The opinion
If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EUGENE SEALS, UNPUBLISHED
May 07, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 11:33 AM
v No. 373684
Saginaw Circuit Court
SAGINAW TOWNSHIP COMMUNITY LC No. 23-001503-CD
SCHOOLS, KENNETH KRAATZ, and CRAIG
AIMAR,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and REDFORD and PATEL, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this case of alleged race discrimination, plaintiff Eugene Seals appeals as of right the
trial court’s written opinion and order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants
Saginaw Township Community Schools (“STCS”), Kenneth Kraatz, and Craig Aimar pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10). On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his race-
discrimination claim under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et seq.,
and his claim for tortious interference with a business relationship. We disagree and affirm.
I. FACTS
In July 2023, plaintiff filed his complaint against defendants. Kraatz was the athletic
director for STCS, Aimar was the athletic director for John Glenn High School, a high school in
nearby Bay City, and plaintiff was the varsity girls’ basketball coach for Heritage High School, a
high school within STCS. On February 14, 2022, Kraatz submitted a report to the Michigan High
School Athletic Association (MHSAA) clearly implying that plaintiff had improperly recruited a
high-school basketball player, “Student A” (hereinafter R.G.), from John Glenn to Heritage and
allowed her to participate in varsity basketball team activities at Heritage despite her athletic
eligibility to do so being in doubt. The report also indicated that plaintiff concealed relevant facts
during the investigation into the matter. According to plaintiff, such incriminating statements in
the report, which were false, resulted in his termination as the varsity girls’ basketball coach.
Plaintiff alleged that the false statements had a racially discriminatory intent, as demonstrated by
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the fact that he, an African-American man, was replaced by a Caucasian coach. Plaintiff thus
maintained an ELCRA claim against all three defendants, as well as other claims such as tortious
interference against Amair.
After several months of court proceedings, defendants moved for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). The various documents filed by the parties in relation to that
motion established the following underlying facts.
The MHSAA is an organization that provides rules and guidelines for its member schools
with respect to athletics. STCS, as with most schools in the state, is a member of the MHSAA.
Section 10 of the MHSAA Handbook for the 2021-2022 School Year provided, in relevant part:
SECTION 10 – UNDUE INFLUENCE
SECTION 10—The use of undue influence for athletic purposes by any person or
persons directly or indirectly associated with a student, a student’s parents, the
school or its athletic program to secure or encourage the attendance of a student or
the student’s parents or guardians as residents of the school district, shall cause the
student to become ineligible for interscholastic scrimmages or contests a minimum
of 90 scheduled school days and a maximum of four years. The offending school
shall be placed on probation for up to four years and offending individuals
disconnected from the program. The offending coach or coaches shall not be
permitted to coach at that school for up to four years in any sport and shall not
coach for up to four years at any other member school in any MHSAA tournament
in any sport. Examples of undue influence would include but not be limited to
offers of or acceptance of: residential relocation, financial aid to parents, guardians
or student; reduced or eliminated tuition and/or fees; any special privileges not
accorded to other students, whether athletes or not; transportation allowances;
preference in job assignments; room, board or clothing; promotional efforts and
admission policies for athletes which are in excess of efforts for other students.
[Emphasis omitted.]
Section 10 also included illustrations regarding “undue influence,” such as the following:
105. When a student at a junior high/middle school or other high school, or
the parents of that student, contacts the coach about attending the coach’s school,
the coach shall refer the student or parent to the appropriate school personnel (those
who have the responsibilities for seeking and processing prospective students). It
is not a coach’s role to explain or encourage a transfer student in how to gain
interscholastic athletic eligibility. There should be no contact or communication
regarding enrollment between coaches and potential transfer students or incoming
9th-graders or their parents.
106. Except as permitted under Interpretations 101 and 102, a high school
coach may not initiate contact with a student at a junior high/middle school or other
high school, or the parents of that student, about attendance at the school. It is not
a violation for a coach to have normal community contact with a student who
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attends a junior high/middle school of the same system which is a feeder to the high
school.
107. Normal community contact may include but is not limited to that
which is unavoidable, brief, incidental to other intentions and without prior
knowledge that it is likely to occur.
