

Woods as well as testimony from Dr. Apollonio, that he was above the

legal limit. And we also observed video of Mr. Walker obstructing

Officer Woods and his partner at that time, immediately getting out of

his car against his orders, approaching officers, getting in their

personal space, reaching for his pockets. And furthering that stop and

their interaction with him that impeded their duties.

So, your Honor, viewing the light most favorable to the State, I do

believe that we did meet our burden to get us to the jury for

consideration.

Tr. 245-247.

The trial court denied Walker’s Crim.R. 29 motion. The trial court

then asked if the stipulation to Walker’s prior offense should be in the jury

instructions or just something that the trial court can verbally advise the jury.

Tr. 248. Walker’s trial counsel stated: “I mean, I guess I should have mentioned this

in my Rule 29 motion, but the prosecutor never entered it into evidence. We had a

stipulation, but —.” Id. The State interrupted, stating: “Your Honor, my

understanding is with the stipulation was to the identity and the contents of it as a

whole. It’s a self-authenticating journal entry.” Id. However, Walker’s counsel

countered by stating it was supposed to be done in front of the jury. The State

responded, stating:

My understanding is we did not have to, it’s a stipulated-to document

that they would receive as an exhibit. We also heard testimony that he

has the prior conviction as well through Officer Woods. It’s not a

document that they would be receiving the information of itself for the

first time. We’ve heard testimony, it’s been stipulated to and it would

be considered by the jury.

Tr. 248-249.

The trial court responded: “We do have a stipulation as part of the

record. And the certified copies of the plea and conviction were entered into

evidence without objection from defense counsel.” Tr. 249. Walker’s trial counsel

responded that he stipulated but it was never presented to the jury. Id. The trial

court allowed Walker’s trial counsel to renew his Crim.R. 29 motion to dismiss based

upon the fact that the stipulation to the journal entries were never presented to the

jury. He clarified that he objected to the admission of the entries, not their

authentication. Tr. 253. The trial court, again, denied the motion. Tr. 254.

The trial continued, and Walker testified that the police were never

behind him. He parked his car at his home, exited the vehicle, and then he saw the

police with guns and tasers pointed at him. Tr. 256. Walker also testified that his

girlfriend previously used his car several times and she more than likely placed the

gun under the seat. He testified that he was unaware the gun was in the car. He also

claimed that he spoke with the FBI and Office of Professional Standards because the

surveillance videos had been edited. He also testified that the toxicology report

stating that there was ten times the legal limit of marijuana in his system was

incorrect.

At the end of the trial, the jury found him guilty of all counts except

for obstruction of official business, and Walker was sentenced to community-control

sanctions. He filed this appeal, assigning four errors for our review.

1. The trial court erred by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress

in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution and Art. I, § 14 of the Ohio Constitution;

2. The trial court erred when it denied appellant’s motion for

acquittal under Crim.R. 29 because the state failed to present sufficient

evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the elements

necessary to support the convictions;

3. Appellant’s convictions are against the manifest weight of the

evidence; and

4. The trial court erred by admitting the certified copies of the

journal entries after the State rested its case and over defense objection.

We review the assignments of error out of order for ease of structure.

II. Motion to Suppress

A. Standard of Review

“The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution prohibit warrantless searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are

per se unreasonable unless an exception applies.” State v. Crawford, 2020-Ohio-

268, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.), citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).

“Evidence obtained from an unreasonable search or seizure must be suppressed.”

Id., citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).

This court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under

a mixed standard of review.

“In a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact

and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate

witness credibility.” State v. Curry, 95 Ohio App.3d 93, 96, 641 N.E.2d

1172 (8th Dist.1994). The reviewing court must accept the trial court’s

findings of fact in ruling on a motion to suppress if the findings are

supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Burnside, 100

Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. With respect to

the trial court’s conclusion of law, the reviewing court applies a de novo

standard of review and decides whether the facts satisfy the applicable

legal standard. Id., citing State v. McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706,

707 N.E.2d 539 (4th Dist.1997).

Id., quoting State v. Miller, 2018-Ohio-4898, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.).

B. Law and Analysis

In Walker’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

erred by denying his motion to suppress. Specifically, he claims that the search of

his vehicle was not justified by any exception to the warrant requirement. Walker

cites the Third District’s decision in State v. Eversole, 2017-Ohio-8436 (3d Dist.),

where the court held that “law enforcement may only search a vehicle incident to an

OVI arrest when that law-enforcement officer has reason to believe, based on

common-sense factors and the totality of the circumstances, that evidence of the

offense of arrest is inside.” Id. ¶ 28. The Third District reversed the trial court’s

judgment denying the appellant’s motion to suppress.

