Bondi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 0:26-CV-60434-MIDDLEBROOKS/AUGUSTIN-BIRCH

ANDRES REYNALDO

DOMINGO PEREZ,

Petitioner,

v.

PAMELA BONDI, U.S. ATTORNEY

GENERAL, et al.,

Respondents.

____________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

This cause comes before the Court on Petitioner Andres Reynaldo Domingo Perez’s

Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. DE 1. The Honorable Donald M. Middlebrooks, United

States District Judge, referred the Petition to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge to

take all action required by law. DE 6. Respondents filed a response to the Petition. DE 8. The

Court has carefully considered the briefing and the record and is otherwise fully advised. The

Court RECOMMENDS that the Petition [DE 1] be GRANTED insofar as Respondents be

ordered to, within seven days, either afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an

Immigration Judge or release him.

I. Background

This case is one of many cases around the country stemming from the Department of

Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) recent changes to its interpretation of the Immigration and

Nationality Act’s (“INA”) detention provisions and the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”)

agreement with that interpretation in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).

Two INA detention provisions are at issue, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

Section 1225(b)(2) states that, “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for admission, if the

examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and

beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

Section 1226(a) states, “On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be

arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United

States.” Id. § 1226(a). But § 1226(a) provides that an alien awaiting a decision on removal may

be released on bond instead of continuing to be detained. Id. “Federal regulations provide that

aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)).

On July 8, 2025, DHS informed Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)

employees that § 1225(b)(2), rather than § 1226(a), applies to all non-citizens present in the United

States who have “not been admitted . . . whether or not at a designated port of arrival.” Merino v.

Ripa, No. 25-23845-CIV, 2025 WL 2941609, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (quoting ICE Memo:

Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applications for Admission, AILA Doc.

No. 25071607 (July 8, 2025)). DHS has taken the position that all non-citizens present in the

United States who have not been admitted or paroled are applicants for admission and are subject

to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), without the possibility of bond. Id. On September 5,

2025, BIA agreed with this interpretation, issuing a binding ruling in Matter of Yajure Hurtado

that Immigration Judges lack the authority to hear bond requests or to grant bonds to non-citizens

who are present in the United States without admission because those non-citizens are properly

detained under § 1225(b)(2). Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). With

this background in mind, the Court turns to the facts of this case.

Petitioner states that he is an 18-year-old citizen and national of Guatemala who entered

the United States in February 2023 as an unaccompanied alien child. DE 1 ¶¶ 19, 25–26. He filed

an asylum application in December 2023. Id. ¶ 28. He also applied for a special juvenile visa, and

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services approved a visa in September 2024. Id. ¶ 29. He

obtained a social security card and work authorization. Id. ¶ 36. On November 26, 2025, he was

stopped while driving lawfully and arrested. Id. ¶¶ 1, 30. He currently is detained at the Broward

Transitional Center in Pompano Beach, Florida. Id. ¶¶ 1, 30.

II. Analysis

Petitioner maintains that his detention without bond violates the INA and his right to due

process under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 14–17. Respondents

assert that Petitioner has named incorrect Respondents and that he properly is detained without

bond under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). DE 8.

A. The Correct Respondent

Respondents argue that Petitioner incorrectly has named various Respondents. Id. at 1 n.1.

They maintain that, because he is detained at the Broward Transitional Center, his custodian and

the only correct Respondent is Assistant Field Office Director Juan Gonzalez. Id.

A writ of habeas corpus must “be directed to the person having custody of the person

detained.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. “[T]here is generally only one proper respondent to a given

prisoner’s habeas petition,” and that is the custodian “with the ability to produce the prisoner’s

body before the habeas court.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 434–35 (2004). Assistant Field

Office Director Juan Gonzalez, in his official capacity, should be substituted as a Respondent, and

the claims against the remaining Respondents should be dismissed.

B. The Appropriate Statute Governing Petitioner’s Detention

Respondents contend that the Petition must be denied because Petitioner properly is

detained without bond under § 1225(b)(2), as opposed to § 1226(a). Respondents maintain that

§ 1225(b)(2) applies to all non-citizens who are present in the United States without admission.