108. It is a violation of the undue influence regulation if coaches or their
representatives call, send questionnaires, cards, electronic messages or letters or
visit prospective athletes and their families at their homes.
***
115. It is an undue influence violation for a person directly or indirectly
associated with a school or for a person whose activities are related to athletics to
arrange, secure or encourage the arrival or residency of a student into a school
district or the enrollment of a student into a school based on athletic ability or
potential. It is undue influence for a student of one school to encourage because of
athletics the relocation to their community or transfer to their school by students
who are enrolled in another school. [Emphasis omitted.]
In June 2020, plaintiff was hired by STCS to be the varsity girls’ basketball coach at
Heritage and other related administrative responsibilities within STCS. In addition to those
coaching and administrative positions, plaintiff was involved with an Amateur Athletic Union
(“AAU”) travel basketball program in the region, a program that seeks to develop younger athletic
talent.
On or about November 17, 2021, STCS received a transfer form from R.G. indicating, in
relevant part, that she had moved to Saginaw a week ago and that she was seeking to transfer from
John Glenn to Heritage. When asked to “List ALL high school sports the student participated in
(game/meet or scrimmage at any level) in the most recent previous school year,” the form stated,
“Volleyball.” And, when asked to identify the sports in which the student desired to participate at
the new school, the form stated, “Soccer.” Moreover, the form indicated that R.G. had never been
coached while at the previous high school by a member of the STCS coaching staff.
The form was submitted to Aimar to approve and sign. However, on November 19, 2021,
Aimar e-mailed Cody Inglis, the assistant director of the MHSAA, explaining that he had received
a transfer form with questionable information. In particular, Aimar explained, “[t]he student
[R.G.] . . . attended 3 days of tryouts for JGHS Varsity Girls Basketball on November 8, 9 and 10
and didn’t make Varsity as a sophomore but was offered a spot on JV which she did accept. She
then did not attend Thursday and Friday practice and I received this form that she is transferring
schools.” Aimar continued:
She did play Volleyball at JGHS in Fall of 21, and played JV Girls Basketball in
Winter of 21 (last year) for JGHS. Upon learning this news about a potential
transfer I ask[ed] around and word is she is moving schools because she didn’t
make Varsity and her mom “knows” a [STCS] coach. . . . I find it very fishy that
this all happened within a week and it seems to be very athletically motivated. . . .
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Inglis responded that Aimar should contact Kraatz to discuss the matter with him, as the
primary burden was on STCS to ensure athletic eligibility. Aimar did so, which triggered an
investigation.
On February 14, 2022, Kraatz submitted an investigative report to Inglis in his capacity as
MHSAA assistant director. In the report, Kraatz explained that upon receiving a phone call from
Aimar on or about November 22, 2021, he discussed the matter with plaintiff. The report states,
in relevant part:1
Do you know Student A, a move-in student from John Glenn?
He knew of her, that his wife had let him know that a basketball player from
John Glenn had moved into the district.
I informed him that John Glenn told me that he was her AAU coach. So
you have never coached her in the past?
She was in the same organization, but he never coached her directly.
So you have never coached her, messaged her, no phone calls, No D.M.’s
anything that you can think of that I may want to get out in front of?
I had very limited contact with her when she was younger, but has had no
recent contact/communication with her.
I finished the conversation by telling Coach Seals that because of the current
situation Student A is ineligible and she is not to practice or play with the team. It
would be best if she didn’t associate with the team at all. Coach Seals disputes that
I said this to him.
The report then explained the results of the investigation:
It was found that even though Coach Seals initially stated that he knew of
Student A but never coached her, it became obvious through social media that she
was a member of several of his AAU teams and conducted various training sessions
with her. . . . Student A’s Mother said that Student A was on the roster and very
active in Coach Seals AAU program in the 8th grade and he trained her in 9th grade.
Social Media shows her being in at least 3 AAU tournaments coached by Coach
Seals. Social Media also shows that he trained her up until at least February 27,
2021.
When initially asked about contact with Student A or her mother, Coach
Seals stated that there was no recent contact with either her or her mother. As the
1
The indentations and format of the following block quote have been partially modified for ease
of reading.
