The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al., )
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Plaintiffs, )
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v. ) Case No. 20-cv-3010 (APM)
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GOOGLE LLC, )
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Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
_________________________________________
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STATE OF COLORADO et al., )
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Plaintiffs, )
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v. ) Case No. 20-cv-3715 (APM)
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GOOGLE LLC, )
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Defendant. )
_________________________________________ )
ORDER
I.
On December 5, 2025, this court entered the Final Judgment against Defendant Google
LLC for unlawfully maintaining a monopoly in the general search services and general search text
advertising markets. The Final Judgment (1) prohibits Google from entering into exclusive
distribution agreements for its search and search-related products and (2) compels Google to share
its search index data and user-side data and to syndicate its search results and search text ads to
Qualified Competitors. It also establishes a Technical Committee to assist in Plaintiffs’
enforcement efforts and sets a judgment period of six years, among other things.
Google filed a notice of appeal to the D.C. Circuit on January 16, 2026. See ECF No. 1472.
Plaintiffs then filed notices of cross-appeal on February 3, 2026. See ECF Nos. 1484, 1485.
The Final Judgment became effective on February 3, 2026.
Now, Google asks the court to partially stay the Final Judgment pending appeal—
specifically, those provisions compelling the disclosure of search index and user data and the
syndication of search results and search text ads. See Def.’s Mot. for a Partial Stay Pending
Appeal, ECF No. 1471 [hereinafter Google’s Mot.], Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Google’s Mot.,
ECF No. 1471-1 [hereinafter Google’s Mem.], at 1. Plaintiffs oppose the stay, but only for now,
on the basis that compelled data-sharing and syndication are still months away and therefore
cannot satisfy the demanding irreparable-harm standard. See Pls.’ Mem. of P. & A. in Opp’n to
Google’s Mot., ECF No. 1478 [hereinafter Pls.’ Opp’n], at 1–3.
The court agrees with Plaintiffs. Google’s Motion for a Partial Stay Pending Appeal,
ECF No. 1471, is therefore denied without prejudice.
II.
Under “long-standing principles governing stays pending appeal,” the court considers four
factors: “(1) the likelihood that the party seeking the stay will prevail on the merits of the appeal;
(2) the likelihood that the moving party will be irreparably harmed absent a stay; (3) the prospect
that others will be harmed if the court grants the stay; and (4) the public interest in granting the
stay.” Marin Audubon Soc’y v. FAA, 129 F.4th 869, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2025); see Nken v. Holder,
556 U.S. 418, 427 (2009). The test is “essentially the same” as that for a preliminary injunction.
Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. Supp. 2d 188, 193 n.5 (D.D.C. 2005) (citing cases); see also Nken,
556 U.S. at 434.
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Staying a judgment pending its appeal is “extraordinary relief.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics
in Wash. v. FEC, 904 F.3d 1014, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Because “[a] stay is an ‘intrusion into the
ordinary processes of administration and judicial review,’” Nken, 556 U.S. at 427, it “is not a
matter of right,” Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 672 (1926). Rather, it is “an
exercise of judicial discretion,” and “[t]he propriety of its issue is dependent upon the
circumstances of the particular case.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 433 (quoting Virginian Ry., 272 U.S. at
672–73). And while a stay pending appeal is “a means of ensuring that appellate courts can
responsibly fulfill their role in the judicial process, . . . a reviewing court may not resolve a conflict
between considered review and effective relief by reflexively holding a final order in abeyance
pending review.” Id. at 427. The traditional stay factors rather “contemplate individualized
judgments in each case.” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 777 (1987).
III.
The court’s decision today starts and ends with irreparable harm. A showing of irreparable
harm is “a necessary prerequisite for a stay,” and the failure to demonstrate such harm is “fatal” to
the movant’s request, KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC, 119 F.4th 58, 64 (D.C. Cir. 2024), “even if the other
three factors entering the calculus merit such relief,” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v.
England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for
irreparable injury.” Id. Specifically, the movant must establish that they will suffer harm that is
“both certain and great, actual and not theoretical, . . . and of such imminence that there is a clear
and present need for equitable relief to prevent” it. Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA,
787 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d
669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Relief “will not be granted against something merely feared as liable
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to occur at some indefinite time.” Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674 (quoting Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 674 (1931)).
