Thomas

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

GREENVILLE DIVISION

JERMELL THOMAS PLAINTIFF

v. CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:26-cv-3-RPC-JMV

BOLIVAR COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,

et al. DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before the Court is Defendants Bolivar County, Mississippi; Kenny Edwards Scott; and

Bolivar County Regional Correctional Facility’s [4] Motion to Dismiss. Also before the Court is

Plaintiff Jermell Thomas’s [14] Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint. For the reasons stated

herein, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, and

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is DENIED. Plaintiff’s claims arising under

federal law are DISMISSED, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims, which are hereby REMANDED to the Circuit Court of

Bolivar County, Mississippi.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint in the Circuit Court of Bolivar County on December 8, 2025,

asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. See [Doc. 2]. On

January 7, 2026, Defendants Kenny Edwards Scott (Scott)1, Bolivar County, Mississippi (the

County), and the Bolivar County Regional Correctional Facility2 (collectively “Defendants”) filed

a Notice of Removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1441. See [Doc. 1]. One week later, on

1 Scott is incorrectly identified in the Complaint as “Kenny Edwards” and will be referred to in this opinion as “Officer

Scott.” See [5] at 1.

2 Bolivar County Regional Correctional Facility is incorrectly identified in the Complaint as “Bolivar County Regional

Corrections.” See [5] at 1.

January 14, 2026, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. See [Doc.

4]. The Court subsequently stayed the proceedings pending resolution of Defendants’ Motion to

Dismiss. See [Doc. 9].

The Plaintiff originally did not file a response within the time allowed under the local rules.

As a result, on April 1, 2026, almost three months after the Motion to Dismiss was filed, the Court

directed Plaintiff to file a response to the Motion to Dismiss on or before April 13, 2026, if he

wished to have a response considered. See [Doc. 12].3 Plaintiff filed his response on April 13,

shortly after 5:00 p.m. See [Doc. 13]. That same day, Plaintiff also, for the first time, filed a Motion

to Amend the Complaint. See [Doc. 14]. On April 20, 2026, Defendants filed their reply to

Plaintiff’s response. See [Doc. 15]. A week later, on April 27, 2026, Defendants filed their

Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s motion to amend. See [Doc. 16].

Plaintiff’s [13] Response does not address many of the arguments raised in the Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss. Rather, it largely argues about Defendants’ reading of the Complaint and

asserts Plaintiff’s request for leave to amend the complaint. The Motion to Amend the Complaint

is addressed herein.

The factual allegations in the Complaint are as follows. Plaintiff alleges that, on September

6, 2024, he was being “transported” in a Bolivar County vehicle driven by Officer Scott when

Scott lost control of the vehicle, causing it to leave the roadway and resulting in “serious injuries”

to Plaintiff. [Doc. 2 ¶¶ 6-8]. Plaintiff alleges that Scott “failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to

yield [to] traffic, and failed to obey the rules of the road, causing the vehicle to lose control and

drive into a ditch.” Id. at ¶ 9. Plaintiff further alleges that Scott “was either in the course and scope

3 The Court’s [12] Order emphasized that “Plaintiff’s response was due fourteen (14) days after the filing of the Motion

pursuant to L.U. Civ. R. 7(b)(4).” The response was due on or before January 29, 2026.

of his employment…or on a personal errand” at the time of the accident and “acted with reckless

disregard” for Plaintiff’s safety. Id. ¶¶ 9, 13. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts that the

Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff to operate the vehicle in a safe and prudent manner,

both negligently and with reckless disregard. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.

Defendants advance several arguments in support of dismissal. First, they contend that

Bolivar County Regional Correctional Facility is not a legal entity capable of being sued and

should be dismissed as an improper party. Second, Defendants assert multiple theories of

immunity, including that all Defendants are immune from Plaintiff’s state law claims under the

Mississippi Tort Claims Act (MTCA) and that Officer Scott is entitled to qualified immunity.

Lastly, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to plead a Monell4 claim against the County under

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” In re Great

Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). A court must accept all well-pleaded

facts as true and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Shakeri v. ADT Sec.

