The opinion
FILED
MAY 14, 2026
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Welfare of: )
) No. 41291-1-III
)
E.B. † )
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) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
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COONEY, J. — Following trial, the court granted the Department of Children,
Youth, and Families’ (Department) petition to terminate the parent-child relationship
between T.H. and his son, E.B. T.H. appeals, arguing (1) the Department failed to prove,
and the court erroneously concluded, that the Department made an effort to support a
guardianship as an alternative to termination, and (2) the court erred in concluding that
To protect the privacy interests of E.B., we use their initials throughout this
†
opinion. Gen. Order for Court of Appeals, In re Changes to Case Title (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 22, 2018) (effective Sept. 1, 2018) http://www.courts.wa.gov/appellate_trial_courts.
No. 41291-1-III
In re the Welfare of E.B.
termination was in E.B.’s best interest. The Department concedes the trial court’s finding
regarding the Department’s effort to support a guardianship is not supported by
substantial evidence. We accept the Department’s concession yet affirm because the
erroneous finding does not materially affect the trial court’s conclusions of law. We
disagree with T.H.’s contention that the court erred in concluding termination of the
parent-child relationship was in E.B.’s best interest.
BACKGROUND
In 2019, the Department received a report of bruising on E.B.’s face and body. He
was eight years old at the time. A dependency petition was filed, and E.B. was found
dependent. A disposition order was later entered that required E.B.’s father, T.H., to
engage in several services to remediate his parental deficiencies. A petition to terminate
the parent-child relationship between E.B. and his parents was filed on November 4,
2021. 1 Trial on the petition was held in April 2025.
At trial, Samantha Mbow, the first social worker assigned to E.B.’s case in 2019,
testified that the Department had concerns about E.B.’s cognitive functions and physical
issues. Once removed from T.H.’s care, E.B.’s physical issues subsided and his cognitive
and psychosocial issues improved.
1
E.B.’s mother relinquished her parental rights in December 2024, and the court
terminated her parental rights in January 2025.
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Ms. Mbow testified that T.H. was engaged in counseling when the dependency
was filed. The Department then referred T.H. for a neuropsychological assessment and
an evidence-based parenting program. Although T.H. was originally willing to engage in
services, Ms. Mbow testified T.H. did not recognize why the services were necessary and
became resistant to the providers and their goals. In February 2021, T.H. was discharged
from mental health counseling due to “verbal aggression” toward his provider. Rep. of
Proc. (RP) at 66. During discharge, the provider noted T.H. had made no progress in his
mental health goals.
James Renner testified that he provided family therapy to E.B. and T.H. between
2020 and 2022. Mr. Renner thought “both of them care extremely for each other” and
exhibited good interactions during therapy. RP at 169. Mr. Renner stated T.H. and E.B.
would meet with him at least once a week for one hour, and T.H. had made little
improvement by the time their therapy sessions had ended. Mr. Renner ceased providing
family therapy after T.H. “became extremely upset” about the upcoming termination
hearing during the last session. RP at 167. During the outburst, Mr. Renner had to
remove E.B. from the office and return him to his foster parent. T.H. “follow[ed] [Mr.
Renner] out to the foster parent and . . . continued to kind of yell and express pretty
loudly his feelings.” RP at 167. Mr. Renner ended the family therapy because he felt
T.H. needed to first work on himself.
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Jennifer Pilkinton testified that she is a social service specialist with the
Department who had been assigned to E.B.’s case since September 2024. Ms. Pilkinton
attempted to reengage T.H. in a neurological evaluation, mental health services, and
domestic violence services. Ms. Pilkinton tried “to meet [T.H.] where he was.” RP at
219-20. At T.H.’s request, Ms. Pilkinton watched sermons on YouTube given by Jesse
Lee Peterson, a pastor T.H. watches daily. Ms. Pilkinton testified, “[T.H.] was very
passionate and motivated by Jesse Lee Peterson.” RP at 219. In Ms. Pilkinton’s opinion,
the sermons did not qualify as mental health therapy because they lacked individuality.