The decision in Eversole can be distinguished from the facts in the

instant case. The appellant in Eversole was pulled over by police for committing

traffic violations. Following a field sobriety test, the appellant was detained and put

into the police car. Following the detainment, the police searched the appellant’s

car and found heroin in the appellant’s purse. The appellant filed a motion to

suppress the evidence found in her purse. She argued that it was unreasonable for

the police officers to search her vehicle incident to her arrest for OVI for evidence of

that offense based on Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).

In Gant, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that

“[p]olice may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident

to a recent occupant’s arrest only if it is reasonable to believe that the

arrestee might access the vehicle at the time of the search or that the

vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Gant at syllabus.

Id. at ¶ 4.

However, the facts in this case differ because while the police officers

did initiate a traffic stop on Walker, they smelled marijuana on Walker before they

searched the vehicle. Walker also indicated to the officers that they could keep the

weed and the gun if they issued him a ticket, instead of arresting him. During his

testimony, Walker claimed, without any evidence to substantiate his claim, that the

body-camera footage has been edited by the police.

The facts in this case are analogous to the facts in State v. Richmond,

2017-Ohio-2860 (8th Dist.) where the officers smelled marijuana on the appellant.

Quoting State v. Moore, 90 Ohio St.3d 47 (2000), the court in Richmond stated:

“[T]he smell of marijuana, alone, by a person qualified to recognize the

odor, is sufficient to establish probable cause to search a motor vehicle,

pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

There need be no other tangible evidence to justify a warrantless search

of a vehicle.”

Id. at ¶ 14, quoting Moore at 48.

The Court in Moore reiterated that point when it further stated:

According to defendant, there must be other tangible evidence of drug

use in order to justify a search. We disagree . . . . [I]f the smell of

marijuana, as detected by a person who is qualified to recognize the

odor, is the sole circumstance, this is sufficient to establish probable

cause. There need be no additional factors to corroborate the suspicion

of the presence of marijuana.

...

Once a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a

vehicle contains contraband, he or she may search a validly stopped

motor vehicle based upon the well-established automobile exception to

the warrant requirement.

Richmond at ¶ 15, citing id. at 51.

Walker further argues that his vehicle should not have been towed

and impounded. He cites the decision in State v. Leak, 2016-Ohio-154, to support

his contention. In Leak, the appellant was arrested on a warrant following a

domestic-violence incident. Immediately prior to his arrest, he was a passenger in

a car legally parked on a public street. Id. at ¶ 1. The officer made contact with the

appellant, ordered him out of the car, arrested him, and placed him in the back of

his patrol car. After the appellant was arrested, the officer checked the Law

Enforcement Automated Data System and found that the person who was in the

driver’s seat of the car did not have any outstanding warrants. The officer

nevertheless went back to the car, got the driver and the other passenger out of the

car, called to request a tow of the car, and conducted an inventory search of the car.

During this search, the officer found a handgun under the passenger seat of the car.

Id. at ¶ 6.

The Court in Leak examined the second exception to the

constitutional prohibition on warrantless searches, those conducted in the service

of law enforcement’s community-caretaking function, stating:

This function is “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or

acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”

Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). In the interest of public

safety, as part of the community-caretaking function of police, vehicles

are frequently taken into police custody. South Dakota v. Opperman,

428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976), citing Cady at 441. Examples of vehicles

taken into custody as part of law enforcement’s community-caretaking

role include those that have been in accidents, those that violate

parking ordinances, those that are stolen or abandoned, and those that

cannot be lawfully driven. See id. at 368-369. The authority of police

to seize and remove from the street vehicles that impede traffic or

threaten public safety and convenience is beyond challenge. Id. at 369.

Id. at ¶ 20.

Inventory searches performed pursuant to standard police procedure

on cars taken into the custody of the police as part of a community-caretaking

function are reasonable. Id. at ¶ 21, citing id. at 373. “There are three main

objectives to inventory searches: (1) protecting an individual’s property while it is in

the custody of the police, (2) protecting the police from claims of lost or stolen

property, and (3) protecting the police from danger.” Id., citing id. at 369.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has noted that inventory searches of

lawfully impounded vehicles are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when

performed in accordance with standard police procedure when the evidence does

not demonstrate that the procedure involved is merely a pretext for an evidentiary

search of the impounded vehicle. Id. at ¶ 22, citing Blue Ash v. Kavanagh, 2007-

Ohio-1103, ¶ 11; State v. Robinson, 58 Ohio St.2d 478, 480 (1979), citing Opperman.

