McNulty

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

PATRICK MCNULTY, Civil No. 3:26-cv-189

Petitioner (Judge Mariani)

v. FILED

: SCRANTON

WARDEN OF FCI-SCHUYLKILL,

. MAR 20 2996

Respondent : PER appl

DEPUTY CLERK

MEMORANDUM

Petitioner Patrick McNulty (“McNulty”) initiated the above-captioned action by filing a

petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). McNulty alleges

that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) incorrectly denied his early release eligibility

upon completion of the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program (“"RDAP"). (/d.). For

the reasons that follow, the Court will dismiss the habeas petition.

I. Background

A. McNulty’s Criminal History

McNulty is serving a 52-month term of imprisonment imposed by the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for his conviction of conspiracy to distribute

methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1){A){viil), and 846. (Doc. 7-2,

Declaration of BOP Supervisory Attorney Jennifer Knepper (“Knepper Decl.”}, at 2 J 3; Doc.

7-3, Public Information Inmate Data}. According to BOP documentation submitted by

Respondent, McNulty's projected release date, via good conduct time, is June 1, 2028.

(Doc. 7-2, Knepper Decl., at 2 J 3; Doc. 7-3).

B. Administrative Remedy History

The Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval reveals that, while in BOP

custody, McNulty has not filed any administrative remedies. (Doc. 7-2, Knepper Decl. at 3 ]

5; Doc. 7-4, Administrative Remedy Generalized Retrieval).

C. —_ Eacts Related to the Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program

The BOP operates a drug abuse treatment program that identifies inmates in need of

substance abuse treatment. 28 C.F.R. § 550.50 ef seq. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621, the

BOP has the authority to reduce an inmate's sentence for completion of RDAP. 18 U.S.C. §

3621 provides, in relevant part, that “the Bureau of Prisons shail, subject to the availability of

appropriations, provide residential substance abuse treatment...for ail eligible prisoners...”

18 U.S.C. § 3621{e)(1}(C). If the inmate complies with RDAP’s requirements, the BOP

“may’ reduce the inmate's term of imprisonment by up to one year. 18 U.S.C. §

3621(e}(2)(B) (emphasis added); see also 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(a).

In accordance with BOP Program Statement (“PS”) 5331.02, Early Release

Procedures Under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e), section 7.b, a federal prison’s Drug Abuse Program

Coordinator ("DAPC") requests an offense review from the DSCC Legal Department after

he or she determines that the inmate qualifies for participation in the RDAP and is not

otherwise ineligible for early release as a result of one of the conditions identified in PS

9331.02, section 7.a. See Program Statement 5331.02, Early Release Procedures Under

18 U.S.C, § 3621(e), United States Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Prisons (May

26, 2016), https:/Avww.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5331 .02.pdf (visited March 19, 2026)). The

DSCC Legal Department then completes the offense review. See id. As part of the offense

review, the DSCC Legal Department determines whether an inmate is precluded from

receiving early release after reviewing the inmate's current and prior offenses, including the

Judgment and Commitment Order and any other relevant sentencing documentation. See

id. The final decision regarding 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e) eligibility is then transmitted back to the

requesting DAPC. See id.

The DSCC conducted a review of McNulty's current and prior convictions. (Doc. 7-2,

Knepper Deci. at 3 | 9; Doc. 7-5, Request for a § 3621(e) Offense Review, BP-A0942).

Following this review, the DSCC noted that McNulty’s current conviction was for a

conspiracy that “involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous

weapon or explosives (including any explosive material or explosive device) (28 C.F.R. §

590,55(b)(5}(i/})”, and “by its nature or conduct, presents a serious potential risk of physical

force against the person or property of another (28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(iii}).” (Doc. 7-5, at

2). The DSCC specifically noted that “the [Presentence Report] recommended a +2

[Specific Offense Characteristics] for weapons which was adopted by the court at

sentencing.” (/d.). As a result, the DSCC found that McNuity’s conviction precludes him

from early release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). (Id. at 2-3).