Ms. Pilkinton testified T.H. has a history of “anger outbursts, calling of names,
profanities, and screaming and yelling” during visitations. RP at 252. Ms. Pilkinton was
of the opinion E.B. could not be safely returned to T.H.’s care.
Ms. Pilkinton testified E.B. had “just really blossomed” while she was assigned to
his case. RP at 222. She stated T.H. had not had any visits with E.B. since she was
assigned to the case, and there was currently no relationship between E.B. and T.H. Ms.
Pilkinton testified that E.B. wished to stay with and be adopted by his current placement,
who were prepared for the adoption once legally allowed to do so. She believed it was in
E.B.’s best interest to terminate T.H.’s parental rights so E.B. could gain the “structure,
stability, and permanency” of adoption. RP at 237.
Ms. Pilkinton testified that after considering E.B.’s wishes, his fearfulness of
returning to T.H.’s care, and his current placement’s intent to adopt him, a guardianship
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would not be a viable alternative to termination. She stated that it would be “very
detrimental to [E.B.] and his own mental health and his own structure and stability” if he
returned to his father. RP at 236. She explained E.B. wants to be somewhere he “feels
safe and secure.” RP at 238.
Constance Shields testified she was appointed as E.B.’s guardian ad litem (GAL)
in January 2020. She reported that E.B. was having medical problems, trouble in school
and with his peers, and difficulty conversing when they first met. She testified that, by
the time of trial, E.B. was doing well in school and had been released from counseling.
Ms. Shields stated E.B. had security for the first time in his life, and he wants the stability
of adoption.
Ms. Shields stated she had a few in-person conversations with T.H. before
choosing to communicate by text messages due to T.H.’s anger and threats. Ms. Shields
believes termination is in E.B.’s best interest because he deserves stability, and it will not
“preclude a relationship with his father on down the road.” RP at 281. E.B. told Ms.
Shields that “[h]e wants to see his father sometime, like maybe when he can drive.” RP
at 279. Ms. Shields stated E.B. is very settled where he is and wants to be adopted.
When asked if she supported E.B.’s adoption by his current placement, Ms. Shields
testified:
I support the plan because actually the [current placement] were
people that [T.H.] picked. So, it’s family that is familiar with [E.B.’s
family]. They have a history . . . the [current placement] are able to
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meet [E.B.’s] needs. . . they love him very much. And he’s
integrated into their household.
RP at 283. Ms. Shields testified that, although she had not discussed a guardianship with
E.B.’s current placement, a guardianship would not be an option because his current
placement desires the permanency of adoption. Ms. Shields opined that termination is in
E.B.’s best interest.
Jon Christensen, PhD, completed a neuropsychological evaluation of E.B. in 2020.
Dr. Christensen noted concerns with E.B.’s working memory, executive functioning, and
mild visual motor skills. Dr. Christensen diagnosed E.B. with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, mild depression, mild anxiety disorder, and a reading disorder.
With these diagnoses, Dr. Christensen opined E.B. would need a caregiver who would
provide him with enhanced oversight and supervision.
Dr. Christensen also completed a neuropsychological evaluation of T.H. in 2020.
Dr. Christensen diagnosed T.H. with “specified disruptive impulsivity conduct disorder,”
“[a] cognitive disorder related to [T.H.]’s stroke [ 2] that caused cognitive difficulties such
as attention, memory, and learning, executive functioning difficulties,” “[r]eading
disorder,” and “other specified anxiety disorder.” RP at 328. Dr. Christensen remarked
that T.H.’s “diagnoses could definitely affect his ability to parent unless it was taken care
of and helped.” RP at 332.
2
T.H. testified he experienced a traumatic brain injury (TBI) in 2008.
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T.H. testified he suffered a TBI in 2008. He left treatment for his TBI against
medical advice and could not recall receiving any further treatment. T.H. does
not believe he has any lasting symptoms from the TBI. T.H. testified he entered an
“Alford [ 3] plea” for an assault he committed against E.B. that led to the Department
removing E.B. from his care. RP at 20-21. T.H. stated he receives counseling daily by
watching Jesse Lee Peterson’s sermons, and he no longer has angry outbursts. T.H.
recalled he participated in counseling with Stephanie Lytle, but “she did not help [him] at
all.” RP at 24. He also participated in a parenting program that taught him some skills
but feels the program is no longer necessary.