The Court in Leak reasoned that

[i]t is also undisputed that Leak was in the passenger seat when the

arresting officer approached the car and that the person in the driver’s

seat of the car had a “clean license.” There is nothing in the record to

indicate that the car could not be lawfully driven away by the person

who was in the driver’s seat at the time of Leak’s arrest. There is no

indication in the record that the car was connected to Leak’s offense of

arrest. There is no indication in the record that the car had been parked

in the same spot in excess of 48 hours. There is no indication in the

record that the vehicle was going to be left unattended after Leak’s

arrest.

Id. at ¶ 26.

However, the facts in this instant case are different than those in

Leak. In this case, Walker was the driver and legal owner of the vehicle. He

admitted to police that there was “weed” and a gun in the vehicle. The car was

connected to Walker’s offense of arrest. Additionally, the trial court did not use

community-caretaking function as the officers’ reason for impounding Walker’s

vehicle. The trial court stated, in its journal entry: “The search incident to a lawful

arrest exception has two rationales: Officer safety and safeguarding evidence that

the arrestee might conceal or destroy.” Journal Entry No. 193182367 (Mar. 10,

2025.)

“As the Ohio Supreme Court has acknowledged, ‘[t]he inventory-

search exception is a well-defined exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement.’” State v. Nixon, 2023-Ohio-3457, ¶ 13 (9th Dist.), quoting State v.

Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 20, citing Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 643,

(1983). As previously stated:

“[A] routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle is not

unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when

performed pursuant to standard police practice and when the evidence

does not demonstrate that the procedure involved is merely a pretext

for an evidentiary search of the impounded vehicle.”

Id., quoting Kavanugh, 2007-Ohio-1103, ¶ 11, citing Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368

(1976).

“‘To determine if an inventory search is valid, the court must first

determine whether the police lawfully impounded the vehicle. A vehicle can be

lawfully impounded when the occupant of the vehicle is arrested.’” Id. at ¶ 14,

quoting State v. Neal, 2012-Ohio-2609, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Robinson,

2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4920, *3 (9th Dist. Oct. 25, 2000). “Next, a court must

determine ‘whether the impoundment was merely a pretext for an evidentiary

search of the impounded vehicle.’” Id., quoting Kavanagh at ¶ 12. “‘This Court has

rejected a challenge to the impoundment of a vehicle when there was no evidence of

a pretextual motive, and the impoundment was conducted pursuant to standard

police procedure.’” Id., quoting Neal at ¶ 7.

Given the facts that the police officers smelled marijuana on Walker’s

person, he had just exited his vehicle, and he admitted that there was weed and a

gun in the car, the officers lawfully searched and impounded Walker’s vehicle for

their safety and to safeguard any evidence that could be concealed or destroyed. We

determine from this record that the trial court did not err when it denied Walker’s

motion to suppress.

Therefore, Walker’s first assignment of error is overruled.

III. Admitted Evidence

A. Standard of Review

“‘Generally, evidentiary rulings made at trial rest within the sound

discretion of the trial court. We give substantial deference to the trial court [absent]

an abuse of discretion . . . [which] will not be found when the trial court makes the

correct decision, however, gives the wrong reason . . . .’” ( Citations omitted.) State

v. Heineman, 2016-Ohio-3058, ¶ 50 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Darkenwald,

2004-Ohio-2693, ¶ 12 (8th Dist.). A court commits an abuse of discretion by

“exercising its judgment, in an unwarranted way, in regard to a matter over which it

has discretionary authority.” Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.

B. Law and Analysis

In Walker’s fourth assignment of error, he argues that the trial court

erred by admitting certified copies of the journal entries after the State rested its

case and over defense objection. Once the State rested its case, the trial court asked

if the stipulation to Walker’s prior offense should be in the jury instructions or just

something that the trial court can verbally advise the jury. Tr. 248. Walker’s trial

counsel stated: “I mean, I guess I should have mentioned this in my Rule 29 motion,

but the prosecutor never entered it into evidence. We had a stipulation, but —.” Id.

The State interrupted, stating: “Your Honor, my understanding is with the

stipulation was to the identify and the contents of it as a whole. It’s a self-

authenticating journal entry.” Id. However, Walker’s counsel countered by stating

it was supposed to be done in front of the jury. The State responded, stating:

My understanding is we did not have to, it’s a stipulated-to document

that they would have received as an exhibit. We also heard testimony

that he has the prior conviction as well through Officer Woods. It’s not

a document that they would be receiving the information of itself for

the first time. We’ve heard testimony, it’s been stipulated to and it

would be considered by the jury.