Opinion

InGenesis, Inc. v. DGS

Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
May 8, 2026
Status
Unpublished
Author
Wolf
On the bench
Wolf
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 40.5%

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

InGenesis, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 818 C.D. 2025

:

Department of General Services, :

Respondent : Argued: April 13, 2026

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE WOLF FILED: May 8, 2026

InGenesis, Inc. (Petitioner) petitions for review from the June 24, 2025

final determination (Final Determination) of the Pennsylvania Department of

General Services (DGS). DGS denied Petitioner’s bid protest on the basis that the

protest lacked merit. After careful review, we affirm.

On January 22, 2024, DGS issued Request for Proposal Number

6100058189 (RFP) for contracted medical staffing services. The RFP consisted of

three lots to be awarded to at least two different offerors: Lot 1 (nursing

professionals), Lot 2 (medical and therapy professionals), and Lot 3 (ancillary

professionals). The RFP set forth the following process for scoring and selecting

proposals, as found by DGS in the Final Determination:

4. The percentage of points assigned to the evaluation of

technical responses for the RFP was 65% of the total

points. Evaluation of the technical was based upon

soundness of approach, demonstrations, offeror

qualifications, personnel qualifications, and understanding

the problem.

5. The RFP included requirements regarding offeror

responsibility . . . . [T]o be considered responsible and

eligible for selection for best and final offers (BAFOs) or

contract negotiations, the total score for the technical

submittal of the offeror’s proposal must be greater than or

equal to 75% of the available technical points.

6. The RFP also described the process for BAFOs. The

RFP [d]escription [s]ection stated that the [i]ssuing

[o]ffice reserved the right to conduct discussions with

offerors for the purpose of obtaining BAFOs in one or

more of the following ways, in any combination and order:

schedule oral presentations, request revised proposals,

conduct an online auction, and enter into pre-selection

negotiations.

7. The RFP also described the final ranking and award of

the RFP. It stated that: After any best and final offer

process is conducted, the [i]ssuing [o]ffice will combine

the evaluation committee’s final technical scores, the final

cost scores, and the domestic workforce utilization scores.

The [i]ssuing [o]ffice will rank responsible [o]fferors

according to the total overall score assigned to each in

descending order. The [i]ssuing [o]ffice must select for

contract negotiations the [o]fferor with the highest overall

score.

Final Determination,1 Findings of Fact (F.F.) 4-7 (internal citations omitted).

Petitioner submitted proposals for all three lots. On November 27,

2024, DGS notified Petitioner it was not selected for negotiations. DGS awarded

contracts for Lots 1 and 3 to 22nd Century Technologies, Inc. (22nd Century) and a

contract for Lot 2 to MHM Solutions, LLC (MHM) (together with 22nd Century,

1

The Final Determination is found at pages 798a-806a of the Reproduced Record (R.R.).

2

Awardees). DGS’s award indicated Petitioner failed to meet the 75% technical

scoring threshold for Lots 1 and 2. Final Determination, F.F. 11. On April 14, 2025,

Petitioner filed protests of all awards on various bases, and DGS stayed the awards

pending the protest. DGS’s Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) Kelly Martini

reviewed the protest and recommended it be denied. Executive Deputy Secretary of

DGS Sandra Aguilera denied the protest by final determination on June 24, 2025.

Relevant to this appeal, the Deputy Secretary reasoned as follows:

2. Non-Compliance with QIO[2] Requirement

....

[According to DGS’s clarification of the RFP’s technical

QIO requirement,] if the selected offeror is not QIO or

QIO-Like certified, then it must identify its subcontractors

that are QIO or QIO-Like certified that can meet the needs

of the Commonwealth. In the original protest, [Petitioner]

claimed that 22nd Century and MHM are not QIO or QIO-

Like accredited but did not address the fact that each of the

selected offerors could have included subcontractors that

are QIO or QIO-like certified in their proposals . . . .

In her response to the protest, CPO Martini, stated that,

although 22nd Century is not QIO or QIO-like certified, it

did identify two subcontractors who are QIO-like certified

partners. She also noted that MHM held a QIO-like

certification at the time of proposal submission and is in

the process of recertifying which will be complete before

the contract is implemented. Further, one of MHMs

subcontractors is in the process of receiving its QIO-like

certification as well. Therefore, both 22nd Century and

MHM also met the requirements of the RFP.

2

The RFP required that “the selected Offeror must be Quality Improvement Organization

(QIO) Certified or QIO-like certified, which allows agencies (as applicable) to request a federal

funding match of 75% / 25%. If selected Offeror is not QIO, or QIO-like certified, it must identify

its subcontractors that are QIO, or QIO-like certified, that can meet the needs of the

Commonwealth.” R.R. at 765a-67a.

3

It is important to note that compliance with the QIO or

QIO-Like accreditation requirement was not a mandatory

requirement for the RFP. The RFP Description Section 16,

Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements, listed four

requirements that are not waivable. The four requirements

were listed as: 1) the proposal must be timely received and

submitted, 2) the proposal must be electronically signed

by the offeror, 3) the proposal must contain a completed

[small diverse business] participation submittal, and 4) the

proposal must contain a completed [veteran business

enterprise] participation submittal. Further, in Section 14,

Proposal Submission, the language states that the

Mandatory Responsiveness Requirements as set forth in

Section 16 are the only RFP requirements that the

Commonwealth will consider to be not waivable. The

Commonwealth specifically reserved the right to waive

any other technical or immaterial nonconformities in the

offerors’ proposals.

The QIO or QIO-like certification requirement was not a

mandatory requirement of the RFP, but rather a

component of the scored technical submittal . . . .

3. Failure to Hold Discussions with [Petitioner]

....

[Section 513(f) of the Procurement Code (Code), 62

Pa.C.S. § 513(f)3] allows the contracting officer to have

discussions and negotiations with responsible offerors for

the purpose of clarifications and obtaining best and final

3

Section 513(f), 62 Pa.C.S. § 513(f), states:

Discussion with responsible offerors and revision of proposals.--As provided in

the request for proposals, discussions and negotiations may be conducted with

responsible offerors for the purpose of clarification and of obtaining best and final

offers. Responsible offers shall be accorded fair and equal treatment with respect

to any opportunity for discussion and revision of proposals. In conducting

discussions, there shall be no disclosure of any information derived from proposals

submitted by competing offerors.

4

offers. The subsection further requires that all responsible

offers are afforded fair and equal treatment with respect to

any opportunity for discussion and revision of proposals.

I note that this subsection does not require discussions or

negotiation with responsible offerors; just that if those

discussions or negotiations occur, all responsible offerors

are allowed to participate.

[Petitioner] alleges that DGS held discussions with 22nd

Century and MHM but offers no proof of such discussions

. . . . If what [Petitioner] is arguing is that, by entering into

negotiations with MHM and 22nd Century once all

evaluations were completed and the Recommendation for

Contractor Selection Memorandum signed, DGS held

“discussions” with those offerors, [Petitioner] is clearly

not understanding [Section 513(g) of the Code, 62 Pa.C.S.

§ 513(g),4] which sets forth the authority to select offerors

for negotiation. Those negotiations are not the same as the

discussions provided for in Subsection 513(f); they are

done after all evaluations (cost and technical) are complete

and an offeror is selected for negotiation as set forth in

Subsection 513(g) . . . . Actual negotiations with selected

the selected [sic] Offerors, 22nd Century and MHM, were

authorized by Subsection 513(g) . . . .

4. Improper Best Value Determination

[Petitioner] next argues that DGS made an improper best

value determination in selecting 22nd Century and alleges

that 22nd Century is only a technology company and

therefore does not have the experience required for a

healthcare staffing services contract of the size of the

Commonwealth’s . . . .

....

4

Section 513(g), 62 Pa.C.S. § 513(g), states:

(g) Selection for negotiation.--The responsible offeror whose proposal is

determined in writing to be the most advantageous to the purchasing agency, taking

into consideration price and all evaluation factors, shall be selected for contract

negotiation.

5

The actual definition of best value in the Procurement

Handbook is “the process of selecting the offer which

provides the greatest value to the agency based on

evaluating and comparing all pertinent factors, including

price, so that the overall combination that best meets the

agency’s needs is selected . . . .” [Petitioner] appears to be

arguing that experience was the only factor that the

evaluation committee could consider as part of the

technical evaluation. While that was clearly not the case,

[Petitioner] also does not provide any factual information

regarding its allegation that 22nd Century is not qualified.

....

6. Failure to Debrief

Once the award was posted, all offerors who submitted a

proposal were able to request a debriefing. Due to the

number of proposals received . . . [,] DGS was still

attempting to schedule all requested debriefings . . . .

I find this argument to be clearly without merit and now

moot as a debriefing has been conducted.

Final Determination at 3-8 (some internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Petitioner petitioned this Court for review.

On appeal,5 Petitioner raises four issues in which it argues DGS erred:

(1) neither Awardee met the QIO requirements at submission, and the QIO

requirements were mandatory and nonwaivable; (2) DGS held discussions with

Awardees but not with Petitioner; (3) DGS improperly determined best value in

regards to 22nd Century; and (4) DGS failed to schedule a debriefing until after the

time for submitting a protest.

5

Our review is limited to considering “whether the determination of [DGS] [was] arbitrary

and capricious, an abuse of discretion or contrary to law.” JPay, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 89 A.3d

756, 761 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

6

First, regarding the QIO status, Petitioner argues that the two QIO-like

subcontractors 22nd Century identified cannot “meet the needs of the

Commonwealth” because those subcontractors cannot control whether other

subcontractors will contribute to QIO needs. Petitioner also argues MHM was

essentially between QIO certifications at the time of selection, with its prior

certification having lapsed after submission, so DGS erred in relying on MHM’s

effort to get recertified as a basis for meeting this requirement. Finally, Petitioner

argues the QIO requirements are mandatory.