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investigation had progressed we learned there were messages between Student A,
her mother, and Coach Seals. Coach Seals stated that the messages were related to
training times and road conditions for practice. Mother stated that there was a
phone call about Student A not being able to participate with the team, she did not
share any other details. . . .
Even though Coach Seals was told Student A was ineligible and should not
be associated with the girls basketball team, it was later brought to our attention
through an email from John Glenn that she was a participant in the pre-game, sitting
on the bench, in the team huddle during timeouts and generally behaving as an
active member of the team. The athletic department had no knowledge of her
participation on the basketball team, there was no documentation, transportation
permission slip or communication in any form that ever allowed Coach Seals to
practice or transport Student A. . . .
When Coach Seals was asked why he let Student A practice with the varsity
and not the JV, he responded that the JV coach is not a good enough coach to coach
some of his better players. He stated that his JV coach is only good enough to coach
the players that will never play varsity.
When asked about her being a member of his team, Coach Seals said that
even though John Glenn is saying she was in a warm-up during the game she was
never given a uniform or warm-up and her only role on the team is taking stats
during games. After watching 2 complete game films Student A is clearly seen
participating in pregame warm-up and lined-up with the team while the starting
line-up was announced. She was not in any warm-up or uniform. When watching
the Frankenmuth (away game Dec.3rd) film she is never seen actually taking any
stats nor does she have an i-pad or paper in her hand. She could be considered a
member of the team. . . . It was also later learned that she was in the team photo in
full uniform, and the photo had to be retaken mid-way through the season to remove
Student A from the team photo. . . .
In the Student A’s Mother meeting she stated that her move to Heritage was
not athletically motivated and she moved to Heritage High School because it is a
great school and has a lot of diversity. She felt that John Glenn lacked diversity
and had an issue with racism. . . .
About a month later, on March 10, 2022, Mark Uyl, the executive director of the MHSAA,
issued the following response to Kraatz:
Based on the information provided in your letter, it is clear that a reasonable
person would believe that a violation of MHSAA Handbook, Regulation I, Section
10, Undue Influence (Recruiting) has occurred. The MHSAA Handbook states the
following regarding penalties:
The offending school shall be placed on probation for up to four
years and offending individuals disconnected from the program.
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The offending coach or coaches shall not be permitted to coach at
that school for up to four years in any sport and shall not coach for
up to four years at any other member school in any MHSAA
tournament in any sport.
In this matter, the Heritage High School girls basketball program will be
placed on probation for two years which will include the 2022-23 and 2023-24
school years. This same two-year penalty that prohibits coaching at any MHSAA
member school, including Heritage High School, will be applied to Coach Seals for
the 2022-23 and 2023-24 school years. We also understand that your school district
may take additional action because of the dishonesty of Coach Seals regarding his
previous coaching contact with this student and his actions of allowing this
ineligible student to be fully engaged as an active team member without approval
of your athletic department.
Given the undue influence violation, the student was ineligible for the 2021-
22 season in basketball and will continue to be ineligible for the 2022-23 school
year in basketball.
On April 3, 2022, plaintiff submitted his letter of resignation, stating that “[t]his decision,
in no way, reflects any feeling of guilt or wrong doing on my part. It is one hundred percent related
to the lack of integrity in your athletic office. . . . The athletic director’s campaign to smear myself
and anyone who was connected to me to get his friend in to my position is sickening. . . .”
Apparently, at about the same time, plaintiff discussed or sought to challenge the matter
with the MHSAA. On July 18, 2022, Uyl responded to plaintiff on behalf of the MHSAA, stating,
in relevant part:
In this matter, you were given a two-year penalty for the 2022-23 and 2023-
24 school years. Based on the conversations that have taken place between yourself
and MHSAA staff, the two-year individual penalty will be removed contingent
upon your completion of the MHSAA Coaches Advancement Program Level 1
(repeat) and Level 2 (new) courses. From everything that has transpired, it is clear
that additional education is appropriate should you wish to return to coaching at an
MHSAA member school. Once Level 1 and Level 2 CAP courses are completed,
we will provide an updated letter that can be shared with schools with prospective
coaching opportunities.