T.H. testified that he and E.B. received family therapy from Mr. Renner. He
recalled some of the sessions went well but he had an outburst at the last meeting, about
three years earlier, that led to the cancellation of further sessions. T.H. had not
participated in family therapy since. He commented that therapy is not necessary “since
[he has] gotten rid of [his] anger.” RP at 32.
T.H. testified that he receives letters from the social worker, Ms. Pilkinton, every
month outlining the services that are being offered to him, but he does not believe it is
necessary to complete any of the services because it is “[a] bunch of stuff that was
3
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
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nonsense.” RP at 21. T.H. stated that he receives Social Security disability income
(SSDI) every month.
T.H. testified his last visit with E.B. was more than three years prior to trial. T.H.
was aware he could have remote visits with E.B., but he refuses to attend if the visit is
supervised. T.H. remarked, “I am not going to—I don’t need to see my son with
somebody else looking over my shoulder.” RP at 35. He testified he feels his situation
has improved since E.B. was taken from his care. He stated he is still working on himself
daily.
At the conclusion of trial, the court found by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that continuation of the parent-child relationship between T.H. and E.B. clearly
diminishes E.B.’s prospects for early integration into a permanent and stable home.
Specifically, the court found:
2.9.1 [E.B.] is thirteen years old and has lived with suitable others,
[current placement], for over three years where he has been stable and
happy. The continuation of the legal relationship between [E.B.] and
[T.H.] diminishes the final connection piece of early integration into
the stable and permanent home that is currently meeting his daily
needs. This home is the proposed adoptive home for [E.B.].
2.9.2 [The Department] made efforts to support a potential Title 11 or
Title 13 guardianship as an option for the child’s permanency, but the
[current placement] do[es] not consent to guardianship. [The
Department] cannot force a party into a guardianship who is unwilling,
and it would be unreasonably disruptive to move [E.B.] to a placement
that is willing to enter into a guardianship. The court finds that
guardianship is not available as permanent option for [E.B.].
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Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 310. The court found T.H. unfit to parent E.B. and that it was in
E.B.’s best interest to terminate the parent-child relationship. The court concluded that
the elements of RCW 13.34.180(1) had been proved by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence. The court further concluded that the Department had established, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that termination of the parent-child relationship is in
E.B.’s best interest. Consequently, T.H.’s parental rights to E.B. were terminated.
T.H. timely appeals.
ANALYSIS
T.H. first contends the Department failed to prove, and the court erroneously
concluded, that the Department made an effort to support a guardianship as an alternative
to termination. He also argues the court erred in concluding that termination was in
E.B.’s best interest. We disagree with both of T.H.’s arguments.
An order terminating parental rights must be affirmed if substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s findings in light of the degree of proof required. In re Welfare
of Aschauer, 93 Wn.2d 689, 695, 611 P.2d 1245 (1980). Substantial evidence is evidence
in “‘sufficient quantity to persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the
declared premise.’” World Wide Video, Inc. v. City of Tukwila, 117 Wn.2d 382, 387, 816
P.2d 18 (1991) (quoting Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 220, 721 P.2d 918 (1986)).
The trial court’s decision is entitled to great deference, and its findings of fact must be
upheld when supported by substantial evidence. In re Dependency of K.S.C., 137 Wn.2d
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918, 925, 976 P.2d 113 (1999). The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence or
decide witness credibility. In re Dependency of A.V.D., 62 Wn. App. 562, 568, 815 P.2d
277 (1991).
To terminate a parent’s parental rights, the Department must prove all six elements
of RCW 13.34.180(1) “by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence” and prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that termination would be in the child’s best interest. In re
Dependency of G.C.B., 28 Wn. App. 2d 157, 171, 535 P.3d 451 (2023).
CONSIDERATION OF A GUARDIANSHIP
T.H. argues substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s finding that the
Department made efforts to support a guardianship as a permanent option for E.B.; thus
the court’s conclusion that the Department proved the elements of RCW 13.34.180(1)(f)
is unsupported. The Department and E.B. respond that sufficient evidence was presented
to support a finding that a continuation of the parent-child relationship would diminish
E.B.’s prospects of integrating into a stable and permanent home under RCW
13.34.180(1)(f). We agree with the Department and E.B.
RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) requires a supported finding that the “‘continuation of the
parent and child relationship clearly diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration
into a stable and permanent home’” before the court can terminate a parent’s rights. Id.
(quoting RCW 13.34.180(1)(f)). RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) can be satisfied by a showing that
the “prospects for a permanent home exist but continuing the parent-child relationship
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prevents the child from obtaining that placement” or “parent-child relationship has a
damaging and destabilizing effect on the child that would negatively impact the child’s
integration into a permanent home.” Id. at 171-72. Under RCW 13.34.180(1)(f), “the
court must consider the efforts taken by the department to support a guardianship and
whether a guardianship is available as a permanent option for the child.”
T.H. argues findings of fact 2.9, 2.9.1, 2.9.2, and one sentence in 2.11 are not
supported by substantial evidence. The challenged findings read:
2.9. Continuation of the parent-child relationship clearly diminishes the
child’s prospects for early integration into a permanent and stable home.
2.9.1 [E.B.] is thirteen years old and has lived with suitable others, [current
placement], for over three years where he has been stable and happy. The
continuation of the legal relationship between [E.B.] and [T.H.] diminishes
the final connection piece of early integration into the stable and permanent
home that is currently meeting his daily needs. This home is the proposed
adoptive home for [E.B.].
2.9.2 [The Department] made efforts to support a potential Title 11 or Title
13 guardianship as an option for the child’s permanency, but the [current
placement] do[es] not consent to guardianship. [The Department] cannot
force a party into a guardianship who is unwilling, and it would be
unreasonably disruptive to move [E.B.] to a placement that is willing to
enter into a guardianship. The court finds that guardianship is not available
as a permanent option for [E.B.].
2.11 . . . Without termination of parental rights, [E.B.] will be left in the
limbo of dependency, which is not in his best interest. . . .
CP at 309-10. These findings are supported by substantial evidence.
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Concerning findings of fact 2.9, 2.9.1, and 2.11, evidence was presented that E.B.
was eight years old when he entered into foster care. During the five years the
dependency was pending, E.B. lived with two different relatives and two foster families
before residing with his current placement. During this period, T.H. had made little
progress remediating his parental deficiencies. Consequently, E.B. remained dependent.
Further, Ms. Pilkinton and Ms. Shields both testified that a continuation of the parent-
child relationship precluded E.B.’s prospects for early integration into the home of his
current placement. Evidence was presented that E.B.’s current placement is willing and
intent on adopting E.B. Thus, findings of fact 2.9, 2.9.1, and 2.11 are supported by
substantial evidence.
Concerning finding of fact 2.9.2, the evidence indicated E.B.’s current placement
wishes to adopt E.B. They are therefore inherently unsupportive of a guardianship that
would, as Ms. Shields testified, preclude their ability to adopt E.B. Likewise, Ms.
Pilkinton testified that it was in E.B.’s best interest that T.H.’s parental rights be
terminated so E.B. could gain the “structure, stability, and permanency” of adoption. RP
at 237. Thus, finding of fact 2.9.2 is supported by substantial evidence.
T.H. next argues finding of fact 2.14 is not supported by substantial evidence.
Finding of fact 2.14 states:
2.14 The Department worked with the parties and child’s permanent
placement options to consider title 13 guardianship and title 11
guardianship as alternatives to adoption. The Department has held
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permanency meetings and provided placement options with resources and
information about guardianship. A guardianship is not anticipated as a
permanent option for this child.
CP at 311. The Department concedes this finding is not supported by substantial
evidence because witnesses testified that a guardianship was not discussed with E.B. nor
with his current placement. Notwithstanding the Department’s concession, the
unsupported finding does not affect the court’s conclusions of law.
“[A]n erroneous finding of fact not materially affecting the conclusions of law is
not prejudicial and does not warrant a reversal.” State v. Caldera, 66 Wn. App. 548, 551,
832 P.2d 139 (1992). Here, the trial court made other findings that supported its
conclusion that a continuation of the parent-child relationship between T.H. and E.B.
would diminish E.B.’s prospects for integration into a permanent and stable home.