Servs., Inc., 816 F.3d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 2016); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements

of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at

678. While a complaint does not need detailed factual contentions, the “allegations must be enough

4 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978).

to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly,

“conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice

to prevent a motion to dismiss.” Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 685 (5th Cir. 2017)

(quotation omitted). “When confronted with a qualified-immunity defense at the pleadings stage,

the plaintiff must plead facts which, if proved, would defeat the claim of immunity.” Murry v. City

of Indianola, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186614, at *16-17 (N.D. Miss. July 19, 2024) (quoting

Guerra v. Castillo, 82 F.4th 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2003)); see also Waller v. Hanlon, 922 F.3d 590,

599 (5th Cir. 2019).

B. Qualified Immunity

Officer Scott asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity shields

government officials such as Scott from civil liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 73 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1982); see

also Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (2011) (“Qualified

immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments

about open legal questions.”). When a defendant invokes the defense, “a plaintiff has the burden

of establishing a constitutional violation and overcoming the defense.” Paixao v. City of

Greenwood, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1199, at *7 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 2, 2024) (citing Jackson v. City

of Hearne, 959 F.3d 194, 201 (5th Cir. 2020); McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323

(5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (en banc)).

“To determine whether a public official is entitled to qualified immunity, courts decide (1)

whether the facts the plaintiff has alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2)

whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged

misconduct.” Triplett v. Swindle, No. 1:24-cv-201-GHD-RP, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6505, at *5

(N.D. Miss. Jan. 12, 2026) (citing Doe v. Jewell, 151 F.4th 236, 244-45 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The Court’s first and threshold inquiry is whether the facts alleged, taken

as true, make out a violation of a constitutional right. “Crucially, a plaintiff’s inability to establish

an underlying constitutional violation forecloses any chance of recovery against an individual

defendant who asserts qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 320

(5th Cir. 2007)). The Plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating that qualified immunity is

inappropriate. Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 284 (5th Cir. 2021).

Here, Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that Officer Scott violated his constitutional rights.

The Complaint asserts that Scott failed to keep a proper lookout, failed to yield to traffic, and failed

to obey traffic laws, resulting in an accident. [Doc. 2, ¶ 9]. These allegations, even accepted as

true, sound in negligence—or at most gross negligence—and therefore do not give rise to a

constitutional violation actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,

332-36, 106 S. Ct. 662, 88 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1986) (rejecting contention that § 1983 embraces tort

concepts of negligence); Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 645 (5th Cir. 1997) (recognizing

constitutional standard for § 1983 claims must be more than negligence or gross negligence).

Additionally, Plaintiff failed to address Defendant’s argument that qualified immunity

applies, so he has not met his burden of demonstrating that qualified immunity is inapplicable.5

Macon v. Phila. Police Dep’t, No. 3:24-cv-807-DPJ-ASH, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7113, at *6

(S.D. Miss. Jan. 14, 2026); see also Murry, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186614, at *32 (holding that

plaintiff not responding to defendants’ arguments against § 1983 liability waived those claims);

McClelland v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 63 F.4th 996, 1010 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[A] party abandons a

5 Plaintiff’s [13] Response does not rebut or otherwise address Defendant’s qualified immunity argument.

claim by failing to defend it in response to motions to dismiss.”). The Complaint contains no

factual allegations plausibly suggesting that Officer Scott violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.

For this reason, the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis—whether a constitutional

violation occurred—has not been satisfied by Plaintiff, and any federal law claims against Officer

Scott in his individual capacity must be dismissed.

To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against Officer Scott in his official capacity, those

claims likewise fail. “[S]uits against officers in their official capacities are tantamount to suits

against the municipality.” Harmon v. City of Ocean Springs, No. 1:24-cv-242-HSO-RPM, 2025

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141661, at *9 (S.D. Miss. July 24, 2025) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658 at 690

n.55). Because the County is a defendant to this action, any official capacity claim against Officer

Scott would be redundant of those against the County and should also be dismissed. See Sanders-

Burns v. City of Plano, 594 F.3d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 2010). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s federal

law claims against Officer Scott are dismissed.

C. Bolivar County Regional Correctional Facility is an Improper Party

Bolivar County Regional Correctional Facility’s capacity to be sued is determined

according to state law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(3). “Under Mississippi law, a jail is not a separate legal

entity capable of being sued; rather, it is considered an extension of the county.” Battle v. Hinds

Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 3:24-cv-168-KHJ-MTP, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 212920, at *4 (S.D. Miss.

