the city, rather than the pool, was the “proper ‘insurance carrier’ under the labor code”
How later courts described this case
- the city, rather than the pool, was the “proper ‘insurance carrier’ under the labor code”
- concluding “[T]he Fund itself would 7 appear to enjoy local-government status under the Act.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
________________
NO. 09-25-00158-CV
________________
TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
RISK MANAGEMENT POOL, Appellant
V.
DIANNA ADAMS, AS SURVIVING SPOUSE OF NEIL ADAMS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 258th District Court
San Jacinto County, Texas
Trial Cause No. CV17,490
________________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an interlocutory appeal filed by the Texas Association of Counties Risk
Management Pool (TACRMP) arising out of a suit filed by Dianna Adams after her
workers’ compensation claim for the death of her husband, Neil, was denied by the
Texas Department of Insurance, Division of Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel
(DWC). The trial court denied TACRMP’s plea to the jurisdiction based on
governmental immunity and granted Dianna’s motion for summary judgment
1
asserting Neil was in the course and scope of his employment for San Jacinto County
when he was shot and killed. TACRMP filed this interlocutory appeal. In two issues,
the TACRMP challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction.
Background
Neil Adams was employed as a deputy constable with the San Jacinto
County’s Constable Office.1 In addition to his duties as a deputy constable, Neil
provided private security for the Sharpstown Mall in Houston. On February 23,
2022, Neil was working private security at the mall dressed in his constable uniform.
Neil was called to a store regarding an angry customer and a declined credit card.
During the altercation, the customer grabbed Neil’s service firearm and shot and
killed him.
Neil’s widow, Dianna, filed for workers’ compensation death benefits from
San Jacinto County. The County disputed the claim on the basis that Neil was not in
the course and scope of his employment when he was killed because he was working
a private job outside his jurisdiction. After a contested case hearing, the DWC
concluded that Neil was not working in the course and scope of his employment
when he was shot, and that Neil was killed due to a personal reason and not because
he was an employee of the constable’s office or because of his employer.
1
Since Dianna and Neil share the same last name, we will use their first names.
2
In February 2023, Dianna filed for judicial review of the DWC’s decision. In
her petition, Dianna sought relief under the Workers’ Compensation Act, arguing
that Neil was in the course and scope of his employment with San Jacinto County
when he was killed. Dianna also requested declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing
that the trial court should declare the law in Texas is that a police officer:
(1) is immediately in the course and scope of employment under [Texas
Labor Code section] 410.252 and the below laws when a disturbance of
the peace or a crime occurs in the officer’s presence; (2) a Texas Peace
Officer working an extra duty job remains in the course and scope of
employment as a Texas Peace Officer for the employing governmental
entity, including a Texas political subdivision, especially when
authorized to perform such extra duty work at any other location in
Texas especially while in uniform as authorized by and for the
governmental entity; and (3) the personal animosity exception does not
apply to strangers where an encounter occurs as a result of work.
San Jacinto County—named in the petition as a “potential defendant”—filed
an original answer, and TACRMP—named as the defendant—filed a Plea to the
Jurisdiction and Original Answer, asserting the following:
Plaintiff’s employer, San Jacinto County, self-insures for workers’
compensation through participation in an Interlocal Participation
Agreement which is administered by [TACRMP]. Texas Labor Code
section 504.011(c) permits political subdivisions to enter into an
interlocal agreement with other political subdivisions providing for
self-insurance. [TACRMP] pools and administer counties’ workers’
compensation self-insurance as authorized by Texas Labor Code
section 504.011 through an interlocal fund.
....
[TACRMP] was created as an administrative agency of cooperating
local governments pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act [Texas
3
Government Code Chapter 791]. As such, it is a governmental entity
subject to governmental immunity. Through interlocal agreements, the
[TACRMP] pools and administers counties’ workers’ compensation
self-insurance as authorized by Texas Labor Code section 504.011.
Therefore, as noted above, San Jacinto County is self[-]insured for
purposes of workers’ compensation benefits to its employees. To the
extent that [TACRMP] is administering San Jacinto County’s self-
insured workers’ compensation program, [TACRMP] is furthering the
affairs of San Jacinto County in administering San Jacinto County’s
workers’ compensation claims, and such claims are barred by
governmental immunity.
