People of Michigan v. Gregory Cornell Anderson

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, UNPUBLISHED

May 11, 2026

Plaintiff-Appellee, 10:39 AM

v No. 373729

Wayne Circuit Court

GREGORY CORNELL ANDERSON, LC No. 24-001413-01-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BORRELLO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and ACKERMAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant appeals his jury-trial convictions of two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.89,

and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),

MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to 81 months to 20 years for armed robbery, along with

a consecutive two-year term for felony-firearm. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The charges in this case arise from a traffic-related incident that escalated into a

confrontation. Defendant was driving a Chrysler 300 on Evergreen Road in Detroit with his

fiancée, Ishsa Lankford, in the passenger seat. Defendant stopped the vehicle in the roadway, and

as a Chevrolet pickup truck passed on his left, defendant drove the Chrysler 300 into the passenger

side of the pickup truck while making a left turn. Wilbert McKeever, Jr., was driving the pickup

truck and was accompanied by his fiancée, Sanya Watson, who was in the passenger seat.

While McKeever was outside inspecting the damage, defendant ran toward him with a

black pistol in his hand and shouted obscenities. Defendant hit McKeever in the chest with the

gun, saying, “[m]other [f]*****, I should kill you,” and blamed McKeever for hitting his car.

Watson saw defendant point the gun at McKeever. Defendant searched McKeever’s pockets and

took approximately $350 to $400, two gold necklaces, and McKeever’s phone. Defendant then

opened the pickup truck’s driver door and searched the center console while pointing the gun at

Watson. Watson believed defendant also attempted to take her emotional support dog, which was

in a small dog carrier. As defendant walked away, McKeever asked for his phone, and defendant

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threw it in the street. Defendant continued to threaten McKeever as defendant walked away.

McKeever drove to a nearby police precinct while Watson called the police.

Officer Kenneth Burley of the Detroit Police Department was informed of the incident by

an unknown bystander who witnessed the event from her vehicle. Officer Burley was told

defendant was driving a white Chrysler 300 with tinted windows, which Burley found parked at a

home on Evergreen Road where defendant and Lankford lived. Officer Burley waited for

additional police units, knocked on the door, and announced his presence. Lankford opened the

door, and Officer Burley observed defendant and Jeron Binion, defendant’s nephew, in the living

room. Officer Burley ordered everyone to exit the house, and they complied. Lankford gave

verbal consent to search the residence. Officers then conducted what Officer Burley described as

“a protective sweep.” During the search, Officer Burley found a black pistol on a dresser upstairs

and removed it, unloading a bullet from the chamber. A holster was also recovered. Lankford

accompanied Officer Burley during the search and observed the seizure of the gun. Later that day,

Officer Melad Abed executed a search warrant at the residence and found McKeever’s two gold

necklaces on a dining table. The stolen money was not recovered.

When later interviewed by Detroit police, defendant admitted he had a gun and holster at

the time of the incident but denied pointing it at anyone or taking McKeever’s money. He claimed

McKeever gave him the necklaces “as compensation” for vehicle damage.

Officer Burley testified about the initial search of defendant’s residence at trial, stating:

I asked [Lankford] was there any other individuals in the house, she stated yes. I

observed two black males in the living room. I had ordered everybody out of the

house. Once the individuals [were] outside I did detain both, both males until our

investigation was over. I asked her was anybody else in the house again, she said

no. She gave us consent to, to search the home. So we, we conducted a protective

sweep, okay.

Officer Burley explained that he conducted a protective sweep to ensure everyone was safe inside

because of the armed robbery investigation. Binion and Lankford testified that they witnessed the

incident but denied defendant pointed the gun at anyone.

Defendant was convicted on all counts. At sentencing, defense counsel objected to the

assessment of 10 points for Offense Variable (“OV”) 4, arguing insufficient evidence supported

the score. The trial court deferred ruling until after hearing victim statements. During his victim

statement, McKeever described having to seek medical treatment for his “mental state,” including

therapy, and that he experienced paranoia after the incident. Watson stated her sister died just

before the incident and that defendant “really interrupted [her] life.” In the presentence

investigation report (PSIR), Watson stated she was diagnosed and receiving treatment for post-

traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) after the incident. No further discussion occurred regarding

OV 4, and the trial court sentenced defendant. This appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues on appeal that (1) his Fourth Amendment rights, US Const, Am IV, were

violated when police searched his home because a protective sweep was not justified and the seized

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gun should have been suppressed; (2) defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek

suppression of the gun; and (3) the trial court erred in assigning 10 points for OV 4. We find no

error warranting reversal of defendant’s convictions or sentences.

A. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Defendant contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when police initially

searched the residence without consent. Defendant also argues that the search could not qualify

as a protective sweep because no factual basis or exigent circumstance justified such police action,

and therefore the firearm seized should have been suppressed at trial. None of these arguments

warrants relief.

Defendant did not object to the admission of the firearm or move to suppress it, leaving the

issue unpreserved for appellate review. In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 703; 859 NW2d 208 (2014);

People v Gentner, Inc, 262 Mich App 363, 368-369; 686 NW2d 752 (2004). Unpreserved issues

of constitutional error are reviewed for plain error. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764; 597

NW2d 130 (1999). “[U]nder the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must

have occurred, 2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected

substantial rights.” Id. at 763. The third requirement burdens the defendant with showing they

were prejudiced by the error. Id. “Reversal is warranted only when the plain, forfeited error

resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent defendant or when an error seriously affected the

fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s

innocence.” Id. at 763-764 (cleaned up).

“Both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution guarantee the right of

persons to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Pagano, 507 Mich 26,

31-32; 967 NW2d 590 (2021), citing Const 1963, art 1, § 11; US Const, Am IV. To invoke the

constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, a defendant must have a

reasonable expectation of privacy in the location being searched. People v Brown, 279 Mich App

116, 130; 755 NW2d 664 (2008). “Generally, searches or seizures conducted without a warrant

are presumptively unreasonable and, therefore, unconstitutional.” People v Barbarich, 291 Mich

App 468, 472; 807 NW2d 56 (2011). Evidence taken in violation of the right against unreasonable

searches and seizures is generally inadmissible at trial. Id. at 473.

“Consent permits a warrantless search so long as it is unequivocal, specific, and freely and

intelligently given.” People v Rodriguez, 327 Mich App 573, 584; 935 NW2d 51 (2019) (quotation

marks omitted). It is the prosecutor’s burden at trial to establish that consent to search was given.

People v Wagner, 104 Mich App 169, 176; 304 NW2d 517 (1981). To determine whether consent

is valid, a court must weigh the totality of the circumstances. Id.

Generally . . . consent must come from the person whose property is being

searched or from a third party who possesses common authority over the property.

Common authority is based on mutual use of the property by persons generally

having joint access or control for most purposes. Further, a third party without

actual authority to consent to a search may render a search valid if the police

officer’s belief in the authority to consent was objectively reasonable. However,

the consent of a third party does not render a search valid if the other party is present

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and expressly objects to the search. Although a police officer may not remove

someone from the premises for the purpose of preventing an objection, the officer

is not required to locate an absent person to obtain the person’s consent. [Brown,

279 Mich App at 131-132 (cleaned up).]

It is uncontested that police did not have a warrant for the initial search. The record reflects

two potential justifications: consent and a protective sweep. Officer Burley testified that Lankford

consented to a search of the home, and it is undisputed that she lived there. Officer Burley also

stated that he and the other officers “conducted a protective sweep.” The search must be justified

under one of these two theories.

In this case, the prosecution met its burden in establishing that consent was unequivocally

and freely given to the police. The prosecution’s primary support in establishing that the police

had consent to enter the home was Officer Burley’s testimony stating Lankford consented to

searching the home. No objections or contradictions were offered to this testimony, and no

additional evidence suggested that Lankford did not consent to the initial search.

That said, other testimony provides context suggesting that potentially coercive police

actions may have influenced Lankford’s consent, including the detention of defendant and Binion

and the order that occupants exit the home. Coercive police tactics may invalidate consent if they

undermine its voluntariness. People v Farrow, 461 Mich 202, 204; 600 NW2d 634 (1999). We

therefore must resolve whether those circumstances rendered Lankford’s consent defective.

We conclude that they did not. In People v Hughes, ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW3d

___ (2025) (Docket No. 367172); slip op at 1, this Court addressed similar facts where police

arrested the defendant outside of his home before obtaining his mother’s consent to a search. This

Court considered whether the mother’s statement that police could check whether the grandmother

was inside permitted the police to seize firearms found in the house. Id. at ___; slip op at 3.