Nov. 22, 2024) (citing Tuesno v. Jackson, No. 5:08-cv-302-DCB-JMR, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

61416, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 30, 2009)); see also Brown v. Thompson, 927 So. 2d 733, 737 (Miss.

2006). For this reason, the correctional facility is not a proper party, and all claims against it must

be dismissed with prejudice.

D. Federal Law Claims

Plaintiff asserts a cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Complaint alleges that

the Defendants:

acted with deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 towards the Plaintiff by:

(a) failing to keep a proper lookout…;(b) driving the aforesaid vehicle in a reckless

and indifferent manner; (c) failing to keep the vehicle under proper control; (d)

failing to yield to the traffic; (e) failing to follow the [r]ules of the [r]oad in

Mississippi; and (f) in other respects as will be shown at the trial of this cause.

[Doc. 2 ¶ 30] (misnumbered as ¶ 17).

In response, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of his

constitutional rights. In the alternative, Defendants argues that even if a constitutional violation

has been alleged, it is not clearly established as required by Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court

precedent. Plaintiff’s [13] Response addresses neither argument.

It is also unclear from the face of the Complaint whether Plaintiff intends to assert his §

1983 claim against Officer Scott, the County, or both. As discussed above, Officer Scott is entitled

to qualified immunity from individual liability. Accordingly, the Court addresses only the § 1983

claim(s) asserted against the County.

“Under § 1983, municipalities ‘cannot be found liable on a theory of vicarious liability or

respondeat superior.’” Jones v. City of Hutto, 154 F.4th 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2025) (citing St. Maron

Props., L.L.C. v. City of Hous., 78 F.4th 754, 759-60 (5th Cir. 2023)). Any alleged unconstitutional

conduct must be “directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or

imprimatur,” meaning “isolated unconstitutional actions by municipal employees will almost

never trigger liability” on behalf of the municipality. Webb v. Town of Saint Joseph, 925 F.3d 209,

214 (5th Cir. 2019). To state a plausible claim against the County under § 1983, Plaintiff must

allege and establish that “(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policy maker (3)

was the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right.” Id. “Without a predicate

constitutional violation, there can be no Monell liability.” Rockette v. Carpenter Mgmt. Co., 2026

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52354, at *12-13 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 13, 2026) (quoting Loftin v. City of Prentiss,

Miss., 33 F.4th 774, 783 (5th Cir. 2022)). Put differently, the County “cannot be liable for

causing…a constitutional violation if no violation occurred.” Perdomo v. City of League City, 163

F.4th 921, 926 (5th Cir. 2026).

Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts showing that the alleged constitutional violation, if

any, resulted from an official policy, custom, or practice of Bolivar County promulgated or ratified

by a policymaker with actual or constructive knowledge. See Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454,

462 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that plaintiff must identify policy or custom and policy maker with

actual or constructive knowledge to establish § 1983 municipal liability) (citing Monell, 436 U.S.

at 694)). The Complaint does not identify a policy, custom, or practice related to the alleged

conduct or Plaintiff’s injuries, nor does it even include allegations of such a policy. Plaintiff also

fails to allege that any such policy was the moving force behind a constitutional violation. Lastly,

the Complaint does not allege any actual violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Without

allegations establishing both a constitutional violation and a causal policy or practice, Plaintiff’s §

1983 claims against the County fail as a matter of law and must be dismissed.

E. Motion for Leave to Amend

Plaintiff also requests leave to amend the complaint, first in the [13] Response to the

Motion to Dismiss and again in his separately filed [14] Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint.

Leave to amend should be given “when justice so requires,” and ““[w]hether leave to

amend should be granted is entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.” Scott v. U.S.

Bank. Nat’l Ass’n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)); Young v.

U.S. Postal Service ex rel. Donahoe, 620 F. App’x 241, 245 (5th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

Relevant considerations include, but are not limited to, undue delay by the movant and futility of

the amendment. See Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004).

Although Plaintiff originally filed his complaint in Mississippi State court, which applies

a more lenient pleading standard, federal pleading standards control upon removal. See Peña v.

City of Rio Grande City, 879 F.3d 613, 617 (5th Cir. 2018). The Fifth Circuit has recognized that

removal from a notice-pleading jurisdiction may be a “natural time” for amendment. Id. Even so,

a plaintiff seeking leave to amend must still provide the Court with “some notice of what his or

her amendments would be and how those amendments would cure the initial complaint’s defects.”

