Calvin Lee v. Milwaukee County, Wisconsin

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-1945

CALVIN D. LEE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MILWAUKEE COUNTY, WISCONSIN,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Wisconsin.

No. 2:22-cv-01089 — William E. Duffin, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED MARCH 3, 2026 — DECIDED MAY 7, 2026

____________________

Before ROVNER, SCUDDER, and KOLAR, Circuit Judges.

KOLAR, Circuit Judge. Calvin Lee filed a pro se lawsuit

against Milwaukee County for allegedly unconstitutional

conditions of confinement that he experienced while detained

for two and a half years in the County’s Jail. The district court

granted summary judgment to the County, and Lee—now

represented by counsel—appeals.

2 No. 24-1945

Lee’s allegations are troubling: in particular, his descrip-

tions of potential gaps in the Jail’s mental-health resources

give us pause. His medical conditions, a traumatic brain in-

jury and post-traumatic stress disorder, are serious enough to

mandate some level of care under the Fourteenth Amend-

ment. And the County’s attempt to insulate itself from liabil-

ity by claiming that it lacked notice of any deficient care pro-

vided by its private contractor is a non-starter.

But on the sparse record before us, we cannot conclude

that any of Lee’s claims rise to the level of a constitutional vi-

olation. The little evidence available on the scope of Lee’s

mental-health needs does not raise a triable issue of fact as to

whether the limited care the Jail did offer him was constitu-

tionally insufficient. Though we sympathize with the chal-

lenges Lee undoubtedly faced in mustering this evidence

while litigating the case pro se below, we find he failed to meet

his burden at summary judgment. Thus, we affirm.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

We take the following facts from the summary judgment

record, drawing all reasonable inferences in Lee’s favor as the

nonmovant. Stockton v. Milwaukee County, 44 F.4th 605, 614

(7th Cir. 2022). Like the magistrate judge, 1 we construe his pro

se filings below liberally and review the signed and sworn al-

legations in his amended complaint as an affidavit for sum-

mary judgment purposes. Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 901–02

(7th Cir. 2017).

1 Magistrate Judge William E. Duffin presided over the case with the

parties’ consent.

No. 24-1945 3

Lee was a pretrial detainee at the Milwaukee County Jail

from December 2020 to April 2023. The County contracts with

Wellpath, LLC to provide routine medical services, including

mental-health care, at the Jail. When Lee was initially pro-

cessed at the Jail, he informed medical staff that he was a U.S.

Army veteran with a documented history of traumatic brain

injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, insomnia, de-

pression, headaches, and blackouts, as well as nerve pain. Lee

said that he was “actively being treated” for these conditions

before his detention. But the record yields few details about

what this prior treatment entailed and contains no evidence

that Lee was evaluated by a mental-health care professional

upon intake. In fact, the record contains none of Lee’s medical

records from either before or during his time at the Jail.

Lee’s arrival came midway through the COVID-19 pan-

demic when the Jail was struggling to curb transmission of

the virus. As part of the Jail’s efforts to control the spread of

COVID-19, Lee and other detainees were regularly confined

to their cells for extended periods of time in alternating shifts;

Lee estimates these confinements could last as long as twenty-

six and a half hours. The County, for its part, admits some of

them lasted at least twenty-three hours. Lee also asserts that

while the Jail eventually ended its formal COVID “lock-in

policy,” it continued to impose extended lockdowns through-

out his incarceration, and that some lockdowns lasted at least

forty-four hours. During some of these lockdowns, the Jail

disabled toilets across entire cell blocks—a response, in the

County’s telling, to detainees flooding their cells.

In September 2021, a little over eight months into his de-

tention, Lee filed a grievance complaining that the Jail had

failed to provide him with “veteran services [and] resources,”

4 No. 24-1945

including “[m]ental [h]ealth resources.” Correctional staff re-

sponded that the facility could not provide volunteer veteran

services at that time, but that Lee should fill out a slip to re-

quest mental-health services, and closed Lee’s grievance. Lee

appealed, asserting he had already “requested mental health

services, with no success” and that the facility was “ill

equipped” to treat his specific combat-related issues. The ap-

peal was forwarded to Wellpath staff, who informed Lee that

they could not provide him with medication under the Jail’s

general policies, since his medical records from the Depart-

ment of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) did not reflect any recent ac-

tive prescriptions. Wellpath listed the Jail’s available mental-

health services as “crisis intervention, brief counseling, medi-

cation management, [and] providing w[ri]tten materials to as-

sist with mental health issues,” but qualified that “[l]ong term

therapy is not provided, such as in a prison setting.”

Lee consistently filed grievances throughout his time at

the Jail. He continued to complain about inadequate mental-

health services, as well as treatment for his physical nerve

pain. While it appears the Jail provided Lee with medication

for his nerve pain, the record is ambiguous on what (if any)

mental-health care he received. At some point after Lee had

been confined for over a year, he went on a four-day hunger

strike and was placed on suicide observation, during which

he spoke with a staff psychiatrist. Beyond this, it is unclear

what level of mental-health treatment Lee received at the Jail.

Lee also protested the recurring lockdowns in his griev-

ances. And he called out a number of unhygienic conditions

that he observed at the Jail, including fecal matter left in a

broom closet, blood draws being conducted near food-service

areas, clogged sinks in cells, and black mold in showers. Jail

No. 24-1945 5

staff responded to his grievances saying that these issues ei-

ther would be or had already been addressed.

B. Procedural History

Lee filed a lawsuit pro se against the County 2 in September

2022 while still detained at the Jail. He never moved for ap-

pointment of counsel. The district court screened his com-

plaint and allowed him to proceed on several claims against

the County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for inadequate medical

treatment and unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

After the parties consented to proceeding before a magistrate

judge, the County moved for summary judgment on all of

Lee’s remaining claims.

In May 2024, the magistrate judge granted the County’s

motion and dismissed Lee’s case in its entirety. The magis-

trate judge held that Lee had failed to raise a triable issue as

to whether the Jail’s COVID-related lockdown policies were

unconstitutionally excessive. He likewise found none of Lee’s

cited unhygienic conditions objectively serious enough to

raise constitutional concerns—let alone pervasive enough to

2 Lee’s original complaint named both the County and Wellpath as

defendants. The district court ordered him to refile his claims against

Wellpath separately. Lee did so, and Wellpath moved for summary judg-

ment based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, which the dis-

trict court granted. Lee then separately appealed this dismissal. While we

initially consolidated the two appeals for briefing and argument, we later

deconsolidated and stayed the Wellpath appeal after Wellpath filed for

bankruptcy. Lee has since notified the court of his intent to resume brief-

ing his appeal against Wellpath with the contractor’s Liquidating Trust

substituted as defendant, but has yet to file a motion to that effect. Since

exhaustion is not at issue in Lee’s case against the County, we do not ad-

dress it further.

6 No. 24-1945

show a widespread pattern or practice that could be at-

tributed to the County under Monell v. Department of Social

Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). And as to Lee’s medical-care

claim, he found no indication that Wellpath’s treatment was

objectively unreasonable, that any deficiency was formal or

pervasive enough to create Monell liability, or that the County

was on notice of any issues with Wellpath’s care.

Lee appealed. After reviewing the parties’ initial submis-

sions, we determined that his case would benefit from further

briefing and argument and appointed counsel to represent

him before us. We thank appointed counsel for their able ser-

vice on Lee’s behalf.

II. Discussion

We review the magistrate judge’s grant of summary judg-

ment de novo. Stockton, 44 F.4th at 614. Summary judgment is

appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any ma-

terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But summary judgment is not

appropriate where “the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Stock-

ton, 44 F.4th at 614 (citation omitted). “A party who fails to

produce evidence sufficient to establish an element essential

to that party’s case on which they bear the burden of proof

cannot survive a summary judgment challenge.” Id. The non-

moving party must “respond to the moving party’s properly-

supported motion by identifying specific, admissible evi-

dence showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact

for trial.” Grant v. Trustees of Indiana University, 870 F.3d 562,

568 (7th Cir. 2017).

No. 24-1945 7

Lee’s constitutional claims from his time as a pretrial de-

tainee arise under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause. Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir.

2019). To overcome the County’s motion, he must first raise a

triable issue as to whether the conditions he experienced at

the Jail were objectively unreasonable. Id. at 823–24. Condi-

tions are objectively unreasonable if they are imposed ex-

pressly to punish or are excessive in relation to a legitimate

purpose. Id. at 822; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).

Since all of Lee’s claims are brought against the County,

he has several additional hurdles to clear under Monell, which

requires § 1983 liability against local governments to be direct

and not vicarious. At a high level, and without reciting all of

Monell’s many nuances, Lee must:

(1) show that he was “deprived of a federal right”;

(2) “trace the deprivation to some municipal action (i.e., a

policy or custom) … attributable to the municipality it-

self”;

(3) show “municipal fault”; and

(4) show that “the municipal action was the moving force

behind the federal-rights violation.”

Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir.

2021) (cleaned up).

With these standards in mind, we turn to Lee’s appeal. We

first assess his claim relating to inadequate medical care, then

his claim based on excessive lockdowns, and finally his claim

over the Jail’s unhygienic conditions.

A. Medical-Care Claim

Lee’s claim of systemically unconstitutional gaps in the

Jail’s medical care presents the most challenging issue in this

8 No. 24-1945

case. We begin by touching on the County’s defense of inad-

equate notice, before moving to the merits of Lee’s constitu-

tional claim.

In its brief on appeal, the County argued that Lee had

failed to show the County was properly on “notice that in-

mates requiring more or different care were not receiving it”

from Wellpath. The County contended that—even if Lee

could show that the care he received was unconstitutional—

he had failed to establish, under Monell’s “municipal fault”

prong, that County policymakers were “aware of the risk cre-

ated by [Wellpath’s] custom or practice and … failed to take

appropriate steps to protect [him].” Thomas v. Cook County

Sheriff's Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010). All of Lee’s

medical-related grievances, the County pointed out, were for-

warded directly to Wellpath staff. And it argued that Lee had

not identified any “pattern of similar violations” tending to

suggest the County’s awareness and “conscious disregard” of

any problem with Wellpath’s services. See Dean, 18 F.4th at

236 (citing Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 408

(1997)). Thus, in the County’s view, it could not have been “on

notice that [Wellpath’s] medical policies were causing serious

problems at the jail.” Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 638 (7th Cir.

2014).

We take no issue with the County’s recitation of Monell’s

basic notice requirement. Its efforts to use that requirement to

insulate itself from liability through a private contractor is an-

other story, one with more than a few troubling chapters. Un-

der the settled law of our circuit, “[t]he County cannot shield

itself from § 1983 liability by contracting out its duty to pro-

vide medical services.” King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1020

(7th Cir. 2012). The County’s efforts to reargue this

No. 24-1945 9

established point of law by invoking respondeat superior do not

hold water. “The underlying rationale,” we noted in King, “is

not based on respondeat superior, but rather on the fact that the

private company’s policy becomes that of the County if the

County delegates final decision-making authority to it.” Id.

To this end, Lee need not—as the County argues—show a

widespread pattern of issues with Wellpath’s care to prove

that the County was on notice of any constitutional violations.

If Wellpath had an express policy of refusing to treat prison-

ers’ cardiac arrests, for example, that is enough to establish

the County’s municipal fault whether or not Wellpath ever

disclosed that policy to County officials. True, a plaintiff must

still establish that their deprivation of rights was either formal

or pervasive enough to constitute “municipal action” rather

than an individual employee’s isolated act. Dean, 18 F.4th at 235.

And they must show that the action was taken with the req-

uisite level of fault at a “policymaking level.” Id. at 236 (cita-

tion omitted). But if they met their burden on these elements

with evidence of Wellpath’s policies or practices, those ac-

tions are properly attributable to the County, which does not

contend that the scope of its delegation to Wellpath is any-

thing less than absolute. See, e.g., Thomas, 604 F.3d at 303 (rec-

ognizing county’s potential Monell liability based on contrac-

tor’s practices).

The County appeared to walk back its position at oral ar-

gument, acknowledging that Wellpath’s policies are treated

as the County’s based on the breadth of its delegated author-

ity. It was wise to do so: its initial position not only contra-

venes King, but would incentivize municipalities to shirk their

constitutional obligations by sticking their heads in the sand.

That is not our law.

10 No. 24-1945

With the County’s notice argument disposed of, we turn

to the first and most basic element in Lee’s Monell claim:

whether he suffered a constitutional injury. To satisfy this el-

ement, as a pretrial detainee, he must first show that the care

he received was objectively unreasonable—that is, insuffi-

cient to abate a “serious risk of harm” from a reasonable of-

ficer’s perspective. Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Madison County,

108 F.4th 561, 571–72 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Pittman IV”) (citation

omitted). Second, Lee must show that he was harmed as a re-

sult. Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 347 (7th Cir. 2018).

Under this standard, Lee’s physical ailments—such as

nerve pain—merit only brief discussion. Even if Lee could es-

tablish that these symptoms were objectively serious (which

is not clear on this limited record), the County took affirma-

tive steps in response by offering him injections of pain-man-

agement medication. Lee offers no evidence to suggest this

course of treatment caused him unnecessary suffering. We

agree with the magistrate judge that no reasonable jury could

find Wellpath’s actions on this front constitutionally deficient.

Lee’s mental-health issues merit closer scrutiny. He avers

that he has a documented history of traumatic brain injury

and PTSD and was actively treated for these conditions at

some point before entering the Jail. These conditions could

certainly rise to the level of an “objectively serious” medical

need for which at least some degree of treatment was neces-

sary to avoid a substantial risk of harm. Id. at 346–47 (evalu-

ating claim for failure to treat suicidal detainee’s serious men-

tal-health issues); Pittman IV, 108 F.4th at 566 (same); cf. San-

ville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2001) (recogniz-

ing “mental illness” can be a “serious medical need” under

the Eighth Amendment). And the County does not dispute

No. 24-1945 11

that Wellpath’s staff were aware of Lee’s conditions: Lee dis-

closed them upon intake, and Wellpath later notified him that

it had received his prior medical history from the VA.

The problem is that Lee has not put forth any clinical evi-

dence that would allow us to assess whether the mental-

health care options the County did provide were objectively

insufficient to meet his serious needs. It is clear enough that

he himself found Wellpath’s suite of available services—“cri-

sis intervention, brief counseling, [and] medication manage-

ment,” but not “long term therapy”—inadequate to treat his

combat-related issues. But the record contains precious little

information on the scope and severity of his conditions, what

treatment he was receiving before he arrived at the Jail, and

whether and how Wellpath evaluated his neurological and

psychiatric symptoms once he got there. Without this infor-

mation, we have no principled basis to conclude that the treat-

ment Wellpath offered him was objectively unreasonable. Cf.

Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 754 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting, in

the context of the Eighth Amendment, that “an inmate is not

entitled to demand specific care,” but only to “reasonable

measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm”).

We understand the difficult burden Lee faces on this issue:

he litigated the case pro se below and lacked access to the

kinds of evidentiary tools, such as expert testimony, that

could help define the precise contours of his mental-health

needs. See James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 328 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting

that “cases involving complex medical evidence are typically

more difficult for pro se litigants” who have “received at least

some treatment” (cleaned up)); Pennewell v. Parish, 923 F.3d

486, 491 (7th Cir. 2019) (describing the “untenable and ab-

struse position” an inmate faced in “unearthing evidence that

12 No. 24-1945

a substantial departure from accepted medical standards oc-

curred”). In acknowledging the barriers Lee faced as a pro se

litigant, we do not mean to imply that expert testimony or

other clinical evidence is per se necessary for incarcerated

plaintiffs’ medical-care claims to withstand summary judg-

ment. See, e.g., Jackson v. Sheriff of Winnebago County, 74 F.4th

496, 502 (7th Cir. 2023) (finding expert testimony unnecessary

to allow a jury to determine whether delay in medical care

diminished pretrial detainee’s chances of survival).

Nor do we discount the seriousness of any potential gaps

in the County’s mental-health services. Lee was incarcerated

at the Jail for over two and a half years. The record is ambig-

uous on whether the County, through Wellpath, in fact main-

tained a blanket policy of denying “long term therapy” for

pretrial detainees regardless of a detainee’s objectively estab-

lished need for such care. But such a policy, were it in place,

could raise constitutional concerns. See Wellman v. Faulkner,

715 F.2d 269, 272–73 (7th Cir. 1983) (describing two-year va-

cancy in prison’s staff psychiatrist position as a “serious sys-

temic deficiency”).

Here, however, we need not (and do not) reach Monell’s

“policy” inquiry, since we conclude on the record before us

that Lee’s claim ultimately founders at the initial step of

showing an underlying constitutional violation. Since Lee has

not put forth “specific, admissible evidence showing that

there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial” on whether

the medical care he received at the Jail was objectively unrea-

sonable, he has failed to meet his burden at summary judg-

ment. Grant, 870 F.3d at 568. Even if Wellpath’s long-term

therapy policy is read to set the stage for a constitutional vio-

lation, we lack a sufficient basis to conclude that one may

No. 24-1945 13

have occurred here. Thus, we must affirm the magistrate

judge’s grant of summary judgment on Lee’s medical-care

claim.

B. Excessive-Lockdown Claim

Lee’s other claims stem from conditions that are far from

ideal, but again do not rise to the level of a constitutional vio-

lation. We turn next to his challenges to the Jail’s lockdown

policies.

A pretrial detainee has “no general liberty interest in

movement outside of his cell guaranteed by the Due Process

Clause.” Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996).

Lockdowns only transgress the Fourteenth Amendment

when they become punitive, i.e. when they are not “reasona-

bly related to a legitimate governmental objective” or are “ex-

cessive in relation” to that objective. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39.

On this record, a reasonable jury could not conclude that

the Jail’s lockdowns during Lee’s incarceration were uncon-

stitutionally excessive. The Jail had a legitimate interest in

protecting its detainees during the pandemic by reducing

transmission of the COVID-19 virus, and we are ill-equipped

to second-guess whether its resulting lockdown policies were

adequately tailored to that interest. See Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d

810, 819–21 (7th Cir. 2020). Lee identifies alternative steps the

Jail could have taken, such as allowing inmates out of their

cells more frequently in smaller rotating groups or relocating

inmates to decompress the Jail’s population. But Jail adminis-

trators were caught in the unenviable position of facing suits

from some inmates for failing to adequately protect them

from COVID-19, on one hand, and suits from inmates like Lee

for implementing allegedly excessive restrictions, on the

14 No. 24-1945

other. While Lee’s proposals might have benefited the Jail’s

inmates in retrospect, the Fourteenth Amendment’s require-

ments should not be confused with “a court’s idea of how best

to operate a detention facility.” 3 Bell, 441 U.S. at 539.

Lee also points to certain lockdowns from mid-2021 on-

ward that were not clearly related to COVID safety concerns.

But his complaint and grievances only reference a handful of

lockdowns that fall into this camp. Even if Lee could show

that these instances were overtly punitive or excessive to the

point of punishment, he has failed to either tie them to an ex-

press policy or show that they were sufficiently pervasive to

constitute a de facto practice for Monell purposes. A “random

event” or isolated series of events does not amount to a

“widespread custom or practice” under Monell. Thomas, 604

F.3d at 303. We therefore affirm the magistrate judge’s judg-

ment on Lee’s excessive-lockdown claim.

C. Unsanitary-Conditions Claim

Lee has also failed to raise a triable issue as to whether the

Jail’s unsanitary conditions deprived him of a constitutional

right. Broadly, Lee attacks a host of different unhygienic inci-

dents at the Jail, including fecal matter left in a broom closet

for multiple weeks, “food being served in the same area that

blood labs were being drawn,” a clogged sink in Lee’s cell,

3 Lee alternatively challenges the lockdowns as excessively restricting

his ability to exercise. See, e.g., Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 488, 493 (7th Cir.

1981) (recognizing due-process violation where inmates were confined to

small cells “for the overwhelming portion of their waking and sleeping

hours”). While we do not question the importance of inmates’ access to

exercise, none of the cases Lee cites addressed the countervailing safety

interests implicated by the “unprecedented” COVID-19 pandemic. Mays,

974 F.3d at 814.

No. 24-1945 15

and black mold in showers. Jail officials have a duty to ensure

that inmates are afforded “the minimum civilized measure of

life’s necessities, including adequate sanitation and personal

hygiene items.” Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir.

2013) (per curiam) (cleaned up). While individual substandard

conditions are not always “serious enough to work constitu-

tional violations,” they may “violate the Constitution in com-

bination when they have a ‘mutually enforcing effect that pro-

duces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need.’”

Id. at 842–43 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)).

Lee’s unsanitary-conditions claim, too, fails under multi-

ple prongs of Monell. His grievances do not isolate a single

issue or recurring pattern of issues, but rather a grab-bag of

different complaints—all occurring while Jail resources were

taxed during the COVID-19 pandemic and its immediate af-

termath. These incidents are “certainly unpleasant,” and the

County “deserves no praise for permitting them to persist.”

Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008). But in this con-

text, we lack sufficient evidence to infer either that they man-

ifested a “single, identifiable” deprivation or are traceable to

a widespread practice of constitutionally unacceptable

maintenance. Budd, 711 F.3d at 843 (citation omitted).

Jail staff typically responded within a week indicating

that Lee’s complaints would be or had already been ad-

dressed. Sain, 512 F.3d at 894 (finding inmate’s pest com-

plaints insufficiently serious where “an exterminator regu-

larly visited his cell … and also would come in response to

[his] complaints”). Even inferring in Lee’s favor that staff

never actually followed through on these promises, the record

lacks evidence that most of his specific complaints ever re-

curred. Cf. Antonelli, 81 F.3d at 1431 (reversing dismissal at

16 No. 24-1945

pleading stage where inmate described sixteen-month pest

infestation); Budd, 711 F.3d at 842 (reversing dismissal at

screening stage where inmate alleged repeated stays in facil-

ity without adequate bedding or functioning heat over multi-

ple years).

The closest Lee comes to identifying a systemic pattern of

unhygienic conditions is the Jail’s apparent practice of shut-

ting off toilets in entire cell blocks for prolonged periods of

time, forcing inmates to live with their own waste. The

County’s summary-judgment response explains these

shutoffs as an emergency response to other inmates flooding

their cells during the COVID-19 pandemic. The cell-block-

wide shutoffs were evidently a function of the Jail’s plumbing

system, which does not permit more targeted shutoffs to in-

dividual cells. While the toilet shutoffs are unsanitary and un-

savory, and might on a different record cross the line into an

unconstitutional practice, the Jail has put forth a legitimate

justification for their necessity in the specific case before us.

We cannot reasonably conclude, without knowing more

about the circumstances, that they constituted excessive pun-

ishment. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538–39; cf. Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 819,

824–25 (affirming qualified-immunity denial at pleading

stage where jail administrators shut off water without fore-

warning inmates as part of planned shutdown to fix water

tank, and punished inmates who complained with lock-

downs).

III. Conclusion

We AFFIRM.