D. Claims Raised in the Habeas Petition

In his Section 2241 petition, McNulty alleges that the BOP incorrectly denied his

early release eligibility upon completion of RDAP and improperly characterized his

conviction as a crime of violence. (Doc. 1), Respondent contends that the Section 2241

petition must be dismissed because McNulty failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.

(Doc. 7}. Alternatively, Respondent argues that the petition must be dismissed because the

Court lacks jurisdiction to hear McNuity’s claims and because McNulty is not entitled to early

release under the RDAP incentive. (/d.).

il. Discussion

A. — Exhaustion of Administrative Review

While there is no statutory exhaustion requirement for habeas corpus petitions

brought pursuant to Section 2241, the Third Circuit has recognized that “[flederal prisoners

are ordinarily required to exhaust their administrative remedies before petitioning for a writ

of habeas corpus pursuant to [Section] 2241.” Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98

F.3d 757, 760 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d

Cir. 2000). Exhaustion is required because: “(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop

a factual record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review; (2) permitting agencies to

grant the relief requested conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the

opportunity to correct their own errors fosters administrative autonomy.’ Moscato, 98 F.3d

at 761-62 (citations omitted); Bradshaw v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1984).

However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is not required where these

underlying reasons for exhaustion would not be served. See Coleman v. U.S, Parole

Comm'n, 644 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2016) (unpublished). For example, exhaustion is

unnecessary if the issue presented is one that involves only statutory construction. See

Vasquez v. Strada, 684 F.3d 431, 433-34 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Bradshaw, 682 F.2d at

1052). Exhaustion is also excused when it would be futile. See Rose v, Lundy, 455 U.S.

509, 516 n.7 (1982); see also Brown v. Warden Canaan USP, 763 F. App’x 296, 297 (3d

Cir. 2019). “In order to invoke the futility exception to exhaustion, a party must ‘provide a

clear and positive showing’ of futility before the District Court.” Wilson v. MVM, Inc., 475

F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting D'Amico v. CBS Corp., 297 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir.

2002)).

To exhaust administrative remedies, a federal inmate must comply with the

procedural requirements of the BOP's administrative remedy process, which are set forth in

the Code of Federal Regulations. See generally 28 C.F.R. §§ 542.10-542.19, Under these

regulations, an inmate shall first attempt informal resolution of his complaint with staff and, if

the inmate is unable to resolve his complaint informally, he shal! submit a formai, written

request on the proper form to the designated staff member. See id. §§ 542.13-642.14. If

the inmate is not satisfied with the Warden's response, the inmate shall then submit an

appeal to the Regional Director, using the appropriate form. See id. § 542.15(a}. And,

finally, if the inmate is not satisfied with the Regional! Director’s response, then the inmate

shall submit an appeal to the Office of the General Counsel, located in the BOP Central

Office, using the appropriate form. See id. An inmate is not deemed fo have exhausted his

administrative remedies until his complaint has been pursued at all levels. See id.

(explaining that an “[a]ppeal to the General Counsel is the final administrative appeal’).

Here, the undisputed record reflects that McNulty has not filed a single administrative

remedy while in BOP custody. (Doc. 7-4). Rather than comply with the Administrative

Remedy process, McNulty entirely bypassed the statutorily mandated procedures and,

instead, filed the instant habeas petition in federal court.

McNulty has not identified any BOP actions that would clearly and unambiguously

violate statutory or constitutional rights, and he has not set forth any facts or advanced any

argument that would permit this Court to find that exhaustion of administrative remedies

would subject him to irreparable injury. (See Docs. 1, 8). Notably, the exhaustion

requirement has been applied to claims regarding a prisoner's eligibility to receive a

sentence reduction under RDAP. See, e.g., Beckley v. Miner, 125 F. App’x 385, 389 (3d

Cir. 2005) (holding that the court had no subject matter jurisdiction over prisoner's claim

concerning transfer to RDAP facility due to prisoner's failure to exhaust BOP remedies);

Monteiro v. Spaulding, 2021 WL 1721571, *3 (M.D. Pa. April 30, 2021) (“district courts have

held that prisoners are still required to exhaust their administrative remedies as to requests

for home confinement’).