When plaintiff was deposed in March 2024 for this case, he explained that he had
completed the required courses mentioned above and that he would be coaching on behalf of the
AAU.2
2
According to defendants, plaintiff testified in his deposition that he currently was coaching
MHSAA athletics. However, his testimony is brief and unclear with regard to MHSAA athletics,
although it is clear with regard to the AAU.
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In light of these facts, defendants argued that they were entitled to summary disposition of
plaintiff’s ELCRA claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because (1) the MHSAA, not defendants
themselves, imposed an employment-related penalty against plaintiff; (2) plaintiff was not
constructively discharged by defendants, as he voluntarily resigned; and (3) defendants had non-
discriminatory reasons for their actions that plaintiff could not rebut. Defendants argued that
plaintiff’s remaining claims were meritless as well.
In his response, plaintiff highlighted several purported inconsistencies and inaccuracies in
the record suggesting that the investigation was a pretext to terminate his employment because of
his race. For example, the February 14, 2022 investigation report authored by Kraatz indicated
that plaintiff falsely said that he did not “coach” R.G. However, plaintiff explained, “RG did
testify [in her deposition] that she trained with Pride and Storm, basketball programs Plaintiff is
involved in, but not that the Plaintiff coached her during high school through Plaintiff’s AAU
programs.” (Emphasis in original.) Thus, according to plaintiff, the February 14, 2022
investigation report was inaccurate to that extent, i.e., the report falsely conflated coaching with
training. As another example, Kraatz testified in his deposition that he sent the November 17,
2021 transfer form to Aimar, whereas an e-mail exchange subsequently uncovered by plaintiff
during these proceedings showed that the STCS athletics secretary, not Kraatz, was the person
who sent the transfer form to Aimar. As a third example of an alleged inaccuracy, when R.G. was
asked during her deposition whether “the school primarily asked the white basketball players”
about the alleged recruitment, R.G. responded, “Yes. To my knowledge.”3
Further, according to plaintiff, Kraatz failed to include exculpatory information in the
February 14, 2022 investigation report. For instance, plaintiff highlighted the following facts that,
in his view, should have been included. First, R.G.’s mother told Kraatz via e-mail in January
2022 that, according to R.G., R.G. did not wear a uniform or participate in warm-ups before or
during the Frankenmuth game. Second, both R.G. and her mother wrote undated letters, apparently
directed to Kraatz himself, during or after the course of this investigation indicating that one reason
for the requested transfer was the fact that R.G. had been the victim of an “altercation” that caused
her to want to change schools to Heritage. According to plaintiff, the failure to include these
exculpatory facts in the February 14, 2022 investigation report is evidence of a discriminatory
intent.4
With regard to the merits of his ELCRA claim, plaintiff argued that he suffered an adverse
employment action by defendants because defendants themselves were responsible for submitting
the February 14, 2022 investigation report to the MHSAA; he was constructively discharged
because he was essentially forced to quit; and defendants’ articulated non-discriminatory reasons
3
Plaintiff did not develop this assertion beyond briefly quoting the question-and-answer from
R.G.’s deposition. For example, plaintiff did not identify the ratio of Caucasian to African-
American players on the basketball team.
4
Plaintiff observed in passing that “[i]nteresting to note here is that Mr. Seals was not the first
African-American coach that Defendant Aimar initiated an MHSAA investigation ultimately
resulting in suspension by the MHSAA.” However, plaintiff did not factually develop this
observation or even suggest that the previous incident was unjustified.
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for their actions were both pretextual and not legitimate. Moreover, plaintiff conceded that his
false-light claim should be dismissed but argued that the remaining claims should proceed to trial.
In November 2024, following a motion hearing, the trial court entered its 13-page written
opinion and order granting summary disposition in favor of defendants. Concerning the ELCRA
claim, the trial court agreed with plaintiff that “the two-year penalty imposed upon Seals by the
MHSAA was an adverse employment action” because “[t]he parties have provided no case law
that would suggest that the adverse employment action must be taken by the employer in order to
be actionable.” However, the trial court explained, the ELCRA claim failed since plaintiff did not
show that defendants “submitted the information that they obtained through the [allegedly] false
and incomplete investigation to the MHSAA to have him terminated because of his race.”