Whether a guardianship is available as an alternative to termination is a case
specific inquiry. G.C.B., 28 Wn. App. 2d at 173. Indeed, termination may be appropriate
even when a guardianship is available. Id. at 174; In re Welfare of R.H., 176 Wn. App.
419, 429, 309 P.3d 620 (2013). The plain language of RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) “requires
the trial court to consider the viability of guardianship as a factor when assessing whether
the Department has shown that ‘continuation of the parent and child relationship clearly
diminishes the child’s prospects for early integration into a stable and permanent home.’”
G.C.B., 28 Wn. App. 2d at 173 (emphasis added) (quoting RCW 13.34.180(1)(f)).
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The essence of RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) is the “‘continued effect of the legal
relationship between parent and child, as an obstacle to adoption,’” especially where the
child has potential adoption resources. In re Dependency of A.M.F., 1 Wn.3d 407, 417,
526 P.3d 32 (2023) (quoting In re Dependency of A.C., 123 Wn. App. 244, 250, 98 P.3d
89 (2004)). Consequently, RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) can be satisfied “when the parental
relationship is an impediment to a legal, permanent placement in an adoptive home.” Id.
at 418.
In G.C.B., the court relied on testimony that guardianship was not viable because
“the children were thriving in their current placement, and a guardianship would keep
them ‘in limbo’ with negative ‘consequences.’” G.C.B., 28 Wn. App. 2d at 174. There,
the father argued no evidence was offered showing the Department considered his
“proposed guardianship with the current caregivers.” Id. at 173. Notwithstanding the
father’s argument, the court noted the dependency action had been ongoing for seven
years, the father had not seen his children in five years, and the children’s caregiver
preferred adoption and had been approved for adoption. Id. at 174-75. In affirming the
termination of the father’s parental rights, this court held that the Department’s
consideration of a guardianship is but one factor for the court to consider. Id. at 174.
Here, the court found that E.B. is “stable and happy” with his prospective
adoptive family and that the continuation of the “legal relationship” between E.B. and
T.H. “diminishes the final connection piece of early integration into the stable and
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permanent home” of E.B.’s current placement. CP at 310. Regardless of the court’s
erroneous finding of fact 2.14, the court’s other supported findings, in turn, support the
court’s conclusion that RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) had been proved by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence.
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
T.H. next argues the court erred in concluding that termination was in E.B.’s best
interest under RCW 13.34.190(1)(b). Specifically, T.H. claims that because the court
erred in finding RCW 13.34.180(1)(f) was met, it could not have found that termination
was in E.B.’s best interest. T.H. also argues that E.B. would benefit from maintaining the
parent-child relationship because E.B. could receive his SSDI if he dies, and because E.B.
desires a relationship with him. We disagree with his contentions.
Once the elements of RCW 13.34.180(1) have been met, the Department must
then “establish that termination of parental rights would in the child’s best interest by a
preponderance of the evidence.” G.C.B., 28 Wn. App. 2d at 171; see also RCW
13.34.190.
T.H. argues that, as a matter of law, the trial court could not reach the question of
E.B.’s best interest because the Department failed to prove RCW 13.34.180(1)(f). As
discussed above, the Department met its burden under RCW 13.34.180(1). We therefore
reject this argument.
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T.H. next claims E.B.’s best interest would be served through a guardianship
because E.B. could still receive his SSDI once he passes away and because E.B. desires a
relationship with him.
E.B.’s current placement has expressed their intent to adopt E.B., which cannot
occur until T.H.’s parental rights are terminated. The potential for E.B. to potentially
acquire T.H.’s SSDI does little to outweigh the stability and permanency E.B. will attain
through adoption. Lastly, termination of T.H.’s parental rights does not preclude a
relationship with E.B. in the future if both are interested in fostering such a relationship.
The trial court did not err in concluding that termination is in E.B.’s best interest.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
Cooney, J.
WE CONCUR:
Staab, C.J. Hill, J.
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