TACRMP also asserted that Dianna was not entitled to a declaratory
judgment, because “[w]hen a statute provides an avenue for attacking a final agency
order, a declaratory judgment action directed at that order will not lie.” TACRMP
subsequently filed an amended plea to the jurisdiction and Motion for Summary
Judgment, arguing again that the risk management pool is a governmental unit
entitled to governmental immunity and that the redundant remedies doctrine applied
to Dianna’s claims. 2 TACRMP attached the following exhibits to its amended plea
to the jurisdiction:
Exhibit A: DWC’s Decision and Order
Exhibit B: Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment & Notice of
Hearing
This amended Plea to the Jurisdiction and Motion for Summary Judgment
2
was filed after the trial court signed an order on February 14, 2024, denying
TACRMP’s original plea to the jurisdiction.
4
Dianna moved for summary judgment against TACRMP. She attached the
following exhibits to her motion:
Exhibit A: TDI-DWC Certified Hearing File copy of DWC Contested
Case Hearing Decision and Order and Appeals Panel Finality Notice
Exhibit B: Certified Copy of Claimant’s Exhibits from DWC Contested
Case Hearing
Exhibit C: Certified Copy of Carrier’s Exhibits from DWC Contested
Case Hearing
Exhibit D: Transcript of DWC Contested Case Hearing
The trial court denied TACRMP’s plea to the jurisdiction and granted
Dianna’s motion for summary judgment. TACRMP filed this interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, TACRMP argues the trial court erred by denying its plea to the
jurisdiction, because it is not a proper defendant due to governmental immunity, and
no basis exists for waiver of governmental immunity. TACRMP also contends that
we should reverse the trial court’s judgment and denial of TACRMP’s plea to the
jurisdiction because the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) cannot be used
to expand the scope of judicial review. Finally, the UDJA action is redundant
because of the judicial review proceeding, and thus unfounded.
Issue One
In its first issue, TACRMP argues that the trial court erred when it denied its
Plea to the Jurisdiction because it is a governmental entity entitled to governmental
5
immunity, and there is no waiver of immunity entitling Dianna to pursue her claims
against TACRMP.
Unless waived by the Legislature, governmental immunity generally protects
political subdivisions of the state from suit. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman,
342 S.W.3d 54, 57-58 (Tex. 2011). “[I]mmunity from suit defeats a trial court’s
subject matter jurisdiction and thus is properly asserted in a plea to the jurisdiction.”
Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 639 (Tex. 1999). “Whether
governmental immunity has been waived in a given case implicates subject-matter
jurisdiction.” San Jacinto River Auth. v. City of Conroe, 688 S.W.3d 124, 130 (Tex.
2024).
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential to a court’s authority to decide a case
and is never presumed. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440,
443-44 (Tex. 1993). We interpret statutory waivers of immunity narrowly, since the
Legislature’s intent to waive immunity must be “effected by clear and unambiguous
language.” See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.034; Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.
v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2008). Whether subject-matter jurisdiction
exists due to waiver of immunity is a question of law, and we review the trial court’s
ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo. State v. Holland, 221 S.W.3d 639, 642
(Tex. 2007); Tex. Dep’t of Parks and Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228
(Tex. 2004).
6
A county is a political subdivision of the state. See Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco
Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Pol. Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund,
212 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Tex. 2006). Both parties acknowledge San Jacinto County
was Neil’s employer. Chapter 504 of the Texas Labor Code requires political
subdivisions to provide workers’ compensation benefits to their employees, by:
(1) becoming a self-insurer;
(2) providing insurance under a workers’ compensation insurance
policy; or
(3) entering into an interlocal agreement with other political
subdivisions providing for self-insurance.
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 504.011.
Texas Government Code Chapter 2259 allows governmental units to self-
insure against “any insurable risk or hazard.” See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. §
2259.031(a). Chapter 791, the “Interlocal Cooperation Act,” allows a local
government to contract with other local governments to collectively perform
“governmental functions in which the contracting parties are mutually interested.”
See Id. §§ 791.003(N), 791.011. When “two or more political subdivisions
collectively self-insur[e] under an interlocal contract under Chapter 791,” the Labor
Code refers to such political subdivisions as a “pool[.]” See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §
501.001(4). Such pools are also governmental units entitled to governmental
immunity. See Ben Bolt, 212 S.W.3d at 324-25 (concluding “[T]he Fund itself would
7
appear to enjoy local-government status under the Act.”). As a pool of self-insured
governmental units authorized by Chapters 791 and 2259, TACRMP is a
governmental unit entitled to immunity unless such immunity has been waived by
statute, the question we address next. 3
The Workers’ Compensation Act provides, “An insurance carrier is liable for
compensation for an employee’s injury[.]” See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.031(a)
(emphasis added). The Act defines “insurance carrier” to include “a governmental
entity that self-insures, either individually or collectively.” Id. § 401.011(27)(D).