In response, DGS emphasizes that the QIO requirement is waivable at

the discretion of DGS, which can only be disturbed if it is arbitrary, an abuse of

discretion, or contrary to law. DGS states responsibility of a bidder and

responsiveness of a proposal are determined at the time of submission, not at the

time of award. DGS argues its public clarification made during the bid process

supports its action here. DGS would determine QIO compliance, including by

considering subcontractors and exercising its discretion to ensure the

Commonwealth’s QIO needs were met. DGS did not bear a burden to prove or

quantify how specific subcontractors would meet those needs; it was only required

to reasonably determine that they could. In reply, Petitioner claims DGS was

required to support its reliance on subcontractors with specific evidence from the

record. Regarding MHM, Petitioner disputes DGS’s assertion that submission is the

relevant time for determining QIO compliance.

We initially agree with DGS that the technical QIO requirements of the

RFP were waivable at DGS’s discretion. “[W]here the requirements in an RFP are

not mandated by statute and the RFP reserves the right to waive defects, a non-

compliant submission may be waived.” JPay, Inc. v. Dep’t of Corr., 89 A.3d 756,

7

766 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). The RFP includes four “mandatory” criteria. Reproduced

Record (R.R.) at 5a. QIO compliance was not listed as mandatory, so it was

“waivable by [DGS] per se.” KPMG LLP v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 276 A.3d 308,

314 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022). Further, we agree with DGS that it did not abuse its

discretion on these criteria. DGS determined that 22nd Century’s two QIO-like

certified subcontractors were sufficient to meet the needs of the Commonwealth, and

Petitioner has not explained how that is inconsistent with the record. For MHM’s

certification, “the key inquiry must be whether offerors [meet the requirement] at

the time they submit their initial proposals.” Language Line Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of

Gen. Servs., 991 A.2d 383, 389 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). MHM was QIO certified at

that time, and DGS exercised its discretion in making an award, knowing that MHM

was pursuing recertification. We conclude that DGS did not abuse its discretion or

act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding Awardees satisfied the QIO requirement.

Second, Petitioner argues the discussions DGS had with Awardees

were pursuant to Section 513(f) of the Code because no other section of the Code

expressly provides for discussion. Petitioner insists DGS was obligated to engage

in similar discussions with Petitioner and never did so. DGS maintains that it never

held discussions under Section 513(f), but only discussed with Awardees

incidentally under Section 513(g) as part of final negotiation of contracts after the

awards. We agree with DGS that its discussions with Awardees were not under

Section 513(f). DGS found the communications with Awardees occurred after

evaluation of proposals was completed and the internal recommendation for the

award was signed. See Final Determination at 5-6. Discussions under Section 513(f)

are performed before the evaluation is complete and as part of the evaluation. See

id. at 6. We find no error in DGS’s determination that discussions with Awardees

8

here were part of contract negotiation under Section 513(g), nor any evidence that

pre-evaluation discussions occurred that would require DGS to extend the same to

Petitioner.

Third, Petitioner argues DGS abused its discretion in its best value

determination for 22nd Century, which has experience with different medical

staffing services in smaller contracts in the past, so it does not meet the RFP’s

experience requirement. DGS responds that it has significant discretion to determine

best value by considering all factors for best value in the RFP, not just one factor

alone. It notes that, once again, Petitioner has not shown how the record or findings

undermine DGS’s discretionary determination that 22nd Century’s experience was

sufficiently similar to qualify it for a best value finding. We agree with DGS.

Experience, like other factors that are not mandatory under the RFP, is subject to

DGS’s discretion and a “purported lack of experience with similar projects does not

rise to the level that it would deprive” DGS of that discretion. JPay, 89 A.3d at 767.

Beyond Petitioner’s assertions that 22nd Century’s experience is, in its judgment,

insufficient, we cannot say DGS abused its discretion.

Fourth and finally, Petitioner argues DGS did not timely comply with

the RFP’s requirement to debrief Petitioner after the award. Petitioner acknowledges

that it was eventually debriefed, but not until “long after the protest period expired.”

Petitioner’s Br. at 19. DGS responds that Petitioner has not shown prejudice from

the timing of the debriefing. It also points out that the RFP did not promise a

debriefing during the protest period. See R.R. at 7a. In reply, Petitioner asserts it

was prejudiced because a debriefing could have revealed further bases for protest,

though Petitioner does not specifically identify any such basis. We agree that DGS

complied with the debrief process set out in the RFP. The RFP does not establish a

9

time certain and notably states the debriefing will “not toll the time for filing a

protest.” Id. Additionally, we are not persuaded that Petitioner suffered any

prejudice, given its failure to identify prejudice with specificity. We conclude

DGS’s determination on this issue was not erroneous.

For these reasons, we conclude DGS’s Final Determination was not

arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or contrary to law. Accordingly, we

affirm the Final Determination.

_____________________________________

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

10

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

InGenesis, Inc., :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 818 C.D. 2025

:

Department of General Services, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 8th day of May 2026, the June 24, 2025 final

determination of the Department of General Services is hereby AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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