(Emphasis in original). The trial court reasoned that the letters written by R.G. and her mother
about the alleged altercation apparently were written after the MHSAA investigation was complete
and would not have aided plaintiff in any event because “there is absolutely nothing in these letters
that would even suggest that any action taken by any of the defendants was racially motivated.”
The trial court added that plaintiff failed to sufficiently support his vague factual assertion that the
STCS only interviewed Caucasian basketball players, and not African-American, basketball
players, about the matter. Thus, the trial court concluded, plaintiff failed to prove that he was
discriminated against because of his race.
Finally, concerning the tortious-interference claim, the trial court dismissed that claim as
well because “Aimar did exactly what he should have when faced with inaccurate information on
a student transfer form. Seals has proffered no evidence, documentary or otherwise, that Aimar
acted to intentionally interfere with Seals’s employment.” Accordingly, the trial court granted
summary disposition in favor of defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
On appeal, plaintiff primarily challenges the trial court’s dismissal of his ELCRA claim,
but also briefly argues in a second appellate issue that the trial court erred by also dismissing his
tortious-interference claim. With regard to his ELCRA claim, plaintiff asserts that he satisfied the
burden-shifting framework commonly applied by federal and state courts when addressing
discrimination claims that lack direct evidence of discrimination. Specifically, plaintiff states,
“Plaintiff does not attack the sanction imposed by the MHSAA – Plaintiff attacks the investigation
conducted by Kraatz, initiated by Aimar, to the extent that material information was withheld that
would likely have changed the outcome.” Further, with regard to his tortious-interference claim,
plaintiff asserts that Aimar wrongfully “initiated the investigation by indicating to the MHSAA
that he believed R-G and Plaintiff had a previous relationship . . . .” Defendants have responded,
arguing that plaintiff failed to establish a question of fact with regard to either of these two claims.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review de novo motions for summary disposition brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10).”
Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169, 173; 821 NW2d 520 (2012). “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10)
. . . tests the factual sufficiency of a claim.” El-Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152,
160; 934 NW2d 665 (2019) (emphasis omitted). “When considering such a motion, a trial court
must consider all evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion.” Id. “A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) may only be granted when there is no
genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record leaves
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open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. ELCRA CLAIM
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his ELCRA claim against
defendants. We disagree.
At the time relevant to this case, MCL 37.2202(1)(a) of ELCRA provided as follows:
(1) An employer shall not do any of the following:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate
against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term,
condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national
origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status.[5]
“The ultimate question in an employment discrimination case is whether the plaintiff was
the victim of intentional discrimination.” Hecht v Nat’l Heritage Academies, Inc, 499 Mich 586,
606; 886 NW2d 135 (2016). “There are multiple ways to prove that a plaintiff was the victim of
unlawful discrimination. Direct evidence of intentional discrimination is a sure but rare method
of challenging an employer’s decision.” Id. at 607. “Direct evidence” is “evidence which, if
believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in
the employer’s actions.” Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich, 469 Mich 124, 133; 666
NW2d 186 (2003) (quotation marks and citations omitted).6
In cases where there is no direct evidence of discrimination, a plaintiff must prove his or
her case through circumstantial evidence. Hecht, 499 Mich at 607. The most common manner of
proof in this regard is the familiar burden-shifting approach of McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green,
411 US 792; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). See Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456,
462; 628 NW2d 515 (2001). “The McDonnell Douglas approach allows a plaintiff to present a
rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs from which a factfinder could infer that the
plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination.” Id. (cleaned up).
5
MCL 37.2202 was amended effective February 13, 2024, to include additional protected classes.
See 2023 PA 6 and 31. However, those amendments are not relevant here, and we quote the statute
in effect at the time the events in question occurred.
6
While Sniecinski referred to “a motivating factor,” the standard is but-for causation. See Rouch
World, LLC v Dep’t of Civil Rights, 510 Mich 398, 420; 987 NW2d 501 (2022) (“This Court has
previously held that the operative phrase ‘because of’ in the ELCRA establishes a but-for causation
standard. . . . In other words, causation is established where the discriminatory action would not
have occurred but for the [protected class] of the complainant.”).