Combined, sections 406.031(a) and 401.011(27)(D) clearly express the legislature’s
intent to waive governmental immunity for workers’ compensation claims against
3
Although we agree TACRMP is a governmental unit, we disagree with the
parties’ reliance on Local Government Code chapter 119 for this conclusion. Chapter
119 authorizes “the County Government Risk Management Pool” to insure counties
“against liability for the acts or omissions of that county and the officials and
employees of that county under the law.” See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. §
119.002(a) (emphasis added). Although a footnote in Tex. Ass’n Gov’t Risk Mgmt.
Pool v. Matagorda Cnty., indicates the pool involved in that case was authorized
under Local Government Code chapter 119 and Government Code chapter 791,
Matagorda involved a third-party liability claim, not a workers’ compensation
claim, and the pool in question was the “Texas Association of Counties County
Government Risk Management Pool” which closely tracks the name of the liability
coverage pool authorized by chapter 119 but differs slightly from the name of the
entity involved in this workers’ compensation case. 52 S.W.3d 128, 129, n.1 (Tex.
2000) (emphasis added). Therefore, although we conclude Local Government Code
chapter 119 does not apply, we nevertheless conclude, based on Government Code
Chapters 791 and 2259 and Ben Bolt, that TACRMP is a governmental unit entitled
to governmental immunity unless a waiver of immunity applies.
8
governmental entities that qualify as insurance carriers by self-insuring, individually
or collectively. Id. §§ 401.011(27)(D), 406.031(a).
There is no assertion in this case that TACRMP insures itself for workers’
compensation claims, but even if it does, Dianna would have no such claim against
TACRMP since Neil was not TACRMP’s employee. Rather, Dianna claims
TACRMP is an insurance carrier because it provides workers’ compensation
coverage to counties such as San Jacinto. If true, this would make TACRMP a
governmental entity that insures other governmental entities, not “a governmental
entity that self-insures, either individually or collectively.” San Jacinto County, on
the other hand, is a governmental entity that self-insures collectively with other
counties. It does so through its participation in a “pool” as permitted by Labor Code
sections 504.011(3), 501.001(4) and Government Code chapters 791 and 2259. San
Jacinto County, therefore, was both Neil’s employer and the “insurance carrier”
against whom a workers’ compensation claim could be filed for Neil’s death. See
Tex. Mun. League v. Burns, 209 S.W.3d 806, 812-13 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006,
no pet.) overruled on other grounds, Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chicas, 593 S.W.3d 284,
291 (Tex. 2019) (the city, rather than the pool, was the “proper ‘insurance carrier’
under the labor code”); see also State Office of Risk Mgmt. v. Herrera, 288 S.W.3d
543, 549 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2009, no pet.) (same). Because TACRMP was not
an “insurance carrier” under section 401.011(27)(D), the waiver of immunity
9
provided by sections 406.031(a) and 401.011(27)(D) does not apply to TACRMP.
Tex. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 401.011(27)(D), 406.031(a).
Nevertheless, Dianna argues TACRMP is the insurance carrier in this case
because the DWC’s Decision and Order lists the “true corporate name” of the
insurance carrier as “San Jacinto County, by and through [TACRMP],” and provides
contact information for a representative at TACRMP, rather than the County. But
listing “San Jacinto County, by and through [TACRMP],” as the insurance carrier is
not the same as listing “TACRMP” as the carrier, and we note that TACRMP’s
contact information was required by statute to be provided to Dianna so she could
comply with the written notice requirements of section 504.002(d) of the Act, which
provides,
For the purpose of applying the provisions listed by Subsection (a)
[incorporating various provisions of the Act into chapter 504 which
deals with political subdivisions], “written notice” to a political
subdivision that self-insures, either individually or collectively through
an interlocal agreement as described by Section 504.011, occurs only
on written notice to the intergovernmental risk pool or other entity
responsible for administering the claim.
Id. § 504.002(d).
Dianna also argues that she is not bound by the ombudsman’s stipulation
during the DWC contested case hearing that San Jacinto County is the “insurance
carrier,” but we need not consider this argument since we rely on the statutes, rather
than the stipulation, for our conclusion.
10
Because TACRMP is entitled to governmental immunity and that immunity
was not waived, the trial court erred by denying TACRMP’s plea to the jurisdiction
with respect to Dianna’s workers’ compensation claim. We sustain TACRMP’s first
issue.
Issue Two
In its second issue, TACRMP argues the trial court erred when it denied its
plea to the jurisdiction with respect to Dianna’s declaratory judgment action because
that remedy is not available based on governmental immunity and the redundant
remedies doctrine.