Relying on minimal testimony, this Court concluded that the consent may have been limited to

finding the grandmother, meaning the seizure of the guns fell outside its scope. Id. at ___; slip op

at 4. But this Court did not find that the mother’s consent was compromised by the concurrent

arrest of the defendant.

Here, there is even less testimony suggesting limitation or coercion. Nothing in the record

indicates that Lankford restricted the scope of her consent. Although the detention of defendant

and Binion may have influenced her decision, there is little evidence that police actions rendered

her consent involuntary. Notably, Lankford accompanied officers throughout the search,

indicating she had ample opportunity to limit or revoke her consent but did not do so. Consent to

search may be revoked “at any time,” People v Powell, 199 Mich App 492, 500; 502 NW2d 353

(1993), yet Lankford did not withdraw it. Accordingly, the prosecution met its burden in

establishing that consent was “unequivocal, specific, and freely and intelligently given.”

Rodriguez, 327 Mich App at 584 (citation omitted). Because consent justified the search, we need

not address whether it was also justified as a protective sweep.

Defendant also argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress

the firearm. For similar reasons, this argument also fails. Because defendant did not move for a

new trial or evidentiary hearing, the issue is unpreserved. People v Sabin (On Second Remand),

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242 Mich App 656, 658; 620 NW2d 19 (2000); People v Abcumby-Blair, 335 Mich App 210, 227;

966 NW2d 437 (2020). To establish ineffective assistance, “a defendant must show that (1)

counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) but for counsel’s

deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been

different.” People v Trakhtenberg, 493 Mich 38, 51; 826 NW2d 136 (2012). Because this issue

is unpreserved, our review is limited to “errors apparent on the record.” People v Armisted, 295

Mich App 32, 46; 811 NW2d 47 (2011).

Defendant’s argument depends entirely on the premise that the search was unlawful.

Because the search was supported by valid consent, a motion to suppress would have failed.

Counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless argument. People v Snider, 239 Mich App

393, 425; 608 NW2d 502 (2000). Moreover, even without the firearm, the victims’ testimony

independently established defendant’s guilt. Defendant therefore cannot show a reasonable

probability of a different outcome.

B. OV 4

Defendant argues the trial court clearly erred by assigning 10 points for OV 4 because there

was insufficient evidence of psychological injury. We disagree.

“OV 4 should be assigned 10 points when serious psychological injury requiring

professional treatment occurred to a victim.” People v Lampe, 327 Mich App 104, 113; 933 NW2d

314 (2019) (cleaned up); MCL 777.34(1)(a). Serious psychological injury may include

“personality changes, anger, fright, or feelings of being hurt, unsafe, or violated.” People v

Armstrong, 305 Mich App 230, 247; 851 NW2d 856 (2014). A trial court may not assign 10 points

to OV 4 merely because psychological injury is a typical outcome of the crime or because a victim

experienced fear while the crime was being committed. Lampe, 327 Mich App at 114. Although

not dispositive, “evidence that a victim sought counseling may be considered.” Id.

Statements from McKeever and Watson at sentencing sufficiently support the trial court’s

scoring of OV 4. McKeever stated that he sought treatment for his “mental state,” including

therapy, and experienced paranoia after the incident. He also said that he was “constantly looking

over his shoulders.” This evidence reflects psychological injury, including paranoia and

personality changes, supporting the trial court’s assessment of 10 points. Watson’s statements

likewise support the score. In the PSIR, she reported that she was diagnosed and receiving

treatment for PTSD as a result of the incident. This evidence further supports the conclusion that

serious psychological injury occurred. See People v Rosa, 322 Mich App 726, 745; 913 NW2d

392 (2018) (holding that evidence of a “terrifying” experience and subsequent counseling

supported scoring OV4). Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in assigning 10 points for

OV 4.

III. CONCLUSION

Defendant has not established that police lacked consent for the initial search of the

residence and therefore has not shown that admission of the firearm was erroneous. Accordingly,

defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek suppression of the firearm, and defendant

cannot demonstrate prejudice. Moreover, the trial court properly assessed 10 points for OV 4.

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Affirmed.

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

/s/ Matthew S. Ackerman

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