Since entry of the Final Judgment, the parties have been working to carry out those parts
of the Final Judgment that require immediate action. They have identified and sought court
approval for the three members of the Technical Committee’s Standing Committee, and they have
largely finalized the terms under which the Technical Committee members will operate.
See Order, ECF No. 1474; Order, ECF No. 1497; Tr. of Status Conference, ECF No. 1495, at 5:18–
6:14. The Standing Committee also has started to lay the groundwork for its operations. See Pls.’
First Status Report on Google’s Compliance with the Final J., ECF No. 1512 [hereinafter Pls.’
SR], at 4–6. That progress is commendable. But as of the date of this order, the Technical
Committee is not yet fully staffed—two members remain unappointed—and so the tasks of
developing data-sharing and syndication license templates has not begun. See Order,
ECF No. 1505; Order, ECF No. 1510. Nor have Qualified Competitors been comprehensively
identified or the privacy safeguards as to the sharing of user data been discussed. See Tr. of Hr’g
on Mot., ECF No. 1507 [hereinafter Hr’g Tr.], at 9:6-11. The parties also continue to work through
operational and governing details, some of which have required the court’s intervention. See Joint
Status Report, ECF No. 1491 (Technical Committee’s compensation); Joint Status Report,
ECF No. 1511 (Google’s access to confidential third-party information). All of this has in turn
required status hearings and extensions of time, see, e.g., Minute Order, Feb. 11, 2026; Minute
Order, May 1, 2026; Order, ECF No. 1505; Order, ECF No. 1510. Plaintiffs estimate that
Qualified Competitors may be able to concretely reap the benefits of the Final Judgment, most
optimistically, by late fall or early winter of this year. Hr’g Tr. at 6:6–7:19.
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Google argues that it will be irreparably harmed absent a partial stay, because the data-
sharing and syndication provisions will result in the disclosure of confidential information.
Google’s Mem. at 26–30. From that, they argue, will flow further harms still, including to its right
to appeal, competitive standing and reputation, and the way it does business, particularly as to
competitors. Id. at 30–35.
As of today, neither the court nor the parties have any concrete point of reference for the
harms the data-sharing and syndication provisions may precipitate. The Final Judgment broadly
orders that certain search index and user-side data be disclosed and that search results and search
text ads be syndicated on ordinary commercial terms. See Final J., ECF No. 1462, §§ IV.A–B, V,
VI.B–C. But key details such as license terms, security and privacy safeguards, and who the
Qualified Competitors will be are far from established. And discussions as to these details will
not meaningfully begin until the Technical Committee is not only fully staffed but also internally
organized, which will include hiring staff, assigning responsibilities, establishing procedures, and
securing an annual budget. See Pls.’ SR at 7–8; Final J. § VII.A.7. Further, Plaintiffs’ rosy
estimate of when these remedies will be available to Qualified Competitors likely depends on
relatively conflict-free negotiations of licensing terms and certifying competitors, which is far from
assured. The time at which any of the potential harms Google asserts will occur is therefore not
imminent, see Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674, and what those harms will be are yet “speculative,”
see Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 298.
Google lodges many objections to this approach. First, it cites a string of examples in
which courts have granted a stay even where the harm was to occur many months later. See Def.’s
Reply in Supp. of Google’s Mot., ECF No. 1493 [hereinafter Google’s Reply], at 2–4. But those
courts did so presumably because they had enough information to effectively weigh the stay
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factors, even months before the purported harms were to take effect. Second, Google cautions that
Plaintiffs’ proposal would “create a procedural morass.” Id. at 4. It describes the proposal as
requiring Google to “file motions on the eve of implementation of each of the four remedies at
issue,” such that Google will be made to file multiple emergency motions with the D.C. Circuit if
this court does not enter a stay. Id. To that concern, the court will require Plaintiffs to notify both
the court and Google 45 days before the date on which a Qualified Competitor (as certified by
Plaintiffs and the Technical Committee) may begin to access a data-sharing or syndication remedy,
so that Google can seek a stay at that juncture. By that time, template license terms, procedures,
safeguards, and other important details will presumably have been established as to both the data
disclosure and syndication remedies. The court also thinks it unlikely that Google will have to
seek relief before each remedy comes into effect. The outcome of the first such application may
prove dispositive as to others.
Finally, Google contends that its harm is “neither ‘speculative’ nor ‘unrealistic,’” because
notwithstanding the nascent stage of their implementation, the remedies expressly and plainly
require Google to disclose “its valuable assets and confidential data to competitors.” Id. at 1–2.
The fundamental harm caused by the data-sharing and syndication provisions is the disclosure of
confidential information to a competitor, and neither more time nor further details would change
that. Id. at 5–6. Once that information is disclosed, Google argues, “the cat is out of the bag” and
“would irreparably harm Google under any circumstance.” Id. (emphasis added).
But there is no rule in this circuit that any disclosure of information is an irreparable harm
sufficient to warrant a stay. See Univ. of Cal. Student Ass’n v. Carter, 766 F. Supp. 3d 114, 121
(D.D.C. 2025) (explaining that, although “disclosure of information generally cannot be ‘undone,’
. . . that is not sufficient to show irreparable harm”). Nor is there a per se rule in the antitrust
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context that the disclosure of information to competitors is an irreparable harm that warrants an
automatic stay. There have certainly been instances where a court found irreparable harm because
confidential information was to be disclosed to competitors. See, e.g., Hosp. Staffing Sols., LLC
v. Reyes, 736 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200 (D.D.C. 2010). But “[w]hat [Google] overlooks is that the
context of the dissemination matters.” See Carter, 766 F. Supp. 3d at 121 (whether the harm of
the disclosure of confidential information is irreparable depends in part on the recipient and
circumstances of the disclosure (citing cases)). Evaluating whether the disclosure of confidential
information would be an irreparable harm “requires looking at (1) the type of information disclosed
and (2) the breadth of disclosure and the use of the information disclosed.” Am. Fed’n of Lab. &
Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Dep’t of Labor, No. 25-cv-339, 2025 WL 1783899, at *11 (D.D.C. June
27, 2025). Whether there are safeguards protecting the information disclosed can also figure into
this determination. See id. at *12 (citing cases). The court must therefore account for the contours
of the disclosure to assess irreparable harm rather than merely rely on the fact of disclosure itself.
See, e.g., Carter, 766 F. Supp. 3d at 121; Am. Fed’n of Lab., 2025 WL 1783899, at *11–12;
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. FTC, 409 F. Supp. 297, 308–09 (D.D.C. 1976); Kaplan v. Bd. of Educ. of City
Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y., 759 F.2d 256, 259–60 (2d Cir. 1985). Specifics as to the “context of the
dissemination” in this case, such as the identities of the Qualified Competitors, the ways in which
they plan to use the remedies, the security and privacy safeguards, the substance of the license
terms, and even the extent to which Google participates in and objects to these decisions, will help
inform the irreparable-harm inquiry.
The court thinks it is therefore prudent to let the preparatory work take its course for now.
The “circumstances of [this] particular case” warrant seeing the details of these remedies through
before deciding whether their execution should be stayed. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 433; id. at 427
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(describing a stay as “an intrusion into the ordinary processes of administration and judicial
review”). Plaintiffs also have indicated that they would be “open to talking about how to address
this more comprehensively” with Google as the potential harms become more evident. Hr’g Tr.
at 8:25–9:4; see also Pls.’ Opp’n at 1 (“The Plaintiffs . . . offered to work with Google on ways to
allow it to raise its stay arguments as to these remedies when they are ripe . . . .”). Giving any
harm time to potentially materialize into something “actual and not theoretical, . . . and of such
imminence” may bring to light information that could bear on discussions among the parties and
the court’s evaluation of the stay factors. See Mexichem, 787 F.3d 544 at 555. Though the court
is loath to kick the proverbial can down the road, it is what the high bar of irreparable harm
presently demands.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, Google’s Motion for a Partial Stay Pending Appeal,
ECF No. 1471, is denied without prejudice. Plaintiffs shall notify Google and the court 45 days
before the date on which any Qualified Competitor (as certified by Plaintiffs and the Technical
Committee) may begin to access a data-sharing or syndication remedy so that Google can renew
its request for a stay, if necessary.
Dated: May 7, 2026 Amit P. Mehta
United States District Judge
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