The Court finds that McNuity’s claim must first be presented to BOP officials and fully

exhausted. Because McNulty did not even attempt to exhaust his administrative remedies

before petitioning this Court, and because no exception to the exhaustion requirement

applies here, his Section 2241 petition must be dismissed.

The Court will nevertheless address McNulty’s claim regarding the early release

incentive under RDAP.

B. Residential Drug Abuse Treatment Program

The BOP’s management of RDAP is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3621. When an

inmate successfully completes “a program of residential substance abuse treatment,”

including RDAP, his sentence “may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons” for up to one

year. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2) (emphasis added): see also 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(a).

Pursuant to its authority under the statute, the BOP has passed a regulation categorically

excluding certain classes of inmates from receiving sentence reductions when they

complete the RDAP. See 28 C.F.R. § 550.55. These disqualifying offenses include any

felony conviction that “involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other

dangerous weapon or explosives.” 28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(ii).

Because RDAP placement is discretionary, “many courts have held that they lack

jurisdiction to consider challenges to RDAP early release decisions.” VanOchten v. United

States, No. 1:25-CV-00133, 2025 WL 1644370, at *1 (M.D. Pa. June 9, 2025): Harvey v.

Warden/Superintendent of USP Canaan, No. 21-CV-02150, 2022 WL 2292006, at *5 (M.D.

Pa, June 24, 2022) {listing cases). Regardless, it is clear from the record that McNulty

would not be entitled to habeas relief.

McNulty was convicted of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of

21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a}(1}, (b)(1)(A)(vilil}, and 846, which disqualifies him from the RDAP

reduction. As stated, the DSCC noted that McNulty’s current conviction was for a

conspiracy that “involved the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm or other dangerous

weapon or explosives (including any explosive material or explosive device) (28 C.F.R. §

550.55(b)(5)(ii})”, and “by its nature or conduct, presents a serious potential risk of physical

force against the person or property of another (28 C.F.R. § 550.55(b)(5)(iii})." (Doc. 7-5, at

2). Additionally, the DSCC noted that “the [Presentence Report] recommended a +2

[Specific Offense Characteristics] for weapons which was adopted by the court at

sentencing.” (/d.). McNulty nonetheless argues that the BOP’s decision to deny him the

early release benefit is not in accordance with federal law because his offense is non-

violent. McNulty's argument iacks merit.

In Lopez v. Davis, the BOP determined that the Section 2241 habeas petitioner, who

had been convicted of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of

21U.8.C. § 841, was qualified to participate in RDAP but categorically ineligible for early

release if he completed the program because the sentencing court enhanced his sentence

by two levels under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) after finding that the petitioner possessed a firearm

in connection with the offense. See Lopez v. Davis, 531 U.S. 230, 236 (2001). The BOP

based its ineligibility determination on 28 C.F.R. § 550.58(a)(1}{vi), which was a prior

version of the regulation at issue here (28 C.F.R. § 550.55). See id,; see also Hendricks v.

Jenkins, No. 19-cv-4427, 2020 WL 5430821, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2020) (The

particular regulation addressed in Lopez, former 28 C.F.R. § 550.58, has been redesignated

and is now 28 C.F.R. § 550.55.” (citing 69 Fed. Reg. 39887-02 (2004))). The Lopez Court

held that the BOP's regulation “categorically denie[d] early release to prisoners whose

current offense is a felony attended by ‘the carrying, possession, or use of a firearm.”

Lopez, 531 U.S. at 232-33. The Court will dismiss McNulty's habeas petition because the

Lopez Court squarely rejected the type of claim he asserts in this case.

lll. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1}.

A separate Order shall issue.

K JIN /

Te 7 ( UM ad Zr

Robert D. Mariani,

United States District Judge

Dated: March 22" , 2026

.