“Generally, sovereign immunity deprives a trial court of jurisdiction over a
lawsuit in which a party has sued the State or a state agency unless the Legislature
has consented to suit.” Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Sawyer Tr., 354 S.W.3d 384,
388 (Tex. 2011). The UDJA “permits a person who is interested in a deed, or whose
rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, to obtain a declaration
of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.” Id. However “there is no general
right to sue a state agency for a declaration of rights.” Id. The Texas Supreme Court
in Sawyer Trust, explained that there are certain situations that allow waiver of
immunity under the UDJA, such as immunity for claims challenging the validity of
ordinances or statutes, “[b]ut generally, the [UDJA] does not alter a trial court’s
jurisdiction.” Id. The UDJA “‘does not waive the state’s sovereign immunity when
11
the plaintiff seeks a declaration of his or her rights under a statute or other law.’”
Jefferson Cnty. v. Stines, 523 S.W.3d 691, 708 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2017, rev’d
in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 550 S.W.3d 178 (2018) (quoting Tex.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2011)). Dianna’s petition
sought the following declarations:
20. Dianna Adams, Plaintiff and Claimant, additionally requests
declaratory relief and injunctive relief against Texas Association of
Counties Risk Management Pool, Defendant. This declaratory relief
sought should resolve this lawsuit as a matter of law.
21. Dianna Adams requests that this Court declare the law in Texas that
a Texas Peace Officer, such as Deputy Neil Adams, (1) is immediately
in the course and scope of employment under [Texas Labor Code Ann.]
§410.252 and the below laws when a disturbance of the peace or a crime
occurs in the officer’s presence; (2) a Texas Peace Officer working an
extra duty job remains in the course and scope of employment as a
Texas Peace Officer for the employing governmental entity, including
a Texas political subdivision, especially when authorized to perform
such extra duty work at any other location in Texas especially while in
uniform as authorized by and for the governmental entity; and (3) the
personal animosity exception does not apply to strangers where an
encounter occurs as a result of work.
22. Plaintiff seeks a declaration including that County deputies and city
police officers are “peace officers” pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 2.12. [Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.] art. 2.12. The
authority of any such peace officer extends to any place in the State of
Texas and assigns the duty to every peace officer to preserve the peace
within the entire State of Texas and not only the local jurisdiction
through all lawful means. A peace officer shall perform the duties as
required under the [Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.] art. 2.13.
A peace officer also has the duty to try to prevent injuries in his or her
presence in the entire State of Texas. [Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.] art.
12
6.06. This would certainly include to themselves if being assaulted as
here.
....
23. Plaintiff also seeks a declaration that the personal animosity
exception under [Texas Labor Code.] § 406.032 does not apply in
situations described and applicable to this lawsuit.
24. Plaintiff asks this Court so declare the above law and enforce such
against Defendant TACRMP. In Nasser, the Texas Supreme Court
explained that the “personal animosity exception” excludes workers’
compensation for injuries “resulting from a dispute which has been
transported into the place of employment from the injured employee’s
private or domestic life, at least where the animosity is not exacerbated
by the employment.” Nasser v. Sec. Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 17, 19, 30
(Tex. 1987); and see Walls Reg’l Hosp. v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805, 806-
08 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (explaining personal animosity exception
applies where something privately and personally brings about the
injuries outside the workplace).
Dianna’s petition did not challenge the validity of the statutes; instead, it
sought a declaration of her rights, if any, under the statutes. See id. at 708-09.
Accordingly, we conclude that the UDJA’s limited waiver of immunity does not
apply to Dianna’s declaratory judgment claim, and the trial court erred in denying
TACRMP’s plea to the jurisdiction even if it properly construed Dianna’s claim as
seeking a declaration regarding how the statutes apply to Dianna’s claims. See id.;
Sefzik, 355 S.W.3d at 621. We sustain TACRMP’s second issue. We need not reach
the applicability of the redundant remedies doctrine nor any of TACRMP’s
remaining issues on appeal, as they would not afford TACRMP any greater relief.
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
13
Conclusion
Having sustained TACRMP’s first and second issues and having determined
that any further analysis of its remaining subsidiary issues would entitle it no greater
relief under the law, we reverse the trial court’s judgment and render judgment
dismissing Dianna’s claims for want of jurisdiction.
REVERSED AND RENDERED.
KENT CHAMBERS
Justice
Submitted on January 15, 2026
Opinion Delivered May 7, 2026
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Chambers, JJ.
14