Scott, 16 F.4th at 1209. “Otherwise, the absence of any proposed amendments, compounded by

the lack of grounds for such an amendment justifies a district court’s denial of leave to amend.”

Johnson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 7247, 2023 WL 2645553, at *4 (5th Cir.

2023) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

Amendment is not warranted in this case for several reasons. First, Plaintiff has been aware

of the arguments raised in the Motion to Dismiss since January 14, 2026, yet failed to file any

response—let alone a motion to amend—until three months later, and only after the Court directed

him to do so. See [Doc. 4].6 Second, Plaintiff’s request to amend the complaint violates L.U. CIV.

R. 7(b)(2) and L.U. CIV. R. 15, each of which requires a Plaintiff seeking leave to amend to file

“a proposed amended pleading” as “an exhibit to a motion for leave to file the pleading.” Plaintiff

failed to attach a proposed amended complaint as required by the local rules.7 If a plaintiff does

6 The Court further notes that Plaintiff had the opportunity to amend his Complaint once as a matter of course pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1)(B) within twenty-one days after service of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on January 14, 2026. See [Doc. 4]. Plaintiff did not amend within that period

and instead waited approximately three months—until after the Court directed him to respond to the Motion to

Dismiss—before seeking leave to amend.

7 “Denial of leave to amend is reasonable where the plaintiff fails to comply with the local rules.” Young, 620 F. App’x

at 245 n.8 (citation omitted).

not provide the Court with a copy of the amended complaint, the district court may deny leave.

See McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002).

Even if an amended complaint is not provided, plaintiffs must “give the court at least some

notice of what his...amendments would be and how those amendments would cure the initial

complaint’s defects.” Banda v. City of McAllen, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 28917, at *12 (5th Cir.

Nov. 4, 2025) (quoting Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016)). Here,

Plaintiff merely asks for permission to file a pleading that “more specifically states his allegations,

clarifies the claims asserted, and identifies the parties and capacities intended to be asserted.” [Doc.

14, at 1]. Such conclusory assertions, without specifics, leave the court unable to determine the

importance of the request or what would be accomplished by the amendment. Kovalchuk v.

Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, 528 F.Supp.3d 647, 654 (E.D. Texas 2021); see also Molina-

Aranda v. Black Magic Enterprises, L.L.C., 983 F.3d 779, 789 (5th Cir. 2020).8

The motion further confuses the issue. The problems with the Complaint are not

technicalities of state court versus federal court pleading requirements. The Complaint is thorough

enough. It simply does not state a claim. Regardless, the threadbare motion, without the benefit of

the proposed amended pleading, is of no help to the Court. For these reasons, the Court declines

to afford the Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his Complaint.

F. Remaining State Law Claims

As explained herein, this action was originally filed in the Circuit Court of Bolivar County,

Mississippi. See [Doc. 2]. Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331 and 1441. See [Doc. 1].

8 See Johnson, 2023 WL 2645553, at *4 (holding that, in a removal case, a district court does not abuse its discretion

in denying leave to amend where plaintiffs make only a bare request without proposing specific amendments or

identifying additional facts that would cure pleading deficiencies. Plaintiff’s request to amend in the event their claims

needed “additional clarification” was deemed insufficient.).

In addition to the dismissed claims arising under federal law, Plaintiff also asserts a

negligence/reckless indifference claim pursuant to the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), “[t]he district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

a claim” when “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”

The Court’s “decision to exercise that jurisdiction after dismissing every claim over which it had

original jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635,

639, 129 S. Ct. 1862, 173 L. Ed. 2d 843 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)). This includes

remanding the case to state court. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 383 U.S. 343, 351,

108 S. Ct. 614, 98 L. Ed. 2d. 270 (1988) (noting that when a district court relinquishes jurisdiction

over a removed case involving pendent claims, the court has discretion to remand the case to state

court).

The Fifth Circuit has set forth several statutory and common law factors Court are to apply

when deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Davis v. City of Vicksburg, No. 3:13-

cv-886-DCB-MTP, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90611, at *14 (S.D. Miss. July 13, 2015) (citing

Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 159 (5th Cir. 2011)). Courts in the Fifth Circuit treat the

following four categories as the “statutory factors” for consideration: (1) whether the claim raises

a novel or complex issue of state law; (2) whether the claim predominates over the claims which

the district court has original jurisdiction; (3) if the district court has dismissed all claims over

which it has original jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling

reasons for declining jurisdiction. Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)).

As to the first factor, this Court has recognized that whether an officer’s actions occurred

within the course and scope of her employment and whether she exercised reckless disregard

present “difficult state law issues under the MTCA.” Kimbriel v. City of Greenville, No. 4:14-cv-

26-SA-JMV, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76478, at *7-8 (N.D. Miss. June 12, 2025). The second and

third factors also weigh against exercising jurisdiction in this case because the federal claims have

been dismissed, leaving the state law claims to predominate. Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159 (finding that

“state law claims predominate over the non-existent federal claims”). Thus, the statutory factors

weigh in favor of remanding the case back to the circuit court.

Similarly, the “common law” factors courts in the Fifth Circuit are required to consider

include “judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159 (citation

omitted). For the judicial economy factor, the Fifth Circuit has held that district courts should not

decline jurisdiction if a “significant amount of judicial resources” have already been expended

deciding the case. Brookshire Bros. Holding Inc. v. Dayco Prods. Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th

Cir. 2009). Here, significant judicial resources have not been expended. From a procedural

standpoint, this case remains at an early stage, as a case management order has not been entered,

no discovery has taken place, and the case was recently filed in January of this year. See, e.g. Est.

of Parker v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 278 F. Supp. 3d 372, 393 (S.D. Miss. 2024); Knox v. City

of Gautier, No. 1:18-cv-220-HSO-JCG, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26316, at *27 (S.D. Miss. Feb.

11, 2021).

As for convenience, the complaint alleges that “the subject incident occurred in Hinds

County.” [Doc. 2. ¶ 5]. However, all parties are residents of Bolivar County, Mississippi, which

provides a more convenient venue. Id. ¶¶ 1-4; See Davis, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90611, at *14.

This favors remand to the Circuit Court of Bolivar County. As for the fairness factor, the Fifth

Circuit has held it to be “fair” for state law claims to be resolved in state court, which will be the

result here if the case is remanded. Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160. “Finally, insofar as federal courts are

‘not so well equipped for determinations of state law as are state courts,’ the fourth common law

factor of comity is served on remand.” Thompson v. Beasley, 309 F.R.D. 236, 251 (N.D. Miss.

2015) (citing Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159).

More broadly, “[t]he general rule in the Fifth Circuit ‘is that a court should decline to

exercise jurisdiction over remaining state law claims when all federal law claims are eliminated

before trial.” Est. of Parker, 278 F. Supp. 3d at 392 (quoting Brookshire Bros., 554 F.3d at 602).

Moreover, because only state law claims remain, the “important interests of federalism and

comity” also favor remand. Parker & Parlsey Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 588

(5th Cir. 1992).9

Given these circumstances and having determined that Plaintiff’s Monell and 42 U.S.C. §

1983 claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim, the Court finds that both the statutory factors

and common law factors disfavor the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in this case. Therefore,

the remaining state law claim(s) are remanded to the Circuit Court of Bolivar County for further

proceedings.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s [14] Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is

DENIED. Defendants’ [4] Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART as to Plaintiff’s claims

arising under federal law. Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED. The Court

9 “The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 14-15, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 2420,

49 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1976), and often are not as well equipped for determinations of state law as are state courts. Aside

from the state courts' superior familiarity with their respective jurisdictions' law, the federal courts' construction of

state law can be uncertain and ephemeral." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 122 n. 32,

104 S.Ct. 900, 920 n. 32, 79 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1984). "[F]ederal courts are not the authorized expositors of state law; there

is no mechanism by which their errors in such matters can be corrected on appeal by state courts." Herbert Wechsler,

Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 216, 232 (1948)(cited in [United

Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 n. 15, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1139 n. 15, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218 (1966)] and quoted in

[Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Metzger, 680 F.2d 768, 776, 220 U.S. App. D.C. 219 (D.C. Cir. 1982)]. See

United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 135, 82 S.Ct. 676, 677, 7 L. Ed. 2d 623 (1962)(per

curiam)(state court defines authoritative meaning of state law).” Id. at 588-89.

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state law claim(s), which

are hereby REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Bolivar County, Mississippi.

SO ORDERED, this the 8th day of May, 2026.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14