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The first step of the McDonnell Douglas approach is the prima-facie case itself, which
requires a showing of four elements:
(1) [the plaintiff] belongs to a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse
employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) the job was given
to another person under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination. [Id. at 463.]
“When the plaintiff has sufficiently established a prima facie case, a presumption of
discrimination arises.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The burden then shifts to the
defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for plaintiff’s termination to
overcome and dispose of this presumption.” Lytle v Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich 153, 173;
579 NW2d 906 (1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The articulation requirement
means that the defendant has the burden of producing evidence that its employment actions were
taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Thus, the defendant cannot meet its burden
merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel.” Hazle, 464 Mich at 464-
465 (cleaned up). “If the employer makes such an articulation, the presumption created by the
McDonnell Douglas prima facie case drops away.” Id. at 465.
“At that point, in order to survive a motion for summary disposition, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the evidence in the case, when construed in the plaintiff’s favor, is sufficient to
permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for the
adverse action taken by the employer toward the plaintiff.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “[A] plaintiff must not merely raise a triable issue that the employer’s proffered reason
was pretextual, but that it was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 465-466 (cleaned up).
A plaintiff can establish that proffered reasons are pretexts by doing the following:
(1) by showing the reasons had no basis in fact, (2) if they have a basis in
fact, by showing that they were not the actual factors motivating the decision, or
(3) if they were factors, by showing that they were jointly insufficient to justify the
decision. [Major v Village of Newberry, 316 Mich App 527, 542; 892 NW2d 402
(2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).]
Turning to the case before us, plaintiff has not submitted direct evidence of discrimination,
such as a statement by a decision-maker that he or she acted against plaintiff because of his race.
See DeBrow v Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc, 463 Mich 534, 539-540; 620 NW2d 836 (2001). Nor
has plaintiff submitted circumstantial evidence of discrimination beyond the McDonnell Douglas
framework, such as evidence that the workplace tolerated race-based language by its employees.
See Hecht, 499 Mich at 610. Therefore, as the parties agree, plaintiff must proceed under the
McDonnell Douglas framework alone.
As to the first step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, we agree with plaintiff that he
established a prima facie case of discrimination. In particular, his race establishes that he was a
member of a protected class, there is no dispute that plaintiff was qualified for the coaching
position before the events at issue transpired, and his position was given to another individual of a
different race. These facts satisfy the first, third, and fourth elements of the prima facie case. See
Hazle, 464 Mich at 463.
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Defendants, however, dispute whether plaintiff satisfied the second element of the prima
facie case, i.e., that he “suffered an adverse employment action.” Id. According to defendants,
the coaching-ineligibility period and the class-requirement sanction imposed on plaintiff were the
result of the MHSAA’s actions, not defendants’ actions. Defendants reason that they merely
cooperated with a third-party investigation and cannot be liable for this cooperation. At this stage
of the legal analysis, we disagree. While the parties have not provided us with relevant caselaw
on the question, the Southern District of New York explained in somewhat analogous
circumstances that “the initiation of either an internal investigation or a government investigation
may constitute a materially adverse action only if it results in a hostile work environment,
constructive discharge, or other employment consequences of a negative nature . . . .” Robinson v
De Niro, 739 F Supp 3d 33, 97 (SD NY, 2023) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[S]imply
undergoing an investigation is not sufficient to constitute adverse employment action.” Id.
(quotation marks and citations omitted). “In the context of government investigations, there is . . .
some suggestion in the law that the plaintiff must allege and prove that the report was made based
on false information.” Id. at 97-98. “Thus, for example, where an employer makes an incorrect
report, a claim for retaliation will lie where the incorrect report results in charges which have a
negative effect on the plaintiff’s ability to continue her work or results in a criminal trial that is
necessarily public and therefore carries a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation, and
a concomitant harm to future employment prospects.” Id. at 98 (quotation marks and citations
omitted). “Courts have also stated that an investigation may form the basis of an adverse
employment action claim where the charges at issue resulted in subsequent employment
consequences.” Id. (cleaned up). “Further, being forced to defend against disciplinary charges
may constitute an adverse employment action.” Id. (cleaned up).
As applied here, plaintiff was forced to defend against, essentially, disciplinary charges
sought by the MHSAA and, indirectly, the STCS. Moreover, these charges resulted in a coaching
ineligibility period for plaintiff pending his completion of remedial compliance classes. Therefore,
regardless of whether plaintiff was constructively discharged or voluntarily quit, the mere fact that
he was forced to defend against some charges, and had some sanctions imposed against him as a
result of those charges, satisfies the second element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case
for the purposes of our discussion. See id.
Having concluded that plaintiff established the four elements of his prima facie case, the
next question is whether defendants were able to “articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for [their] employment decision in an effort to rebut the presumption created by the plaintiff’s
prima facie case.” Hazle, 464 Mich at 464. “The articulation requirement means that the defendant
has the burden of producing evidence that its employment actions were taken for a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason.” Id. We agree with defendants that they articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for their actions.
The record shows that R.G. sought to transfer to Heritage a few days after not being
selected for the John Glenn High School varsity basketball team. When Aimar, the athletic director
for John Glenn, reviewed her transfer form, it was within his prerogative to at least speculate
whether these two events were related and bring the matter to the attention of the MHSAA and
STCS. Moreover, Kraatz’s investigation into the matter, which culminated in his February 14,
2022 investigation report, certainly reflects some legitimate concerns. For example, according to
that report, plaintiff either lied to or misled Kraatz when he said that he had never coached R.G. in
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his capacity as an AAU coach. The report also indicates that plaintiff allowed R.G. to be affiliated
with the Heritage varsity basketball team in multiple respects despite purportedly being told a few
months earlier that such affiliation was prohibited pending further developments. These facts
implicate the “undue influence” section of the MHSAA Handbook, specifically the language in
that section prohibiting cooperation between a prospective student-athlete and a coach at another
school, as was plaintiff’s role, to encourage a transfer. In other words, the facts outlined in the
February 14, 2022 investigation report suggest the strong possibility that plaintiff cooperated with
R.G. and her mother to have her transfer to Heritage to play varsity basketball, conduct which is
prohibited by the MHSAA. Simply put, defendants have articulated a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason” for their actions. See Lytle, 458 Mich at 173 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
Therefore, the final question before us is whether plaintiff raised a triable issue that
defendants’ “proffered reason . . . was a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Hazle, 464 Mich at
466 (cleaned up). “The inquiry at this final stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework is exactly
the same as the ultimate factual inquiry made by the jury . . . .” Id. We conclude that plaintiff has
failed to do so. According to plaintiff:
How could Defendant’s purpose be legitimate where they withhold relevant and
exculpatory evidence from the investigation. MG told both Kraatz and Aimar that
it was not her daughter in the video. This information was not provided to the
MHSAA. Even if after the investigation, Kraatz did not provide the letters authored
by MG and RG giving the reason RG transferred to Heritage High School. Even
before the letters were written, RG and MG did provide information to Kraatz that
the move was not athletically motivated, commenting only that it was a “lack of
diversity.” However, Kraatz, in his investigation, made the quality judgment to
downplay this fact.
***
Here, the question of fact is simple: why did Aimar and Kraatz not provide
the exculpatory information to the MHSAA once they had it. That is the conduct
that is otherwise unexplained that creates a question of fact such that a jury is
necessary.
We agree with plaintiff, as a general proposition, that an intentionally flawed investigation
or a maliciously prepared investigation report to a third party that distorts the underlying facts
would be strong evidence that the defendant-employer’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason was,
in reality, a pretext for unlawful discrimination. See Major, 316 Mich App at 542; Robinson, 739
F Supp 2d at 97. However, the facts of this case do not raise such concerns and, with regard to the
three facts recited by plaintiff in the analysis section of his brief on appeal quoted above, we briefly
note the following.
First, while the February 14, 2022 investigation report could have included the fact that
R.G. allegedly told her mother that she did not wear a uniform or participate in warm-ups before
or during the Frankenmuth game, that game was only mentioned in passing in the investigation
report. It was not incumbent upon Kraatz to comb through his e-mail records to find and cite every
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piece of potentially exculpatory evidence regarding minor details in his investigation report.
Second, while plaintiff faults Kraatz for not providing the letters written by R.G. and her mother
to the MHSAA, Kraatz explained in his deposition that they asked him to keep the contents of the
letters “very confidential.” Moreover, the letters would not have exonerated plaintiff from his
problematic conduct outlined in the investigation report, such as concealing the intent to which he
had interacted with R.G. in the past. Rather, the letters only would have provided a second reason
for R.G.’s transfer to Heritage, beyond the alleged lack of diversity at John Glenn. Third, while
plaintiff asserts that “Kraatz, in his investigation, made the quality judgment to downplay” lack of
diversity as the reason for R.G.’s transfer, the record suggests otherwise. The investigation report,
which was about three pages long, includes a full, substantial paragraph explaining that R.G.’s
mother said that R.G. wanted to transfer to Heritage for greater diversity. The paragraph includes
such details as references to a potential “diversity club” and R.G.’s possible interactions with a
foreign exchange student. Thus, the investigation report did not “downplay” the alleged
exculpatory reason why R.G. wanted to transfer to Heritage. Finally, we note that we have
reviewed the other facts referenced by plaintiff in the trial court and on appeal, and we similarly
find them to be either unsupported by the record or inconsequential in nature.
Ultimately, as noted, the inquiry in the final McDonnell Douglas step is whether plaintiff
established a question of fact as to whether defendants engaged in unlawful discrimination. See
Hazle, 464 Mich at 466. The record before us fails to establish such a question of fact. The
investigation initiated and conducted by Aimar, Kraatz, and the STCS administration was
reasonably within the bounds of what a person would expect in this matter. Plaintiff has not cited
any act or omission by defendants in the course of this investigation that is so unexplained or
unusual that it would suggest that unlawful discrimination is the true, underlying reason for the
sanctions imposed against plaintiff. “The plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s
decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus
motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Town
v Mich Bell Telephone Co, 455 Mich 688, 704; 568 NW2d 64 (1997) (cleaned up). The facts of
this case arguably do not show that defendants even engaged in conduct that was “wrong or
mistaken,” much less that their actions were motivated by an unlawful intent.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s ELCRA claim under MCR
2.116(C)(10).
B. TORTIOUS-INTERFERENCE CLAIM
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his claim against Aimar for
tortious interference with a business relationship. We disagree.
The elements of tortious interference with a business relationship are the existence
of a valid business relationship or expectancy, knowledge of the relationship or
expectancy on the part of the defendant, an intentional interference by the defendant
inducing or causing a breach or termination of the relationship or expectancy, and
resultant damage to the plaintiff. [BPS Clinical Laboratories v Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Mich (On Remand), 217 Mich App 687, 698-699; 552 NW2d 919 (1996).]
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“To fulfill the third element, intentional interference inducing or causing a breach of a
business relationship, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant acted both intentionally and
either improperly or without justification.” Dalley v Dykema Gossett, 287 Mich App 296, 323;
788 NW2d 679 (2010). “To establish that a defendant’s conduct lacked justification and showed
malice, the plaintiff must demonstrate, with specificity, affirmative acts by the defendant that
corroborate the improper motive of the interference.” Id. at 324 (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “Where the defendant’s actions were motivated by legitimate business reasons, its
actions would not constitute improper motive or interference.” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). “In order to succeed under a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship,
the plaintiffs must allege that the interferer did something illegal, unethical or fraudulent.” Id.
(cleaned up).
In this case, as explained, Aimar’s actions were justified by MHSAA regulations and its
requirement that an investigation be undertaken. Plaintiff has not shown that Aimar acted with
malice or otherwise engaged in illegal, unethical, or fraudulent conduct by initiating this
investigation. See id. Therefore, the trial court correctly dismissed this claim under MCR
2.116(C)(10).
IV. CONCLUSION
The trial court correctly dismissed plaintiff’s ELCRA and tortious-interference claims
under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Consequently, we affirm.
/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Sima G. Patel
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