This Court already has rejected Respondents’ position, and Judge Middlebrooks has

agreed. Sanchez v. Noem, No. 0:25-CV-62677, 2026 WL 218739, at *2–3 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 2026)

(concluding that “Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), [and] Petitioner is

entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge”), report &

recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 222556 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2026); Gonzalez, 2025 WL

4053421, at *4 (concluding that “Petitioner’s detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), [and]

Petitioner is entitled to an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge”), report &

recommendation adopted, 2026 WL 115211. Likewise, many courts in this District and around

the country have rejected Respondents’ position.1 E.g., Merino, 2025 WL 2941609, at *3 (“DHS’s

interpretation of the applicability of § 1225(b)(2), rather than § 1226, to noncitizens who have

resided in the count[r]y for years and were already in the United States when apprehended, runs

afoul of the statutes’ legislative history, plain meaning, and interpretation by courts in the First,

1 The Fifth Circuit recently reached a contrary conclusion in a split decision. See Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,

No. 25-20496, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026). That opinion is not binding on this Court. Following the

decision in Buenrostro-Mendez, courts within this Circuit have declined to follow its majority opinion, finding its

dissenting opinion more persuasive. E.g., Vasquez Lopez v. Warden, Glades Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 2:26-CV-147-JES-

NPM, 2026 WL 369362, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 10, 2026) (recognizing Buenrostro-Mendez but determining that the

majority opinion was “contrary to the overwhelming majority of district court judges to have considered the issue”);

Rostislav Malikov v. Bondi, No. 2:26-CV-00172-SPC-NPM, 2026 WL 395296, at *1 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 12, 2026)

(“The Court acknowledges the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Buenrostro-Mendez . . . which agreed with the government’s

interpretation of the INA. The decision is not binding here, and it contradicts the vast majority of district court opinions

addressing the issue. The Court respectfully disagrees with the majority’s reasoning and finds Judge Douglas’s dissent

more persuasive.”).

Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.”); Puga v. Assistant Field Off. Dir., Krome N.

Serv. Processing Ctr., No. 25-24535-CIV, 2025 WL 2938369, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025)

(“[N]umerous courts that have examined the interpretation of section 1225 articulated by

Respondents––particularly following the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado––have

rejected their construction and adopted Petitioner’s.”).

Section 1225(b) “applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States.”

Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. In contrast, § 1226(a) “applies to aliens already present in the United

States.” Id. at 303. Petitioner was detained while he was already present in the United States, not

while he was seeking entry into the United States. According to Petitioner, he had lived in the

United States for more than two years by the time he was detained. Petitioner’s detention is

governed under § 1226(a), not under § 1225(b)(2). See Merino, 2025 WL 2941609, at *3

(“Petitioner, who has resided in the country for nearly a decade and was apprehended while already

within the United States, not at the border, falls under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), and is therefore

subject to discretionary bond determination.”). As Petitioner’s detention is governed under

§ 1226(a), he must receive an individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge.

See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1)).

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, the Court RECOMMENDS that Assistant Field Office Director Juan

Gonzalez, in his official capacity, be substituted as a Respondent and that the claims against the

remaining Respondents be dismissed. The Court further RECOMMENDS that the Petition

[DE 1] be GRANTED insofar as Respondents be ordered to, within seven days, either afford

Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an Immigration Judge or release him.

While a party normally has fourteen days to serve and file written objections to any of the

findings and recommendations in a report and recommendation, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);

S.D. Fla. Mag. R. 4(a), this case warrants a shorter objection period. Within seven days of being

served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, any party may serve and file written

objections to any of the above findings and recommendations. Failure to timely object waives the

right to challenge on appeal the District Court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal

conclusions contained in this Report and Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2014).

DONE AND SUBMITTED in Chambers at Fort Lauderdale, Florida, this 17th day of

March, 2026.

GO\..

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE