Ricciardi v. District of Columbia

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 24-CV-0718

MATTHEW JOSEPH RICCIARDI, APPELLANT,

V.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(2023-CAB-006981)

(Hon. Todd E. Edelman, Reviewing Judge)

(Argued November 12, 2025 Decided May 7, 2026)

Matthew J. Ricciardi, pro se.

Amber Greenaway, with whom Brian L. Schwab, Attorney General for the

District of Columbia, Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak,

Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Graham E. Phillips, Deputy Solicitor

General, were on the brief for appellee.

Before BECKWITH and DEAHL, Associate Judges, and WASHINGTON, Senior

Judge.

DEAHL, Associate Judge: Matthew Ricciardi challenges a speeding ticket he

received after one of the District’s automated speeding cameras clocked him going

61 miles per hour in a 50 mph zone on D.C. Route 295. The charged infraction was

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for exceeding the speed limit by 11 to 15 mph. See 18 D.C.M.R. §§ 2200, 2600.1.

Ricciardi challenged that ticket, arguing that the District had not satisfied its burden

of proving that he was traveling 11 mph or more over the speed limit given that its

speeding camera was calibrated to within only a “plus or minus one” mph margin of

error. That is, when factoring in that margin of error, the District had proven only

that he was traveling somewhere between 60 to 62 mph, making it just as likely that

he was traveling less than 11 mph over the speed limit as more than 11 mph over.

Because the District is required to prove speeding infractions “by clear and

convincing evidence,” D.C. Code § 50-2302.06(a), and a mere coin flip is not that,

Ricciardi asked that his ticket be dismissed.

Both a DMV hearing examiner and the Traffic Adjudication Appeals Board

rejected Ricciardi’s challenge. The Board instead adopted the District’s view that

once a speeding camera passes calibration testing—requiring it to be accurate to

within a ±1 mph margin of error—its measurements are “deemed” perfectly accurate

as a matter of law per applicable regulations. See 18 D.C.M.R. § 1035.2. Under that

view, the ±1 mph margin of error “refers to the testing of the radar unit not the speed

captured on the violation.” So in the Board’s telling, while all speeding cameras in

fact have some margin of error, those imperfections effectively vanish as a legal

matter for purposes of proving infractions.

3

We disagree with the District and the Board and agree with Ricciardi. The

District did not present clear and convincing evidence that Ricciardi was traveling

61 mph or above because its evidence showed only that he was traveling between

60 and 62 mph, making it just as likely that he was traveling beneath the 61 mph

threshold as above it. The District and the Board misread 18 D.C.M.R. § 1035.2 as

establishing the legal fiction that its speeding cameras are perfectly accurate

whenever they measure speeds within a ±1 mph margin of error. The regulation says

no such thing: It provides that speeding cameras are “calibrated correctly and in

proper working order” so long as they measure speeds within that range, meaning

only that properly calibrated cameras are fit to deploy and that tickets may be issued

based on their readings, not that they are infallible. And even if this regulation

purported to create that legal fiction, it would be invalid because it would be at odds

with the statutory requirement that the District prove speeding violations “by clear

and convincing evidence.” D.C. Code § 50-2302.06(a). The District is not free to

override that statutory requirement via regulation, as its interpretation of its

regulations would effectively do. We therefore dismiss Ricciardi’s speeding ticket.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

One of the District’s automated speeding cameras photographed Ricciardi’s

vehicle traveling on D.C. Route 295 late one night. The camera captured two images

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of Ricciardi’s car and license plate, taken half-a-second apart. It also superimposed

certain data on those images, including: (1) the location where the camera was

positioned, (2) the posted speed limit of “050” mph, and (3) the car’s measured

speed of “061” mph. The camera reported the measured speed in whole numbers,

with no decimals; i.e., it did not say that Ricciardi was traveling 60.6 mph, 61.0 mph,

or 61.4 mph—only 61 mph. A week later, the District mailed Ricciardi a notice of

infraction charging him with “SPEED 11-15 OVR LIMT” and assessing him the

attendant $100 fine for that offense. That notice also informed Ricciardi that he

could view the speeding camera’s “deployment log” from a publicly accessible

website.

The deployment log for that speeding camera showed that a technician tested

the camera’s measurements two days before and about twelve hours after Ricciardi’s

perceived infraction. In each test, the camera was tested against a tuning fork

calibrated to 40 mph and the camera returned a reading of 40 mph, again with no

decimals. The technician thus certified, consistent with applicable regulations, that

the reading was “accurate to plus or minus one mile per hour of frequency.” See 18

D.C.M.R. § 1035.2(b)(1)-(2).

Ricciardi submitted a written challenge to his speeding ticket, which was first

considered by a DMV hearing examiner. In his challenge, Ricciardi argued that the

5

ticket and the accompanying deployment log did not establish by the requisite “clear

and convincing evidence,” D.C. Code § 50-2302.06(a), that he was traveling 11 mph

or more over the 50 mph speed limit as charged. Instead, because the deployment

log indicated only that the camera was accurate to within ±1 mph, the most that could

be said of its 61 mph measurement was that Ricciardi’s vehicle was traveling

between 60 mph and 62 mph, with half of that range falling below the 61 mph

threshold for the cited infraction.

The hearing examiner rejected Ricciardi’s challenge and upheld the ticket.

The hearing examiner opined that the District “provided sufficient evidence to

demonstrate that equipment was tested, working properly and calibrated correctly,”

and that Ricciardi “did not submit any evidence to show that the speed recorded was

in error.” The examiner did not mention the ±1 mph margin of error that Ricciardi

had highlighted from the deployment log. Ricciardi sought reconsideration before

the hearing examiner, reiterating his same argument. The hearing examiner denied

reconsideration and more directly addressed Ricciardi’s argument on this second

pass, but only by noting that “[t]he margin of error also indicates +1 mph and so

there is a real possibility that [Ricciardi’s] vehicle was traveling at 62 mph.” The

hearing examiner did not address the seemingly equal likelihood that Ricciardi was

traveling at some speed below the 61 mph threshold that he was charged with.

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Ricciardi appealed to the Traffic Adjudication Appeals Board, which likewise

upheld the ticket. The Board concluded that the ±1 mph margin of error noted in the

deployment log “refers to the testing of the radar unit not the speed captured on the

violation.” Once a radar unit is properly calibrated to within that ±1 mph margin of

error, the Board reasoned, it is “deemed to be calibrated correctly and in proper

working order,” per 18 D.C.M.R. § 1035.2. The Board further reasoned that the

notice of infraction was “prima facie evidence” that Ricciardi was traveling 11 to

15 mph over the limit as charged, see D.C. Code § 50-2209.01(b), sufficient to

sustain the infraction absent affirmative evidence from Ricciardi that he was not

traveling the measured speed. And because Ricciardi did not submit affirmative

evidence showing that he was not exceeding the speed limit by 11 mph or more—

discounting the deployment log as any evidence of that—the Board affirmed the

hearing examiner’s decision.

Ricciardi next sought review in the Superior Court, pressing the same

argument. The court initially agreed with him and vacated the Board’s decision,

noting the speeding camera that captured Ricciardi’s vehicle was “necessarily also

subject to the same margin of error” indicated on the deployment log. The District

sought reconsideration, however, and the court reversed course and ultimately

upheld the Board’s ruling. On reconsideration, the court reasoned that this particular

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deployment log indicated the device “was precise in its speed measurement” since

the 40 mph reading matched the tuning fork’s 40 mph frequency.

Ricciardi now appeals.

II. Analysis

“Although this is an appeal from a review of agency action by the Superior

Court rather than a direct appeal to us, we review the administrative decision as if

the appeal had been heard initially in this court,” without the intervening review of

the Superior Court. DeVita v. District of Columbia, 74 A.3d 714, 719 (D.C. 2013)

(quoting Pub. Emp. Rels. Bd. v. Wash. Tchrs.’ Union Loc. 6, 556 A.2d 206, 207

(D.C. 1989)). Ricciardi raises the same argument before this court that he has

pressed throughout the proceedings to date: The District did not present sufficient

evidence that he committed the charged infraction because it failed to establish “by

clear and convincing evidence” that he was traveling 11 mph or more over the posted

speed limit.

Before we examine that question, we provide some background on the

relevant statutory and regulatory framework.

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A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

The D.C. Council has authorized the Mayor, through the District’s agencies,

to use automated camera systems to detect moving violations, including speeding.

D.C. Code § 50-2209.01(a). Speeding fines are graduated under the pertinent

regulations. As relevant here, a driver exceeding the speed limit by “[u]p to 10 mph”

faces a $50 fine, and a driver exceeding it by “11 to 15 mph” faces the $100 fine that

Ricciardi was assessed. 18 D.C.M.R. § 2600.1. When an automated camera

captures a perceived violation, the District mails the vehicle’s registered owner a

notice of infraction. D.C. Code § 50-2209.02(b). The notice must include

photographs of the perceived infraction, its date and location, the car’s license plate

number, and the type of violation detected, as occurred here. Id.

One statutory and two regulatory provisions speak to the evidentiary weight

of this notice of infraction and its contents. By statute, “[r]ecorded images taken by

an automated traffic enforcement system are prima facie evidence of an infraction

and may be submitted without authentication.” D.C. Code § 50-2209.01(b).

Similarly, by regulation, “[t]he Notice of Infraction shall constitute prima facie

evidence of the statements contained in the notice.” 18 D.C.M.R. § 3012.6. A

separate regulation governs speeding camera calibration. It provides that a “photo

radar device shall be deemed to be calibrated correctly and in proper working order”

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if, for a fixed camera (as opposed to a mobile one operated from a vehicle), there is

a deployment log indicating, among other things, that within four days before and

after the alleged violation “the tuning fork reading was accurate to plus or minus one

(1) mile per hour of the tuning fork frequency being used.” 18 D.C.M.R.

§ 1035.2(b)(1). The deployment log must also contain “certifications by a technician

or a police officer . . . that the device was correctly set up.” Id. § 1035.2(b)(2).

At the same time, the statute places the burden of persuasion squarely on the

District to prove any detected infractions: “The burden of proof shall be on the

District and no infraction shall be established except by clear and convincing

evidence.” D.C. Code § 50-2302.06(a).

B. There Was Not Clear and Convincing Evidence of the Charged Infraction.

The parties’ dispute reduces to whether the District actually proved by clear

and convincing evidence that Ricciardi was traveling at or over the 61 mph threshold

as charged. Clear and convincing evidence “lies somewhere between a

preponderance of evidence and evidence probative beyond a reasonable doubt.” In

re A.B., 955 A.2d 161, 166 (D.C. 2008) (quoting In re Tw.P., 756 A.2d 402, 407

(D.C. 2000)). It requires evidence that establishes the infraction by more than a mere

likelihood that it occurred; the evidence must “produce in the mind of the trier of

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fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re Dortch,

860 A.2d 346, 358 (D.C. 2004) (quoting In re T.J., 666 A.2d 1, 16 n.17 (D.C. 1995)).

To recap the relevant evidence in this case: (1) two photographs showed that

one of the District’s speeding cameras clocked Ricciardi’s car going 61 mph in a

50 mph zone; and (2) a deployment log showed that speeding camera was calibrated

within the requisite ±1 mph margin of error. Ricciardi argues that this evidence on

its face demonstrates only that he was going somewhere between 60 and 62 mph,

which is not enough to give rise to a firm conviction that he was traveling on the

higher end of that range—at or above 61 mph. Indeed, Ricciardi argues that because

half of the speeds within the 60 to 62 mph range “fall below the charged range,”

under 61 mph and perhaps as low as 60 mph, “and half fall within the charged

range,” from 61 to 62 mph, the District’s evidence amounts to no more than a “coin

flip” that he was traveling 11 mph or above the posted speed limit as charged.

We agree with Ricciardi that this evidence leaves it just as likely that he was

traveling below 61 mph as at or above that threshold. And because a coin flip is not

clear and convincing evidence, the evidence seems to be insufficient to sustain the

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charged infraction. 1 See In re Romansky, 938 A.2d 733, 742 (D.C. 2007) (evidence

that is “virtually in equipoise” does not satisfy burden of proving charge by clear

and convincing evidence). The District offers various counterpoints to that

straightforward conclusion, however, and we now address those.

C. Statutes and Regulations Do Not Fill the Gaps in the District’s Evidence.

The District counters by stressing both statutory and regulatory provisions

that, in its view, effectively elevate its evidence to clear and convincing proof of the

charged infraction as a matter of law.

The District first highlights the statutory provision that states: “Recorded

images taken by a” speeding camera “are prima facie evidence of an infraction and

1

One might think that the range from 61 to 62 mph is some sliver larger than

the range from 60 to just below 61 mph, given that a measure of precisely 61 mph

fits only within the higher range. We doubt that’s right. See John Morgan Russell,

Significant Statistics: An Introduction to Statistics § 4.4, at 185 (2025) (explaining

that for “continuous variables” capable of infinitely fine gradations, like speed

measurements, the inclusion or exclusion of endpoints does not change their

probability because “[t]he probability that x takes on any single individual value is

zero”), available at https://doi.org/10.21061/significantstatistics;

https://perma.cc/JU5A-R5JB. Put in the terms of this case, the odds that Ricciardi

was traveling precisely 61 mph when photographed—and not one of the infinite

fractions above or below it within the 60-62 mph range—are mathematically zero.

But we will leave this theoretical point to the mathematicians. For present purposes,

it suffices to say that even a 50.1% chance that Ricciardi was traveling 61 mph or

above still falls well short of clear and convincing evidence. See In re Romansky,

938 A.2d at 742.

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may be submitted without authentication.” D.C. Code § 50-2209.01(b). And

because “[p]rima facie evidence is, by definition, evidence that suffices to carry a

party’s burden of proof,” the District argues that it has perforce carried its

evidentiary burden unless Ricciardi produced affirmative evidence that “he was

driving at a speed less than 61 mph,” which the District argues he has not done. See

generally Royal v. D.C. Metro. Police Dep’t, 314 A.3d 67, 77 (D.C. 2024) (“The

term ‘prima facie evidence’ is commonly understood to mean ‘evidence that will

establish a fact or sustain a judgment unless contradictory evidence is produced.’”

(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019))).

We disagree because Ricciardi has produced contradictory evidence in the

form of the deployment log. The District is correct that a prima facie case typically

refers to proof sufficient to support a judgment, but only presumptively so. That is,

the presumption will stand only if no “contradictory evidence is produced.” Id.; see

also Am. Stud. Ass’n v. Bronner, 259 A.3d 728, 744 & n.57 (D.C. 2021) (recognizing

a “prima facie showing” as one that is “[s]ufficient to establish a fact or raise a

presumption unless disproved or rebutted” (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (10th

ed. 2014) (emphasis added))). The problem for the District is that Ricciardi did

produce contradictory evidence when he highlighted the deployment log, which

indicated that the speeding camera that measured his speed had some margin of

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error, and that the District could say only that it was within the ±1 mph margin of

error permitted by law.

Contrary to the District’s suggestions, the fact that the deployment log was

referenced in the District’s own notice of infraction does not preclude it from

supplying the rebuttal evidence necessary to overcome the District’s prima facie

case. A cited individual can of course rebut a presumptively sufficient case by

pointing to apparent flaws within the evidence itself, rather than producing truly

independent evidence. For instance, just imagine if Ricciardi were charged with

speeding 11 mph over the limit but the District’s own pictures showed his recorded

speed as 50 mph in a 50 mph zone—pointing that discrepancy out would constitute

evidence sufficient to rebut the District’s prima facie case. And here, the deployment

log coupled with the fact that Ricciardi was cited for traveling at the very bottom of

the charged range was similarly sufficient to rebut the District’s prima facie case

because it cast serious doubt on the District’s allegation that Ricciardi was in fact

traveling 61 mph or above. See Gatewood v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 82 A.3d

41, 52 (D.C. 2013) (prima facie case can be rebutted through any “credible

evidence”).

The District counters that all we know from the deployment log is that the

speeding camera here measured speeds within the permitted ±1 mph margin of error,

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but it might have been more accurate than that. That is, perhaps the camera was in

fact accurate to within a ±0.5, or even a ±0.1 mph, margin of error. That uncertainty

does not help the District’s cause for three reasons. First, the exact margin of error

is not critical to our analysis. If this particular speeding camera’s margin of error

was ±0.5 mph, or ±0.1 mph, the result would be the same. In either case, once the

margin of error is factored in, there is no reason to think it any more likely that

Ricciardi was traveling within the half of that range at or above 61 mph than within

the half of that range below 61 mph. Second, any uncertainty must be held against

the District in light of its statutory burden of persuasion, not to mention that it is

uniquely positioned to provide information about its speeding cameras’ precise

margins of error in the event that more detailed information actually exists. 2 See

Lasche v. Levin, 977 A.2d 361, 373 (D.C. 2009) (typically, “the burden to produce

evidence . . . must rest with the party . . . [that] is uniquely situated to produce [the]

2

The District argues that “[t]here is no evidence in the record that any such

error would be evenly distributed above and below the camera’s reading,” so that it

is conceivable that its cameras only err downward to the perceived speeder’s benefit.

That might be a theoretical possibility, but the District seems to mistakenly think

that presenting a prima facie case shifts the burden of persuasion to Ricciardi to

prove his defense beyond all doubt. That is wrong. See Blount v. Nat’l Ctr. for

Tobacco-Free Kids, 775 A.2d 1110, 1116 (D.C. 2001) (noting that presenting a

prima facie case shifted the “burden of production, not of persuasion”). As the

statutory scheme makes clear, the burden of persuasion is always on the District to

prove these traffic offenses by clear and convincing evidence, D.C. Code

§ 50-2302.06(a), and the District’s evidence proved no more than that this camera’s

margin of error was within ±1 mph.

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evidence”). Third, the District acknowledges that all of its automated speeding

cameras have some margin of error, and that alone leaves the evidence in equipoise

regarding whether Ricciardi was traveling at or above the 61 mph threshold. 3 Such

equivocal evidence is well short of clear and convincing evidence.

The District next pivots to the regulation that the Board likewise relied upon

in reaching its decision, which provides that a “photo radar device shall be deemed

to be calibrated correctly and in proper working order if,” among other things, “the

tuning fork reading was accurate to plus or minus one (1) mile per hour of the tuning

fork frequency.” 18 D.C.M.R. § 1035.2. In the District’s telling, this means that

once a camera passes calibration, its output is “treated as accurate in law, even if it

3

The District suggests that Ricciardi could have but did not avail himself of

various discovery devices to uncover this camera’s true margin of error. It points

out that those discovery devices include “applying for the issuance of subpoenas,”

“seeking authorization to take depositions,” and “submitting written

interrogatories.” Devita, 74 A.3d at 723 (citing 18 D.C.M.R. §§ 1020-22). We think

it was quite sensible for Ricciardi to rely on the deployment log as the entire universe

of what the District could supply about this particular camera’s accuracy, and indeed,

the District was unable to represent that it had any more information available to it

when pressed on the point at oral argument. If the District in fact has more detail

about a particular camera’s calibration that would help support its case—for

instance, if a camera erred only downward when clocking a person’s speed, to that

person’s benefit—it can put that information in its deployment logs in the future, or

otherwise affirmatively produce it when faced with challenges similar to Ricciardi’s

that sow serious doubts about whether the individual committed the charged

infraction. On the current record, without such evidence, it is just as likely that

Ricciardi was traveling below 61 mph as above it, and that uncertainty is fatal to the

District’s charge, not to Ricciardi’s defense against it.

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might not be 100% accurate in fact.” This echoes the Board’s reasoning that the

±1 mph margin of error noted in the deployment log “refers to the testing of the radar

unit not the speed captured on the violation.” There are three problems with this

position: (1) that is not a viable reading of the regulation; 4 (2) it would lead to clear

absurdities; and (3) the regulation would be invalid if read in that manner because it

would contravene the District’s statutorily prescribed burden of proof. We now

elaborate on each of these three points.

First, the plain text of this regulation is not susceptible to the District’s

reading. Section 1035.2 deems a camera that measures speeds within a ±1 mph

margin of error “to be calibrated correctly and in proper working order,” but it does

not deem the camera to be “perfectly accurate,” “precise,” or free from measurement

4

The parties have not briefed, and we do not decide, the extent to which we

should defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations. This court has

historically deferred to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of their own regulations.

See, e.g., McDonald v. D.C. Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 291 A.3d 1109, 1115 (D.C.

2023). But the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,

603 U.S. 369 (2024), in addition to upending traditional “Chevron deference,” casts

some doubt upon the propriety of so-called “Auer deference” pertaining to agency

interpretations of their own regulations. See Niblock v. Univ. of Ky, 165 F.4th 460,

471 (6th Cir. 2026) (Sutton, J., concurring) (positing that “we no longer lightly defer

to agency interpretations of their own regulations,” and arguing that without

Chevron deference, “Auer deference narrows considerably, if indeed it remains

meaningful at all”). We do not address that question because, even assuming Auer

deference applies here, the DMV and District’s interpretation of the pertinent

regulation is an unreasonable one that we would not defer to in any event.

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errors, as the District would have it. There is a plain difference between saying a

device is in “proper working order”—meaning it functions within acceptable

tolerances and is suitable for its intended use—and saying that it measures with zero

error. To illustrate the point, most of us would consider a bathroom scale to be in

proper working order if it measures weight to within ±1 pound. But if anything

hinged on a greater degree of precision—say you’re a boxer near the limit of your

weight class and coming up on the official weigh-in—you would not treat the scale

as being perfectly accurate down to the ounce or the gram. That is, while the scale

is perfectly suitable for your intended use of weighing yourself, you would keep the

scale’s margin of error in mind when assessing its readings near the thresholds, not

ignore it. So the fact that this speeding camera was in “proper working order” under

the regulation did not permit, much less require, the relevant factfinders to close their

eyes to its acknowledged margin of error. 5

Second, the District’s contrary reading of this regulation would produce

absurd results, further counseling against its interpretation. See In re Bright Ideas

5

Notably, the factfinder here—the hearing examiner—endorsed Ricciardi’s

understanding that the speeding camera’s margin of error was ±1 mph. The hearing

examiner simply noted that there was a “real possibility that [Ricciardi’s] vehicle

was traveling at 62 mph” in light of that margin of error, while offering no

explanation for how the District carried its burden given that Ricciardi was just as

likely to have been traveling beneath the 61 mph threshold as above it.

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Co., 284 A.3d 1037, 1049-50 (D.C. 2022) (rejecting an interpretation of a motor

vehicle regulation because it led to “absurd results” and “obvious injustice”).

Suppose a speeding camera consistently measures speeds as 1 mph above the tuning

fork’s frequency during calibration. Under the District’s interpretation, the

technician could certify that reading as within the ±1 mph tolerance, and the camera

would pass calibration. Every subsequent measurement would then be treated as

legally perfect, even though the District’s own testing shows the device reads high.

If that’s right, then a vehicle traveling at precisely the speed limit—or even 0.9 mph

below it—could be ticketed for speeding based on that camera’s inflated readings,

and that ticket would have to be upheld. See 18 D.C.M.R. § 2600.1 (penalty table

providing $50 fine for speeding “[u]p to 10 mph in excess of limit”). That is not a

sensible reading of the regulation.

Third, even if we read this regulation as the District does, it would be invalid

and have no effect because it would contravene the statute requiring the District to

prove traffic offenses “by clear and convincing evidence.” D.C. Code

§ 50-2302.06(a); see also Tenants of 738 Longfellow St., N.W. v. D.C. Rental Hous.

Comm’n, 575 A.2d 1205, 1213 (D.C. 1990) (“[A] regulation which create[s] a rule

out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity.” (quoting District of Columbia v.

Jones, 287 A.2d 816, 818 (D.C. 1972))). The legislatively prescribed “clear and

convincing evidence” standard is an “intentionally elevated one,” Blackson v. United

19

States, 897 A.2d 187, 195 n.12 (D.C. 2006), meant to protect “particularly important

individual interests in various civil cases,” In re Nelson, 408 A.2d 1233, 1234 n.2

(D.C. 1979) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979)). The District

is not free to simply regulate around that statutory requirement and “deem” that some

modicum of evidence that is less than clear and convincing nonetheless satisfies that

standard. The District can no more pass a regulation that counterfactually deems its

speed measurement devices to be perfectly accurate than it could pass a regulation

deeming everybody on the District’s roadways to be guilty of whatever they happen

to be charged with.

Finally, while the District does not seem to defend the Superior Court’s

reasoning on reconsideration, for the sake of completeness we explain why we

disagree with it as well. In our view, the court had it right the first time when it

rejected the Board’s reasoning that the ±1 mph margin of error noted in the

deployment log “refers to the testing of the radar unit not the speed captured on the

violation.” That is not a defensible view, as the court initially explained, because

the District’s speeding cameras “are necessarily also subject to the same margin of

error” that applies to how they are calibrated. The court reversed course on

reconsideration, however, positing that the deployment log showed the speeding

camera “was precise in its speed measurement” since the 40 mph reading matched

the tuning fork’s 40 mph frequency. That is mistaken. The fact that this speeding

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camera returned a 40 mph measurement when measured against a tuning fork with

a 40 mph frequency is no indication that it did not have any margin of error, which,

as the District correctly acknowledges, all speeding cameras invariably have. The

speeding camera may yet have inflated speeds by +0.99 mph, or deflated them by

that same margin, consistent with the deployment log’s readings—the camera

reported its readings only in whole integers, with no decimals. So there is simply no

telling the exact margin of error from this record beyond that it is within ±1 mph

and, for that reason, the District did not satisfy its burden to prove this particular

speeding infraction by clear and convincing evidence.

D. The District’s Alternative Argument About Its Penalty Table Is Unavailing.

The District also offers a fallback position. It argues that, even accepting that

Ricciardi’s true speed was somewhere between 60 and 62 mph, the $100 penalty still

applies to any speed in excess of 10 mph over the posted speed limit. The argument

proceeds in four steps: (1) the District’s penalty table uses consecutive integers as

defining the pertinent ranges for assessing penalties—speeding “[u]p to 10 mph”

over the limit ($50); “11 to 15 mph” over ($100); “16 to 20 mph” over ($150), etc.;

(2) read “hyper-literally, the table seems to provide no penalty” in the gaps between

the bookending integers—e.g., speeding 10.5 mph over the limit is neither “up to

10 mph” over or between 11 to 15 mph over; (3) to avoid that absurdity, “the best

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interpretation” of the table is that anything above 10 mph over the speed limit—like

10.1 mph over—qualifies as “11 to 15 mph” over, just as anything above 15 mph

over the speed limit qualifies as “16 to 20 mph” over, and so forth; and (4) there is

clear and convincing evidence that Ricciardi was traveling more than 10 mph over

the speed limit, so that the $100 penalty applies. We disagree with the District at the

third, “best interpretation” step of its argument, for two reasons.

First, there is no practical absurdity in the penalty table when applied

according to its plain terms, because the District is always free to charge a less

serious offense than the harshest one applicable—a person who is traveling precisely

10.5 mph over the speed limit is also traveling 8, 9 and 10 mph over the speed limit

(though they are not traveling 11, 12, or 13 mph over). Put in a different context, if

you slept for exactly nine hours last night, you also slept for eight hours last night,

but not ten. That resolves any difficulty with applying the penalty table in practice.

Even if Ricciardi were traveling 20 mph over the speed limit, nothing precluded the

District or one of its officers from going easy on him and citing him for going 10 mph

over the limit, as he would unquestionably be guilty of that offense as well.

Second, while we agree that traveling 10.5 mph over the speed limit is not,

strictly speaking, speeding “up to 10 mph” over the limit in the table’s parlance, the

far better way to smooth over the gaps in the penalty table is to resolve them in

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Ricciardi’s favor—by reducing rather than inflating the applicable penalty. To read

the penalty table as the District prefers, where “11 mph” over includes anything

between “10.1 and 11 mph” over—or even to read it as applicable to anything

between 10.5 and 11 mph over, as the District alternatively argues under a

“rounding” theory—would raise serious Due Process concerns about fair notice that

we should endeavor to avoid. See F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S.

239, 253 (2012) (“[T]he Due Process Clause . . . requires the invalidation of laws

that are impermissibly vague” even in a civil enforcement context); Mashaud v.

Boone, 295 A.3d 1139, 1169-70 (D.C. 2023) (en banc) (discussing “constitutional

avoidance” canon of construction). And when faced with grievous ambiguity—like

how to fill the gaps in the table’s plain terms, if they need filling at all—the rule of

lenity applies when interpreting civil traffic regulations and dictates that we resolve

that ambiguity in favor of leniency. See Whitfield v. United States, 99 A.3d 650, 656

n.14 (D.C. 2014) (applying “the rule of lenity to civil traffic regulations”). That is,

the best way to resolve the seeming absurdity with a hyper-literal reading of the

penalty table is to recognize that a $50 penalty applies to anything up to 11 mph over

the limit (and thereover, if the District is feeling lenient).

For those reasons, we conclude that the District cannot prove a charge for

speeding “11 to 15 mph in excess” of the limit, 18 D.C.M.R. § 2600.1, unless it has

proven by clear and convincing evidence that the cited individual was, in fact,

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speeding 11 mph or more over the speed limit. And here, the evidence did not satisfy

that burden given that Ricciardi’s speed was measured at the very bottom of the

charged range (11 mph over), and the only evidence about the speeding camera’s

admitted margin of error is that it was within ±1 mph, rendering it just as likely that

Ricciardi was traveling below 61 mph as above it.

III. Conclusion

We thus reverse the Superior Court’s order upholding the Board’s decision.

Ricciardi asks that we dismiss his speeding ticket outright rather than remanding for

assessment of the lesser $50 penalty that he admits could have been properly

assessed against him. In support of that remedy, Ricciardi stresses that he “has

repeatedly acknowledged that the District’s evidence is sufficient to establish”

liability for that lesser $50 offense, but “the District chose to maintain the original

charge” of speeding 11 to 15 mph over the limit, without ever advancing the lesser

charge as an alternative. The District offers no counter to that and does not ask us

to remand the case for imposition of a $50 fine if we agree with Ricciardi on the

merits. So we remand the case with instructions to dismiss Ricciardi’s notice of

infraction.

So ordered.